*Call for Abstracts: Two-Day Workshop on*
VIRTUE AND MORAL REASONING UNDER
OPPRESSIVE SOCIAL CONDITIONS
Concordia University in Montreal, February 10-11, 2018

KEYNOTES BY: Charlotte Witt (U New Hampshire), Erik Wiland (U Missouri, 
St. Louis), Elijah Milgram (U Utah), and Macalester Bell (Bryn Mawr 
College).
TOPIC
How should we think about virtue and practical rationality under 
oppressive conditions? Practical rationality and virtues are often 
understood in terms of ideals, such as: fully flourishing agents, ideal 
observers, or reasoners who are not subject to influences of 
sensibility. It is unclear, however, whether such ideals are helpful for 
us, non-ideal agents when facing real-life decisions in a non-ideal world.
One well-known problem for virtue theories here is that a less than 
fully virtuous agent shouldn't always do what a fully virtuous agent 
would do in her situation. Must we perhaps turn to conceptions such as 
care, social practices, spheres of virtues, bounded rationality, moral 
advice or the like to determine the role of virtues and rationality 
under non-ideal social and political conditions?
Traditionally, virtues are seen as closely related to practical 
rationality (see Aristotle, Kant, Foot). Some have claimed, however, 
that certain character traits—for instance an unwillingness to 
compromise—count as virtues in the context of systemic injustice but not 
in other contexts. If what counts as a virtue depends on the political 
circumstances, then what counts as practically rational will probably 
depend on the same factors. But shouldn't rationality be the same for 
everyone? Can rationality require us to do what is less than fully 
rational if what would be fully rational is beyond reach?
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS include, but are not limited to: How can ideals of 
complete virtue or rationality be relevant for non-ideal agents in 
non-ideal social circumstances? What does it mean for oppressed people 
to be virtuous and rational? How do social structures make it difficult 
to become virtuous or rational? Are virtues or rationality relative to 
social and political contexts? What resources does virtue ethics offer 
to theorize non-ideal political conditions? Are some virtues essentially 
geared towards non-ideal social relations? What role should moral 
advice, testimony and consciousness-raising play in situations of 
oppression? How should we reason together about policies when our 
practical rationality is impaired?
SUBMISSION RULES
We welcome submissions from a wide range of philosophical perspectives. 
Women and members of underrepresented groups are particularly encouraged 
to apply.
Please submit an anonymized abstract (500-1000 words; pdf, doc, or docx) 
through EasyChair at: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__easychair.org_conferences_-3Fconf-3Dvprm2017&d=DwIDaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HUp8-bkYMlNgd3ZJBxWBKsBsFAFGHrEZg21p9gxugJA&m=0Er7qCC6mJyuQHWFWhZo-Owt6D6Fpk3Q3vNgaUtsk40&s=x8eGdA3jl2x2LOCMucDTHxEaTLCy3NTr8pvZVbTssoc&e= . 
Selection will be via blind review.
DEADLINE: *September 30, 2017*.
NOTIFICATION BY: October 30, 2017.
QUESTIONS?
A website for the workshop will be available soon at: 
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__sites.google.com_site_vprm2017_&d=DwIDaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HUp8-bkYMlNgd3ZJBxWBKsBsFAFGHrEZg21p9gxugJA&m=0Er7qCC6mJyuQHWFWhZo-Owt6D6Fpk3Q3vNgaUtsk40&s=HUfhhdwivRn6HBRkVB2DlhgmKzQ_Wwj5vyPJnU7dQwk&e= . For other questions, please 
email one of the organizers: Ulf Hlobil ([log in to unmask]) or 
Katharina Nieswandt ([log in to unmask]).

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