Gregg,

In your last post you attached some of your slides from our 2017 Division 24 Midwinter Meeting seminar (on metatheortical visions for psychology), the first of which included the phrase "My View from Humanity." I would like take this opportunity to clarify that when I coined the term "View from Humanity," I intended it to refer to a set of pre-empirical core concepts that are universal. That is, the assumptions of the "View from Humanity" are those that are undeniable by any human being (either verbally or implicitly endorsed in action). Therefore, the phrase "My View from Humanity" is misleading, at least if you want to be consistent with the usage the term was created to convey.

I have refrained from joining these TOK discussions because I am working on a revised version of my "View from Humanity" manuscript to resubmit to the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. But since I am piping up now, I will add a few comments that have come to mind in response to what has been recently posted.

I think that Nancy asks the right question: "What are psychological theories intended to do?" Many theorists, including Blaine, view psychology (and all of science) as a practice embedded in a social and historical context. Every practice is grounded on epistemological and moral assumptions (that have become the grounding because they have been successfully justified). That is, a practice is intended to accomplish a purpose assumed to be morally worthwhile via procedures that are assumed to be based on reliable knowledge. Prediction and control, as Nancy pointed out, have been the traditional purposes of the physical and biological sciences, but may be "chilling" or inhumane goals for psychological science. I suggest that prediction and control are appropriate purposes for psychology only in limited circumstances (e.g., to predict crime or to control maladaptive behaviors given the consent of the client). Most of us don't ever want to be predicted or controlled, and instead want psychology to provide us with insights and possibilities that we can agentically employ to further our own lives through our self-interpretations. Thus, depending on what one's theory (academic or folk) is being used for, it may or may not be useful/valid/appropriate for reasons to be treated as causes. For Officers A and B in your example (and for most other everyday situations) treating reasons as causes works. In scientific analysis, however, as Blaine commented, causal language is not "anywhere near sufficient to describe the human world."

So I agree with you that the metaphysics (what I would call the epistemological and moral assumptions) that precede any psychological theory should be made explicit. I wonder if John would agree with your analysis of his metaphysics as positivist and reductionist. 

Best,
Gary

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