Hi List,

  As an FYI, I offered the following comment on another list.

 

Best,
G

 

 

Hi Scott,

 

  I see you are a big fan of Kendler. I like Kendler, but he is so vague with his levels and what he means by mind relative to brain. And, IMO, his focus on the “empirical” misses where the real problem is, which is metaphysical. And, since he fails to give a clear metaphysical picture of mind, I don’t find his analyses all that compelling, although certainly better than a reductive biological stance.

 

If anyone is looking for a clear definition of mind relative to brain, I welcome folks to consider the ToK System map. In this “language game,” when we talk of “the mind” we are talking about the information instantiated within and processed by the brain/nervous system. Moreover, to see the mind and how it works, you need the concept of “informational interface,” which refers to how information is transferred across various mediums. The domains of human mental behavior are the domains of informational interface. First, we can talk about messaging between various parts of the brain. The nervous system is constantly engaged in communication and feedback within it.  We can “see” such information flow processes by following the energy trail.

 

Second, there is the phenomenological field. This is the “whole brain” theater of conscious experience. How this happens is complicated (the hard problem/the binding problem), but much progress is being made and it seems that whole brain frequencies create some sort of signature/ignition switch that allow for the interface between brain and conscious experience.

 

Third, there is the informational interface with the neuromuscular system that gives rise to actions. Overt behaviors are informational interface between the nervous system, mediated via muscles and then into “behaviors” that can be seen.

 

Fourth, in humans (in contrast to other animals) there is the informational interface via symbolic/syntactical language. That is our capacity to translate/symbolically tag our mental images into nouns (objects), verbs (change) adjectives (differences) and then share that informational content with others who speak the same language (and thus can engage in this kind of informational interface).

 

Here is a picture that captures the meanings of my terms.

I should note that we, right now, in this epoch, are witnessing the emergence of a fifth kind of informational interface, that of the direct exchange of mental information with computers. For a fascinating but also unnerving look as to how this is going to change things, I recommend the book, The Future of the Mind, although it is not very uplifting at the start given that the author is a theoretical physicist surveys the field and decides he can offer a better definition of consciousness than he sees out there (he fails, but it is not a positive comment on the current state of affairs in our field).

 

So, bottom line, Kendler is right when he starts (as he does in the 2005 article) that the metaphysics of substance dualism is all wrong. But given that, why, then, wouldn’t we want procede to get the metaphysics right?

 

According to the ToK, the universe is an unfolding wave of behavioral complexity that has given rise to different dimensions of complexity as a function of information processing/communication control systems. Genetic/epigenetic information processing and cell-cell communication gives rise to Life. Neuronal information processing, the coordination of the behavior of the animal as a whole and animal-animal communication gives rise to Mind. Symbolic language and person to person communication gives rise to Culture.

 

It is crystal clear from a ToK perspective that Kendler’s metaphysics of mind is inadequate because (a) he fails to differentiate animals from persons; (b) fails to solve the mentalism versus behaviorism problem; (c) and does not even offer a workable definition of mind. He offers no maps or pictures that help us see what he is talking about. Instead, he advocates for an empirical pluralism that really is basically the confused status quo, as far as I am concerned.

 

Best,

Gregg

 

 

 

 

 

 

And forgot to mention another favorite psychologist of mine, Jane Loevinger.  See:

 

Loevinger, J. (1957). Objective tests as instruments of psychological theory. Psychological Reports, 3, 635-694. (an old article and exceedingly challenging, but still well worth reading).

 

Loevinger, J. (1994). Has psychology lost its conscience?. Journal of Personality Assessment, 62, 2-8.

 

…Scott

 

 

Scott O. Lilienfeld, Ph.D.

Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor,

Department of Psychology, Room 473

Emory University

Editor, Clinical Psychological Science

Associate Editor, Archives of Scientific Psychology

President, Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology

36 Eagle Row

Atlanta, Georgia 30322

 

 

 

 

Hi All: When it comes to thinking clearly about psychopathology, I always recommend that our graduate students read psychiatrist Ken Kendler’s writings, which are thoughtful and accessible (it probably helps that Kendler’s father was a philosophically-oriented psychologist, Howard Kendler), e.g.,

 

Kendler, K. S. (2005). Toward a philosophical structure for psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 433-440.

 

Zachar, P., & Kendler, K. S. (2007). Psychiatric disorders: A conceptual taxonomy. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 557-565.

 

Kendler, K. S. (2008). Explanatory models for psychiatric illness. American Journal of Psychiatry, 165, 695-702.

 

Kendler, K. S. (2009). An historical framework for psychiatric nosology. Psychological Medicine, 39, 1935-1941.

 

Kendler, K. S. (2012). The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: Replacing the organic–functional/hardware–software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism. Molecular Psychiatry, 17, 377-388.

 

Some of my other favorite authors on philosophical/conceptual issues relevant to clinical psychology – Lee J. Cronbach, Donald Campbell, Paul Meehl,  Lee Sechrest, David Faust, Robyn Dawes, Peter Zachar, Bill O’Donohue, Dick McFall (I realize that Alan mentions some of these folks in his list). I don’t always agree with him (we’ve criticized each other in print over the years), but I always enjoy reading Jerome Wakefield’s writings on psychiatric classification – he’s a thoughtful scholar and clear thinker. Well worth reading too.

 

I have many Meehl favorites, but especially recommend:

 

Meehl, P. E. (1967). Theory-testing in psychology and physics: A methodological paradox. Philosophy of Science, 34, 103-115.

 

Meehl, P. E. (1977). Specific etiology and other forms of strong influence: Some quantitative meanings. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2, 33-53.

 

Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806-834.

 

Meehl, P. E. (1993). Philosophy of science: Help or hindrance?. Psychological Reports, 72, 707-733.

 

Take care…Scott

 

Scott O. Lilienfeld, Ph.D.

Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor,

Department of Psychology, Room 473

Emory University

Editor, Clinical Psychological Science

Associate Editor, Archives of Scientific Psychology

President, Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology

36 Eagle Row

Atlanta, Georgia 30322

 

 

 

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