On Jan 16, 2018, at 6:10 PM, nysa71 <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Clues to the possible Latin etymology of "danda" and "dubitanda":

dandus m (feminine danda, neuter dandum); first/second declension

1. which is to be given
   
   

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/dandus#Participle

dubitandus m (feminine dubitanda, neuter dubitandum); first/second declension

1. which is to be doubted or questioned
2. which is to be deliberated or considered
   
   

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/dubitandus#Latin

~ Jason Bessey

On Tuesday, January 16, 2018, 5:26:11 PM EST, [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Steve:

Thank you for the reply about terminology.

I suspect your idea that these might be neologisms is as much answer as we’ll find.

And, again, thank you for doing this.

It is a tremendous amount of work and thought.

We all benefit from your largesse.

I like your “season one, episode 2” link to TV - a Masterpiece Theater production for the intellect! 🧐

Best regards,

Waldemar

Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044

Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)

On Jan 16, 2018, at 1:58 PM, Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Hello ToK Community, 

Thanks for the various comments and questions.  I promise that I will try to address them all eventually.   But I want to finish reviewing the four "relatively adequate" world hypotheses before I explore the implications (or corollaries) of Pepper's approach.  

Here, I'd like to offer a few thoughts regarding eclecticism to supplement my previous e-mail (a "deleted scene" of sorts).  

On Eclecticism:

Pepper informs us that "eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104). But, as Pepper is offering a complete survey of metaphysics, his understanding of (metaphysical) eclecticism may differ from the way the term is ordinarily used in psychology journals.  

Lazarus & Beutler (1993), for example, begin their discussion of eclecticism by acknowledging that "many counselors and clinicians have realized that one true path to understanding and correcting human problems does not exist -- no single orientation has all the answers" (p. 381). 

But these authors are concerned that "the haphazard mishmash of divergent bits and pieces, and the syncretistic muddle of idiosyncratic and ineffable clinical creations, are the antithesis of what effective and efficient counseling represents" (p. 71).  This sort of theoretical scrap quilt is dubbed unsystematic eclecticism.  

One alternative to such undignified eclecticism is theoretical integrationism, where two or more imperfect theories (or approaches to counseling) presumably achieve some sort of synergistic effect when combined.  

• e.g., (1) the focus on insight associated with psychodynamic theory, + (2) the concern with action associated with behavioral theory, = (3) a much more adequate behavioral- psychodymic theory (where the whole, it seems, is much greater than the parts). 
  
• "Does this not argue for merging psychodynamic and behavioral formulations?" (p. 382).
• Lazarus & Beutler reply: "Emphatically not!" (p. 382). 

What's wrong with theoretical integrationism?

• According to Lazarus & Beutler (1993), "We lack criteria to determine what portions or pieces of each theory to preserve or expunge....Such criteria are not available and it is uncertain whether the value that might exist in these theories could be retained in a truncated and combined form" (p. 382)
  
• e.g., "How would one assess whether to introduce systematic desensitization before, during, or after the exploration of defense mechanisms?" (p. 383)
  
• "In general, when looking through these two divergent lenses, how would the counselor know whether and when to explore mental conflict rather than promote reparative action?" (p. 383)
  

As an alternative to both unsystematic eclecticism and theoretical eclecticism, Lazarus & Beutler (1993) consider technical eclecticism, an approach whereby practitioners "select procedures from different sources without necessarily subscribing to the theories that spawned them" (p. 383).  

• "They work within a preferred theory...but recognize that few techniques are inevitably wedded to any theory" (p. 384).  
• "Hence they borrow techniques from other orientations, based on the proven worth of these procedures" (p. 384).

We can think what we will about "technical eclecticism" (as defined here), but it should be clear that it has little to do with Pepper's discussion.  Technical eclectics remain firmly grounded in a single world hypothesis and are thus not "eclectic" in his sense.  

Regarding "theoretical integrationism", it might be said that the picture is not as bleak as Lazarus and Beutler (1993) suggest.  Perhaps there is a way to sew together the various scraps that are worth saving from alternative theoretical frameworks (e.g., behaviorism, psychoanalysis), and do so in a manner that makes good theoretical sense.  But these frameworks are not "world hypotheses", as understood by Pepper.    

A metaphysical world hypothesis is a synthesis of ontology and epistemology.  It doesn't merely account for the "way things are", it plays a role in determining what there is "to account for" in the first place.  Thus, working with multiple world hypotheses is not really akin to patching together a quilt.  Rather, it is like trying to play both checkers and chess on the same board, at the same time.  "Confusing", to say the least!  

I'd like to suggest that eclecticism, in Pepper's sense, is the exception to the rule in the field of psychology.  The typical student learns early on that psychology is the science of behavior and mental processes.  And then, in a series of required statistics and methods courses, assimilates a more-or-less-unified account of the scientific enterprise.  The point of view eventually be adopted by the well-socialized psychology student is wonderfully articulated in Keith Stanovich's classic text, How to Think Straight about Psychology.   Of course, there are epistemological variations (family squabbles, of sorts).  But most of us begin our work with a more-or-less agreed upon framework for asking and answering questions.   From this point of view, a certain sort of theoretical (but not metaphysical) eclecticism seems quite reasonable.  Insofar as we remain firmly grounded in our (relatively refined) philosophy of science, we have the cognitive tools necessary to sew together the pieces from many boxes of scraps.   

P.S. #1, Waldemar: I've been looking into the question regarding the etymology of the terms "danda" and "dubitanda."   I haven't found anything to suggest the terms precede Pepper.  Perhaps they are neologisms.  [Can anyone offer assistance here?]

P.S. #2: Jason: I'm especially intrigued by your suggestion that metaphysical eclecticism may involve a regression (or sorts) back to mysticism or animism.  e.g., If I lose touch with my (relatively refined) root metaphor, perhaps I'll be tempted by what Pepper describes as an "emotion theory of truth" (mysticism).  

P.S. #3: Darcia: Thanks for the Developmental Systems Theory link.  I will read the material and offer comments in a subsequent post.  I tried to click on the Overton PowerPoint link, but ended up with a "page not found" error.

 

~ Steve Q.  

  

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 9:10 PM, nysa71 <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

A few questions...

Since mysticism is inadequate in scope, and animism is inadequate in precision, could mysticism be considered an unrefined and inadequate integrative hypothesis, and animism an unrefined and  inadequate dispersive hypothesis?

If so, could both Mechanism and Organicism be conceived as significant refinements of Mysticism, and could Formism and Contextualism be conceived as significant refinements of Animism?

Or conversely, could Mysticism be conceived as an unrefined eclectic of proto-Mechanism and proto-Organicism, and Animism be conceived of as an unrefined eclectic of proto-Formism and proto-Contextualism?

Indeed, could Eclecticism be conceived --- not as progress --- but ultimately as a regression to Mysticism and Animism?

~ Jason Bessey

On Sunday, January 14, 2018, 10:23:39 PM EST, Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 

 

Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses: Season 1, Episode 2

 

Narrator: “Previously on World Hypotheses:” 

• We began with “common sense” (the dubitanda). 
• Though “secure” (because we can always fall back on it), common sense is nevertheless “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, irritable” (p. 44).
• As such, we are driven to “refine” (or criticize) cognition. 
• For Pepper, “all critical evidence becomes critical only as a result of the addition of corroborative evidence” (p. 47)
• Corroboration can take one of two forms:
• Multiplicative corroboration: agreement among persons (consensus)
• This generates data that can vary from rough to refined, depending on the extent or quality of corroboration.  The fact that my four friends and I just saw Casper the Ghost is merely “rough data” (as I have no reason to believe that my skeptical brother will see things the same way whenever he shows up).   Scores on the NEO-PI are relatively refined [insofar as everyone can see that Andrew scored one standard deviation below the mean on the agreeableness subscale]
• The refinement of data, it would appear, is the path to achieving objectivity in science – i.e., interpretations free of idiosyncratic biases 
• Structural corroboration: agreement among facts
• This generates danda that can vary from rough to refined, depending on the extent or quality of corroboration.
• The notion of structural corroboration is rather mysterious at this point.  What does it mean for a fact to agree with a fact?  A simple example is the principle of converging evidence, where multiples sources of information point me in the same direction (e.g., it is safe to sit on this chair because it is made of solid wood, the manufacturer can be trusted, etc.).  But as our theories grow more complex, it is not always clear what evidence would serve to corroborate a specific theoretical claim.   E.g., what facts can we highlight in support of Melanie Klein’s “object relations” theory?  And how do we determine the adequacy of this theory relative to competing accounts of the same phenomena?  Do we simply count up the number of corroborations [such that each theory gets a “corroboration score”] or are some corroborations worth more than others? 
• Whereas multiplicative corroboration offers us consensus, structural corroboration advances understanding. 
• Our goal is ultimately to make sense of our universe, to grasp how it all “hangs together”.

 

World Hypotheses, Chapters 5-7. 

• A world hypothesis is a hypothesis about “the world itself” (p. 1). 
•  But how do we generate world hypotheses?
•  Pepper offers his “root metaphor theory” as “a hypothesis concerning the origins of world theories” (p. 84; emphasis added)
• The fact that this is just a hypothesis implies that there may be other ways to generate theories about the world.  The value of studying world hypotheses (of whatever sort) is not contingent on the truth of root metaphor theory. 
• Pepper observes that root metaphor theory “is itself a structural hypothesis” that must ultimately be supported by “an adequate world theory”
• But Pepper also acknowledges that we are not yet in possession of a perfect world theory:
• “Ideally, we should pass directly from dubitanda and data to fully adequate danda which would exhibit all things cognitively in their proper order.  Unfortunately, danda are not at present nearly adequate” (p. 86).
• We are entitled to ask: Why do our world theories fall short of our cognitive ideal?
• Pepper’s root metaphor theory is an effort explain how we have developed our less-than-perfect world hypotheses.
• The root metaphor theory is “in the nature of a rough dandum” (p. 86, emphasis added).
• It “definitely does not legislate over world theories except so far as these voluntarily accept and refine it” (p. 86).
• “On the contrary, an adequate world theory by virtue of its refinement legislates over this theory or any like it. There is no reliable cognitive appeal beyond an adequate world theory.  But when world theories show themselves to be inadequate we accept what makeshifts we can find.  This root-metaphor theory is such a makeshift.  Its purpose is to squeeze out all the cognitive values that can found in the world theories we have and to supply a receptacle in which their juices may be collected, so that they will not dry up from dogmatism, or be wasted over the ground through the indiscriminate pecking of marauding birds” (pp. 86-87).

Root Metaphor Theory

• How do we manage to get from common sense to a world hypothesis? [or from dubitanda to relatively refined danda?]
• Pepper suggests that we look out into the world of common sense and grab onto something.  In effect, I find myself saying: Perhaps this is the key to the universe! 
• Here’s how Pepper puts the matter:   
• “A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of common sense fact and tries if he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. The original area becomes then his basic analogy or root metaphor” (p. 91, emphasis added)
• This person then “describes as best he can the characteristics of this area, or, if you will, discriminates its structure.  A list of its structural characteristics becomes his basic concepts of explanation and description.  We call them a set of categories” (p. 91, emphasis added)
•  “In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized.  He undertakes to interpret all facts in terms of these categories” (p. 91)
• “As a result of the impact of these other facts upon his categories, he may qualify and readjust the categories…” (p. 91).
•  “a great deal of development and refinement is required if they are to prove adequate for a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 91). 
•  “Some root metaphors prove more fertile than others, have greater powers of expansion and of adjustment.  These survive in comparison with the others and generate relatively adequate world theories” (pp. 91-92).
• So, let’s try to build a world theory:
• In the beginning, I adopted an unrefined natural attitude consonant with the spirit of my age. 
• One day, I experience (seemingly out of the blue) a love more profound than anything I could have ever imagined possible.  
• Fully cognizant of the fact that words can never do justice to my experience, I nevertheless tell my friends and relatives that I have finally achieved a state of true peace and harmony – a sense of oneness with a caring cosmos.  
• Perhaps this is the key that unlocks the secret of the universe!
• According to Pepper, I have just become a mystic.
• Root metaphor = Love
• “This hypothesis states that this emotion is the substance of the universe, and that as far as we differentiate things, these are generated from this substance and are ultimately nothing but this substance” (p. 133). 
• Well, what’s wrong with this?   [It sounds good to me!]
• There’s nothing to be said against the mystical experience as such.   
• The mystic “need not be a metaphysician.  He might have and enjoy his experience and make no cognitive claims for it beyond his having had it and enjoyed it” (p. 129)
• But if mysticism is considered as a metaphysical hypothesis, it will ultimately leave us unsatisfied.   Pepper cites mysticism as an example of a world hypothesis with inadequate scope.   There are simply too many facts that the theory leaves behind (or interprets in a manner that is simply too crude for more refined cognitive tastes)
•  “The immediate temptation here is to deny outright the reality of all ‘facts’ except the one mystic Fact” (p. 131).
• “So pain, misery, sorrow, sadness are unreal, as opposed to beatific qualities” (p. 134).
• In addition, "pleasures, comforts, sensuous delights are false from lack of intensity” (p. 134).    
•   Interestingly, Pepper dubs mysticism as an “emotional theory of truth” (p. 135). 
•  “As the philosophy of unity and love, it is the most destructive of all world theories in cognition and finally destroys itself by the very intensity of its desire for unity and peace” (p. 127).
• Ok, so much for mysticism. 
•  I return to my stroll amongst the dubitanda. I take a trip to Hawaii and receive a text message telling me that there is a “ballistic missile threat inbound” and I should “seek cover immediately.”  After thirty minutes of panic, I am relieved to learn it was a false alarm.  [Incidentally, this twist in the narrative was inspired by the fact that my brother is presently vacationing in Hawaii and experienced the threat firsthand.]
• So, as I recover from the ballistic missile threat, I start thinking about myself and how wonderful it is to be alive.  I have goals, yet I also have the freedom to change my path in life.  I have values, though I fully realize that they may well be crushed if I don’t do something to stand up for them.
• Perhaps I’m the key to the universe!  I don’t mean this in the sense that the universe should cater to my whims.  Rather, perhaps my very mode of being-in-the-world illuminates the structure of the cosmos.  I look out into the starry heavens and I have a sense that “we are not alone”.  [As Tom Cruise once said in an interview, “are you really so arrogant as to believe we are alone in this universe?”]   Better, as I reflect on the cosmos, I don’t simply contemplate creation. I also experience myself in relation to some sort of creative spirit – a divine “person” that somehow participates in my essence, or vice versa.
•  My truth is no longer love (which, I now recognize, was simply a positive experience to be valued).  
• Rather, personhood as such is the key to the universe.
• I have become an animist. 
• Root Metaphor = The Person
• According to Pepper, “animism, as a metaphysical hypothesis, is the theory that takes common-sense man, the human being, the person, as its primitive root metaphor” (p. 120). 
• “This is the most appealing root metaphor that has ever been selected” (p. 120). 
• “This view of the world is the only one in which many feels completely at home” (p. 120). 
• I’m reminded here of the wonderful scene at the end of Close Encounters, where a bunch of kindhearted aliens arrive in a magnificent spaceship, befriend humanity, and invite Richard Dreyfus to fly away on what I like to call: “the secure base from outer space”. 
• In its crudest forms, animism is difficult to sustain past childhood.  But the root metaphor can be refined: 
  
• “The full maturity of an animistic world theory…occurs when the root metaphor of man’s personality has developed into in the richest conception of spirit, and when a luxuriant mythology has vividly populated the universe with explanatory spirits” (p. 123).
  
•  But: “under the pressure of criticism, mythological interpretations begin to be thinned down.  At first they are treated as allegories, then as symbols of something higher and finer, and finally the notion of spirit itself is ephemeralized into an emotionally shaded word with vague direction outward or inward” (p. 124)
  
•  So, the original animistic categories eventually evolve [or devolve] into acceptable – but ultimately “empty” – abstractions (see pp. 124-126)
  
• Significantly, these abstractions (e.g. the divine “source of all”) retain their appeal precisely by virtue of their “animistic source”.
  
•  “They would not be entertained for a moment if the source were cut off” (p. 126)
• Unlike mysticism, animism has no problem with scope.  It doesn’t demean (or render less than real) any particular set of facts. 
• The problem with animism, according to Pepper, is its inadequate precision.  
  
•  “What is thunder?  It is the angry voice of a great spirit….[Or] It is the stamping of the hoofs of the steeds of a great spirit…[Or] It may even be a spirit itself roaring in pursuit of some other spirit to devour.” (p. 122).
  
• “[There] is nothing but the limits of poetic fancy to put a stop to such interpretations” (p. 122).
  
•  “These interpretations are all consonant with the categories of spirit....There is no one precise determination of thunder, nor is there any precise method for finding one, nor is there any hope that more factual observations will ever produce one through these categories” (p. 122).
  
• “Since the categories lack determinateness, they are unable to control their interpretations, which multiply about the same fact and mutually contradict one another” (p. 127, from the concluding paragraph of the section)
  
• If we are able to decide upon a specific interpretation, it is by virtue of “the authority of shaman, medicine man, and priest” (p. 123)
  
• Pepper submits that “animism is the natural metaphysical support of authoritarianism” (p. 123)
  
•  Note: For a consideration of animism in the context Gregg’s ToK framework, I recommend Leigh Shaffer’s (2008) article entitled: Religion as a Large-Scale Justification System: Does the Justification Hypothesis Explain Animistic Attribution? [The abstract is available here: http://journals.sagepub.com/ doi/abs/10.1177/ 0959354308097257?journalCode= tapa]

Generalizations regarding the role played by root metaphors in the development of World Hypotheses:

• Maxim I: “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor" (p. 96).  
• Pepper identifies four “relatively adequate” world theories and their corresponding "root metaphors"  
• World Hypothesis #1 = Formism; root metaphor = "similarity" 
• World Hypothesis #2 = Mechanism; root metaphor = "machine"
• World Hypothesis #3  = Contextualism; root metaphor = "historical event"  
• World Hypothesis #4 = Organicism; root metaphor = "organism"
• Pepper devotes a chapter to each of these world hypotheses (Chapters 8,9,10, & 11, respectively).  So we will eventually have a chance to examine each of these hypotheses in considerable detail. 
• Maxim II: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
• Corollary #1: "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
• "It follows that what are pure facts for one theory are highly interpreted evidence for another" (p. 100) 
• Corollary #2: "A world hypothesis does not have to accept data at their face value, or to exclude the acceptance of any other sort of evidence than data" (p. 101).
• Corollary #3: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of structural refinement (world hypotheses) to the cognitive standards (or limitations) of multiplicative refinement” (p. 101).
• “Data must be accepted as evidence to be accounted for in a world hypothesis, but a world hypothesis does not have to accept data at their face value, or to exclude acceptance of any other sort of evidence than data (p. 101).
• Corollary #4: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of structural refinement to the assumptions of common sense” (p. 102).
• Corollary #5: “It is convenient to employ common-sense concepts as bases for comparison for parallel fields of evidence among world theories” (p. 102)
• In other words, we can clarify differences among world theories by considering how they might respectively deal with events that occur in the world of ordinary experience.  
• For example, consider the statement: “Joe has a good sense of humor.”  The notion of “humor” is part of our ordinary experience and thus falls within the scope of any comprehensive world theory.  So, how would a mechanistic make sense of humor?  How would a formist understand this concept?  Etc.
• Answering such questions helps us appreciate differences in how each world hypothesis interprets “the same common-sense fact” (p. 103, emphasis in original)       
• Maxim III: “Eclecticism is confusing " (p. 104)
• "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually exclusive.  A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing".  
• For example, we might be tempted remedy the shortcomings of animism by somehow combining it with mysticism: 
• “Just fill in the empty spirit concept of an emaciated animism with the vivid indubitable mystic emotion, and each theory seems to revive” (p. 136).
• But Pepper doesn’t think that we can achieve a stable synthesis of mysticism and animism. 
• E.g., “the world of spirits still try to raise their Great Spirit upon the throne which mystic intuition occupies” (p. 136)
• Thus, we now have a tension between (a) the infallibility implicit in animism (which was necessary to avoid endless proliferation of personalistic interpretations) and (b) the indubitability that lies at the core of mysticism (i.e., the very real experience of love). 
• Pepper observes that “historically the ecclesiastics and the mystics have never harmonized very well.  Periodically each group has tried to clean the other out – and this may be taken as a typical lesson in eclecticism” (p. 136).
• It might be replied that we would have more luck if we tried to achieve a synthesis of relatively adequate world hypotheses.  But Pepper doesn’t think that’s possible at the present time:
• “While all sorts of things might happen to these diverse theories so far as abstract possibility is concerned, as a fact (in the best sense of fact we know) these four theories are just now irreconcilable.  Any credible attempt to reconcile them turns out to be the judgment of one of the theories on the nature of the others” (p. 105-106)
• "Maxim IV: Concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113).
• Interestingly, Pepper suggests that such “empty abstractions” are a likely consequence of the push toward eclecticism (which has no root metaphor of its own to help refine cognition).   

A Conceptual Scheme for Comparing World Hypotheses:

• Analytic vs. Synthetic World Hypotheses:
• Analytic: Formism, Mechanism – Basic facts include “elements” or “factors".  Any apparent synthesis (e.g., my life conceived holistically) is merely derivative.
• Synthetic: Organicism, Contextualism – Basic facts include “complexes” or “contexts”.  I’m reminded here of family systems theory, where certain formal “elements” (e.g., the personality traits of a single family member) might be considered as a function of contextual dynamics (and are thus derivative).   
• Dispersive vs. Integrative World Hypotheses
• Dispersive Hypotheses: Formism, contextualism – The facts are “loosely scattered about” and “are not necessarily determining one another to any considerable degree” (pp. 142-143).
• Example: In a formist “trait psychology”, Andrew’s disagreeableness may be reflected in (a) a tendency to make snide comments about coworkers, and (b) a recent “road rage” incident.  These two behaviors (a & b) don’t really have much to do with each other, outside of the fact that they are presumably mediated by the notion of disagreeableness.  Contrast this with the notion of a machine where every fact has its place in an integrative whole.
• The chief problem associated with dispersive theories is inadequate precision.  [What will disagreeable Andrew do next?  Who knows.  But whatever he chooses to do, we will be able to make sense of it via our categories]
• Integrative Hypotheses: Mechanism, organicism 
• “For these two theories the world appears literally as a cosmos where facts occur in determinate order, and where, if enough were known, they could be predicted or at least described, as being necessarily just what they are to the minutest detail” (p. 143)
• The chief problem associated with integrative theories is inadequate scope

Narrator: “Next week on Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses. We discuss two relatively adequate metaphysical systems: Formism and Mechanism" (Chapters 8 & 9; Sunday, January 21)

~ Steve Q.

On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 9:27 AM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc- [log in to unmask]> wrote:

Hello ToK Community,

Is there something fundamentally paradoxical about Pepper's World Hypotheses?

That is, wouldn't Pepper's "World Hypotheses" itself necessarily be a World Hypothesis by definition?

And insofar that his "World Hypotheses" is itself a "World Hypothesis", would it not necessarily have to be grounded in one of his Root Metaphors, therefore meaning that one would have to embrace that particular root metaphor (to the exclusion of the other root metaphors) in the first place for even the possibility to (in turn) embrace his World Hypothesis about World Hypotheses?

~ Jason Bessey

On Thursday, January 11, 2018, 7:55:34 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Thanks for this narrative, John.

 

My expectation is that soon after the tour that Steve offers us of the World Hypotheses, we should shift the floor to you so that you can narrate your “world hypothesis.” I know in talking with you, I have had visions of “Human Psycho-Physiological Laws” that would allow us to harmonize ourselves, all the way from literal legal systems down into our individual experiences into our bio-physiological developmental life cycles and even down into negentropic energy flow, and information-communication transfer that you see connecting the dots in a bottom up fashion, from physics to biology all the way into human consciousness.

Best,
Gregg 

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@ listserv.jmu.edu] On Behalf Of JOHN TORDAY
Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2018 2:31 PM

To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"

 

Gregg, having lost most of my family in the Holocaust I came to the 'table' as a Blank Slate. My passion as a scientist has been to contribute knowledge that would make life better, specifically for preterm newborns as a way to mitigate against hate, which I consider the nidus of the Holocaust. Over the course of the last decade or so I have come to a bigger picture perspective because I had amassed enough data over the course of 50 years of research to understand the development and phylogeny of the lung, going all the way back to its unicellular origins by connecting the physiologic dots between gas exchange and gravity experimentally. That exercise provided insight to the evolution of the lung and many other physiologic traits. And in the aggregate, the biggest picture was the relationship between physiology and the Singularity/Big Bang through the homology between Quantum Mechanics and the evolution of the protocell as The First Principles of Physiology. So my world view has expanded exponentially of late based on a priori scientific knowledge, hubris aside. 

 

On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 9:47 AM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc- [log in to unmask]> wrote:

Gregg,

Oh, I don't disagree with you Gregg. However, I suspect you'd find that those who have a World Hypothesis grounded in "common sense" (i.e., Level 1 Justification Systems), themselves typically have a more commonpersonality type, while those who have more refined World Hypotheses, would tend to have more uncommon personality types. The research in that paper, I think, was focused on the latter. 

~ Jason B.

 

On Wednesday, January 10, 2018, 10:45:56 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 

 

Am loving this discussion.

 

One point I think we should keep in mind about Pepper’s analysis (which Steve will get to, but I bring it up here because of Jason B’s point about personality and a comment Steve made regarding justification level 1).

 

Most people hold World Hypotheses that are animistic or mystical. That is, most people are religious and view the universe as being created by God and/or has some mystical animating force. To me, Jason B., this is an important point to keep in mind and why I would question the set up of the reseach. Just because Pepper sees these World Hypotheses as “inadequate,” does not mean that most folks don’t see the world this way. To me, by the time you are really diving into the four world hypotheses Pepper sees as adequate, you are likely dealing with people who have, at least at some level, “refined” knowledge, rather than just populist “common sense.” 

Best,
Gregg

 

Sent from Mail for Windows 10

 

From: Stout, Jason (DBHDS)
Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2018 10:17 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"

 

This has been a fascinating discussion.  I found myself recalling Donald Hoffman’s TED talk entitled “Do we see reality as it is?” while reading this.  He does work in computer simulations using natural selection algorithms to better understand this process and is particularly interested in “a mathematical model of consciousness.”  Here is a more in-depth article about his positions: https://www.theatlantic.com/ science/archive/2016/04/the- illusion-of-reality/479559/  I haven’t yet taken the time to make direct correlations between his work and that of Pepper, but my mental algorithms, or world hypothesis, suggest to me that there are correlations here.

 

I love sci-fi and futurism, and an interesting thought experiment to me is pondering how a consciousness that sees reality as it actually is, and not how it is selected to do so through environmental pressures, would vary from our experience of the same.   Hoffman has also wondered about this, and has speculated that perhaps logic and reasoning are selected for traits through evolutionary processes.    

 

Thanks,

 

Jason

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@ listserv.jmu.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Quackenbush

Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 6:14 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"

 

A few quick comments before I begin the process of crafting the next formal outline (scheduled for Sunday).  

• Waldemar asks whether it is appropriate to consider an individual's worldview as an example of a world hypothesis.  

• This seems reasonable to me, and I've always loosely equated an individual's worldview with a "world hypothesis" (of some sort).  Of course, the conventional language user (adopting what Gregg calls Level 1 Justifications) might not formally embrace any of the world hypotheses discussed by Pepper.  If we ask a random person to describe their worldview, the answer may come across as an incoherent mess (including random elements of formism, mysticism, organicism, etc.).  Still, even a pastiche can be understood as a "world hypothesis" of sorts.    
• That said, I'm intrigued by Jason's suggestion (grounded in Jungian theory) that some of us are satisfied with "local hypotheses".   Even if I will never be satisfied until my philosophy is corroborated by the entire world, that doesn't mean that the rest of humanity must submit to my need to achieve unlimited scope.
• My personal bias is that we all have "world hypotheses" that are (implicitly) unlimited in scope (even if we say we are only concerned with local hypotheses).  But I'm not sure Pepper would agree with me here.  We will return to this issue in due course.  

• Ken observes that the ghost example I gave in my previous post "sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and validity."  He asks: "Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?"

• I agree that Pepper's understanding of multiplicative and structural corroboration resembles the distinction typically made between reliability (especially consensus) and validity.   
• Two quick notes (inspired by Ken's comments, though not really answers to his question).  

• The validation process is itself closely tied to an individual's world hypothesis. 

• In the ghost example, it is possible to imagine a metaphysical framework [some sort of "supernaturalism"] that would validate the reliable report of the witnesses (even if this framework has problems of its own and does not thereby achieve universal acclaim). 
• The close link between metaphysical frameworks and the validation process is more obvious when we consider the countless hypothetical constructs that find their way into psychology textbooks.  What does it mean, for example, to develop a valid measure of "self-esteem"?   The concept itself is grounded in a theoretical framework (that may or may not be formally articulated).  Moreover, it is not obvious what "facts" would corroborate: (a) the relevant validity claims and (b) the theoretical framework within which such claims are made.

• In Pepper's thought, there seems to be blurring a reliability and validity (though I may modify this claim when we reach the end of the book).  

• In the course of his conversation regarding the tensions between data and danda (where he presented the ghost scenario), Pepper admits that "a highly refined datum would probably never have to give way to a highly refined dandum."  In other words, the objectivity of the data would be sufficient to withstand the "winds of theory" [my phrase].  But this is "only because the datum has been thinned to such a degree that it does not commit itself to very much" [p. 50]
• A few pages later, Pepper observes that "the inherent lack of significance in data alone is what we meant earlier by the thinness of refined data, a thinness which finally causes a return to common sense for a security and healthiness of fact that threatens to disappear when data try to carry cognition alone" (pp. 63-64, emphasis added)
• So, even as we are assessing what we all see (consensus) we are also deciding what we should be looking at (which is necessarily a reflection of our theoretical framework and thus implicitly a "validity" concern).  In other words, we don't want to waste our time developing reliable measures of trivia.  Rather, we seek out truths that are "reliably meaningful", or "meaningfully reliable", even if this means that we have to sacrifice some degree of refinement (purity).  

 

Again, all this is based on my reading of Chapters 1-4.  When we reach the end of the book, I will try to provide more satisfactory answers to everyone's questions.  Here's the list of questions that I've compiled so far: 

 

• "Is there a term when multiplicative corroboration (data) and structural corroboration (danda) are in agreement? Would that be considered 'idealdata'? Or is a prerequisite, if you will, of danda that it first be data?"  [Ali]
• "The ghost example you give sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and validity. Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?"  [Ken]
• "Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of a world hypothesis?" [Waldemar]

Until next time, 

 

~ Steve Q. 

 

On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 2:40 PM, [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Steve:

 

A question about world hypotheses and the concept of worldview.

 

Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of a world hypothesis?

 

Best regards,

 

Waldemar

 

Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044

Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)

 

 

 

 

 

On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:57 PM, Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 

 Hello ToK community,

Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread.  The focus of this post is World Hypotheses, Chapters 1-4.  My reflections today are largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory. 

Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place where most of us began our intellectual journey: common sense.  For Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39).

Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude” described by phenomenologists.  For Pepper, the world of common sense can be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” – i.e., we can always fall back on it:

 

• “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we completely give up trying to know anything, then is precisely when we know things in the common-sense way.  In that lies the security of common sense” (p. 43). 

 

 

 

 But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively irritable”:

 

• “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging, contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized, rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt, playfully enjoyed, and so forth. One may accept common sense and thoughtlessly roam in its pasture, but if one looks up and tries to take it in, it is like a fantastic dream.  To the serious cognizer it is like a bad dream. For the serious cognizer feels responsible to fact and principle, and common sense is utterly irresponsible” (p. 43)
• Common sense is “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, irritable” (p. 44).

 

Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected to criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes “refined knowledge” or “critical cognition” (p. 47).  How do we achieve this transformation?

 

• For Pepper, “all critical evidence becomes critical only as a result of the addition of corroborative evidence.  The work of legitimate criticism in cognition, then, is corroboration” (p. 47, emphasis added)

 

Corroboration can take one of two forms:

 

• 1) Multiplicative corroboration (data):  i.e., The agreement of “man with man.” (p. 47).

• An obvious example of this is the notion of interjudge (or interrater) reliability, as understood by psychometricians
• But, as discussed below, the notion of multiplicative corroboration has an important role to play in any scientific enterprise.   

• 2) Structural corroboration (danda):  i.e., The agreement of “fact with fact” (p. 47)

• An obvious example of this is the “principle of converging evidence” in science.

• Pepper’s example: I might evaluate whether a chair is strong enough to bear my weight by considering (a) the kind of wood with which it is made, (b) the reputation of the company that put together the chair, and (c) the fact that the chair shows evidence of wear (suggesting that “many people had successfully sat in it”).  It is by “putting all this evidence together” that I “feel justified in believe that the chair is a strong chair” (p. 49)

• But, insofar as stuctural corroboration is concerned with how a multiplicity of facts “hang together” [my phrase], the quest for such corroboration will inevitably pull us in the direction of theory. As I entertain structural hypotheses, I’m not simply interested in this or that set of data.  Rather, I’m interested in how the data I observe coheres with other things we think we know.  The nature of this coherence is a theoreticalpuzzle.    

 

On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (or data collection) is synonymous with the notion of objectivity in science.  It reflects the idea that what we see would be described in precisely the same way by anyone else (given the appropriate level of training):

 

• In Pepper’s words, “the search for multiplicative corroboration is the effort on the part of a datum to confirm its claim to purity.  It is as though a datum turned from one observer to another and asked, Am I not just what I said I was?....Are there not some data that never vary, no matter who the observer and, if possible, no matter what his point of view?  If such there are, these are ideal data” (p. 52). 

 

Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not available” (p. 52).  Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been developed in the course of cognitive history” (p. 52). Specifically, Pepper highlights “two genuses of refined data”:

 

•  Refined empirical data: “pointer readings and correlations among pointer readings” (p. 52)

• Refined logical data: “evidence for the validity of logical and mathematical transitions and for those organizations of such transitions which are called logical and mathematic systems” (p. 57).

 

Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the quest for highly refined empirical and logical data.   But there are several threats to the program of the dogmatic positivist:

 

• The scarcity of refined data

• “The refined empirical data presently at our disposal cover a very small field of nature” (p. 63) 

• “Outside of the fields of physics and chemistry, refined data play a secondary role and are rarely capable of expression in the form of a deductive mathematical system” (p. 63)

• The metaphysical poverty of refined data

•  “In order to set up refined data as the sole norm of evidence, it is necessary to deny the claims of danda, derived from various structural world theories, as alternative norms of evidence” (pp. 67, 69)

•  In other words, the dogmatic positivist intends to let the data speak for themselves, free of the influence of danda (which we might consider as a facet of a metaphysical system).

• But, if we really wish to drive such danda out of our refined cognition, “multiplicative corroboration alone will not do this, for it only establishes the data it establishes, and neither affirms nor denies the claims of any facts other than those, like pointer readings, by which man corroborates man” (p. 69, emphasis added)

In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70).   What, though, does it mean to make structural claims (of any sort)?

 

 

• For starters, structural hypotheses necessarily make statements concerning “the structure of the world” (p. 74) – i.e., how things “hang together”.
• But – and this is quite a striking claim –  “structural corroboration does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope” (p. 77, emphasis added)

•  Why?

•  Because: “as long as there are outlying facts which might not corroborate the facts already organized by the structural hypothesis, so long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable” (p. 77).

•  An “ideal structural hypothesis”, then, “is one that all facts will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 77) 
•  “Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis” (p. 77, emphasis added).

 

Comments regarding “world hypotheses”:

 

• They necessarily include data [and not just danda]

• It “draws data within its scope as well as everything else” (p. 78)§ 

• “It, therefore, does not reject but acquires the cognitive force of multiplicative corroboration as well as that of structural corroboration” (pp. 78-79)

•  “Cognition needs both types of refinement [data and danda] as much as a bird needs two wings” (p. 79)

•   Nevertheless, in a world hypothesis, data are ultimately subordinated to danda. 

•  As a rough approximation of what Pepper is driving at, we might consider a world hypothesis as a framework that allows us to render data meaningful. 
• Or, to employ Gregg's language: "all factual/empirical claims are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing)."

• In a world hypothesis, evidence and interpretation are “merged” (p. 79).

•   “…it is impossible to say where pure fact ends and interpretation of fact begins” (p. 79). 

 

 As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field of psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the discipline: Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.

 

• Ignoring (for the sake of simplification) the notion of “mental processes”, we can certainly agree that “behavior” falls within the psychologist’s scope of inquiry.
• But how – in practice – do we identify a unit of behavior?   When does a given behavior begin?  When does it end?  And is it really meaningful to speak of “behavior” in the abstract, or is the concept always qualified in some way?  After all, a personality psychologist never studies “behavior” per se, but aggressive behavior, conscientious behavior, etc.  In other words, personality psychologists study patterns of behavior – and the identification of such patterns is inevitably theory-driven. 

 

On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs “A Tree of Knowledge” (!):

 

• At the bottom of the figure is a box labelled “Roots of knowledge” (and it includes “dubitanda”, Pepper’s rather odd term for “common sense facts”). 
• The tree (originating out of the box) has two major trunks (which makes for a rather strange-looking tree!):

• Trunk #1: Data – Beginning with “rough data” and then branching into “scientific data” and “logical data”
• Trunk #2: Danda – Beginning with “rough danda” and then branching into “formistic danda”, “mechanistic danda”, “contextual danda”, and “organismic danda”

• Above the six branches of data and danda sits the phrase: “fruits of knowledge” 

 

 

 In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January 14), we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know if you have any questions, comments, or corrections pertaining to this episode!  

~ Steve Quackenbush

 

On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It will be the next topic for us to journey on.

 

Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh in now.

 

Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, The UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy, I especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)?

 

At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real persons, and not bring a worldview to what we do?

 

In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing from psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical psychology tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to factual claims about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, and I think he is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing).

 

Enjoy the journey!

 

Best,

Gregg

 

 

 

Sent from Mail for Windows 10

 

From: Steven Quackenbush

Sent: Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"

 

Hello ToK Community

With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of the ToK/UTUA framework.  As many participants in this listserv are aware, Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.   

I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in the 1990’s.  At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism.  Yet I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close study of Pepper’s thought.  So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of California Press).

Why Pepper?  Why Now? 

 

•  As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions.  These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated” and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in 

...

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