Hello ToK Community

With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of the ToK/UTUA framework.  As many participants in this listserv are aware, Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.   

I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in the 1990’s.  At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism.  Yet I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close study of Pepper’s thought.  So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of California Press).

Why Pepper?  Why Now? 

•  As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions.  These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated” and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in relation to broader (and perhaps alternative) metaphysical systems.
• Given its scope and conceptual rigor, my intuition is that Stephen Pepper’s work will be of considerable value as I continue to work through these issues.  The description on the back cover of World Hypotheses offers some justification for this intuition:
•   “In setting forth his root-metaphor theory and examining six such hypotheses – animism, mysticism, formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism – Pepper surveys the whole field of metaphysics…The virtue of the root-metaphor method is that it puts metaphysics on a purely factual basis and pushes philosophical issues back to the interpretation of evidence” (emphasis added). 

Procedural matters:

• My intent in this thread is to proceed with a close reading of Pepper’s text, several chapters at a time.   My next post (scheduled for Sunday, January 7) will focus on Chapters 1-4.   Anyone with a copy of World Hypotheses is welcome to read along and offer corrections and/or clarifications.   But, in case you can’t do the reading, I will try to make sure my outlines are sufficiently clear that they would make sense to everyone on this listserv.
• For the time being, I will limit myself to elaborating and clarifying the thought of Stephen Pepper.  The purpose of this thread is not to articulate my own point of view. That will come later.  Others are certainly free to offer critical comments from whatever vantage point they wish.  My replies will simply reflect my effort to articulate how I think Pepper might respond to the matter at hand. [Of course, I may misinterpret Pepper; in which case, I hope to be corrected.  Indeed, I anticipate that my understanding of Pepper will evolve considerably over the course of this project.]
•  Although the positions articulated in this thread are not my own, I will nevertheless frequently generate original examples to illustrate the arguments that I believe Pepper is trying to make.  To render as clear as possible the distinction between Pepper’s writings and my own elaborations, I will provide page references for all ideas and examples that can be found in World Hypotheses.    
•  When we reach the end of Pepper’s (1942) text, I will proceed to Phase 2 of this venture: How does the ToK/UTUA framework stands in relation to Root Metaphor theory?   

 As noted above, I will begin this inquiry with a close reading of Chapters 1-4.  These chapters include a discussion of the distinction (quite important to Pepper) between “multiplicative” and “structural” corroboration (and the corresponding difference between “data” and “dandum”).      

But it seems appropriate to end this post with a (hopefully enticing) “sneak preview of coming attractions”.   In the opening paragraphs of World Hypotheses, Pepper (1942) observes that “among the variety of objects which we find in the world are hypotheses about the world itself” (p. 1).  Examples cited by Pepper include the worldviews implicit in Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and Descartes’s Meditations.  To his list, we might add Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams, Skinner’s Beyond Freedom & Dignity, and Rogers’ On Becoming a Person. 

In Chapter 5, Pepper offers four maxims pertaining to world hypotheses:

• Maxim I: “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor" (p. 96). 
•  Maxim II: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
•   "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
• Maxim III: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
• "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually exclusive.  A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing" (p. 104)
• Maxim IV: “Concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113)

If you share an interest in the issues reflected in this introductory e-mail, then I invite you to accompany me on a journey through the work of Stephen Pepper. The next installment of this series (focusing on Chapters 1-4) is scheduled for Sunday, January 7. 

~ Steve Quackenbush

P.S.,: My edition of World Hypotheses includes two subtitles.  On the cover, the subtitle is "Prolegomena to systematic philosophy and a complete survey of metaphysics".  On the first page, the subtitle is "A Study in Evidence".   Both subtitles are appropriate, but I think the former more appropriately reflects the incredible ambition of the text.