Dear Colleagues,

In Political Liberalism, Rawls distinguishes between reason and rationality. In a footnote he says the distinction goes back to Kant's distinction between categorical imperatives and hypothetical imperatives (pp.48-49, fn 1). Rawls characterizes reason as the defining trait of equals who are willing to abide by principles they expect others to abide by.  The unreasonable are those who, though desirous of cooperative schemes, are not willing to honour such principles and are willing to break them to suit their interests (pp.48-50).

This definition or account of reason does not extend to the relations of un-equals. As an account of reason it hence seems incomplete, unless that is the intention. Given that Rawls identifies reason with Kant's categorical imperatives, it appears that he does not regard reason as something that mutually relates un-equals. If reason is a condition of justice, Rawls’ account of reason implies that there can be no justice amongst un-equals. 

I'd be grateful for references to critical discussions of Rawls' account of reason—from feminist perspectives or others.

Thank you!

Shyam

Shyam Ranganathan

Department of Philosophy,

York University Toronto