Steve et al., If you google "relational developmental systems" the pdf link should come up. Darcia On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 4:58 PM, Steven Quackenbush < [log in to unmask]> wrote: > Hello ToK Community, > > Thanks for the various comments and questions. I promise that I will try > to address them all eventually. But I want to finish reviewing the four > "relatively adequate" world hypotheses before I explore the implications > (or corollaries) of Pepper's approach. > > Here, I'd like to offer a few thoughts regarding eclecticism to supplement > my previous e-mail (a "deleted scene" of sorts). > > *On Eclecticism:* > > Pepper informs us that "eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104). But, as Pepper > is offering a complete survey of *metaphysics*, his understanding of ( > *metaphysical)* eclecticism may differ from the way the term is > ordinarily used in psychology journals. > > *Lazarus & Beutler (1993), *for example, begin their discussion of > eclecticism by acknowledging that "many counselors and clinicians have > realized that one true path to understanding and correcting human problems > does not exist -- no single orientation has all the answers" (p. 381). > > But these authors are concerned that "the haphazard mishmash of divergent > bits and pieces, and the syncretistic muddle of idiosyncratic and ineffable > clinical creations, are the antithesis of what effective and efficient > counseling represents" (p. 71). This sort of theoretical scrap quilt is > dubbed *unsystematic eclecticism*. > > One alternative to such undignified eclecticism is *theoretical > integrationism*, where two or more imperfect theories (or approaches to > counseling) presumably achieve some sort of *synergistic* effect when > combined. > > - e.g., (1) the focus on *insight* associated with psychodynamic > theory, + (2) the concern with *action* associated with behavioral > theory, = (3) a much more adequate *behavioral-psychodymic* theory > (where the whole, it seems, is much greater than the parts). > - "Does this not argue for merging psychodynamic and behavioral > formulations?" (p. 382). > - Lazarus & Beutler reply: "Emphatically not!" (p. 382). > > What's wrong with theoretical integrationism? > > - According to Lazarus & Beutler (1993), "We lack criteria to > determine what portions or pieces of each theory to preserve or > expunge....Such criteria are not available and it is uncertain whether the > value that might exist in these theories could be retained in a truncated > and combined form" (p. 382) > - e.g., "How would one assess whether to introduce systematic > desensitization before, during, or after the exploration of defense > mechanisms?" (p. 383) > - "In general, when looking through these two divergent lenses, how > would the counselor know whether and when to explore mental conflict rather > than promote reparative action?" (p. 383) > > As an alternative to both unsystematic eclecticism and theoretical > eclecticism, Lazarus & Beutler (1993) consider *technical eclecticism*, > an approach whereby practitioners "select procedures from different sources > without necessarily subscribing to the theories that spawned them" (p. > 383). > > - "They work within a preferred theory...but recognize that few > techniques are inevitably wedded to any theory" (p. 384). > - "Hence they borrow techniques from other orientations, based on the > proven worth of these procedures" (p. 384). > > We can think what we will about "technical eclecticism" (as defined here), > but it should be clear that it has little to do with Pepper's discussion. > Technical eclectics remain firmly grounded in a single world hypothesis and > are thus not "eclectic" in his sense. > > Regarding "theoretical integrationism", it might be said that the picture > is not as bleak as Lazarus and Beutler (1993) suggest. Perhaps there *is* > a way to sew together the various scraps that are worth saving from > alternative theoretical frameworks (e.g., behaviorism, psychoanalysis), and > do so in a manner that makes good theoretical sense. But these frameworks > are not "world hypotheses", as understood by Pepper. > > A metaphysical world hypothesis is a synthesis of ontology and > epistemology. It doesn't merely account for the "way things are", it plays > a role in determining what there is "to account for" in the first place. > Thus, working with multiple world hypotheses is not really akin to patching > together a quilt. Rather, it is like trying to play both checkers and > chess *on the same board, at the same time*. "Confusing", to say the > least! > > I'd like to suggest that eclecticism, in Pepper's sense, is the exception > to the rule in the field of psychology. The typical student learns early > on that psychology is the *science* of behavior and mental processes. > And then, in a series of required statistics and methods courses, > assimilates a more-or-less-unified account of the scientific enterprise. > The point of view eventually be adopted by the well-socialized psychology > student is wonderfully articulated in Keith Stanovich's classic text, *How > to Think Straight about Psychology*. Of course, there are > epistemological variations (family squabbles, of sorts). But most of us > begin our work with a more-or-less agreed upon framework for asking and > answering questions. From this point of view, a certain sort of > *theoretical* (but not *metaphysical*) eclecticism seems quite > reasonable. Insofar as we remain firmly grounded in our (relatively > refined) philosophy of science, we have the cognitive tools necessary to > sew together the pieces from many boxes of scraps. > > P.S. #1, Waldemar: I've been looking into the question regarding the > etymology of the terms "danda" and "dubitanda." I haven't found anything > to suggest the terms precede Pepper. Perhaps they are neologisms. [Can > anyone offer assistance here?] > > P.S. #2: Jason: I'm especially intrigued by your suggestion that > metaphysical eclecticism may involve a regression (or sorts) back to > mysticism or animism. e.g., If I lose touch with my (relatively refined) > root metaphor, perhaps I'll be tempted by what Pepper describes as an > "emotion theory of truth" (mysticism). > > P.S. #3: Darcia: Thanks for the Developmental Systems Theory link. I will > read the material and offer comments in a subsequent post. I tried to > click on the Overton PowerPoint link, but ended up with a "page not found" > error. > > ~ Steve Q. > > > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 9:10 PM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc- > [log in to unmask]> wrote: > >> >> A few questions... >> >> Since mysticism is inadequate in *scope*, and animism is inadequate in >> *precision*, could mysticism be considered an unrefined and inadequate >> *integrative* hypothesis, and animism an unrefined and inadequate >> *dispersive* hypothesis? >> >> If so, could both Mechanism and Organicism be conceived as significant >> refinements of Mysticism, and could Formism and Contextualism be conceived >> as significant refinements of Animism? >> >> Or conversely, could Mysticism be conceived as an unrefined eclectic of >> proto-Mechanism and proto-Organicism, and Animism be conceived of as an >> unrefined eclectic of proto-Formism and proto-Contextualism? >> >> Indeed, could Eclecticism be conceived --- not as progress --- but >> ultimately *as a regression to Mysticism and Animism*? >> >> ~ Jason Bessey >> On Sunday, January 14, 2018, 10:23:39 PM EST, Steven Quackenbush < >> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses**: Season 1, Episode 2* >> >> >> >> *Narrator: “Previously on World Hypotheses:” * >> >> >> - We began with “common sense” (the *dubitanda*). >> - Though “secure” (because we can always fall back on it), common >> sense is nevertheless “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, >> irritable” (p. 44). >> - As such, we are driven to “refine” (or criticize) cognition. >> - For Pepper, “all critical evidence becomes critical only as a >> result of the addition of corroborative evidence” (p. 47) >> - Corroboration can take one of two forms: >> - Multiplicative corroboration: agreement among persons (consensus) >> - This generates *data* that can vary from rough to refined, >> depending on the extent or quality of corroboration. The fact that my four >> friends and I just saw Casper the Ghost is merely “rough data” (as I have >> no reason to believe that my skeptical brother will see things the same way >> whenever he shows up). Scores on the NEO-PI are relatively refined >> [insofar as everyone can see that Andrew scored one standard deviation >> below the mean on the agreeableness subscale] >> - The refinement of data, it would appear, is the path to >> achieving *objectivity* in science – i.e., interpretations free >> of idiosyncratic biases >> - Structural corroboration: agreement among facts >> - This generates *danda* that can vary from rough to refined, >> depending on the extent or quality of corroboration. >> - The notion of structural corroboration is rather mysterious >> at this point. *What does it mean for a fact to agree with a >> fact*? A simple example is the principle of converging >> evidence, where multiples sources of information point me in the same >> direction (e.g., it is safe to sit on this chair because it is made of >> solid wood, the manufacturer can be trusted, etc.). But as our theories >> grow more complex, it is not always clear what evidence would serve to >> corroborate a specific theoretical claim. E.g., what facts can we >> highlight in support of Melanie Klein’s “object relations” theory? And how >> do we determine the *adequacy* of this theory relative to >> competing accounts of the same phenomena? Do we simply count up the number >> of corroborations [such that each theory gets a “corroboration score”] or >> are some corroborations *worth more* than others? >> - Whereas multiplicative corroboration offers us *consensus,* >> structural corroboration advances *understanding. * >> - Our goal is ultimately to make sense of our universe, to grasp >> how it all “hangs together”. >> >> >> >> *World Hypotheses, Chapters 5-7. * >> >> >> - A world hypothesis is a hypothesis about “the world itself” (p. 1). >> - But how do we generate world hypotheses? >> - Pepper offers his “root metaphor theory” as “a *hypothesis* >> concerning the origins of world theories” (p. 84; emphasis added) >> - The fact that this is just a *hypothesis* implies that there >> may be *other ways *to generate theories about the world. The >> value of studying world hypotheses (of whatever sort) is not contingent on >> the truth of root metaphor theory. >> - Pepper observes that root metaphor theory “is itself a >> structural hypothesis” that must ultimately be supported by “an adequate >> world theory” >> - But Pepper also acknowledges that *we are not yet in >> possession of a perfect world theory*: >> - “Ideally, we should pass directly from dubitanda and data >> to fully adequate danda which would exhibit all things cognitively in their >> proper order. Unfortunately, danda are not at present nearly adequate” (p. >> 86). >> - We are entitled to ask: Why do our world theories fall short >> of our cognitive ideal? >> - Pepper’s root metaphor theory is an effort explain *how* we >> have developed our less-than-perfect world hypotheses. >> - The root metaphor theory is “in the nature of a *rough dandum*” >> (p. 86, emphasis added). >> - It “definitely does not legislate over world theories except >> so far as these voluntarily accept and refine it” (p. 86). >> - “On the contrary, an adequate world theory by virtue of >> its refinement legislates over this theory or any like it. There is no >> reliable cognitive appeal beyond an adequate world theory. But when world >> theories show themselves to be inadequate we accept what makeshifts we can >> find. This root-metaphor theory is such a makeshift. Its purpose is to >> squeeze out all the cognitive values that can found in the world theories >> we have and to supply a receptacle in which their juices may be collected, >> so that they will not dry up from dogmatism, or be wasted over the ground >> through the indiscriminate pecking of marauding birds” (pp. 86-87). >> >> *Root Metaphor Theory* >> >> >> - How do we manage to get from common sense to a world hypothesis? >> [or from dubitanda to relatively refined danda?] >> - Pepper suggests that we look out into the world of common sense and *grab >> onto something*. In effect, I find myself saying: *Perhaps this is >> the key to the universe!* >> - Here’s how Pepper puts the matter: >> - “A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a >> clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of common sense fact >> and tries if he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. The >> original area becomes then *his basic analogy or root metaphor*” >> (p. 91, emphasis added) >> - This person then “describes as best he can the >> characteristics of this area, or, if you will, discriminates its >> structure. A list of its structural characteristics becomes his basic >> concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of >> *categories*” (p. 91, emphasis added) >> - “In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other >> areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes >> to interpret all facts in terms of these categories” (p. 91) >> - “As a result of the impact of these other facts upon his >> categories, he may qualify and readjust the categories…” (p. 91). >> - “a great deal of development and refinement is required >> if they are to prove adequate for a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 91). >> - “Some root metaphors prove more fertile than others, have >> greater powers of expansion and of adjustment. These survive in comparison >> with the others and generate relatively adequate world theories” (pp. >> 91-92). >> - So, let’s try to build a world theory: >> - In the beginning, I adopted an unrefined natural attitude >> consonant with the spirit of my age. >> - One day, I experience (seemingly out of the blue) a *love* more >> profound than anything I could have ever imagined possible. >> - Fully cognizant of the fact that words can never do justice to >> my experience, I nevertheless tell my friends and relatives that I have >> finally achieved a state of true peace and harmony – a sense of oneness >> with a caring cosmos. >> - Perhaps *this* is the key that unlocks the secret of the >> universe! >> - According to Pepper, I have just become a *mystic*. >> - Root metaphor = Love >> - “This hypothesis states that this emotion is the substance >> of the universe, and that as far as we differentiate things, these are >> generated from this substance and are ultimately nothing but this >> substance” (p. 133). >> - Well, what’s wrong with this? [It sounds good to me!] >> - There’s nothing to be said against the mystical *experience* >> as such. >> - The mystic “need not be a metaphysician. He might have >> and enjoy his experience and make no cognitive claims for it beyond his >> having had it and enjoyed it” (p. 129) >> - But if mysticism is considered as a metaphysical hypothesis, >> it will ultimately leave us unsatisfied. Pepper cites mysticism as an >> example of a world hypothesis with *inadequate scope*. There >> are simply too many facts that the theory leaves behind (or interprets in a >> manner that is simply too crude for more refined cognitive tastes) >> - “The immediate temptation here is to deny outright the >> reality of all ‘facts’ except the one mystic Fact” (p. 131). >> - “So pain, misery, sorrow, sadness are unreal, as >> opposed to beatific qualities” (p. 134). >> - In addition, "pleasures, comforts, sensuous delights >> are false from lack of intensity” (p. 134). >> - Interestingly, Pepper dubs mysticism as an “emotional >> theory of truth” (p. 135). >> - “As *the* philosophy of unity and love, it is the most >> destructive of all world theories in cognition and finally destroys itself >> by the very intensity of its desire for unity and peace” (p. 127). >> - Ok, so much for mysticism. >> - I return to my stroll amongst the dubitanda. I take a trip to >> Hawaii and receive a text message telling me that there is a “ballistic >> missile threat inbound” and I should “seek cover immediately.” After >> thirty minutes of panic, I am relieved to learn it was a false alarm. >> [Incidentally, this twist in the narrative was inspired by the fact that my >> brother is presently vacationing in Hawaii and experienced the threat >> firsthand.] >> - So, as I recover from the ballistic missile threat, I start >> thinking about *myself* and how wonderful it is to be alive. I >> have goals, yet I also have the freedom to change my path in life. I have >> values, though I fully realize that they may well be crushed if I don’t do >> something to stand up for them. >> - Perhaps *I’m* the key to the universe! I don’t mean this in the >> sense that the universe should cater to my whims. Rather, perhaps my very >> mode of being-in-the-world illuminates the structure of the cosmos. I look >> out into the starry heavens and I have a sense that “we are not alone”. >> [As Tom Cruise once said in an interview, “are you really so arrogant as to >> believe we are alone in this universe?”] Better, as I reflect on the >> cosmos, I don’t simply contemplate creation. I also experience myself in >> relation to some sort of creative spirit – a divine “person” that somehow >> participates in my essence, or vice versa. >> - My truth is no longer *love* (which, I now recognize, was >> simply a positive experience *to be valued*). >> - Rather, *personhood as such* is the key to the universe. >> - I have become an *animist*. >> - Root Metaphor = The Person >> - According to Pepper, “animism, as a metaphysical >> hypothesis, is the theory that takes common-sense man, the human being, the >> person, as its primitive root metaphor” (p. 120). >> - “This is the most appealing root metaphor that has ever >> been selected” (p. 120). >> - “This view of the world is the only one in which many >> feels completely at home” (p. 120). >> - I’m reminded here of the wonderful scene at the end >> of Close Encounters, where a bunch of kindhearted aliens arrive in a >> magnificent spaceship, befriend humanity, and invite Richard Dreyfus to fly >> away on what I like to call: “the secure base from outer space”. >> - In its crudest forms, animism is difficult to sustain >> past childhood. But the root metaphor can be refined: >> - “The full maturity of an animistic world theory…occurs when >> the root metaphor of man’s personality has developed into in the richest >> conception of spirit, and when a luxuriant mythology has vividly populated >> the universe with explanatory spirits” (p. 123). >> - But: “under the pressure of criticism, mythological >> interpretations begin to be thinned down. At first they are treated as >> allegories, then as symbols of something higher and finer, and finally the >> notion of spirit itself is ephemeralized into an emotionally shaded word >> with vague direction outward or inward” (p. 124) >> - So, the original animistic categories eventually evolve >> [or devolve] into acceptable – but ultimately “empty” – abstractions (see >> pp. 124-126) >> - Significantly, these abstractions (e.g. the divine “source >> of all”) retain their appeal precisely by virtue of their “animistic >> source”. >> - “They would not be entertained for a moment if the source >> were cut off” (p. 126) >> - Unlike mysticism, animism has no problem with scope. It >> doesn’t demean (or render *less than real*) any particular set >> of facts. >> - The problem with animism, according to Pepper, is its *inadequate >> precision*. >> - “What is thunder? It is the angry voice of a great >> spirit….[Or] It is the stamping of the hoofs of the steeds of a great >> spirit…[Or] It may even be a spirit itself roaring in pursuit of some other >> spirit to devour.” (p. 122). >> - “[There] is nothing but the limits of poetic fancy to put >> a stop to such interpretations” (p. 122). >> - “These interpretations are all consonant with the >> categories of spirit....There is no one precise determination of thunder, >> nor is there any precise method for finding one, nor is there any hope that >> more factual observations will ever produce one through these categories” >> (p. 122). >> - “Since the categories lack determinateness, they are >> unable to control their interpretations, which multiply about the same fact >> and mutually contradict one another” (p. 127, from the concluding paragraph >> of the section) >> - If we are able to decide upon a specific interpretation, >> it is by virtue of “the authority of shaman, medicine man, and priest” (p. >> 123) >> - Pepper submits that “animism is the natural metaphysical >> support of authoritarianism” (p. 123) >> - Note: For a consideration of animism in the context >> Gregg’s ToK framework, I recommend Leigh Shaffer’s (2008) article entitled: *Religion >> as a Large-Scale Justification System: Does the Justification Hypothesis >> Explain Animistic Attribution*? [The abstract is available >> here: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__journals.sagepub.com_do&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=8r8FwSblHLWwSdudXf57f4TlvU_aP46_KKJPgBYripA&e= >> i/abs/10.1177/0959354308097257?journalCode=tapa >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__journals.sagepub.com_doi_abs_10.1177_0959354308097257-3FjournalCode-3Dtapa&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=7BwDiHWlIEMNxQKcB89qknayUCpaNVt3W-_rQ_skBIg&s=EB-Oc7qE9Raed2TLKSbwz0B5kBbCRLOS0H4IraXhbdc&e=> >> ] >> >> >> *Generalizations regarding the role played by root metaphors in the >> development of World Hypotheses:* >> >> - *Maxim I:* “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor" >> (p. 96). >> - Pepper identifies four “relatively adequate” world theories and >> their corresponding "root metaphors" >> - World Hypothesis #1 = Formism; root metaphor = >> "similarity" >> - World Hypothesis #2 = Mechanism; root metaphor = "machine" >> - World Hypothesis #3 = Contextualism; root metaphor = >> "historical event" >> - World Hypothesis #4 = Organicism; root metaphor = >> "organism" >> - Pepper devotes a chapter to each of these world hypotheses >> (Chapters 8,9,10, & 11, respectively). So we will eventually have a chance >> to examine each of these hypotheses in considerable detail. >> - *Maxim II*: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98) >> - *Corollary #1*: "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual >> interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of >> another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98) >> - "It follows that what are pure facts for one theory are >> highly interpreted evidence for another" (p. 100) >> - *Corollary #2*: "A world hypothesis does not have to accept data >> at their face value, or to exclude the acceptance of any other sort of >> evidence than data" (p. 101). >> - *Corollary #3*: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of >> structural refinement (world hypotheses) to the cognitive standards (or >> limitations) of multiplicative refinement” (p. 101). >> - “Data must be accepted as evidence to be accounted for in a >> world hypothesis, but a world hypothesis does not have to accept data at >> their face value, or to exclude acceptance of any other sort of evidence >> than data (p. 101). >> - *Corollary #4*: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of >> structural refinement to the assumptions of common sense” (p. 102). >> - *Corollary #5*: “It is convenient to employ common-sense >> concepts as bases for comparison for parallel fields of evidence among >> world theories” (p. 102) >> - In other words, we can clarify differences among world >> theories by considering how they might respectively deal with events that >> occur in the world of ordinary experience. >> - For example, consider the statement: “Joe has a good sense >> of humor.” The notion of “humor” is part of our ordinary experience and >> thus falls within the scope of any comprehensive world theory. So, how >> would a mechanistic make sense of humor? How would a formist understand >> this concept? Etc. >> - Answering such questions helps us appreciate differences >> in how each world hypothesis interprets “the *same* >> common-sense fact” (p. 103, emphasis in original) >> - *Maxim III*: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104) >> - "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually >> exclusive. A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing". >> - For example, we might be tempted remedy the shortcomings of >> animism by somehow combining it with mysticism: >> - “Just fill in the empty spirit concept of an emaciated >> animism with the vivid indubitable mystic emotion, and each theory seems to >> revive” (p. 136). >> - But Pepper doesn’t think that we can achieve a stable >> synthesis of mysticism and animism. >> - E.g., “the world of spirits still try to raise their Great >> Spirit upon the throne which mystic intuition occupies” (p. 136) >> - Thus, we now have a tension between (a) the >> infallibility implicit in animism (which was necessary to avoid endless >> proliferation of personalistic interpretations) and (b) the indubitability >> that lies at the core of mysticism (i.e., the very real experience of >> love). >> - Pepper observes that “historically the ecclesiastics and >> the mystics have never harmonized very well. Periodically each group has >> tried to clean the other out – and this may be taken as a typical lesson in >> eclecticism” (p. 136). >> - It might be replied that we would have more luck if we tried >> to achieve a synthesis of relatively adequate world hypotheses. But Pepper >> doesn’t think that’s possible at the present time: >> - “While all sorts of things might happen to these diverse >> theories so far as abstract possibility is concerned, as a fact (in the >> best sense of fact we know) these four theories are just now >> irreconcilable. Any credible attempt to reconcile them turns out to be the >> judgment of one of the theories on the nature of the others” (p. 105-106) >> - "*Maxim IV*: Concepts which have lost contact with their root >> metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113). >> - Interestingly, Pepper suggests that such “empty abstractions” >> are a likely consequence of the push toward eclecticism (which has no root >> metaphor of its own to help refine cognition). >> >> *A Conceptual Scheme for Comparing World Hypotheses:* >> >> >> - *Analytic vs. Synthetic World Hypotheses:* >> - *Analytic:* Formism, Mechanism – Basic facts include “elements” >> or “factors". Any apparent synthesis (e.g., my life conceived >> holistically) is merely derivative. >> - *Synthetic:* Organicism, Contextualism – Basic facts include >> “complexes” or “contexts”. I’m reminded here of family systems theory, >> where certain formal “elements” (e.g., the personality traits of a single >> family member) might be considered as a function of contextual dynamics >> (and are thus derivative). >> - *Dispersive vs. Integrative World Hypotheses* >> - *Dispersive Hypotheses: *Formism, contextualism – The facts are >> “loosely scattered about” and “are not necessarily determining one another >> to any considerable degree” (pp. 142-143). >> - Example: In a formist “trait psychology”, Andrew’s >> disagreeableness may be reflected in (a) a tendency to make snide comments >> about coworkers, and (b) a recent “road rage” incident. These two >> behaviors (a & b) don’t really have much to do with each other, outside of >> the fact that they are presumably mediated by the notion of >> disagreeableness. Contrast this with the notion of a machine where every >> fact has its place in an integrative whole. >> - The chief problem associated with dispersive theories is >> inadequate precision. [What will *disagreeable Andrew* do >> next? Who knows. But whatever he chooses to do, we will be able to make >> sense of it via our categories] >> - *Integrative Hypotheses:* Mechanism, organicism >> - “For these two theories the world appears literally as a >> cosmos where facts occur in determinate order, and where, if enough were >> known, they could be predicted or at least described, as being necessarily >> just what they are to the minutest detail” (p. 143) >> - The chief problem associated with integrative theories is >> inadequate scope >> >> *Narrator: “Next week on Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses. **We discuss >> two relatively adequate metaphysical systems: Formism and Mechanism" >> (Chapters 8 & 9; Sunday, January 21)* >> >> >> ~ Steve Q. >> >> On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 9:27 AM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc-reques >> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> >> Hello ToK Community, >> >> Is there something fundamentally paradoxical about Pepper's *World >> Hypotheses*? >> >> That is, wouldn't Pepper's "World Hypotheses" itself necessarily be a >> World Hypothesis by definition? >> >> And insofar that his "World Hypotheses" is itself a "World Hypothesis", >> would it not necessarily have to be grounded in one of his Root Metaphors, >> therefore meaning that one would have to embrace that particular root >> metaphor (to the exclusion of the other root metaphors) in the first place >> for even the possibility to (in turn) embrace his World Hypothesis about >> World Hypotheses? >> >> ~ Jason Bessey >> On Thursday, January 11, 2018, 7:55:34 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - >> henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for this narrative, John. >> >> >> >> My expectation is that soon after the tour that Steve offers us of the >> World Hypotheses, we should shift the floor to you so that you can narrate >> your “world hypothesis.” I know in talking with you, I have had visions of >> “Human Psycho-Physiological Laws” that would allow us to harmonize >> ourselves, all the way from literal legal systems down into our individual >> experiences into our bio-physiological developmental life cycles and even >> down into negentropic energy flow, and information-communication transfer >> that you see connecting the dots in a bottom up fashion, from physics to >> biology all the way into human consciousness. >> >> >> Best, >> Gregg >> >> >> >> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@ >> listserv.jmu.edu <[log in to unmask]>] *On Behalf Of *JOHN >> TORDAY >> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 10, 2018 2:31 PM >> >> *To:* [log in to unmask] >> *Subject:* Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses" >> >> >> >> Gregg, having lost most of my family in the Holocaust I came to the >> 'table' as a Blank Slate. My passion as a scientist has been to contribute >> knowledge that would make life better, specifically for preterm newborns as >> a way to mitigate against hate, which I consider the nidus of the >> Holocaust. Over the course of the last decade or so I have come to a bigger >> picture perspective because I had amassed enough data over the course of 50 >> years of research to understand the development and phylogeny of the lung, >> going all the way back to its unicellular origins by connecting the >> physiologic dots between gas exchange and gravity experimentally. That >> exercise provided insight to the evolution of the lung and many other >> physiologic traits. And in the aggregate, the biggest picture was the >> relationship between physiology and the Singularity/Big Bang through the >> homology between Quantum Mechanics and the evolution of the protocell as >> The First Principles of Physiology. So my world view has expanded >> exponentially of late based on a priori scientific knowledge, hubris aside. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 9:47 AM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc- >> [log in to unmask] >> <[log in to unmask]>> wrote: >> >> Gregg, >> >> Oh, I don't disagree with you Gregg. However, I suspect you'd find that >> those who have a World Hypothesis grounded in "common sense" (i.e., Level 1 >> Justification Systems), themselves typically have a more *common* >> personality type, while those who have more refined World Hypotheses, would >> tend to have more *uncommon* personality types. The research in that >> paper, I think, was focused on the latter. >> >> ~ Jason B. >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, January 10, 2018, 10:45:56 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - >> henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> Am loving this discussion. >> >> >> >> One point I think we should keep in mind about Pepper’s analysis (which >> Steve will get to, but I bring it up here because of Jason B’s point about >> personality and a comment Steve made regarding justification level 1). >> >> >> >> Most people hold World Hypotheses that are animistic or mystical. That >> is, most people are religious and view the universe as being created by God >> and/or has some mystical animating force. To me, Jason B., this is an >> important point to keep in mind and why I would question the set up of the >> reseach. Just because Pepper sees these World Hypotheses as “inadequate,” >> does not mean that most folks don’t see the world this way. To me, by the >> time you are really diving into the four world hypotheses Pepper sees as >> adequate, you are likely dealing with people who have, at least at some >> level, “refined” knowledge, rather than just populist “common sense.” >> >> >> Best, >> Gregg >> >> >> >> Sent from Mail >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=lpgvCYo-xEMi_dHVRw7Hb_rnYcFYXtHOu-mwYODqBik&s=tTpSky1NBZmXYIiglSFhpFyLiU-Vdf6DeI8TJNMD8fU&e=> >> for Windows 10 >> >> >> >> *From: *Stout, Jason (DBHDS) <[log in to unmask]> >> *Sent: *Wednesday, January 10, 2018 10:17 AM >> *To: *[log in to unmask] >> *Subject: *Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses" >> >> >> >> This has been a fascinating discussion. I found myself recalling Donald >> Hoffman’s TED talk entitled “Do we see reality as it is?” while reading >> this. He does work in computer simulations using natural selection >> algorithms to better understand this process and is particularly interested >> in “a mathematical model of consciousness.” Here is a more in-depth >> article about his positions: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.theatlantic.com_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=Qw3q3YJDIt_rfQy2WRgzAn2iztUC_8t6gW5Iq-ocT7w&e= >> science/archive/2016/04/the- illusion-of-reality/479559/ >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.theatlantic.com_science_archive_2016_04_the-2Dillusion-2Dof-2Dreality_479559_&d=DwMGaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rnb8-r0GMZiKVJVPv4DGLSCcO9TK-NnFDdaxc9p-yKY&s=VoxNLmYZr2VsD4zFeCTlupL_FUPdorxuqyAMheYzhPM&e=> >> I haven’t yet taken the time to make direct correlations between his work >> and that of Pepper, but my mental algorithms, or world hypothesis, suggest >> to me that there are correlations here. >> >> >> >> I love sci-fi and futurism, and an interesting thought experiment to me >> is pondering how a consciousness that sees reality as it actually is, and >> not how it is selected to do so through environmental pressures, would vary >> from our experience of the same. Hoffman has also wondered about this, >> and has speculated that perhaps logic and reasoning are selected for traits >> through evolutionary processes. >> >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> >> >> Jason >> >> >> >> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@ >> listserv.jmu.edu <[log in to unmask]>] *On Behalf Of *Steven >> Quackenbush >> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 09, 2018 6:14 PM >> *To:* [log in to unmask] >> *Subject:* Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses" >> >> >> >> A few quick comments before I begin the process of crafting the next >> formal outline (scheduled for Sunday). >> >> - Waldemar asks whether it is appropriate to consider an individual's >> worldview as an example of a world hypothesis. >> >> >> - This seems reasonable to me*, *and I've always loosely equated an >> individual's worldview with a "world hypothesis" (of some sort). Of >> course, the conventional language user (adopting what Gregg calls Level 1 >> Justifications) might not formally embrace any of the world hypotheses >> discussed by Pepper. If we ask a random person to describe their >> worldview, the answer may come across as an incoherent mess (including >> random elements of formism, mysticism, organicism, etc.). Still, even a >> pastiche can be understood as a "world hypothesis" of sorts. >> - That said, I'm intrigued by Jason's suggestion (grounded in >> Jungian theory) that some of us are satisfied with "local hypotheses". >> Even if I will never be satisfied until my philosophy is corroborated by *the >> entire world*, that doesn't mean that the rest of humanity must >> submit to my need to achieve unlimited scope. >> - My personal bias is that we all have "world hypotheses" that are >> (implicitly) unlimited in scope (even if we *say* we are only >> concerned with local hypotheses). But I'm not sure Pepper would agree with >> me here. We will return to this issue in due course. >> >> >> - Ken observes that the ghost example I gave in my previous post >> "sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability >> (esp consensus / agreement) and validity." He asks: "Does the language >> system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation >> traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?" >> >> >> - I agree that Pepper's understanding of multiplicative and >> structural corroboration resembles the distinction typically made between >> reliability (especially consensus) and validity. >> - Two quick notes (inspired by Ken's comments, though not really >> answers to his question). >> >> >> - The validation process is itself closely tied to an individual's >> world hypothesis. >> >> >> - In the ghost example, it is possible to imagine a metaphysical >> framework [some sort of "supernaturalism"] that would validate the reliable >> report of the witnesses (even if this framework has problems of its own and >> does not thereby achieve universal acclaim). >> - The close link between metaphysical frameworks and the >> validation process is more obvious when we consider the countless >> hypothetical constructs that find their way into psychology textbooks. >> What does it mean, for example, to develop a valid measure of >> "self-esteem"? The concept itself is grounded in a theoretical framework >> (that may or may not be formally articulated). Moreover, it is not obvious >> what "facts" would corroborate: (a) the relevant validity claims and (b) >> the theoretical framework within which such claims are made. >> >> >> - In Pepper's thought, there *seems* to be blurring a reliability and >> validity (though I may modify this claim when we reach the end of the >> book). >> >> >> - In the course of his conversation regarding the tensions between >> data and danda (where he presented the ghost scenario), Pepper admits that >> "a highly refined datum would probably never have to give way to a highly >> refined dandum." In other words, the *objectivity* of the >> data would be sufficient to withstand the "winds of theory" [my phrase]. >> But this is "only because the datum has been thinned to such a degree that >> it does not commit itself to very much" [p. 50] >> - A few pages later, Pepper observes that "*the inherent >> lack of significance in data alone* is what we meant earlier >> by the thinness of refined data, a thinness which finally causes a return >> to common sense for a security and healthiness of fact that threatens to >> disappear when data try to carry cognition alone" (pp. 63-64, emphasis >> added) >> - So, even as we are assessing *what we all see *(consensus) we >> are also deciding *what we should be looking at* (which is >> necessarily a reflection of our theoretical framework and thus implicitly a >> "validity" concern). In other words, we don't want to waste our time >> developing reliable measures of trivia. Rather, we seek out truths that >> are "reliably meaningful", or "meaningfully reliable", even if this means >> that we have to sacrifice some degree of refinement (purity). >> >> >> >> Again, all this is based on my reading of Chapters 1-4. When we reach >> the end of the book, I will try to provide more satisfactory answers to >> everyone's questions. Here's the list of questions that I've compiled so >> far: >> >> >> >> - *"Is there a term when multiplicative corroboration (data) and >> structural corroboration (danda) are in agreement? Would that be considered >> 'idealdata'? Or is a prerequisite, if you will, of danda that it first be >> data?" [Ali]* >> - *"The ghost example you give sounds a lot like the distinction >> commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and >> validity. Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics >> / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some >> way?" [Ken]* >> - *"Is it** appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an >> example of a world hypothesis?" [Waldemar]* >> >> Until next time, >> >> >> >> ~ Steve Q. >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 2:40 PM, [log in to unmask] < >> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> Steve: >> >> >> >> A question about world hypotheses and the concept of worldview. >> >> >> >> Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of >> a world hypothesis? >> >> >> >> Best regards, >> >> >> >> Waldemar >> >> >> >> *Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD* >> (Perseveret et Percipiunt) >> 503.631.8044 >> >> *Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value.* (A Einstein) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:57 PM, Steven Quackenbush < >> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> >> >> Hello ToK community, >> >> Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread. The focus of >> this post is *World Hypotheses*, Chapters 1-4. My reflections today are >> largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage >> for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory. >> >> Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place >> where most of us began our intellectual journey: *common sense.* For >> Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we >> ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell >> and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39). >> >> Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of >> “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude” >> described by phenomenologists. For Pepper, the world of common sense can >> be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” – >> i.e., *we can always fall back on it*: >> >> >> >> - “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we >> completely give up trying to know anything, then is precisely when we know >> things in the common-sense way. In that lies the security of common sense” >> (p. 43). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively >> irritable”: >> >> >> >> - “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging, >> contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized, >> rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt, >> playfully enjoyed, and so forth. One may accept common sense and >> thoughtlessly roam in its pasture, but if one looks up and tries to take it >> in, it is like a fantastic dream. To the serious cognizer it is like a bad >> dream. For the serious cognizer feels responsible to fact and principle, >> and common sense is utterly irresponsible” (p. 43) >> - Common sense is “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, >> irritable” (p. 44). >> >> >> >> Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected >> to criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes >> “refined knowledge” or “critical cognition” (p. 47). How do we achieve >> this transformation? >> >> >> >> - For Pepper, “*all critical evidence becomes critical only as a >> result of the addition of corroborative evidence*. The work of >> legitimate criticism in cognition, then, is corroboration” (p. 47, emphasis >> added) >> >> >> >> Corroboration can take one of two forms: >> >> >> >> - *1) Multiplicative corroboration (data):* i.e., The agreement of >> “man with man.” (p. 47). >> >> >> - An obvious example of this is the notion of interjudge (or >> interrater) reliability, as understood by psychometricians >> - But, as discussed below, the notion of multiplicative >> corroboration has an important role to play in any scientific enterprise. >> >> >> - *2) Structural corroboration (danda):* i.e., The agreement of >> “fact with fact” (p. 47) >> >> >> - An obvious example of this is the “principle of converging >> evidence” in science. >> >> >> - Pepper’s example: I might evaluate whether a chair is strong enough >> to bear my weight by considering (a) the kind of wood with which it is >> made, (b) the reputation of the company that put together the chair, and >> (c) the fact that the chair shows evidence of wear (suggesting that “many >> people had successfully sat in it”). It is by “putting all this evidence >> together” that I “feel justified in believe that the chair is a strong >> chair” (p. 49) >> >> >> - But, insofar as stuctural corroboration is concerned with how a >> multiplicity of facts “hang together” [my phrase], the quest for such >> corroboration will inevitably pull us in the direction of theory. As I >> entertain structural hypotheses, I’m not simply interested in >> *this* or *that *set of data*.* Rather, I’m interested in how the >> data I observe *coheres* with other things we think we know. The >> nature of this coherence is a *theoretical* puzzle. >> >> >> >> On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (or *data* collection) is >> synonymous with the notion of *objectivity* in science. It reflects the >> idea that what we see would be described *in precisely the same way* by >> anyone else (given the appropriate level of training): >> >> >> >> - In Pepper’s words, “the search for multiplicative corroboration is >> the effort on the part of a datum to confirm its claim to purity. It is as >> though a datum turned from one observer to another and asked, Am I not just >> what I said I was?....Are there not some data that never vary, no matter >> who the observer and, if possible, no matter what his point of view? If >> such there are, these are ideal data” (p. 52). >> >> >> >> Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not >> available” (p. 52). Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been >> developed in the course of cognitive history” (p. 52). Specifically, Pepper >> highlights “two genuses of refined data”: >> >> >> >> - *Refined empirical data*: “pointer readings and correlations among >> pointer readings” (p. 52) >> >> >> - *Refined logical data:* “evidence for the validity of logical and >> mathematical transitions and for those organizations of such transitions >> which are called logical and mathematic systems” (p. 57). >> >> >> >> Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the >> quest for highly refined empirical and logical data. But there are >> several threats to the program of the dogmatic positivist: >> >> >> >> - The scarcity of refined data >> >> >> - “The refined empirical data presently at our disposal cover a very >> small field of nature” (p. 63) >> >> >> - “Outside of the fields of physics and chemistry, refined data play >> a secondary role and are rarely capable of expression in the form of a >> deductive mathematical system” (p. 63) >> >> >> - The metaphysical poverty of refined data >> >> >> - “In order to set up refined data as the sole norm of evidence, it >> is necessary to *deny* the claims of danda, derived from various >> structural world theories, as alternative norms of evidence” (pp. 67, 69) >> >> >> - In other words, the dogmatic positivist intends to let the *data >> speak for themselves*, free of the influence of danda (which we >> might consider as a facet of a metaphysical system). >> >> >> - But, if we really wish to drive such danda out of our refined >> cognition, “*multiplicative corroboration alone will not do this*, >> for it only establishes the data it establishes, and neither affirms nor >> denies the claims of any facts other than those, like pointer readings, by >> which man corroborates man” (p. 69, emphasis added) >> >> In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and >> structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70). >> What, though, does it mean to make *structural* claims (of any sort)? >> >> >> >> >> >> - For starters, structural hypotheses necessarily make statements >> concerning “the structure of the world” (p. 74) – i.e., how things “hang >> together”. >> - But – and this is quite a striking claim – “*structural >> corroboration does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope*” (p. >> 77, emphasis added) >> >> >> - Why? >> >> >> - Because: “as long as there are outlying facts which might not >> corroborate the facts already organized by the structural hypothesis, so >> long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable” (p. 77). >> >> >> - An “ideal structural hypothesis”, then, “is one that all facts >> will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 77) >> - “*Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis*” (p. 77, emphasis >> added). >> >> >> >> Comments regarding “world hypotheses”: >> >> >> >> - They necessarily include *data *[and not just *danda*] >> >> >> - It “draws data within its scope as well as everything else” (p. 78)§ >> >> >> >> - “It, therefore, does not reject but acquires the cognitive force of >> multiplicative corroboration as well as that of structural corroboration” >> (pp. 78-79) >> >> >> - “Cognition needs both types of refinement [data and danda] as much >> as a bird needs two wings” (p. 79) >> >> >> - Nevertheless, in a world hypothesis, *data are ultimately >> subordinated to danda*. >> >> >> - As a rough approximation of what Pepper is driving at, we might >> consider a world hypothesis as a framework that allows us to *render >> data meaningful*. >> - Or, to employ Gregg's language: "*all factual/empirical claims >> are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is >> to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort >> of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to >> SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about >> chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees >> nothing)."* >> >> >> - In a world hypothesis, evidence and interpretation are “merged” (p. >> 79). >> >> >> - “…it is impossible to say where pure fact ends and interpretation >> of fact begins” (p. 79). >> >> >> >> As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field >> of psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the discipline: *Psychology >> is* *the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.* >> >> >> >> - Ignoring (for the sake of simplification) the notion of “mental >> processes”, we can certainly agree that “behavior” falls within the >> psychologist’s scope of inquiry. >> - But how – in practice – do we identify a *unit *of behavior? When >> does a given behavior begin? When does it end? And is it really >> meaningful to speak of “behavior” in the abstract, or is the concept always >> qualified in some way? After all, a personality psychologist never studies >> “behavior” *per se*, but *aggressive* behavior, *conscientious* >> behavior, etc. In other words, personality psychologists study >> *patterns* of behavior – and the identification of such patterns is >> inevitably theory-driven. >> >> >> >> On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs *“A Tree of >> Knowledge”* (!): >> >> >> >> - At the bottom of the figure is a box labelled “Roots of knowledge” >> (and it includes “dubitanda”, Pepper’s rather odd term for “common sense >> facts”). >> - The tree (originating out of the box) has *two major trunks* (which >> makes for a rather strange-looking tree!): >> >> >> - Trunk #1: Data – Beginning with “rough data” and then branching >> into “scientific data” and “logical data” >> - Trunk #2: Danda – Beginning with “rough danda” and then >> branching into “formistic danda”, “mechanistic danda”, “contextual danda”, >> and “organismic danda” >> >> >> - Above the six branches of data and danda sits the phrase: “fruits >> of knowledge” >> >> >> >> >> >> In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January >> 14), we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know >> if you have any questions, comments, or corrections pertaining to this >> episode! >> >> ~ Steve Quackenbush >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx < >> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It >> will be the next topic for us to journey on. >> >> >> >> Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I >> thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is >> incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh >> in now. >> >> >> >> Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World >> Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, *The >> UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy*, I >> especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often >> they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their >> formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)? >> >> >> >> At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of >> human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about >> adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real >> persons, and* not* bring a worldview to what we do? >> >> >> >> In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing >> from psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical >> psychology tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to >> factual claims about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, >> and I think he is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims >> are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is >> to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort >> of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to >> SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about >> chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing). >> >> >> >> Enjoy the journey! >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Gregg >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Mail >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hcgEWNgGBY5zBJvvRP2GG3r87id5mXF-VcFbar1Bg-A&s=d5or990N2srKYiXwxcK2dCHk2PbnGO0IezvlQ8AI-YM&e=> >> for Windows 10 >> >> >> >> *From: *Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]> >> >> >> *Sent: *Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM >> *To: *[log in to unmask] >> *Subject: *Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses" >> >> >> >> Hello ToK Community >> >> With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the >> implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of >> the ToK/UTUA framework. As many participants in this listserv are aware, >> Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his >> “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never >> encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation. >> >> I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in >> the 1990’s. At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among >> the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism. Yet >> I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close >> study of Pepper’s thought. So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread >> is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: *World >> Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence* (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of >> California Press). >> >> Why Pepper? Why Now? >> >> >> >> - As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself >> puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions. >> These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and >> science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated” >> and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in >> >> ... >> >> [Message clipped] > > > ############################ > > To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: > mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the > following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= > 1 > -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Darcia Narvaez (DAR-sha narv-EYES) Professor of Psychology, 118 Haggar Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556 USA [log in to unmask], 574-631-7835 *My University Website <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.nd.edu_-257Ednarvaez&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=qLttS3Wr9sCmGvvyNw7UcMLkwTeZSnLCEd0EyQM5c_Q&e= > * Also see DarciaNarvaez.com Blog at Psychology Today: Moral Landscapes <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_blog_moral-2Dlandscapes&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=LduJ_LU1a97sXvpZjcjmtzEWXxdx6CO5qczUuy0fTnU&e= > Former Editor, Journal of Moral Education <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.tandfonline.com_toc_cjme20_current&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=dSxeIWq906jxr3v5jHPsh36pus2EbhX5Coi4Q2yzmLk&e= > Interviews and Podcasts <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www3.nd.edu_-257Ednarvaez_OtherMedia.htm&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=nKVeXaDyS7RSPib9gkkIdgnVIPYEYkM-gpRL6Q4KgP0&e= > BOOKS: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.oup.com_us_catalog_general_subject_Psychology_Developmental_-3Fview-3Dusa-26sf-3Dtoc-26ci-3D9780199755059&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=2RiVbKuUexNPjwyC6UDLFtenOzZQwHDUbsDx9uWfd7s&e= > Embodied Morality: Protectionism, Engagement and Imagination <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.palgrave.com_us_book_9781137553980&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=pGbzNjrII7FCstNQ7ESpFI6opSJ2dlJoLBY1_9pKjw4&e= > (Palgrave-Macmillan) Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution, Culture and Wisdom <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__books.wwnorton.com_books_Author.aspx-3Fid-3D4294978774&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=guVA2mC_2VmSz-fOpny3xz3mcxEXnJc6Ts4kar4ljEA&e= > (Norton; discount: NARVAEZ) Evolution, Early Experience and Human Development <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.oup.com_us_catalog_general_subject_Psychology_Developmental_-3Fview-3Dusa-26sf-3Dtoc-26ci-3D9780199755059&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=2RiVbKuUexNPjwyC6UDLFtenOzZQwHDUbsDx9uWfd7s&e= > (OUP) Ancestral Landscapes in Human Evolution <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__global.oup.com_academic_product_ancestral-2Dlandscapes-2Din-2Dhuman-2Devolution-2D9780199964253-3Fq-3DAncestral-2520Landscapes-2520in-2520Human-2520Evolution-3A-2520Culture-2C-2520Childrearing-2520and-2520Social-2520Wellbeing-26lang-3Den-26cc-3Dus&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=yMqJJp--ljsoGXaRdlAamougrKNqvk6EpiVvdVL9whs&e= > (OUP) Young Child Flourishing: Evolution, Family & Society <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__global.oup.com_academic_product_contexts-2Dfor-2Dyoung-2Dchild-2Dflourishing-2D9780190237790-3Fcc-3Dus-26lang-3Den-26&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=ljMYJHOL_9oZiNqa6ZvqUwW81_3PHQ8c5pQvsdaAXg8&e= > (OUP) amazon.com/author/darcianarvaez <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www3.nd.edu_-7Ednarvaez_OtherMedia.htm&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=_GIoECnrxYwlOSNEMQuZuzJWRHuXCKZot9IlE_QgaVI&e= > Self, Motivation and Virtue Project <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__smvproject.com_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=Dk_rAlH_s5GQU5PbSbfvNfki84sVGE8eNxrSReY2cXM&e= > CONFERENCE VIDEOS: Sustainable Wisdom: Integrating Indigenous Knowhow for Global Flourishing <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__sustainablewisdomatnd.com&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=Rvpl2ui-RHEEcS2Oh3cthKfErGvCHXhYMjykEGbYmJU&e= > Families for Conscious Living <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.familiesforconsciousliving.com_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=vcFj1O1MQOtt3UD3c-MOPJrFDU49tAZ4vtm0k8eIU_0&e= > ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1