****FINAL CALL FOR PAPERS****

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Special Issue:
‘Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory’                                                                             
                       
Guest Editors: Paul Giladi (University College Dublin), Nicola McMillan
(Lancaster University), and Alison Stone (Lancaster University).
 
José Medina, Danielle Petherbridge, Matt Congdon, Rebecca Tsosie, and Miranda
Fricker (afterword) are confirmed contributors.
 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly seeks submissions for a special issue on
Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory. An important development in
contemporary Anglo-American feminist epistemology has been the concept of
epistemic injustice, which, as articulated for example by Miranda Fricker, has
emerged out of and re-invigorated a rich line of work in feminist epistemology
on epistemic exclusion, silencing, subordination, and motivated ignorance,
including work by Linda Alcoff, Kristie Dotson, José Medina, and Charles
Mills. Another important development in moral and political philosophy,
especially in the Continental tradition, has been the philosophy of
recognition. Recognition theory has roots in the work of Beauvoir and Fanon,
although its most influential recent articulation has been by Axel Honneth,
with debates about recognition and inclusion taken forward in feminist contexts
by Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser amongst others.
 
While there are many virtues to the literature on epistemic injustice,
epistemic exclusion, and silencing, current analysis and critique of these
forms of injustice can potentially be improved and enriched by bringing
recognition theory into the conversation. Recognition theory on the one hand,
and contemporary epistemological work informed by feminism and critical race
theory on the other, have developed largely separately from one another. Yet
these fields of discussion have considerable bearing on one another. From a
recognition theory perspective, the failure properly to recognise and afford
somebody or a social group the epistemic respect they merit might be conceived
as an act of recognition injustice. Perhaps part of the harm of epistemic
injustice, exclusion, and silencing, then, is that of robbing a group or
individual of their status as rational enquirer in a conversation, and so
creating an asymmetrical cognitive environment.
The aim of this special issue is to open a dialogue between discussions of
epistemic injustice and in recognition theory.
 
We invite contributing authors to consider how far these developments can and
should inform and enrich one another. Questions that might be considered
include the following, indicatively. Do relations of misrecognition underpin
processes of epistemic exclusion and silencing, or do the latter instead
underpin the former; or are the two mutually supporting? How well can different
types of epistemic injustice—e.g., testimonial and hermeneutical—be
understood as types of recognition injustice? What light can analyses of
epistemic and recognition injustice shed on one another? What limitations do we
discover in either or both types of analysis when we put them into
conversation? What new questions and problems open up as a result of bringing
these two fields of debate into conversation?
 
We are looking for papers that explore advantages of and/or difficulties with
bringing thought on epistemic injustice and recognition together. We expect
contributors to engage with existing feminist work in both strands of thought,
including work by feminist philosophers of colour and critical race theorists.
 
Papers should be 9000 words maximum, exclusive of references, prepared for
anonymous review with a separate cover page, and accompanied by an abstract of
no more than 200 words.
 
The submission deadline is 31 December 2017.
 
Please feel free to contact a couple of the guest editors in advance of
submission: [log in to unmask]; [log in to unmask].
 
Final submissions should be made electronically to the address
[log in to unmask].