Gregg: A few additional thoughts regarding contextualism:

   -  Root metaphors are not parochial metaphors, intended as models of
   specific phenomena. Rather, they inspire a unique vision of the
world, *conceived
   as a totality*.
   - A *discrete mechanist *views the universe as a machine (a "watch" of
      sorts).   However, entities described in mechanistic theories need not be
      likened to machines (even as they are viewed as *parts* of some
      cosmic machine).
      - Similarly, contextualism inspires a holistic vision of the world as
      a cosmic "historical event".  But the phenomena modeled by scientists
      (e.g., electrons) need not echo this root metaphor in any
obvious way (even
      as they are recognized as "strands" -- or "context" -- in some cosmic
      happening).
   - I think it is easier to appreciate differences among world hypotheses
   by comparing their theories of truth (rather than simply comparing root
   metaphors)
      - Formism: Correspondence Theory of Truth (see Episode 3)
      - Mechanism:  Causal-Adjustment Theory of Truth (see Episode 3) --
      But I'm going to call this "attunement" theory, and I might suggest that
      the following statement (from one of your UTUA documents) echoes this
      theory:  "I envisioned a special case where 'measurement'
behavior would be
      identical to kinetic behavior"
      - Contextualism: Truth as "successful functioning" or "verified
      hypotheses" (see Episode 4) -- A highly pragmatic theory (that need not
      preclude the modeling of electrons!).
      - Organicism: Truth as coherence (coming soon)

Chance:  I'm intrigued by your account of mysticism -- and the Star Wars
connection!  I similarly found myself vibrating in reaction to Pepper's
account of the *animistic *world hypotheses (as there are echoes of animism
in my thinking).   I don't think Pepper is challenging regional claims
advanced by animists and mystics.  Rather, he is questioning whether they
have sufficient scope and specificity to account for our world as we
experience it *in toto*.   Imagine it is 400 BC [the time of Plato] and a
ship full of mystics heads off to *Isolated Island #1,* a ship full of
formists heads off to *Isolated Island #2*, a and a ship full of mechanists
heads off to *Isolated Island #3.*  Each group starts a new civilization on
their respective islands that lasts many thousands of years.  We decide to
check in on them once each century.  How will history unfold differently on
these three islands?  I suspect that Pepper would anticipate that we'd be
much less likely to witness the full flowering of science on Island #1.
But what if one of these islands could sponsor (in the spirit of
eclecticism) a "joint conference"?   Perhaps they would finally
appreciate how to make effective use of biofeedback machines.

Jason:

   - You write: "*Any thoughts on the tension between mechanism and
   contextualism? I would assume that there would be even greater tension
   there, since mechanism is analytic and integrative, while contextualism is
   synthetic and dispersive. (At least formism and contextualism are both
   dispersive*.)"
   - I think you are correct here.  The main reason why I focus on the
      tension between formism and contextualism is the simple fact that I find
      this tension to be especially pronounced in the field of
psychology (or at
      least social-personality psychology).  There may also be
personal reasons
      for this focus. As a recovering formist, I *feel* the tension between
      formism and contextualism.  I merely *appreciate* the tension between
      mechanism and contextualism.  I have a visceral reaction when I
read trait
      psychology texts [and the *animist* in me experiences these texts as
      "The Medusa"!]   However, when I read the connectionism literature in
      cognitive psychology [a nice example of mechanism], I'm merely
intrigued.
   -  You write: "So would a contextualist posit something analogous to a
   Kantian-style "Copernican Revolution" where it is the world that must
   conform to our theories?"
   - I think this is good way to put the matter.   It clarifies that the
      contextualist is trying to steer clear of a correspondence
theory of truth,
      even while acknowledging the value of model building.
      - But the contextualist need not presume that the world is nothing
      more than a social construction.  Rather, to borrow the language
of William
      James, the world "*is still in the making, *and awaits part of its
      complexion from the future." [*Pragmatism*]

  ~ Steve Q.

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