Dear Colleagues,

 

 

In Political Liberalism, Rawls distinguishes between reason and rationality.
In a footnote he says the distinction goes back to Kant's distinction
between categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives (pp.48-49, fn
1). Rawls characterizes reason as the defining trait of equals who are
willing to abide by principles they expect others to abide by.  The
unreasonable are those who, though desirous of cooperative schemes, are not
willing to honour such principles and are willing to break them to suit
their interests (pp.48-50). 

 

This definition or account of reason does not extend to the relations of
un-equals. As an account of reason it hence seems incomplete, unless that is
the intention. Given that Rawls identifies reason with Kant's categorical
imperatives, it appears that he does not regard reason as something that
mutually relates un-equals. If reason is a condition of justice, Rawls'
account of reason implies that there can be no justice amongst un-equals.  

 

I'd be grateful for references to critical discussions of Rawls' account of
reason-from feminist perspectives or others. 

 

Thank you!

 

Shyam 

 

Shyam Ranganathan

Department of Philosophy, 

York University Toronto