Thanks for the various comments and questions in response to the first
installment of my commentary on Steven Pepper's *World Hypotheses*.
I should note that it has been many years since I have looked at the book
(except, of course, Chapters 1-4), and I must confess that I have forgotten
much of it. So there are certain questions that I'm not yet able to
answer. That said, I will keep a list of questions and try to address each
of them by the time we finish the book.
Here I would like to comment on the first of Ali's questions: "Is there a
term when multiplicative corroboration (data) and structural corroboration
(danda) are in agreement?"
I don't yet know if there is a *term* for such agreement. But I can
certainly *imagine* (if not yet formally conceive) the perfect harmony of
data and danda.
In Chapter 3, Pepper provides a nice example of an apparent *tension*
between data and danda. As any such tension implies the (conceptual)
possibility of genuine harmony, it might be illuminating to briefly
consider this example here (which I will embellish it in my own way)
Suppose I join four friends on a road trip to take a tour of Stephen King's
neighborhood (and see his rather unique house) in Bangor, Maine. Its a
long trek, so we decide to stay in a cheap motel in a rural community just
outside of Bangor the night before the scheduled tour. At 11:30pm, I
decide to visit the lobby to get a snack from a vending machine. Nobody is
around (as the staff retires at 9pm) and the lights are dim. Suddenly I
see something in front of the glass door leading to the parking lot. *I**ts
a ghost!* I can hardly believe it: *there is a ghost in the lobby of this
motel and it is whistling a tune! *
I knock on my friends' doors and ask them to come check out the ghost in
the lobby. They follow me back to the door where the ghost had appeared
and -- lo and behold -- it is still there! Ask my friends: "Do you see
it?", and they all reply "Yes!" The ghost stares at us for awhile, but
then glides though the glass door, moves across the parking lot, and
disappears into a nearby forest.
I turn on the lights and we all sit down in the lobby. After taking a few
moments to catch our breath, we share our reports of what we saw. The
following agreement is reached:
- We witnessed a strange apparition.
- It looked a lot like Casper (which helps explain why none of us were
very scared).
- It seemed to be whistling a tune of some sort. Four of us agree that
the tune was the theme to the old TV show *Cheers,* but one of us
reports that he wasn't wearing his hearing aid and thus couldn't quite
decipher the tune.
We have here a nice example of multiplicative corroboration. We all report
that we've seen a ghost and we agree on various features of the case
(including the fact that it defied the laws of physics and glided right
though the glass door). Of course, this is not "pure" multiplicative
collaboration. But we have achieved at least a certain degree of
objectivity. What I saw wasn't *simply* a figment of my imagination,
because others saw it too.
The question, of course, is: *was it a ghost*?
The problem here is that multiplicative collaboration (which I've achieved
to a modest degree) stands in tension with structural collaboration.
Here's how Pepper puts the matter:
- “Ghosts...are repeatedly observed by earnest persons, and consistently
doubted by most scientists and philosophers. Ghosts are doubted because as
observed facts they do not fit into the structure of accredited theories
and because in terms of these theories they can be easily explained away as
highly interpreted perceptions” (p. 50).
According to Pepper, "it appears...that between the two types of critical
evidence [data and danda] there is a tension somewhat comparable to that
between critical evidence as a whole and uncritical common-sense evidence"
(p. 51).
We have many mysteries left to solve, not the least of which is: *what
precisely does it mean to achieve structural corroboration*? In other
words, what does it mean to say that *a fact is in harmony with a fact*?
Note: In my last post, I glibly stated that structural corroboration is
concerned with how things "hang together", realizing full well that this
phrase (which I acknowledged as my own) does little justice to the richness
and complexity of Pepper's thought. "But", I said to myself, "its good
enough for now".
Well, as I was writing this email, I skimmed the conclusion of the book,
and found the following passage:
- "The characteristic of danda as distinct from data, we showed,
consisted in the close dependence of the items of evidence upon the theory
which organized them. In structural corroboration the description and
precise determination of any item of evidence is qualified by the other
items of evidence which bear upon it. The whole structure of
evidence *hangs
together*. When the structure is conceived as wholly abstracted from
the evidence, we call it the theory or hypothesis; and when the various
items organized by the structure are considered in abstraction from their
structure, they are called evidences for the hypothesis. Actually the two
are mutually determinative, and they become more and more so, the more
extensive and rigorous the structural corroboration. The term 'danda' for
the evidential items of structural corroboration connotes this close
interdependency of fact and theory in the refinements of structural
corroboration." (pp. 323-324, emphasis added)
In addition to the fortuitous inclusion of my own glib phrase ("hangs
together"), this passage provides a very nice summary of a major theme of
the text (and may indirectly address Ali's questions).
I'll try to respond to other comments in the next few days...
~ Steve Q.
~ Steve Q.
On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 11:51 AM, nysa71 <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
> As I read Steve's outline of *World Hypotheses*, chapters 1-4, I can't
> help but (initially) notice some similarities with Carl Jung's views on
> cognitive functions as outlined in his book, Psychological Types
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__psychclassics.yorku.ca_Jung_types.htm&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=6HV1L-e6FMqiVibmbK9GBra4VejXM3Os5qjBS1isM5M&s=Pdlxvyy1ACS6dDymvgMy3evtX3XYEFiKYCh2lODfYfA&e=>
> *.*
>
> (Interestingly, as a side note, Jung's motivation was to *reconcile the
> theories* of Freud and Adler by focusing on the differences in their
> personalities...their "personal psychologies", so to speak. )
>
>
> If I'm reading this right, the distinctions that Pepper is making seem to
> correspond with the distinction that Jung made between what he called
> "Extraverted Thinking" and "Introverted Thinking".
>
> Extraverted Thinking (Te) refers to judgements that employs *inductive*
> reasoning, based on *data.*
>
> Introverted Thinking (Ti) refers to judgements that employs *deductive* reasoning,
> based on *concepts.*
>
> Jung also distinguished between two types of preferred information:
> Sensation & Intuition, (the former being basically *concrete*
> information, the latter being basically *abstract* information), which he
> called "Perceiving functions".
>
> Extraverted Sensation (Se) refers to concrete information here in the
> *present*.
>
> Introverted Sensation (Si) refers to concrete information stored from the
> *past*.
>
> Extraverted Intuition (Ne) focuses on future possibilities, and is thus
> *divergent* in its possibilities.
>
> Introverted Intuition (Ni) focuses on a singular future possibility, and
> is thus *convergent* on a singular possibility.
>
> It should also be noted that Jung spoke of two other types of "Judgement"
> based on "Feeling", which (in part) are *value-based* judgements:
>
> Extraverted Feeling (Fe) refers to judgments based (in part) on *general*
> *inter*personal values.
>
> Introverted Feeling (Fi) refers to judgements based (in part) on *specific
> intra*personal values.
>
> So as I look at all this, (and at the risk of grossly oversimplifying all
> this), what I see (intuit?) is:
>
> Te, Ni, Se, & Fi together corresponding with Multiplicative Corroboration
> and Local Hypotheses, stopping when it reaches limited scope.
>
> Ti, Ne, Si, & Fe together corresponding with Structural Corroboration and
> World Hypotheses, not stopping until it reaches unlimited scope.
>
>
> Have a good one,
> Jason Bessey
>
>
> Classics in the History of Psychology -- Jung (1921/1923) Chapter 10
>
> CHAPTER X
>
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__psychclassics.yorku.ca_Jung_types.htm&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=6HV1L-e6FMqiVibmbK9GBra4VejXM3Os5qjBS1isM5M&s=Pdlxvyy1ACS6dDymvgMy3evtX3XYEFiKYCh2lODfYfA&e=>
>
>
> .
> On Monday, January 8, 2018, 7:30:56 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>
> I agree with Waldemar and Ali. That was a super cool outline.
>
>
>
> I would like to offer two links here.
>
>
>
> First a link to an earlier post/discussion. Recall I spoke earlier of
> different levels of justification systems. Level 1 was standard, normal
> conventional. Level 2 was academic scientific. That is very much parallel
> with the distinction here between common sense and refined knowledge.
>
>
>
> Second, let me comment that the distinction between “data” and “danda”
> parallels the ToK/UTUA language game of “empirical” (meaning information
> through the senses, which can be done either commonly or scientifically)
> and “metaphysical/conceptual” (meaning the structure of understanding that
> pulls data together to make sense into, in an ideal sense, an ideal world
> hypothesis).
>
>
>
> Now, in the center of the tree in the UTUA Garden is the M.E. flower
> symbol:
>
> The M stands for Metaphysical and the E stands for Empirical. Notice that
> it consists of yin-yang symbol, suggesting a dialectic between the two that
> gives it a whole. Also, notice it consists of a “Big M.E.” in the center
> and a bunch of little “me”s around the edges. The Big ME refers to the
> large scale system of justification that folks believe in. The little mes
> refer to each individual person.
>
>
>
> That this is on the trunk of the tree in the Garden of UTUA shows deep
> parallels with Pepper’s vision of a “Tree of Knowledge.”
>
>
>
> The journey through World Hypotheses is off to a brilliant start!
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gregg
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Sent from Mail
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=6HV1L-e6FMqiVibmbK9GBra4VejXM3Os5qjBS1isM5M&s=7MpuouX6N5eY0St47wD0pefZeAZtcjV6wm9tFcorP-U&e=>
> for Windows 10
>
>
>
> *From: *Kenny, Alexis Catherine - kennyac (Dukes) <[log in to unmask]>
> *Sent: *Monday, January 8, 2018 6:49 AM
> *To: *[log in to unmask]
> *Subject: *Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>
>
>
> Steve,
>
>
> This was very interesting to review. I enjoyed the outline format. Thank
> you so much for putting this together! What work!
>
>
> I do have one question, which I may have very well missed:
>
>
> - Is there a term when multiplicative corroboration (data) and structural
> corroboration (danda) are in agreement? Would that be considered "
> idealdata"? Or is a prerequisite, if you will, of danda that it first be
> data?
>
>
> Warmly,
>
>
> Ali
>
>
> *Alexis (Ali) Kenny*, M.A.
>
> Clinical and School Psychology Doctoral Candidate
>
> Division 52 - International Psychology: Membership Committee, Student
> Representative
>
> James Madison University - Harrisonburg, VA
>
> email: [log in to unmask]
> ------------------------------
> *De:* tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]>
> en nombre de Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD <[log in to unmask]>
> *Enviado:* lunes, enero 08, 2018 12:15:41 AM
> *Para:* [log in to unmask]
> *Asunto:* Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>
> Steve:
>
> Wonderfully done and most stimulating.
> Thank you for this.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Waldemar
>
> Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
> (Perseveret et Percipiunt)
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:57 PM, Steven Quackenbush <
> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
> Hello ToK community,
>
> Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread. The focus of
> this post is *World Hypotheses*, Chapters 1-4. My reflections today are
> largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage
> for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory.
>
> Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place
> where most of us began our intellectual journey: *common sense.* For
> Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we
> ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell
> and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39).
>
> Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of
> “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude”
> described by phenomenologists. For Pepper, the world of common sense can
> be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” –
> i.e., *we can always fall back on it*:
>
>
> - “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we
> completely give up trying to know anything, then is precisely when we know
> things in the common-sense way. In that lies the security of common sense”
> (p. 43).
>
> But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively
> irritable”:
>
>
> - “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging,
> contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized,
> rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt,
> playfully enjoyed, and so forth. One may accept common sense and
> thoughtlessly roam in its pasture, but if one looks up and tries to take it
> in, it is like a fantastic dream. To the serious cognizer it is like a bad
> dream. For the serious cognizer feels responsible to fact and principle,
> and common sense is utterly irresponsible” (p. 43)
> - Common sense is “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word,
> irritable” (p. 44).
>
> Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected
> to criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes
> “refined knowledge” or “critical cognition” (p. 47). How do we achieve
> this transformation?
>
>
> - For Pepper, “*all critical evidence becomes critical only as a
> result of the addition of corroborative evidence*. The work of
> legitimate criticism in cognition, then, is corroboration” (p. 47, emphasis
> added)
>
> Corroboration can take one of two forms:
>
>
> - *1) Multiplicative corroboration (data):* i.e., The agreement of
> “man with man.” (p. 47).
> - An obvious example of this is the notion of interjudge (or
> interrater) reliability, as understood by psychometricians
> - But, as discussed below, the notion of multiplicative
> corroboration has an important role to play in any scientific enterprise.
> - *2) Structural corroboration (danda):* i.e., The agreement of “fact
> with fact” (p. 47)
> - An obvious example of this is the “principle of converging
> evidence” in science.
> - Pepper’s example: I might evaluate whether a chair is strong
> enough to bear my weight by considering (a) the kind of wood with which it
> is made, (b) the reputation of the company that put together the chair, and
> (c) the fact that the chair shows evidence of wear (suggesting that “many
> people had successfully sat in it”). It is by “putting all this evidence
> together” that I “feel justified in believe that the chair is a strong
> chair” (p. 49)
> - But, insofar as stuctural corroboration is concerned with how a
> multiplicity of facts “hang together” [my phrase], the quest for such
> corroboration will inevitably pull us in the direction of theory. As I
> entertain structural hypotheses, I’m not simply interested in *this*
> or *that *set of data*.* Rather, I’m interested in how the data I
> observe *coheres* with other things we think we know. The nature
> of this coherence is a *theoretical* puzzle.
>
> On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (or *data* collection) is
> synonymous with the notion of *objectivity* in science. It reflects the
> idea that what we see would be described *in precisely the same way* by
> anyone else (given the appropriate level of training):
>
>
> - In Pepper’s words, “the search for multiplicative corroboration is
> the effort on the part of a datum to confirm its claim to purity. It is as
> though a datum turned from one observer to another and asked, Am I not just
> what I said I was?....Are there not some data that never vary, no matter
> who the observer and, if possible, no matter what his point of view? If
> such there are, these are ideal data” (p. 52).
>
> Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not
> available” (p. 52). Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been
> developed in the course of cognitive history” (p. 52). Specifically, Pepper
> highlights “two genuses of refined data”:
>
>
> - *Refined empirical data*: “pointer readings and correlations among
> pointer readings” (p. 52)
> - *Refined logical data:* “evidence for the validity of logical and
> mathematical transitions and for those organizations of such transitions
> which are called logical and mathematic systems” (p. 57).
>
> Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the quest
> for highly refined empirical and logical data. But there are several
> threats to the program of the dogmatic positivist:
>
>
> - The scarcity of refined data
> - “The refined empirical data presently at our disposal cover a
> very small field of nature” (p. 63)
> - “Outside of the fields of physics and chemistry, refined data
> play a secondary role and are rarely capable of expression in the form of a
> deductive mathematical system” (p. 63)
> - The metaphysical poverty of refined data
> - “In order to set up refined data as the sole norm of evidence, it
> is necessary to *deny* the claims of danda, derived from various
> structural world theories, as alternative norms of evidence” (pp. 67, 69)
> - In other words, the dogmatic positivist intends to let the *data
> speak for themselves*, free of the influence of danda (which we
> might consider as a facet of a metaphysical system).
> - But, if we really wish to drive such danda out of our refined
> cognition, “*multiplicative corroboration alone will not do this*,
> for it only establishes the data it establishes, and neither affirms nor
> denies the claims of any facts other than those, like pointer readings, by
> which man corroborates man” (p. 69, emphasis added)
>
> In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and
> structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70).
> What, though, does it mean to make *structural* claims (of any sort)?
>
>
> - For starters, structural hypotheses necessarily make statements
> concerning “the structure of the world” (p. 74) – i.e., how things “hang
> together”.
> - But – and this is quite a striking claim – “*structural
> corroboration does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope*” (p. 77,
> emphasis added)
> - Why?
> - Because: “as long as there are outlying facts which might not
> corroborate the facts already organized by the structural hypothesis, so
> long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable” (p. 77).
> - An “ideal structural hypothesis”, then, “is one that all facts
> will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 77)
> - “*Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis*” (p. 77, emphasis added).
>
> Comments regarding “world hypotheses”:
>
>
> - They necessarily include *data *[and not just *danda*]
> - It “draws data within its scope as well as everything else” (p.
> 78)§
> - “It, therefore, does not reject but acquires the cognitive
> force of multiplicative corroboration as well as that of structural
> corroboration” (pp. 78-79)
> - “Cognition needs both types of refinement [data and danda] as
> much as a bird needs two wings” (p. 79)
> - Nevertheless, in a world hypothesis, *data are ultimately
> subordinated to danda*.
> - As a rough approximation of what Pepper is driving at, we might
> consider a world hypothesis as a framework that allows us to *render
> data meaningful*.
> - Or, to employ Gregg's language: "*all factual/empirical claims
> are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is
> to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort
> of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to
> SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about
> chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees
> nothing)."*
> - In a world hypothesis, evidence and interpretation are “merged” (p.
> 79).
> - “…it is impossible to say where pure fact ends and
> interpretation of fact begins” (p. 79).
>
> As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field
> of psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the discipline: *Psychology
> is* *the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.*
>
>
> - Ignoring (for the sake of simplification) the notion of “mental
> processes”, we can certainly agree that “behavior” falls within the
> psychologist’s scope of inquiry.
> - But how – in practice – do we identify a *unit *of behavior? When
> does a given behavior begin? When does it end? And is it really
> meaningful to speak of “behavior” in the abstract, or is the concept always
> qualified in some way? After all, a personality psychologist never studies
> “behavior” *per se*, but *aggressive* behavior, *conscientious*
> behavior, etc. In other words, personality psychologists study
> *patterns* of behavior – and the identification of such patterns is
> inevitably theory-driven.
>
> On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs *“A Tree of
> Knowledge”* (!):
>
>
> - At the bottom of the figure is a box labelled “Roots of knowledge”
> (and it includes “dubitanda”, Pepper’s rather odd term for “common sense
> facts”).
> - The tree (originating out of the box) has *two major trunks* (which
> makes for a rather strange-looking tree!):
> - Trunk #1: Data – Beginning with “rough data” and then branching
> into “scientific data” and “logical data”
> - Trunk #2: Danda – Beginning with “rough danda” and then branching
> into “formistic danda”, “mechanistic danda”, “contextual danda”, and
> “organismic danda”
> - Above the six branches of data and danda sits the phrase: “fruits of
> knowledge”
>
> In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January
> 14), we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know
> if you have any questions, comments, or corrections pertaining to this
> episode!
>
> ~ Steve Quackenbush
>
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
> This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It
> will be the next topic for us to journey on.
>
>
>
> Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I
> thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is
> incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh
> in now.
>
>
>
> Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World
> Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, *The
> UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy*, I
> especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often
> they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their
> formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)?
>
>
>
> At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of
> human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about
> adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real
> persons, and* not* bring a worldview to what we do?
>
>
>
> In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing from
> psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical psychology
> tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to factual claims
> about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, and I think he
> is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims are understood
> from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense
> out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of
> concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a
> chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice
> looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing).
>
>
>
> Enjoy the journey!
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gregg
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Sent from Mail
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hcgEWNgGBY5zBJvvRP2GG3r87id5mXF-VcFbar1Bg-A&s=d5or990N2srKYiXwxcK2dCHk2PbnGO0IezvlQ8AI-YM&e=>
> for Windows 10
>
>
>
> *From: *Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]>
> *Sent: *Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
> *To: *[log in to unmask]
> *Subject: *Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>
>
>
> Hello ToK Community
>
> With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the
> implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of
> the ToK/UTUA framework. As many participants in this listserv are aware,
> Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his
> “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never
> encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.
>
> I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in
> the 1990’s. At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among
> the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism. Yet
> I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close
> study of Pepper’s thought. So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread
> is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: *World
> Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence* (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of
> California Press).
>
> Why Pepper? Why Now?
>
>
> - As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself
> puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions.
> These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and
> science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated”
> and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in relation
> to broader (and perhaps alternative) metaphysical systems.
> - Given its scope and conceptual rigor, my intuition is that Stephen
> Pepper’s work will be of considerable value as I continue to work through
> these issues. The description on the back cover of *World Hypotheses*
> offers some justification for this intuition:
> - “In setting forth his root-metaphor theory and examining six
> such hypotheses – animism, mysticism, formism, mechanism, contextualism,
> and organicism – *Pepper surveys the whole field of metaphysics*…The
> virtue of the root-metaphor method is that it puts metaphysics on a purely
> factual basis and pushes philosophical issues back to the interpretation of
> evidence” (emphasis added).
>
> Procedural matters:
>
>
> - My intent in this thread is to proceed with a close reading of
> Pepper’s text, several chapters at a time. My next post (scheduled for
> Sunday, January 7) will focus on Chapters 1-4. Anyone with a copy of *World
> Hypotheses* is welcome to read along and offer corrections and/or
> clarifications. But, in case you can’t do the reading, I will try to make
> sure my outlines are sufficiently clear that they would make sense to
> everyone on this listserv.
> - For the time being, I will limit myself to elaborating and
> clarifying the thought of Stephen Pepper. The purpose of this thread is
> not to articulate my own point of view. That will come later. Others are
> certainly free to offer critical comments from whatever vantage point they
> wish. My replies will simply reflect my effort to articulate how I think
> Pepper might respond to the matter at hand. [Of course, I may misinterpret
> Pepper; in which case, I hope to be corrected. Indeed, I anticipate that
> my understanding of Pepper will evolve considerably over the course of this
> project.]
> - Although the positions articulated in this thread are not my own, I
> will nevertheless frequently generate original examples to illustrate the
> arguments that I believe Pepper is trying to make. To render as clear as
> possible the distinction between Pepper’s writings and my own elaborations,
> I will provide page references for all ideas and examples that can be found
> in *World Hypotheses*.
> - When we reach the end of Pepper’s (1942) text, I will proceed to
> Phase 2 of this venture: How does the ToK/UTUA framework stands in relation
> to Root Metaphor theory?
>
> As noted above, I will begin this inquiry with a close reading of
> Chapters 1-4. These chapters include a discussion of the distinction
> (quite important to Pepper) between “multiplicative” and “structural”
> corroboration (and the corresponding difference between “data” and
> “dandum”).
>
> But it seems appropriate to end this post with a (hopefully enticing)
> “sneak preview of coming attractions”. In the opening paragraphs of *World
> Hypotheses*, Pepper (1942) observes that “among the variety of objects
> which we find in the world are hypotheses about the world itself” (p. 1).
> Examples cited by Pepper include the worldviews implicit in Plato’s*
> Republic*, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, and Descartes’s *Meditations*. To
> his list, we might add Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams*, Skinner’s *Beyond
> Freedom & Dignity*, and Rogers’ *On Becoming a Person*.
>
> In Chapter 5, Pepper offers four maxims pertaining to world hypotheses:
>
>
> - *Maxim I:* “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor"
> (p. 96).
> - *Maxim II*: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
> - "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of
> one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both
> hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
> - *Maxim III*: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
> - "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually
> exclusive. A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing" (p. 104)
> - *Maxim IV*: “Concepts which have lost contact with their root
> metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113)
>
> If you share an interest in the issues reflected in this introductory
> e-mail, then I invite you to accompany me on a journey through the work of
> Stephen Pepper. The next installment of this series (focusing on Chapters
> 1-4) is scheduled for Sunday, January 7.
>
> ~ Steve Quackenbush
>
> P.S.,: My edition of *World Hypotheses* includes two subtitles. On the
> cover, the subtitle is "Prolegomena to systematic philosophy and a complete
> survey of metaphysics". On the first page, the subtitle is "A Study in
> Evidence". Both subtitles are appropriate, but I think the former more
> appropriately reflects the incredible ambition of the text.
>
>
>
>
> ############################
>
> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF-
> [log in to unmask]
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]> or click the
> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-
> bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
> <http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1>
> ############################
>
> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF-
> [log in to unmask]
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]> or click the
> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-
> bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
> <http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1>
>
>
> ############################
>
> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:
> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the
> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=
> 1
>
> ############################
>
> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:
> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the
> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=
> 1
> ############################
>
> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:
> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the
> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=
> 1
> ############################
>
> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:
> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the
> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=
> 1
> ############################
>
> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:
> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the
> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=
> 1
>
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list:
write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]
or click the following link:
http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1