This has been a fascinating discussion. I found myself recalling Donald Hoffman’s TED talk entitled “Do we see reality as it is?” while reading this. He does work in computer simulations using natural selection algorithms to better understand this process and is particularly interested in “a mathematical model of consciousness.” Here is a more in-depth article about his positions: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.theatlantic.com_science_archive_2016_04_the-2Dillusion-2Dof-2Dreality_479559_&d=DwIGaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rnb8-r0GMZiKVJVPv4DGLSCcO9TK-NnFDdaxc9p-yKY&s=VoxNLmYZr2VsD4zFeCTlupL_FUPdorxuqyAMheYzhPM&e= I haven’t yet taken the time to make direct correlations between his work and that of Pepper, but my mental algorithms, or world hypothesis, suggest to me that there are correlations here.
I love sci-fi and futurism, and an interesting thought experiment to me is pondering how a consciousness that sees reality as it actually is, and not how it is selected to do so through environmental pressures, would vary from our experience of the same. Hoffman has also wondered about this, and has speculated that perhaps logic and reasoning are selected for traits through evolutionary processes.
Thanks,
Jason
From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Steven Quackenbush
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 6:14 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
A few quick comments before I begin the process of crafting the next formal outline (scheduled for Sunday).
* Waldemar asks whether it is appropriate to consider an individual's worldview as an example of a world hypothesis.
* This seems reasonable to me, and I've always loosely equated an individual's worldview with a "world hypothesis" (of some sort). Of course, the conventional language user (adopting what Gregg calls Level 1 Justifications) might not formally embrace any of the world hypotheses discussed by Pepper. If we ask a random person to describe their worldview, the answer may come across as an incoherent mess (including random elements of formism, mysticism, organicism, etc.). Still, even a pastiche can be understood as a "world hypothesis" of sorts.
* That said, I'm intrigued by Jason's suggestion (grounded in Jungian theory) that some of us are satisfied with "local hypotheses". Even if I will never be satisfied until my philosophy is corroborated by the entire world, that doesn't mean that the rest of humanity must submit to my need to achieve unlimited scope.
* My personal bias is that we all have "world hypotheses" that are (implicitly) unlimited in scope (even if we say we are only concerned with local hypotheses). But I'm not sure Pepper would agree with me here. We will return to this issue in due course.
* Ken observes that the ghost example I gave in my previous post "sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and validity." He asks: "Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?"
* I agree that Pepper's understanding of multiplicative and structural corroboration resembles the distinction typically made between reliability (especially consensus) and validity.
* Two quick notes (inspired by Ken's comments, though not really answers to his question).
* The validation process is itself closely tied to an individual's world hypothesis.
* In the ghost example, it is possible to imagine a metaphysical framework [some sort of "supernaturalism"] that would validate the reliable report of the witnesses (even if this framework has problems of its own and does not thereby achieve universal acclaim).
* The close link between metaphysical frameworks and the validation process is more obvious when we consider the countless hypothetical constructs that find their way into psychology textbooks. What does it mean, for example, to develop a valid measure of "self-esteem"? The concept itself is grounded in a theoretical framework (that may or may not be formally articulated). Moreover, it is not obvious what "facts" would corroborate: (a) the relevant validity claims and (b) the theoretical framework within which such claims are made.
* In Pepper's thought, there seems to be blurring a reliability and validity (though I may modify this claim when we reach the end of the book).
* In the course of his conversation regarding the tensions between data and danda (where he presented the ghost scenario), Pepper admits that "a highly refined datum would probably never have to give way to a highly refined dandum." In other words, the objectivity of the data would be sufficient to withstand the "winds of theory" [my phrase]. But this is "only because the datum has been thinned to such a degree that it does not commit itself to very much" [p. 50]
* A few pages later, Pepper observes that "the inherent lack of significance in data alone is what we meant earlier by the thinness of refined data, a thinness which finally causes a return to common sense for a security and healthiness of fact that threatens to disappear when data try to carry cognition alone" (pp. 63-64, emphasis added)
* So, even as we are assessing what we all see (consensus) we are also deciding what we should be looking at (which is necessarily a reflection of our theoretical framework and thus implicitly a "validity" concern). In other words, we don't want to waste our time developing reliable measures of trivia. Rather, we seek out truths that are "reliably meaningful", or "meaningfully reliable", even if this means that we have to sacrifice some degree of refinement (purity).
Again, all this is based on my reading of Chapters 1-4. When we reach the end of the book, I will try to provide more satisfactory answers to everyone's questions. Here's the list of questions that I've compiled so far:
* "Is there a term when multiplicative corroboration (data) and structural corroboration (danda) are in agreement? Would that be considered 'idealdata'? Or is a prerequisite, if you will, of danda that it first be data?" [Ali]
* "The ghost example you give sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and validity. Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?" [Ken]
* "Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of a world hypothesis?" [Waldemar]
Until next time,
~ Steve Q.
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 2:40 PM, [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
Steve:
A question about world hypotheses and the concept of worldview.
Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of a world hypothesis?
Best regards,
Waldemar
Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044<tel:(503)%20631-8044>
Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)
On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:57 PM, Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
Hello ToK community,
Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread. The focus of this post is World Hypotheses, Chapters 1-4. My reflections today are largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory.
Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place where most of us began our intellectual journey: common sense. For Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39).
Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude” described by phenomenologists. For Pepper, the world of common sense can be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” – i.e., we can always fall back on it:
* “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we completely give up trying to know anything, then is precisely when we know things in the common-sense way. In that lies the security of common sense” (p. 43).
But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively irritable”:
* “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging, contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized, rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt, playfully enjoyed, and so forth. One may accept common sense and thoughtlessly roam in its pasture, but if one looks up and tries to take it in, it is like a fantastic dream. To the serious cognizer it is like a bad dream. For the serious cognizer feels responsible to fact and principle, and common sense is utterly irresponsible” (p. 43)
* Common sense is “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, irritable” (p. 44).
Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected to criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes “refined knowledge” or “critical cognition” (p. 47). How do we achieve this transformation?
* For Pepper, “all critical evidence becomes critical only as a result of the addition of corroborative evidence. The work of legitimate criticism in cognition, then, is corroboration” (p. 47, emphasis added)
Corroboration can take one of two forms:
* 1) Multiplicative corroboration (data): i.e., The agreement of “man with man.” (p. 47).
* An obvious example of this is the notion of interjudge (or interrater) reliability, as understood by psychometricians
* But, as discussed below, the notion of multiplicative corroboration has an important role to play in any scientific enterprise.
* 2) Structural corroboration (danda): i.e., The agreement of “fact with fact” (p. 47)
* An obvious example of this is the “principle of converging evidence” in science.
* Pepper’s example: I might evaluate whether a chair is strong enough to bear my weight by considering (a) the kind of wood with which it is made, (b) the reputation of the company that put together the chair, and (c) the fact that the chair shows evidence of wear (suggesting that “many people had successfully sat in it”). It is by “putting all this evidence together” that I “feel justified in believe that the chair is a strong chair” (p. 49)
* But, insofar as stuctural corroboration is concerned with how a multiplicity of facts “hang together” [my phrase], the quest for such corroboration will inevitably pull us in the direction of theory. As I entertain structural hypotheses, I’m not simply interested in this or that set of data. Rather, I’m interested in how the data I observe coheres with other things we think we know. The nature of this coherence is a theoretical puzzle.
On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (or data collection) is synonymous with the notion of objectivity in science. It reflects the idea that what we see would be described in precisely the same way by anyone else (given the appropriate level of training):
* In Pepper’s words, “the search for multiplicative corroboration is the effort on the part of a datum to confirm its claim to purity. It is as though a datum turned from one observer to another and asked, Am I not just what I said I was?....Are there not some data that never vary, no matter who the observer and, if possible, no matter what his point of view? If such there are, these are ideal data” (p. 52).
Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not available” (p. 52). Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been developed in the course of cognitive history” (p. 52). Specifically, Pepper highlights “two genuses of refined data”:
* Refined empirical data: “pointer readings and correlations among pointer readings” (p. 52)
* Refined logical data: “evidence for the validity of logical and mathematical transitions and for those organizations of such transitions which are called logical and mathematic systems” (p. 57).
Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the quest for highly refined empirical and logical data. But there are several threats to the program of the dogmatic positivist:
* The scarcity of refined data
* “The refined empirical data presently at our disposal cover a very small field of nature” (p. 63)
* “Outside of the fields of physics and chemistry, refined data play a secondary role and are rarely capable of expression in the form of a deductive mathematical system” (p. 63)
* The metaphysical poverty of refined data
* “In order to set up refined data as the sole norm of evidence, it is necessary to deny the claims of danda, derived from various structural world theories, as alternative norms of evidence” (pp. 67, 69)
* In other words, the dogmatic positivist intends to let the data speak for themselves, free of the influence of danda (which we might consider as a facet of a metaphysical system).
* But, if we really wish to drive such danda out of our refined cognition, “multiplicative corroboration alone will not do this, for it only establishes the data it establishes, and neither affirms nor denies the claims of any facts other than those, like pointer readings, by which man corroborates man” (p. 69, emphasis added)
In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70). What, though, does it mean to make structural claims (of any sort)?
* For starters, structural hypotheses necessarily make statements concerning “the structure of the world” (p. 74) – i.e., how things “hang together”.
* But – and this is quite a striking claim – “structural corroboration does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope” (p. 77, emphasis added)
* Why?
* Because: “as long as there are outlying facts which might not corroborate the facts already organized by the structural hypothesis, so long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable” (p. 77).
* An “ideal structural hypothesis”, then, “is one that all facts will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 77)
* “Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis” (p. 77, emphasis added).
Comments regarding “world hypotheses”:
* They necessarily include data [and not just danda]
* It “draws data within its scope as well as everything else” (p. 78)•
* “It, therefore, does not reject but acquires the cognitive force of multiplicative corroboration as well as that of structural corroboration” (pp. 78-79)
* “Cognition needs both types of refinement [data and danda] as much as a bird needs two wings” (p. 79)
* Nevertheless, in a world hypothesis, data are ultimately subordinated to danda.
* As a rough approximation of what Pepper is driving at, we might consider a world hypothesis as a framework that allows us to render data meaningful.
* Or, to employ Gregg's language: "all factual/empirical claims are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing)."
* In a world hypothesis, evidence and interpretation are “merged” (p. 79).
* “…it is impossible to say where pure fact ends and interpretation of fact begins” (p. 79).
As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field of psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the discipline: Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.
* Ignoring (for the sake of simplification) the notion of “mental processes”, we can certainly agree that “behavior” falls within the psychologist’s scope of inquiry.
* But how – in practice – do we identify a unit of behavior? When does a given behavior begin? When does it end? And is it really meaningful to speak of “behavior” in the abstract, or is the concept always qualified in some way? After all, a personality psychologist never studies “behavior” per se, but aggressive behavior, conscientious behavior, etc. In other words, personality psychologists study patterns of behavior – and the identification of such patterns is inevitably theory-driven.
On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs “A Tree of Knowledge” (!):
* At the bottom of the figure is a box labelled “Roots of knowledge” (and it includes “dubitanda”, Pepper’s rather odd term for “common sense facts”).
* The tree (originating out of the box) has two major trunks (which makes for a rather strange-looking tree!):
* Trunk #1: Data – Beginning with “rough data” and then branching into “scientific data” and “logical data”
* Trunk #2: Danda – Beginning with “rough danda” and then branching into “formistic danda”, “mechanistic danda”, “contextual danda”, and “organismic danda”
* Above the six branches of data and danda sits the phrase: “fruits of knowledge”
In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January 14), we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know if you have any questions, comments, or corrections pertaining to this episode!
~ Steve Quackenbush
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It will be the next topic for us to journey on.
Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh in now.
Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, The UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy, I especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)?
At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real persons, and not bring a worldview to what we do?
In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing from psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical psychology tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to factual claims about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, and I think he is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing).
Enjoy the journey!
Best,
Gregg
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From: Steven Quackenbush<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
Hello ToK Community
With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of the ToK/UTUA framework. As many participants in this listserv are aware, Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.
I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in the 1990’s. At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism. Yet I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close study of Pepper’s thought. So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of California Press).
Why Pepper? Why Now?
* As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions. These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated” and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in relation to broader (and perhaps alternative) metaphysical systems.
* Given its scope and conceptual rigor, my intuition is that Stephen Pepper’s work will be of considerable value as I continue to work through these issues. The description on the back cover of World Hypotheses offers some justification for this intuition:
* “In setting forth his root-metaphor theory and examining six such hypotheses – animism, mysticism, formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism – Pepper surveys the whole field of metaphysics…The virtue of the root-metaphor method is that it puts metaphysics on a purely factual basis and pushes philosophical issues back to the interpretation of evidence” (emphasis added).
Procedural matters:
* My intent in this thread is to proceed with a close reading of Pepper’s text, several chapters at a time. My next post (scheduled for Sunday, January 7) will focus on Chapters 1-4. Anyone with a copy of World Hypotheses is welcome to read along and offer corrections and/or clarifications. But, in case you can’t do the reading, I will try to make sure my outlines are sufficiently clear that they would make sense to everyone on this listserv.
* For the time being, I will limit myself to elaborating and clarifying the thought of Stephen Pepper. The purpose of this thread is not to articulate my own point of view. That will come later. Others are certainly free to offer critical comments from whatever vantage point they wish. My replies will simply reflect my effort to articulate how I think Pepper might respond to the matter at hand. [Of course, I may misinterpret Pepper; in which case, I hope to be corrected. Indeed, I anticipate that my understanding of Pepper will evolve considerably over the course of this project.]
* Although the positions articulated in this thread are not my own, I will nevertheless frequently generate original examples to illustrate the arguments that I believe Pepper is trying to make. To render as clear as possible the distinction between Pepper’s writings and my own elaborations, I will provide page references for all ideas and examples that can be found in World Hypotheses.
* When we reach the end of Pepper’s (1942) text, I will proceed to Phase 2 of this venture: How does the ToK/UTUA framework stands in relation to Root Metaphor theory?
As noted above, I will begin this inquiry with a close reading of Chapters 1-4. These chapters include a discussion of the distinction (quite important to Pepper) between “multiplicative” and “structural” corroboration (and the corresponding difference between “data” and “dandum”).
But it seems appropriate to end this post with a (hopefully enticing) “sneak preview of coming attractions”. In the opening paragraphs of World Hypotheses, Pepper (1942) observes that “among the variety of objects which we find in the world are hypotheses about the world itself” (p. 1). Examples cited by Pepper include the worldviews implicit in Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and Descartes’s Meditations. To his list, we might add Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, Skinner’s Beyond Freedom & Dignity, and Rogers’ On Becoming a Person.
In Chapter 5, Pepper offers four maxims pertaining to world hypotheses:
* Maxim I: “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor" (p. 96).
* Maxim II: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
* "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
* Maxim III: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
* "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually exclusive. A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing" (p. 104)
* Maxim IV: “Concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113)
If you share an interest in the issues reflected in this introductory e-mail, then I invite you to accompany me on a journey through the work of Stephen Pepper. The next installment of this series (focusing on Chapters 1-4) is scheduled for Sunday, January 7.
~ Steve Quackenbush
P.S.,: My edition of World Hypotheses includes two subtitles. On the cover, the subtitle is "Prolegomena to systematic philosophy and a complete survey of metaphysics". On the first page, the subtitle is "A Study in Evidence". Both subtitles are appropriate, but I think the former more appropriately reflects the incredible ambition of the text.
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