Brent:

Thanks for responding and no need to apologize, there are few who have  
a good "historical" understanding of all this.  People incorrectly  
presume that these topics are "perennial" (i.e. outside of history),  
when in fact they aren't.

For instance, Gregg has lectured on the history of psychology but he  
begins that "history" in the 19th-century (i.e. the ELECTRIC  
environment), when the topic actually began with Aristotle, 2400+  
years earlier (in the SCRIBAL environment.)  What Gregg recounts is  
only the recent "paradigm's" approach to the topic.

Gregg's "property quadism" is his term for the four-fold division of  
his ToK system: Matter, Life, Mind, Culture.  His philosophy is  
founded on what he calls "dimensions of complexity," an adaption of  
the wider interest in complexity that is distinctly late-20th century  
in its origin.  It would never have been possible, or even have made  
sense, in earlier times.

As you might know, these debates about "qualia" and the wider  
"philosophy of mind" and, in particular, the whole interest in  
"consciousness," is also a late-20th century phenomenon.  It arises  
out of a "cognitive" psychology that deliberately ignores what isn't  
"conscious" (i.e. rejecting the early-20th century fascination with  
the "unconscious"), which, in turn, was an ELECTRIC attempt to obscure  
the earlier SCRIBAL understanding of the *inner* senses.  And so on.

Being aware that the *ground* of the debate -- on any topic -- is  
time-bound (synchronic), not time-less (diachronic), and, indeed, the  
motivation of most debates is actually a fight over who is most  
"up-to-date" is crucial.  The notion that the "latest is the greatest"  
is understandable but deeply flawed.  Stupid, in fact.

History isn't a featureless flow of lives, ideas and events.  It has a  
structure and that structure is given to us by our communications  
technologies -- which provide the "grammar" to our speculations.  In  
1956, reporting on their "Explorations" project at UofT, Marshall  
McLuhan and his partner Ted Carpenter, wrote a paper titled "The New  
Languages" (attached) in which they argued that new technologies are  
new languages, each with their own grammars.  They were correct.

This was contrasted by the contemporaneous appointment of Noam Chomsky  
to a tenured position at MIT -- where his "assignment" was to produce  
a "Universal Grammar" that would describe all possible languages.  He  
failed and, as a result, we are now treated to his "anarchism" in his  
role as the "most popular" left-wing lecturer.  The idealistic  
"universalism" is the same (as is the failure to understand what is  
actually going on.)

The quest for a definitive characterization of "consciousness" --  
including John's attempts to expand the notion to all of biology and  
beyond -- is a very recent phenomenon, with very recent motivations  
that have their roots in the attempt to "program" humanity.  For its  
own good, of course.  Until the 1950s, no one would have been silly  
enough to model humans on computers or to invest so much  
time-and-effort in trying to figure out their "operating system."   
This hunt for an API to humanity was a reaction to the earlier-20th  
century conflagrations and an attempt to engineer "world peace" that  
resulted.  "Ban the bomb" and all that.

Gregg has apparently aligned his clinical practices with something  
called "One Divide," in an attempt to help his clinical clients  
"adapt" to a sometimes terrifying world.  This technique attempts to  
educate in "Emotional Warfare," with the goal of using this  
understanding to move towards "emotional peace."  It is akin to Rene  
Girard's claim that if we only understand "mimetics," then we won't  
blow each other up.  Or, as Yoko Ono put it, "Give peas a chance."

The technologies that structure our psychologies are very powerful and  
the social pressures to be "with it" in terms of conforming to the  
now-dominant environment and its "grammar" are stronger than most can  
withstand.  We are all *formed* in this crucible and looking elsewhere  
is powerfully resisted to the point of becoming "taboo."  The tribe  
has spoken.  You're off the island.

Until it isn't.

Under certain circumstances, we shift from one environment to another.  
  When the communications technologies change -- bringing with them a  
new *grammar*, since they are new "languages" -- then we are tossed  
overboard into the roiling ocean and must struggle for a something to  
grab ahold of so that we won't sink and drown.  That is what is  
happening to us right now.

As a result, "consciousness" -- which is to say the quest to "program"  
behaviors in order to avoid global destruction (as John is explicit as  
his goal, for instance) -- is no longer very interesting.  In the  
*new* paradigm, other concerns take over.  The robots make sure that  
we stop being idiots who model humans on computers.  "Cognitive" (and  
all of its offshoots) fades away.  In its place we begin to remember  
what we have forgotten and the *inner* senses that were discarded once  
again become the key topic.

We are now in the midst of a full-blown SCRIBAL *renascence* -- which  
I spell that way to distinguish it from the "renaissance" that took us  
from SCRIBAL to PRINT, ushering in the "modern" world.  Bruno Latour  
famously suggested "we have never been modern."  I'm suggested that we  
were once modern but we aren't doing that any more.

Welcome to the future (which is already DIGITAL): now get out (of the  
past which was once ELECTRIC) . . . <g>

Mark

Quoting Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]>:

> Hi Mark,
>
> I must apologize, I'm not at all a good historian on this topic.  It sounds
> like you already know more than I know about what Aristotle, Descartes,
> Locke... said.
>
> You said:
>
> 1) All this is a fine expression of the "sensibility" topic I have
> introduced.  Rather than being a conflict to be resolved via
> "argument," what we have are different *structural* approaches to the
> world.  No amount of argument will resolve that.
>
> This sounds to me like modeling the world in different ways?  It sounds
> like how Gregg's "Property quadism" is 4 different ways to model particular
> properties of reality?  I think there could be much utility in these types
> of different models of reality.  Some people probably gravitate to
> particular models, and may want to argue with everyone that their way is
> best.  But that is why we created the camp system, so we could get a better
> handle on all the different ideas, without so much arguing?
>
> Does that make sense?  Am I even understanding what you are saying?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 6:44 AM Mark Stahlman <[log in to unmask]>
> wrote:
>
>> Brett:
>>
>> Thanks -- all quite interesting.  Your "Representational Qualia
>> Theory" link, led me to the empty "Veil of Perception" link, which led
>> me to the "Direct and Indirect Realism" Wiki page, which begins with
>> this (under "History") --
>>
>> "Aristotle was the first to provide a description of direct realism.
>> In 'On the Soul' he describes how a see-er is informed of the *object
>> itself* by way of the *hylomorphic form* carried over the intervening
>> material continuum with which the eye is impressed."
>>
>> Okay.  This then leads to a footnote that says this --
>>
>> "The distinction between direct and indirect realism about perception
>> has an interesting history.  There was a time when perception was
>> understood to be about the things themselves, not of our ideas of
>> things.  This is what we find in Aristotle and Aquinas, who maintain
>> that the mind or understanding grasps the form of the material object
>> without the matter.  What we perceive directly, on this view, are
>> material objects.  This changed in the seventeenth century with
>> Descartes and Locke, who can be read as saying that primary objects of
>> perception are not things external to the mind but sense-data . . . "
>>
>> Fascinating.  Last summer, my Center conducted a 13-week seminar on
>> "On the Soul" and it seems that what is being said here confuses many
>> of the matters involved.  My guess is that those quoted don't really
>> understand Aristotle's "grammar" very well. I was wondering, since
>> you've spent the last 10 years working on this, if anyone has tried to
>> sort this out at that level?
>>
>> In particular --
>>
>> 1) What is Aristotle's "hylomorphic form"?  Does anyone try to
>> describe that in "metaphysical" detail?
>>
>> 2) If it is true, according to Aristotle, that this *form* is what is
>> perceived, then how does this become "direct," when it is the "form"
>> and not the "matter" that is perceived?  No, they are not the same.
>> One is "hylo" and the other is "morph."
>>
>> 3) Don't "Descartes and Locke," in this reading, actually just
>> substitute "sense-data" (i.e. today's "qualia") for those "hylomorphic
>> forms"?  What did they have against Aristotle?  Did they know what
>> they were doing and why did they do that?
>>
>> Furthermore --
>>
>> 1) All this is a fine expression of the "sensibility" topic I have
>> introduced.  Rather than being a conflict to be resolved via
>> "argument," what we have are different *structural* approaches to the
>> world.  No amount of argument will resolve that.
>>
>> 2) We deal with this shift in sensibility all the time.  In
>> "structural" terms, Aristotle/Aquinas are what we call SCRIBAL.
>> Descartes and Locke are what we call PRINT.  And the "modern
>> philosophers" looking at all this are what we call ELECTRIC.
>> Different structures: different sensibilities.
>>
>> 3) Let's put this in terms of this list.  For the purpose of
>> illustrating the point, let's say that John Torday is PRINT, Gregg
>> Henriques is ELECTRIC and that I am DIGITAL -- in terms of our
>> structural "sensibilities."  Can we ever "agree"?
>>
>> 4) Can the Canonizer sort all this out?  Can it uncover the
>> *structure* of the presumptions that various people are bringing to
>> the discussion or does it presume that a) there are no differences or
>> b) these differences don't matter?
>>
>> As you might know, the "classical trivium" (which, later morphed into
>> the "Three R's) is the basis of education in the West.  It consists of
>> Rhetoric, Grammar and Dialectics.  Each of these plays a different
>> role, but let's briefly explore the topics of Grammar and Dialectics.
>>
>> "Grammar" is that *structure* which we presume to describe the world.
>> Over time, it doesn't stay the same, so, as a result, as we shift from
>> one structural understanding to another -- from one grammar to another
>> -- and, accordingly, our "sensibilities" shift as well.
>>
>> Many have suggested that this is the origin of the "premises" on which
>> we will later construct "dialectical" arguments -- making Grammar the
>> foundation of Dialectics, in terms of the Trivium.  Yes, Marshall
>> McLuhan wrote his 1943 Cambridge PhD on all this.
>>
>> Could it be that the difficulties you note -- including the "qualia"
>> shouting-matches &c -- are actually differences in *grammar* which
>> cannot be resolved by "dialectics"?  So where does the Canonized fit in?
>>
>> Mark

############################

To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list:
write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]
or click the following link:
http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1