This has been a fascinating discussion. I found myself recalling Donald Hoffman’s TED talk entitled “Do we see reality as it is?” while reading this. He does
work in computer simulations using natural selection algorithms to better understand this process and is particularly interested in “a mathematical model of consciousness.” Here is a more in-depth article about his positions:
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/04/the-illusion-of-reality/479559/ I haven’t yet taken the time to make direct correlations between his work and that of Pepper, but my mental algorithms, or world hypothesis, suggest to me that there are
correlations here.
I love sci-fi and futurism, and an interesting thought experiment to me is pondering how a consciousness that sees reality as it actually is, and not how it
is selected to do so through environmental pressures, would vary from our experience of the same. Hoffman has also wondered about this, and has speculated that perhaps logic and reasoning are selected for traits through evolutionary processes.
Thanks,
Jason
From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
On Behalf Of Steven Quackenbush
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 6:14 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
A few quick comments before I begin the process of crafting the next formal outline (scheduled for Sunday).
Again, all this is based on my reading of Chapters 1-4. When we reach the end of the book, I will try to provide more satisfactory answers to everyone's questions. Here's the list of questions that I've compiled so far:
Until next time,
~ Steve Q.
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 2:40 PM,
[log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Steve:
A question about world hypotheses and the concept of worldview.
Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of a world hypothesis?
Best regards,
Waldemar
Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044
Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)
On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:57 PM, Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Hello ToK community,
Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread. The focus of this post is
World Hypotheses, Chapters 1-4. My reflections today are largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory.
Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place where most of us began our intellectual journey:
common sense. For Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39).
Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude” described by phenomenologists. For Pepper,
the world of common sense can be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” – i.e.,
we can always fall back on it:
But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively irritable”:
Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected to criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes “refined knowledge” or “critical cognition”
(p. 47). How do we achieve this transformation?
Corroboration can take one of two forms:
On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (or
data collection) is synonymous with the notion of objectivity in science. It reflects the idea that what we see would be described
in precisely the same way by anyone else (given the appropriate level of training):
Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not available” (p. 52). Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been developed in the course of cognitive history”
(p. 52). Specifically, Pepper highlights “two genuses of refined data”:
Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the quest for highly refined empirical and logical data. But there are several threats to the program of the dogmatic
positivist:
In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70). What, though, does it mean to make
structural claims (of any sort)?
Comments regarding “world hypotheses”:
As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field of psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the discipline:
Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.
On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs
“A Tree of Knowledge” (!):
In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January 14), we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know if you have any questions, comments,
or corrections pertaining to this episode!
~ Steve Quackenbush
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It will be the next topic for us to journey on.
Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts
about it, but I will not weigh in now.
Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book,
The UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy, I especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their formal education (especially outside
JMU’s program)?
At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about adaptive and maladaptive processes,
work deeply and intimately with real persons, and not bring a worldview to what we do?
In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing from psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical psychology tries to reduce human behavior
and actions of therapists to factual claims about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, and I think he is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make
sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice looks at a game between masters
and basically sees nothing).
Enjoy the journey!
Best,
Gregg
Sent from
Mail for Windows 10
From:
Steven Quackenbush
Sent: Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
Hello ToK Community
With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of the ToK/UTUA framework. As many participants in
this listserv are aware, Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.
I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in the 1990’s. At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism,
and contextualism. Yet I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close study of Pepper’s thought. So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text:
World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of California Press).
Why Pepper? Why Now?
Procedural matters:
As noted above, I will begin this inquiry with a close reading of Chapters 1-4. These chapters include a discussion of the distinction (quite important to Pepper) between “multiplicative”
and “structural” corroboration (and the corresponding difference between “data” and “dandum”).
But it seems appropriate to end this post with a (hopefully enticing) “sneak preview of coming attractions”. In the opening paragraphs of
World Hypotheses, Pepper (1942) observes that “among the variety of objects which we find in the world are hypotheses about the world itself” (p. 1). Examples cited by Pepper include the worldviews implicit in Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, and Descartes’s Meditations. To his list, we might add Freud’s
Interpretation of Dreams, Skinner’s Beyond Freedom & Dignity, and Rogers’
On Becoming a Person.
In Chapter 5, Pepper offers four maxims pertaining to world hypotheses:
If you share an interest in the issues reflected in this introductory e-mail, then I invite you to accompany me on a journey through the work of Stephen Pepper. The next installment of this
series (focusing on Chapters 1-4) is scheduled for Sunday, January 7.
~ Steve Quackenbush
P.S.,: My edition of
World Hypotheses includes two subtitles. On the cover, the subtitle is "Prolegomena to systematic philosophy and a complete survey of metaphysics". On the first page, the subtitle is "A Study in Evidence". Both subtitles are appropriate, but I think
the former more appropriately reflects the incredible ambition of the text.
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