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Episode 3, edited for a few very minor typos. [I'm sure there are others. Eventually, I'll put everything together into a "Complete Season 3" PDF. That will be the official version. So please feel free to suggest additions, corrections, etc., to these drafts]

Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses: Season 1, Episode 3

Narrator: “Previously on World Hypotheses:”

We began with “common sense"
Though “secure” (because we can always fall back on it), common sense is nevertheless “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, irritable” (p. 44).
As such, we are driven to “refine” (or criticize) cognition.
Our goal is ultimately to make sense of our universe, to grasp how it all “hangs together”
A world hypothesis is a hypothesis about “the world itself” (p. 1).
But how do we manage to get from common sense to a world hypothesis?
Pepper suggests that we look out into the world of common sense and grab onto something. In effect, I find myself saying: Perhaps this is the key to the universe!

This key becomes my root metaphor.

Pepper offers a few generalizations, or "maxims", regarding root metaphors and world hypotheses:

Maxim I: “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor" (p. 96).
Maxim II: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
Maxim III: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
Maxim IV: "Concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113).

So we are finally ready to dive into our first world hypothesis. Let's start with formism. Pepper distinguishes two variations: immanent and transcendent.

Immanent Formism

Root metaphor = Similarity

Simply put, multiple objects may seem similar to each other in at least one respect

Pepper’s example: two sheets of yellow paper.

The shade of yellow may be so similar across the two sheets that we are not able to tell the difference.

With respect to objects of perception, we can make a distinction between two aspects:

Particularity – This piece of paper.
Quality – Its yellowness

In Pepper’s example, “we perceive two particulars (sheets of paper) with one quality (yellow)” (p. 153).

Particularity and quality are logically distinct aspects of an object

“There is nothing about a particular as a particular to restrain it from having any quality whatsoever” (p. 153)

Sometimes it is meaningful to highlight relations among particulars (which can be distinguished from logically independent qualities)

For example, these two yellow papers are side by side. Yellow is the quality, “side-by-side-ness” is the relation.

Since both quality and relation characterize a particular object, we can synthesize these two terms and simply refer to the character of the object (as distinct from its “particularness”)
We are just about ready to document the basic categories of immanent formism. These categories are quite important, as they are the keys to interpreting everything else. Recall (from Episode #2):

On the grounds of the root metaphor, the metaphysician delineates a list of "structural characteristics" that become "his basic concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of categories” (p. 91)
“In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to interpret all facts in terms of these categories” (p. 91)

So, here are the basic categories of Immanent formism:

1) Characters
2) Particulars
3) Participation (which “is the tie between characters and particulars, p. 154).

e.g., this paper participates in yellowness; this computer participates in slowness.

Pepper insists that participation is not a relation (in the sense defined above)

If it were a relation, it would be an aspect of character, and then we would only have Basic Categories #1 and #2 (characters and particulars, respectively), with no logical possibility of producing an object (which requires “participation” as a distinct third category).
Rather than using the term “relation” to speak of participation, we can speak instead of ties.
Consider: this yellow sheet of paper.

The paper is tied to the character “yellowness”
But isn’t this just a play with words (i.e., replacing “relation” with “ties” to sustain the autonomy of Basic Category #3 – i.e., “Participation”)?

Pepper: “Ties are relations which are not relations. This sounds very much like a self-contradiction, and seems to indicate a categorical inadequacy. I rather think it is. Nevertheless, the theory contains too many insights for us safely to neglect it, until a much better world theory comes in view” (pp. 155-156)

On the grounds of our basic categories, we can develop other concepts. Fore example: classes

“A class is a collection of particulars which participate in one or more characters” (p. 159).

E.g., blue jays
A class “is itself neither a character, nor a particular, nor a participation…It is simply the actual working of the three categories in the world” (p. 162)
“We simply observe that a character or a group of characters normally participates in a number of different particulars” (p. 162).
“A class is, accordingly, a thoroughly real thing, but what is real is the functioning of the categories” (p. 162).
A classification is an organization of classes (e.g., from the more general to the less general)

It is possible to make a modest shift in our root metaphor and open up new conceptual possibilities. For example, of speaking of crude "similarity", we might think instead of “the work of an artisan in making different objects on the same plan or for the same reason” (e.g., “a carpenter making beds”; p. 162) or “natural objects appearing or growing according to the same plan” (e.g., “oak trees”; p. 162). Similarity remains the animating metaphor, but these ideas allow for considerable enrichment of our world hypothesis. Immanent formism gives way to...

Transcendent Formism

Categories

1) Norms (which parallel “characters”)
2) Matter for the exemplification of norms (which parallel “particulars”)
3) The principle of exemplification which materializes the norms (which parallels “participation”)

So, what’s the difference between a character (immanent formism) and a norm (transcendent formism)?

“A norm is a complex set of characters” (p. 164).

Significantly, a norm need not ever actually appear.

A norm is not a class (which is a collection of actually observed objects)
Indeed, we might not ever observe a norm.

“The norm of the oak is rarely or never fully present in any particular oak. Particular oaks merely approximate the norm” (p. 164).

"Norms seem to be used or presupposed in much of the basic work of empirical scientists” (p. 165).
A species is a norm (not a class)

A species can be viewed as “a state of biological equilibrium in nature, a structural point of balance and stability” (p. 165).

Empirical specimens are imperfect exemplifications of a species

Similarly, molecules, atoms, electrons, etc. can be considered as “norms of physical structure” (p. 165).
Evolution: A commitment to a formist philosophy of science does not imply a commitment to the notion that norms must remain fixed.

“There is no reason why, in a world in which norms constituted a basic type of order, there should not be an order of evolution among the norms” (p. 165)
“If there is a good evidence that the ancient ancestors of men were fish, that does not in any way disturb the structural differences between men and fish” (p. 165-166)

What, then, does the transcendent formist really believe?

Answer: There are norms in nature.

And “there seems to be plenty of apparently direct inductive evidence” (p. 166) for such norms.

The transcendent formist is on a quest to discover the laws of nature.

“Persons who accept the theory that there are laws of nature, and that the aim of science is to discover these laws, which nature ‘follows,’ seem…to imply that these laws are norms which regulate (literally render regular) the occurrences of nature” (p. 165)
“On this view, the inductive method is a method of collecting observations for the discovery of the regularities or laws which ‘hold’ in nature.” (p. 166).

Immanent and transcendent formism seem to be wholly compatible.

Characters [immanent formism] participate in norms [transcendent formism]

Existence: The field of basic particulars [Category 2 in immantent formsim]

Existence is “primarily the field of bare particulars”

But this can never be observed. It may be a “sheer abstraction” (p. 167).
The example given above was “this particular piece of paper” (before we qualified it with the term yellow). But this isn’t quite a “bare particular” because we are already considering it as “paper”

Existence is “secondarily the field of all basically particularized characters” (p. 167).

So, “this particular piece of paper” is a basically particularized character. It can be further characterized as yellow.
“Concrete objects such as we perceive and handle are all in the field of existence as secondarily considered. That is, they are all basic particulars with character” (p. 167-168)

This is the field of concrete existence.

Subsistence: “the field of characters and norms so far as these are not considered as participating or being exemplified in basic particulars” (p. 168).

In other words, we can talk about characters and norms as abstractions, without reference to specific objects.
We can also consider “relations” among characters and norms, without reference to specific objects.

“All these ‘relations’ are, of course, ties of various sorts” (p. 168)

“Norms…are complex in character and are definitely subsistent forms” (p. 168).

A norm [such as the iPhone] will “participate in” (or be tied to) various characters (shiny, etc.).
In a sense, a norm (the iPhone) is a particular that can be “characterized” like any other particular, but it is a “subsistent or second-degree particular” (p. 169).

“It is a subsistent entity which, as subsistent, participates in certain subsistent characters” (p. 169).

Characters can also participate in other characters, and – interestingly enough – this gives us gestalts (“complex characters or patterns”; p. 169). [Notice here the incredible scope of transcendent formism]

Gestalts “are not analyzable completely into elementary characters, though they participate in them” (p. 169).

Causality for the formist:

Causality “is the result of the participation of patterns, norms, or laws in basic particulars through the forms of time and space” (p. 175)
So, here’s “the causal structure of a series of events” (p. 176):

We begin with a basic particular (or a set thereof) “having certain characters” (p. 176).
These characters participate "in a law, which itself participates in time and space characters” (p. 176)
This law determines "other basic particulars as having certain dates or positions and as having certain characters the same as those possessed by the first basic particulars, or different from them” (p. 176)
More simply, “causality is the determination of the characters of certain basic particulars by a law which is set in motion by the characters of other basic particulars which participate in the law” (p. 177).
Example:

Presumed law: Stress elicits a desire to affiliate with others
Character of the first set of basic particulars: Subjects are told that “In this experiment, you will suffer painful electric shocks!” [which presumably induce stress]
Character of a second set of basic particulars: A desire to wait with others while the experimenter sets up the shock generator [an operationalization of the desire to affiliate]
The first set of basic particulars "sets in motion" the law which determines the second set of basic particulars.

If all this seems far removed from the root metaphor of similarity, it is worth remembering that “events are genuinely similar to one another because they genuinely participate in the same law” (p. 177).
For a formist, “a law is not to be identified with a concrete existent structure” (p. 177).
Rather, “a law is a form” (p. 177).
“This is one of the fundamental distinctions between formism and mechanism” (p. 177).

Formism serves as the foundation for a correspondence theory of truth.

Consider: “pictures, maps, diagrams, sentences, formulas, and mental images” (p. 180).

These are “concrete existences”
We can ascribe truth to some of them
But if was declare (say) a map to be “true”, it acquires this truth by virtue of its similarity to some object of reference.
So, when we make a truth claim, we are declaring that a certain set of objects is similar to some set of objects (in some respect).

Truth can be defined as “the degree of similarity which a description has to its object of reference” (p. 181).

Of course, “the objects they are said to be true of are not exactly similar to them, but only in respect to the form under consideration or in accordance with certain conventions” (p. 180).

“[A] true description actually possesses the form of its object” (p. 181).
There are two kinds of truth in formism:

Historical truth: Existence, “descriptions of the qualities and relations of particular events” (p. 182)
Scientific truth: Subsistence, “descriptions of norms and laws” (p. 182)

Empirical uniformities (e.g., “the tides rise twice a day”) are not scientific truths.

“Descriptions of empirical uniformities are simply rungs in the ladder from contingent fact to necessary law. They are signs of human ignorance.”
“For if we knew the whole truth about them, we should know the law or the combination of laws which made their regularity necessary, or we should know that they were not necessary but were mere historical coincidences which have been mistakenly generalized and which cannot be relied upon for scientific predictions” (p. 183).

On the limits of formism

Nature seems to be comprised as a constellation of discrete laws.
But: “the laws of nature may not be so discrete, so separate from one another, as the formist assumes” (p. 184)
“The integration of scientific laws into a single system is…a constant threat to formism” (p. 184).

If all laws could be amalgamated, then scientific descriptions would not approximate a constellation of 'separate subsistent forms', but rather “the single concrete existential structure of the universe” (p. 184)

“There would be no subsistence left” (p. 184)

Also, “the weakness of formism…is its looseness of categorical structure and consequent lack of determinateness” (p. 185)

“Just what constitutes one particular, one character, or one norm or law?”
“How many particulars are there in a sheet of paper?”
“How many in the flight of an airplane?
“How can we definitely tell a tie from a relation?” (p. 185)

Formism, it should now be clear, is a world hypothesis with unlimited scope. We can use it to ground a complete, and reasonably coherent, philosophy of science. In a previous post, I suggested that the typical psychology student “assimilates a more-or-less unified account of the scientific enterprise”. Here I can be more specific: Transcendent formism is the default metaphysics of the modal research psychologist. I don’t mean to imply that this default metaphysics guides the thinking of the research psychologists in all contexts (e.g., I may be a transcendent formist when I teach Research Methods, but an animist when I read Heidegger). But transcendent formism (as a metaphysics with unlimited scope) is the backdrop against which our parochial theories typically emerge. What we end up with, of course, is a constellation of loosely-affiliated theoretical systems, each with its own constellation of discrete laws (or empirical regularities that cry out to be interpreted as laws).

Mechanism

We will begin our discussion of mechanism with a very simple observation: The world is like a machine.

Root metaphor = Machine

What could be simpler than that? And it certainly seems possible to interpret the cosmos as a giant "machine" of sorts. But refined mechanism will enrich this metaphor to such an extent that the ultimate metaphoric machine will bear little resemblance to a spinning jenny.

Pepper distinguishes two variations of mechanism: discrete and consolidated

Discrete Mechanism

Consider a watch. It has a collection of parts that need not be described here. But we can say that each of the parts is externally related to the other parts. That is, they can be considered as conceptually distinct. This is an example of the "discreteness" of discrete mechanism. [Another example is the thesis that "space is distinct from time"; p. 196].

Something else worth noting about the watch is that it matters where the parts are located in the machine. If you fidget with a part -- and move it to a place it is not supposed to be -- the watch might not work any more. This insight clears the way to consider the basic categories of mechanism:

Category 1: The field of locations

Reality is determined by location.

“Whatever can be located is real, and is real by virtue of its location” (p. 197).

The love experienced by the mystic is real once we’ve found its place in a (properly situated) neural network.

“What cannot be located has an ambiguous reality until its place is found” (p. 197).

So, in mechanism (unlike formism) “only particulars exist” (p. 198), and these particulars are located in space and time.

Category 2: The primary qualities

“The traditional discrete mechanism is the theory of atoms and the void, or, as the view develops, the theory of elementary particles distributed in space and time” (p. 201).
Elementary physical particles are “qualitative differentiations of the field of locations” (p. 203).

“Without such differentiations the field would be utterly undifferentiated. Every location would be like every other….Nothing…would be going on in the universe” (p. 204).
“Reciprically, if there were only the characters of matter, and no field in which these characters could be deployed, there could be no configurations” (p. 204)
“Field and matter are, therefore, complementary concepts” (p. 204).
“[We] need differentiating characters in the field to render the cosmic machine descriptive and explanatory of the actual world in which we live” (p. 204)

“The ultimate differentiating characters of the ultimate physical particles are the primary qualities” (p. 204)

Traditional primary qualities:

Size
Shape
Motion
Solidity
Mass (or weight)
Number

Pepper notes that all of the above primary qualities, with the exception of mass (or weight) are concerned with “localization in the spatiotemporal field” (p. 205).

Size: “spatial volume of the differentiated locations”
Shape: “the boundaries of these”
Motion: “their temporal path”
Solidity: “the absence of undifferentiated interior locations”
Number: “the means of specifying distinct locations”
Pepper observes that these so-called qualities are "not technically qualities at all, but field relations in relation to the one genuine quality, mass” (p. 205)

Of course, we can substitute other lists of primary qualities. But whatever list we generate, it will typically include:

1) Properties of location in the field (e.g., size and motion)

These are “actual field properties” that do not sustain the true distinctness of the qualities under consideration.
Pepper describes them as “highly consolidating”, which anticipates his discussion of consolidating mechanism [considered below]

2) Differentiating properties (e.g., mass)

These “seem to be discrete qualities inhering in spatiotemporal volumes” (p. 206).
“These differentiating properties are not structural characteristics of the field like volumes, [they are] not consolidated with the field” (p 206).
They “just happen to have the locations they have” (p. 206).

Category #3: “Laws holding among the primary qualities in the field” (p. 207)

Laws [such as Newton’s laws of motion] “constitute the dynamic element in the mechanistic universe” (p. 210).
“The field itself is static and undifferentiated” (p. 210)
“Even when the field is dotted with masses, it still lacks efficacy” (p. 210)
“The dynamic structure of nature comes from the laws which connect the masses together and guide them from one configuration to another” (p. 210).
Puzzle: What is the ontological status of these laws?

There is a real danger of slipping back into transcendent formism (where the laws of nature served as transcendent norms).

Formism “is the constant threat in the rear of mechanism” (p. 210).

“The only way of avoiding this mechanistic catastrophe [of slipping back into formism] is to imbed the primary qualities and the law firmly in the spatiotemporal field. Things are real only if they have a time and a place. Only particulars exist. This principle must never be abandoned, for the penalty is the dissolution of mechanism” [p. 211]
“The mechanist is scornful of abstractions and forms. He wants his feet on the ground, and the ground in the field of time and space, and he does not want to believe in anything that is not also on the ground (p. 212)
“To achieve this end, however, he must consolidate his categories” (p. 212)
“The primary qualities and the laws must become structural features of the spatiotemporal field…” (p. 212)

This brings us to consolidated mechanism.

Consolidated mechanism

“In place of the discrete particle is the spatiotemporal path” (p. 212)
“In place of the discrete laws of mechanics is a geometry, or, better, a geography” (p. 212)
“The purpose of this cosmic geometry is simply to describe to us the unique structure of the spatiotemporal whole” (p. 212)
Example: Relativity theory

“The chief modern impetus for consolidation comes, of course, from relativity theory, for this has to do with the details of the spatiotemporal field. The special theory of relatively breaks down the clean-cut traditional separation between space and time” (p. 213)
“But the most important evidence is the general theory of relativity, which amalgamates the gravitational field with the spatiotemporal field” (p. 213)

Gravitation is linked to mass – one of the primary qualities considered above
But “gravitational mass is interpreted in terms of a gravitational field, which has the effect of amalgamating the law of gravitation into the first category [location], so that the field is no longer just the spatiotemporal field but the spatiotemporal-gravitational field” (p. 213).

“Strictly speaking, there are no laws in consolidated mechanism; there are just structural modifications of the spatiotemporal field” (p. 214)
There are “no primary qualities, either, for these are resolved into field laws, which are themselves resolved into the structure of the field” (p. 214) .
“So now, at last, only particulars exist, or, more truly still, only a particular exists, namely, the consolidated spatiotemporal-gravitational-electromagnetic field” (p. 314)
“Laws and masses are the structure of the field itself” (p. 215)
But consolidated mechanism lacks “scope”. e.g., what does the general theory of relativity have to do with the fact that Bill and Sam have decided to stop talking to each other?
The scope of mechanism might be expanded if we introduce the notion of secondary qualities.
Secondary qualities include “all the irreducible characters of the world which are not identifiable with the primary qualities…[Among] them are probably all the characters of human perception” (p. 215).
How do we connect primary with secondary qualities? Implicit here is the issue regarding how we understand the relationship between brain (which is presumably consolidated with the primary qualities -- or the spatiotemporal field) and mind (a constellation of secondary qualities).

Three possibilities (for the mechanist to consider):

Identity: Primary and secondary qualities are really the same thing

Pepper doesn’t think this works: “Color and sound, for instance, are not literally electromagnetic or air vibrations, nor even neural activities. They are irreducible qualities” (p. 216).

Causation: Primary qualities somehow “cause” secondary qualities

Pepper doesn’t think this works any better. The laws considered by the mechanist (e.g., electromagnetic-field laws) “have no application to such qualities as colors and sounds” (p. 216)

Correlation: The observation that “upon the occurrence of certain configurations of matter certain qualities appear which are not reducible to the characters of matter or the characters of the configurations” (p. 216-217)

“The term emergence signalizes such correlated appearances” (p. 217).

If we go with correlation [emergence], we have the problem of somehow getting from “matter” to “mind” (and eventually “culture”).

“The gap between such secondary qualities as our sensations of color or sound and the configurations of matter among primary qualities seems to be so great as to suggest many intervening levels of successively emerging secondary qualities” (p. 217).
“Thus we pass from the elementary and primary electrons, positrons, neutrons, and so forth, to atoms, molecules, crystals, amino acids, cells, tissues, organisms.” (p. 217)
“At each level new properties seem to emerge which are not reducible to, or predictable from, the properties of configurations at the lower levels” (p. 217).

As an aside, I wonder if Pepper (were he to have ten minutes to peruse a brief sketch) might classify Gregg’s ToK System as consolidated mechanism with successively emerging secondary qualities.

I don’t think this is the appropriate way to consider the ToK system (which is why I specified that Pepper only spent ten minutes looking at a brief sketch). Further comments on the matter will have to await a subsequent episode of this series.

The mechnanistic theory of truth

Does "correspondence theory" work?

Pepper observes that many mechanists do indeed embrace a simple correspondence theory of truth whereby an idea (or image) in my mind corresponds with the object about which I am making truth claims. But this doesn’t really work because “both the object and the idea which are being directly compared for their correspondences are private awarenesses of the individual organism making the comparison. We get no assurance from such correspondence about the truth of our ideas concerning the external world” (p. 222).

Correspondence theory leads us to the conclusion that “the truth can never be known, since it can never be reached for a direct comparison with an idea that is within the organism” (p. 222).

Simple correspondence theory may eventually give way to a more sophisticated symbolic correspondence theory, where the “idea” is replaced by a “a group of symbols in a sentence or a scientific formula" (p. 222).

“[If] these symbols correspond with features of the object, and the symbolized relations among the symbols with the relations among the objects, [then] the sentence or formula is true” (p. 222)

Symbolic correspondence theory doesn’t solve the problem noted above (i.e., acquiring knowledge of primary qualities).
But another path may be open to the mechanist.

The causal-adjustment theory

We can begin a consideration of this theory by observing the mechanist's commitment to nominalism:

Words such as “blue jay” are not references to immanent forms or transcendental norms.
Rather they are simply labels for a number of objects.

“Blue jays are grouped into a class simply by virtue of the fact that they are all called by that name” (p. 226).

In its simplest form, nominalism has no real way to account for the fact that a particular set of objects were grouped together in the first place (only to be named later).
But the mechanist can develop a more sophisticated nominalism

“What, now, is a name? It is a specific response made by an organism on the stimulus of specific environmental confifurations. In principle it is exactly the sort of thing that happens when an organism reacts positively to food stimuli and negatively to prick stimuli. It is simply specificity of response in an organism carried to a higher degree of refinement” (p. 226)
So, “a sentence or scientific formula physiologically interpreted is nothing but a combination of such reactions or conditioned reflexes. The whole thing can be causally interpreted” (p. 226).

If I say “that is a sharp nail!”, I can test this truth claim by recreating the original experience that led me to make this statement:

“I would tentatively step on the nail, and if I reacted negatively, I would say that the sentence was true; if not, I would say that it was false and look about the causes which produced the illusion” (p. 226)
Contra formism, “nothing is implied about an identity of form between the sentence and the nail” (p. 226)

“What makes error possible is itself causally explained. An organism develops a set of attitudes, or physiological sets, on the basis of certain physical stimuli. These attitudes often lack specificity, so that they may be set off by stimuli which usually support the attitude but on [some occasions] do not” (p. 228)

“The nail turns out to be a twig that looked like a nail” (p. 228)
“The mistake can be easily explained, and is the bases for making the attitude still more specific, so that these mistakes will be rarer” (p. 228).

“Truth thus becomes a name for physiological attitudes which are in adjustment with the environment of the organism” (p. 228).
Pepper suggest that we might dub this the causal-adjustment theory of truth.

According to this theory, we “learn about the structure of the great machine by a sort of detective work” (p. 229)

We document “changes among our private secondary qualities”
And then we “infer their correlations with physiological configurations which are in our organism"
And “thence infer the structural characters of the surrounding field from its effects upon the configuration of our organism” (p. 229).

Example: “Are there any red-winged blackbirds?”

We first establish a pattern of secondary qualities: e.g., “we construct the image in our minds or write out our description in words” (p., 229).
We then "infer that these [secondary qualities] are correlated with effective and specific physiological configurations within our organism” (p. 229)

Our organism (in tune with our mind) thus becomes an instrument that allows us to address the matter at hand.

“We then propel our organism about the environment to find out whether there are any configurations in the world that will directly stimulate this physiological attitude, and so bring up the correlated words in our sentence, or the correlated shapes and colors in our perception” (p. 229)
“If this happens, we call our sentence or idea true” (p. 229).

On the limits of mechanism

Secondary qualities are merely correlated with primary qualities. This reintroduces discreteness into an otherwise consolidated metaphysics.

The “gap between the primary and secondary categories still remains the center of inadequacy for mechanism” (p. 231).

If we abandon secondary qualities entirely (as does the strict materialist), mechanism has a serious problem with scope.

So, we now have sketches of two world hypotheses: Formism & Mechanism. Each world hypothesis employs a unique set of "fundamental categories" to make sense of the world. This set of categories functions as a (more-or-less) consistent system, with unique approaches to the problem of refined truth.

Coming next week: Contextualism.

Here's my episode guide for Season 1 of Steven Pepper's World Hypotheses.

Episode 1: Evidence & Corroboration [Chapters 1-4] -- January 7, 2018
Episode 2: Root Metaphors [Chapters 5-7] -- January 14, 2018
Episode 3: Formism & Mechanism [Chapters 8-9] -- January 21, 2018
Episode 4: Contextualism [Chapter 10] -- January 28, 2018
Episode 5: Organicism; Conclusions [Chapters 11-12] -- February 4, 2018]

Eventually, I'll release the complete Season #1 on PDF, with hours of special features, deleted notes, etc.

Until next week,

~ Steve Q

Note: Bold-faced text = emphasis added