- Root metaphors are not parochial metaphors, intended as models of specific phenomena. Rather, they inspire a unique vision of the world, conceived as a totality.
- A discrete mechanist views the universe as a machine (a "watch" of sorts). However, entities described in mechanistic theories need not be likened to machines (even as they are viewed as parts of some cosmic machine).
- Similarly, contextualism inspires a holistic vision of the world as a cosmic "historical event". But the phenomena modeled by scientists (e.g., electrons) need not echo this root metaphor in any obvious way (even as they are recognized as "strands" -- or "context" -- in some cosmic happening).
- I think it is easier to appreciate differences among world hypotheses by comparing their theories of truth (rather than simply comparing root metaphors)
- Formism: Correspondence Theory of Truth (see Episode 3)
- Mechanism: Causal-Adjustment Theory of Truth (see Episode 3) -- But I'm going to call this "attunement" theory, and I might suggest that the following statement (from one of your UTUA documents) echoes this theory: "I envisioned a special case where 'measurement' behavior would be identical to kinetic behavior"
- Contextualism: Truth as "successful functioning" or "verified hypotheses" (see Episode 4) -- A highly pragmatic theory (that need not preclude the modeling of electrons!).
- Organicism: Truth as coherence (coming soon)
Chance: I'm intrigued by your account of mysticism -- and the Star Wars connection! I similarly found myself vibrating in reaction to Pepper's account of the animistic world hypotheses (as there are echoes of animism in my thinking). I don't think Pepper is challenging regional claims advanced by animists and mystics. Rather, he is questioning whether they have sufficient scope and specificity to account for our world as we experience it in toto. Imagine it is 400 BC [the time of Plato] and a ship full of mystics heads off to Isolated Island #1, a ship full of formists heads off to Isolated Island #2, a and a ship full of mechanists heads off to Isolated Island #3. Each group starts a new civilization on their respective islands that lasts many thousands of years. We decide to check in on them once each century. How will history unfold differently on these three islands? I suspect that Pepper would anticipate that we'd be much less likely to witness the full flowering of science on Island #1. But what if one of these islands could sponsor (in the spirit of eclecticism) a "joint conference"? Perhaps they would finally appreciate how to make effective use of biofeedback machines.
Jason:
- You write: "Any thoughts on the tension between mechanism and contextualism? I would assume that there would be even greater tension there, since mechanism is analytic and integrative, while contextualism is synthetic and dispersive. (At least formism and contextualism are both dispersive.)"
- I think you are correct here. The main reason why I focus on the tension between formism and contextualism is the simple fact that I find this tension to be especially pronounced in the field of psychology (or at least social-personality psychology). There may also be personal reasons for this focus. As a recovering formist, I feel the tension between formism and contextualism. I merely appreciate the tension between mechanism and contextualism. I have a visceral reaction when I read trait psychology texts [and the animist in me experiences these texts as "The Medusa"!] However, when I read the connectionism literature in cognitive psychology [a nice example of mechanism], I'm merely intrigued.
- You write: "So would a contextualist posit something analogous to a Kantian-style "Copernican Revolution" where it is the world that must conform to our theories?"
- I think this is good way to put the matter. It clarifies that the contextualist is trying to steer clear of a correspondence theory of truth, even while acknowledging the value of model building.
- But the contextualist need not presume that the world is nothing more than a social construction. Rather, to borrow the language of William James, the world "is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future." [Pragmatism]
~ Steve Q.