Brent:
As you might imagine, I should resist joining this "debate," however
your latest response compels me to make a few suggestions:
1) The is no evidence that the brain "computes" anything. Computers
are something I know quite well (having designed many of them) and it
is simply *not* possible that the biological brain is structured in
that way. No eff'ing way.
2) By introducing the "dream test," you have shown this to be the
fact. Which is to say, there *must* be something different going on
than simple "direct perception." Indeed, I'd suggest that with all
this talk of stimulating sensory neurons, what is being described is
"sensation" and not "perception" at all. None of this even begins to
tackle the important issues with perception.
3) Your "religious experience" then becomes the topic of its own
"explanation gap." What *sensations* provoked that? Or, instead, was
there something different, something "perceptual" (i.e. well beyond
mere sensation), involved?
I have suggested that *grammar* trumps "dialectics" -- which, in this
case, points to "sensibilities" that go well beyond the "external
senses" (and their associated neural pathways.)
In this regard, I consider John's approach to correspond to the
psycho-technological environment of PRINT (which gave us "empirical
science"), while yours corresponds to the ELECTRIC (which gave us
"modern psychology" and, in particular, the *cognitive* approach
expressed by "representative qualia.")
I don't agree with either of these approaches, since my attack on this
problem begins with the attempt to understand the "faculties of the
soul" involved in all this. That is a SCRIBAL sensibility, retrieved
by our DIGITAL environment.
Once again, how does Canonizer deal with this situation? If those
whose "consensus" is established all more-or-less share the same
"sensibility," then what does this prove other than to work out the
details of that *environmental* causality -- while pushing this
"formative" fact into the background.
Gregg's reply to John (on his own ToK list, where John has long been
at odds with Gregg, not on IDW) was to simply say "let's agree to
disagree." That deliberately avoids the issue and brushes aside what,
it seems to me is most interesting about all this. In Gestalt terms,
it is just more "figures" doing everything possible to avoid the
"ground."
Yes, I suspect that it would be satisfying for either John or you to
"win" the argument. But, as you both know, that is not going to
happen. Your sensibilities are at odds and neither of you will change
those. Even if you could fully understand those sensibilities --
which, per Aristotle, means understanding their causes -- the gap
between you would remain. Indeed, it would probably widen.
Once you admit that this is a matter of conflicting *grammars* --
unresolvable via "dialectics" -- then the door is open to considering
other grammars. Like mine, for instance. Or a Chinese approach,
let's say based on the Yi Jing.
Thanks for conducting this exchange. I, for one, have found it very
illustrative . . . !!
Mark
P.S. In my approach, "consciousness" isn't even an interesting topic,
since it isn't a "power" of the soul. Will, yes. Emotion, yes,
Intellect, yes. Cogitative Reason, yes. All worthy of discussion.
But what is "consciousness" other than an artifact of a sensibility
that denies the *soul* to begin with? Debates are framed on premises
and if that foundation is missing, then the "dialectics" falls apart.
Precisely as it is before our eyes (which is a metaphor for something
far more interesting than the sensation of "vision.")
Quoting Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]>:
> Hi John,
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> [I am not doubting the existence of Qualia, but you must break them down in
> a way that lends itself to controlled experimentation or it will remain
> philosophy, not science.]
>
>
> That, I can do. You are right. Since Lewis first used the term Qualia, in
> 1929, it has remained a philosophy. Daniel Dennett defines “qualia” to be
> “ineffable”, and everyone thinks they are, ineffable, and nobody has
> figured out how to test for qualia, or even how to define qualia. Nobody
> has figured out how to bridge the “explanatory gap
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Explanatory-5Fgap&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=byme7zQIis69f8h83e9EORxNg71yaEpz0UsgyLrYSNU&s=uTzdE6NtLgPwpdfKOYH4Qt-eFFQdYXAqnr_xxS0mMsg&e=>” and until we do
> that,
> qualia will remain a philosophy. Because of this, Dennett says we should
> "quine qualia" or ignore qualia. ;) Not very scientific.
>
>
> This theory finally defines qualia, at least hypothetically, in a way,
> which can be falsified or scientifically tested and verified. If
> experimentalists can experimentally verify the predictions being made by
> this theory, we will then be able to bridge the explanatory gap and eff the
> ineffable.
>
>
> So, next step, tell me if you agree that the following statement is
> necessarily true:
>
>
>
> If you know something, there must be something physical that *IS* that
> knowledge.
>
>
>
> If you agree with that, this necessitates that understanding of perception
> model the following two very different important physical qualities
>
>
>
> 1. The physical properties that are the target of our observation. These
> properties initiate the perception process, such as a strawberry reflecting
> red light.
>
>
>
> 2. The physical properties within the brain that are the final results of
> the perception process. These properties comprise our conscious knowledge
> of a red strawberry. We experience this *directly*, as *redness*.
>
>
>
> We are born to think the 3D knowledge we have, is the actual strawberry,
> but as we’ve pointed out, it can’t be. You can remove everything causally
> upstream from #2, in the perception process, including the eye, the light,
> and the strawberry. When we dream of strawberries, our brain can build
> physical phenomenal knowledge of strawberries, even though we are in a dark
> room, asleep, with our eyes closed.
>
>
>
> For each pixel (or 3D voxel) covering the surface of the strawberry we see
> or dream about, there is something physical in our brain, that is the
> knowledge of that voxel, which has an elemental physical redness quality we
> experience directly. For each point on the surface of the leaves, there is
> also something physical that is that knowledge of that voxel, which has a
> greenness quality. Otherwise, as we said is necessary above, you wouldn’t
> have knowledge of that particular voxel element, on the surface of the
> strawberry. Our brain computationally binds these elemental blocks of
> colored physical qualities, in the shape of a strawberry, into our
> composite qualitative experience of seeing and being aware of the
> strawberry, along with all our additional physical knowledge of what that
> 3D shape of colored blocks is, what is required to eat it, and so on.
>
>
>
> So, are we good with that? This is what is being portrayed in the Image,
> at the top of the "Representational qualia theory
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=byme7zQIis69f8h83e9EORxNg71yaEpz0UsgyLrYSNU&s=7zAdI06F1yqKdLuHpJnAgO8VwMM-s4qcN80S7w6fbyU&e=>" statement.
> If
> so, we can progress further, experimentally. Many people, when they first
> realize the fact of this representational model of perception, they
> describe it as a profound religious experience. This is how it was, with
> me. Life changing, and you can never go back.
>
>
>
> Brent
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