Hi Jason, A few additional predictions: - A transcendent formist is likely to be drawn to some sort of trait psychology. Traits (e.g., disagreeableness) are patterns of behavior [norms] that demonstrate consistency [similarity] across situations. I mentioned in Sunday's post that transcendent formism is the modal metaphysics of the contemporary research psychologist. This is certainly debatable, but I think it helps account for the dominance of the Five-Factor Theory in contemporary personality psychology. It also leads to a sense that consistent traits are somehow more "real" (or more central to who I am) than are more situationally-contingent behaviors. As McCrae and Costa once claimed: "Our traits characterize us; they are our very selves." - But I can also imagine a "Freudian formist" or a "narrative psychology formist". Here formism will guide empirical work by shaping what questions are asked and how they are answered. For example, a narrative psychologist adopting a formist philosophy of science might assess levels of "agency" and "communion" displayed in life stories and examine how these motivations are correlated with other personality and contextual variables. - As another prediction, I suspect that a mechanist might be attracted to a "connectionist" scheme in cognitive psychology (which places a heavy weight on the *location* of activity in the neuro-cognitive system. I hope this make sense! Coming soon: Contextualism. ~ Steve Q. On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 10:08 PM, Steven Quackenbush < [log in to unmask]> wrote: > Hi Jason, > > Metaphysical systems are different *in kind* from "schools of thought in > psychology". So, I'm not entirely sure that the question is meaningful (as > formulated). A metaphysical system is not "represented" by a parochial > theory. Rather, metaphysics functions as *the rules of the game* whereby > the process of theory development and corroboration proceed. As an > analogy, we might consider a metaphysical system as the "backdrop" against > which various theoretical disputes in psychology play themselves out. Or, > to employ another image, metaphysics functions as a *Supreme Court* > beyond which our parochial theories have no appeal. > > To be sure, there may be a correlation between a scholar's metaphysical > commitment and the perceived attractiveness of specific theories. For > example, an animist might find narrative psychology to be downright > inspiring. But this is an empirical question that I have not really > thought much about. Still, we can add it to the list of issues to consider > at the end of the journey... > > Take care, > > ~ Steve Q. > > > > On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 9:19 PM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc- > [log in to unmask]> wrote: > >> >> Steve, >> >> Could you provide some examples of schools of thought in psychology (past >> or present) that are adequate representatives of each type of Formism and >> each type of Mechanism? >> >> ~ Jason Bessey >> On Monday, January 22, 2018, 10:16:03 AM EST, Steven Quackenbush < >> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> >> All four world hypotheses (formism, mechanism, contextualism, and >> organicism) display "unlimited scope" in the sense that they do not intend >> to leave any questions unanswered. It is a pretension rather than an >> accomplishment. The issue of "scope" seems to be logically >> independent of the question of "dispersiveness" (first introduced toward >> the end of Episode #2). We can return to the "dispersiveness" issue (which >> I did not address in the most recent episode) when we reach the conclusion. >> >> >> The latest edited version is copied below. [For the sake of avoiding >> long e-mails, subsequent episodes will be delivered as a PDF attachment] >> >> *Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses**: Season 1, Episode 3* >> >> >> >> *Narrator: “Previously on World Hypothese s:” * >> >> - We began with “common sense" >> - Though “secure” (because we can always fall back on it), common >> sense is nevertheless “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, >> irritable” (p. 44). >> - As such, we are driven to “refine” (or criticize) cognition. >> - Our goal is ultimately to make sense of our universe, to grasp how >> it all “hangs together” >> - A world hypothesis is a hypothesis about “the world itself” (p. 1). >> - But how do we manage to get from common sense to a world >> hypothesis? >> - Pepper suggests that we look out into the world of common sense and *grab >> onto something*. In effect, I find myself saying: *Perhaps this is >> the key to the universe!* >> - This key becomes my *root metaphor.* >> - Pepper offers a few generalizations, or "maxims", regarding root >> metaphors and world hypotheses: >> - *Maxim I:* “A world hypothesis is dete rmined by its root >> metaphor" (p. 96). >> - *Maxim II*: “Each world hypothesis is auto nomous" (p. 98) >> - *Maxim III*: “Eclecticism is confusing " (p. 104) >> - *Maxim IV*: "Concepts which have lost contact with their root >> metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113). >> >> So we are finally ready to dive into our first world hypothesis. Let's >> start with *formism*. Pepper distinguishes two variations: immanent and >> transcendent. >> >> >> *Immanent Formism* >> >> >> - Root metaphor = Similarity >> - Simply put, multiple objects may seem similar to each other in >> at least one respect >> - Pepper’s example: two sheets of yellow paper. >> - The shade of yellow may be so similar across the two >> sheets that we are not able to tell the difference. >> - With respect to objects of perception, we can make a >> distinction between two aspects: >> - *Particularity* – *This* piece of paper. >> - *Quality* – Its *yellowness* >> - In Pepper’s example, “we perceive two particulars (sheets of >> paper) with one quality (yellow)” (p. 153). >> - *Particularity* and *quality* are logically distinct aspects >> of an object >> - “There is nothing about a particular as a particular to >> restrain it from having any quality whatsoever” (p. 153) >> - Sometimes it is meaningful to highlight *relations* among >> particulars (which can be distinguished from logically independent >> qualities) >> - For example, these two yellow papers are *side by side*. >> Yellow is the quality, “side-by-side-ness” is the relation. >> - Since both quality and relation characterize a particular >> object, we can synthesize these two terms and simply refer to the >> *character* of the object (as distinct from its “particularness”) >> - We are just about ready to document the basic categories of >> immanent formism. These categories are quite important, as they are the >> keys to interpreting everything else. Recall (from Episode #2): >> - On the grounds of the root metaphor, the metaphysician >> delineates a list of "structural characteristics" that become "his basic >> concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of categories” >> (p. 91) >> - “In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other >> areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes >> to interpret all facts in terms of these categories” (p. 91) >> - So, here are the *basic categories *of Immanent formism: >> - *1) Characters* >> - *2) Particulars* >> - *3) Participation *(which “is the tie between characters and >> particulars, p. 154). >> - e.g., this paper *participates* in yellowness; this >> computer *participates* in slowness. >> - Pepper insists that *participation is not a relation* (in the >> sense defined above) >> - If it were a relation, it would be an aspect of character, >> and then we would only have Basic Categories #1 and #2 (characters and >> particulars, respectively), with no logical possibility of producing an >> object (which requires “participation” as a distinct third category). >> - Rather than using the term “relation” to speak of >> participation, we can speak instead of *ties.* >> - Consider: *this yellow sheet of paper*. >> - The paper is *tied* to the character “yellowness” >> - But isn’t this just a play with words (i.e., replacing >> “relation” with “ties” to sustain the autonomy of Basic Category #3 – i.e., >> “Participation”)? >> - Pepper: “Ties are relations which are not relations. >> This sounds very much like a self-contradiction, and seems to indicate a >> categorical inadequacy. I rather think it is. Nevertheless, the theory >> contains too many insights for us safely to neglect it, until a much better >> world theory comes in view” (pp. 155-156) >> - On the grounds of our basic categories, we can develop >> other concepts. Fore example: *c**lasses* >> - “A *class* is a collection of particulars which participate >> in one or more characters” (p. 159). >> - E.g., blue jays >> - A class “is itself neither a character, nor a particular, >> nor a participation…*It is simply the actual working of the >> three categories in the world*” (p. 162) >> - “We simply observe that a character or a group of >> characters normally participates in a number of different particulars” (p. >> 162). >> - “A class is, accordingly, a thoroughly real thing, but >> what is real is the functioning of the categories” (p. 162). >> - A *classification* is an organization of classes (e.g., >> from the more general to the less general) >> >> It is possible to make a modest shift in our root metaphor and open up >> new conceptual possibilities. For example, instead of speaking of crude >> "similarity", we might think of “the work of an artisan in making >> different objects on the same plan or for the same reason” (e.g., “a >> carpenter making beds”; p. 162) or “natural objects appearing or >> growing according to the same plan” (e.g., “oak trees”; p. 162). >> Similarity remains the animating metaphor, but these ideas allow for >> considerable enrichment of our world hypothesis. Immanent formism >> gives way to... >> >> *Transcendent Formism* >> >> - Categories >> - *1) Norms* (which parallel “characters”) >> - *2) Matter* for the exemplification of norms (which parallel >> “particulars”) >> - *3) *The principle of *exemplification* which materializes the >> norms (which parallels “participation”) >> - So, what’s the difference between a character (immanent formism) >> and a norm (transcendent formism)? >> - “A norm is a complex set of characters” (p. 164). >> - Significantly, a norm need not ever actually *appear*. >> - A *norm* is not a *class *(which is a collection of *actually >> observed* objects) >> - Indeed, we might not ever observe a norm. >> - “The norm of the oak is rarely or never fully present in any >> particular oak. Particular oaks merely approximate the norm” (p. 164). >> - "Norms seem to be used or presupposed in much of the basic work >> of empirical scientists” (p. 165). >> - A species is a norm (not a class) >> - A species can be viewed as “a state of biological equilibrium >> in nature, a structural point of balance and stability” (p. 165). >> - Empirical specimens are imperfect exemplifications of a >> species >> - Similarly, molecules, atoms, electrons, etc. can be considered >> as “norms of physical structure” (p. 165). >> - *Evolution: *A commitment to a formist philosophy of science does >> not imply a commitment to the notion that norms must remain *fixed*. >> - “There is no reason why, in a world in which norms constituted >> a basic type of order, there should not be an order of evolution among the >> norms” (p. 165) >> - “If there is a good evidence that the ancient ancestors of men >> were fish, that does not in any way disturb the structural differences >> between men and fish” (p. 165-166) >> - What, then, does the transcendent formist really believe? >> - Answer: *There are norms in nature.* >> - And “there seems to be plenty of apparently direct inductive >> evidence” (p. 166) for such norms. >> - *The transcendent formist is on a quest to discover the **laws >> of nature*. >> - “Persons who accept the theory that there are laws of nature, >> and that the aim of science is to discover these laws, which nature >> ‘follows,’ seem…to imply that these laws are norms which regulate >> (literally render regular) the occurrences of nature” (p. 165) >> - “On this view, the inductive method is a method of collecting >> observations for the discovery of the regularities or laws which ‘hold’ in >> nature.” (p. 166). >> - Immanent and transcendent formism seem to be wholly compatible. >> - Characters [immanent formism] *participate in* norms >> [transcendent formism] >> - *Existence*: The field of basic particulars [Category 2 in >> immantent formsim] >> - Existence is “primarily the field of bare particulars” >> - But this can never be observed. It may be a “sheer >> abstraction” (p. 167). >> - The example given above was “this particular piece of >> paper” (before we qualified it with the term yellow). But this isn’t >> quite a “bare particular” because we are already considering it as “paper” >> - Existence is “secondarily the field of all basically >> particularized characters” (p. 167). >> - So, “this particular piece of paper” is a basically >> particularized character. It can be further characterized as yellow. >> - “Concrete objects such as we perceive and handle are >> all in the field of existence as secondarily considered. That is, they are >> all basic particulars with character” (p. 167-168) >> - This is the field of *concrete existence*. >> - *Subsistence*: “the field of characters and norms so >> far as these are not considered as participating or being exemplified in >> basic particulars” (p. 168). >> - In other words, we can talk about characters and norms as >> abstractions, without reference to specific objects. >> - We can also consider “relations” among characters and >> norms, without reference to specific objects. >> - “All these ‘relations’ are, of course, ties of various >> sorts” (p. 168) >> - “Norms…are complex in character and are definitely >> subsistent forms” (p. 168). >> - A norm [such as the iPhone] will “participate in” (or be tied >> to) various characters (shiny, etc.). >> - In a sense, a norm (the iPhone) is a *particular* that can be >> “characterized” like any other particular, but it is a “subsistent or >> second-degree particular” (p. 169). >> - “It is a subsistent entity which, as subsistent, participates >> in certain subsistent characters” (p. 169). >> - Characters can also participate in other characters, and – >> interestingly enough – this gives us *gestalts* (“complex characters >> or patterns”; p. 169). [Notice here the incredible *scope *of >> transcendent formism] >> - Gestalts “are not analyzable completely into elementary >> characters, though they participate in them” (p. 169). >> - *Causality* for the formist: >> - Causality “is the result of the participation of patterns, >> norms, or laws in basic particulars through the forms of time and space” >> (p. 175) >> - So, here’s “the causal structure of a series of events” (p. 176): >> - We begin with a basic particular (or a set thereof) “having >> certain characters” (p. 176). >> - These characters participate "in a law, which itself >> participates in time and space characters” (p. 176) >> - This law determines "other basic particulars as having >> certain dates or positions and as having certain characters the same as >> those possessed by the first basic particulars, or different from them” (p. >> 176) >> - *More simply,* “causality is the determination of the >> characters of certain basic particulars by a law which is set in motion by >> the characters of other basic particulars which participate in the law” (p. >> 177). >> - Example: >> - *Presumed law:* Stress elicits a desire to affiliate with >> others >> - *Character of the first set of basic particulars*: >> Subjects are told that “*In this experiment, you will suffer >> painful electric shocks*!” [which presumably induce stress] >> - *Character of a second** set of basic particulars:* A >> desire to *wait with others* while the experimenter sets up >> the shock generator [an operationalization of the desire to >> affiliate] >> - The first set of basic particulars "sets in motion" the >> law which determines the second set of basic particulars. >> - If all this seems far removed from the root metaphor of >> similarity, it is worth remembering that “events are genuinely similar to >> one another because they genuinely participate in the same law” (p. 177). >> - For a formist, “a law is not to be identified with a concrete >> existent structure” (p. 177). >> - Rather*, “a law is a form”* (p. 177). >> - *“This is one of the fundamental distinctions between formism >> and mechanism”* (p. 177). >> - Formism serves as the foundation for a *correspondence theory of >> truth*. >> - Consider: “pictures, maps, diagrams, sentences, formulas, and >> mental images” (p. 180). >> - These are “concrete existences” >> - We can ascribe truth to some of them >> - But if was declare (say) a map to be “true”, it acquires this >> truth by virtue of its similarity to some object of reference. >> - So, when we make a truth claim, we are declaring that a >> certain set of objects is similar to some set of objects (*in >> some respect*). >> - *Truth* can be defined as “the degree of similarity which a >> description has to its object of reference” (p. 181). >> - Of course, “the objects they are said to be true of are not >> exactly similar to them, but only in respect to the form under >> consideration or in accordance with certain conventions” (p. 180). >> - *“[A] true description actually possesses the form of its >> object” *(p. 181). >> - There are two kinds of truth in formism: >> - Historical truth: *Existence,* “ descriptions of the >> qualities and relations of particular events” (p. 182) >> - Scientific truth: *Subsistence,* “ descriptions of norms and >> laws” (p. 182) >> - *Empirical uniformities* (e.g., “the tides rise twice a day”) >> are *not* scientific truths. >> - “Descriptions of empirical uniformities are simply rungs in >> the ladder from contingent fact to necessary law. They are signs of human >> ignorance.” >> - “For if we knew the whole truth about them, we should know >> the law or the combination of laws which made their regularity necessary, >> or we should know that they were not necessary but were mere historical >> coincidences which have been mistakenly generalized and which cannot be >> relied upon for scientific predictions” (p. 183). >> >> *On the limits of **formism* >> >> - Nature seems to be comprised as a constellation of discrete laws. >> - But: “*the laws of nature may not be so discrete, so separate from >> one another, as the formist assumes*” (p. 184) >> - “*The integration of scientific laws into a single system is…a >> constant threat to formism”* (p. 184). >> - If all laws could be amalgamated, then scientific descriptions >> would not approximate a constellation of 'separate subsistent forms', but >> rather “the single concrete existential structure of the universe” (p. 184) >> - “There would be no subsistence left” (p. 184) >> - Also, “the weakness of formism…is its looseness of categorical >> structure and consequent lack of determinateness” (p. 185) >> - “Just what constitutes one particular, one character, or one >> norm or law?” >> - “How many particulars are there in a sheet of paper?” >> - “How many in the flight of an airplane? >> - “How can we definitely tell a tie from a relation?” (p. 185) >> >> Formism, it should now be clear, is a world hypothesis with unlimited scope. >> We can use it to ground a complete, and reasonably coherent, philosophy of >> science. In a previous post, I suggested that the typical psychology >> student “assimilates a more-or-less unified account of the scientific >> enterprise”. Here I can be more specific: *Transcendent formism is the >> default metaphysics of the modal research psychologist.* I don’t mean >> to imply that this default metaphysics guides the thinking of the research >> psychologists in all contexts (e.g., I may be a transcendent formist when I >> teach Research Methods, but an animist when I read Heidegger). But >> transcendent formism (as a metaphysics with unlimited scope) is the >> backdrop against which our parochial theories typically emerge. What >> we end up with, of course, is a constellation of loosely-affiliated >> theoretical systems, each with its own constellation of discrete laws (or >> empirical regularities that *cry out *to be interpreted as laws). >> >> >> *Mechanism* >> >> We will begin our discussion of mechanism with a very simple observation: >> The world is like a machine. >> >> >> - Root metaphor = Machine >> >> What could be simpler than that? And it certainly seems possible to >> interpret the cosmos as a giant "machine" of sorts. But refined mechanism >> will enrich this metaphor to such an extent that the ultimate metaphoric >> machine will bear little resemblance to a spinning jenny. >> >> Pepper distinguishes two variations of mechanism: discrete and >> consolidated >> >> *Discrete** Mechanism* >> >> Consider a watch. It has a collection of parts that need not be >> described here. But we can say that each of the parts is >> *externally related* to the other parts. That is, they can be >> considered as conceptually distinct. This is an example of the >> "discreteness" of discrete mechanism. [Another example is the thesis that >> "space is distinct from time"; p. 196]. >> >> Something else worth noting about the watch is that *it matters where >> the parts are located in the machine*. If you fidget with a part -- *and >> move it to a place it is not supposed to be* -- the watch might not work >> any more. This insight clears the way to consider the basic categories of >> mechanism: >> >> - *Category 1: The field of locations* >> - Reality is determined by location. >> - “Whatever can be located is real, and is real by virtue of >> its location” (p. 197). >> - The love experienced by the mystic is real once we’ve >> found its place in a (properly situated) neural network. >> - “What cannot be located has an ambiguous reality until its >> place is found” (p. 197). >> - So, in mechanism (unlike formism) “only particulars exist” (p. >> 198), and these particulars are located in space and time. >> - *Category 2: The primary qualities* >> - “The traditional discrete mechanism is the theory of atoms and >> the void, or, as the view develops, the theory of elementary particles >> distributed in space and time” (p. 201). >> - Elementary physical particles are “qualitative differentiations >> of the field of locations” (p. 203). >> - “Without such differentiations the field would be utterly >> undifferentiated. Every location would be like every other….Nothing…would >> be going on in the universe” (p. 204). >> - “Reciprically, if there were only the characters of matter, >> and no field in which these characters could be deployed, there could be no >> configurations” (p. 204) >> - “Field and matter are, therefore, complementary concepts” (p. >> 204). >> - “[We] need differentiating characters in the field to render >> the cosmic machine descriptive and explanatory of the actual world in which >> we live” (p. 204) >> - “The ultimate differentiating characters of the ultimate >> physical particles are the *primary qualities*” (p. 204) >> - Traditional primary qualities: >> - *Size* >> - *Shape* >> - *Motion* >> - *Solidity* >> - *Mass (or weight)* >> - *Number* >> - Pepper notes that all of the above primary qualities, with >> the exception of mass (or weight) are concerned with “localization in the >> spatiotemporal field” (p. 205). >> - *Size:* “spatial volume of the differentiated locations” >> - *Shape:* “the boundaries of these” >> - *Motion:* “their temporal path” >> - *Solidity:* “the absence of undifferentiated interior >> locations” >> - *Number:* “the means of specifying distinct locations” >> - Pepper observes that these so-called qualities are "not >> technically qualities at all, but field *relations* in >> *relation* to the one genuine quality, mass” (p. 205) >> - Of course, we can substitute other lists of primary >> qualities. But whatever list we generate, it will typically include: >> - *1) Properties of location in the field* (e.g., size and >> motion) >> - These are “actual field properties” that do not sustain >> the true distinctness of the qualities under consideration. >> - Pepper describes them as “highly consolidating”, which >> anticipates his discussion of consolidating mechanism [considered below] >> - 2) *Differentiating properties* (e.g., mass) >> - These “seem to be discrete qualities inhering in >> spatiotemporal volumes” (p. 206). >> - “These differentiating properties are not structural >> characteristics of the field like volumes, [they are] not consolidated with >> the field” (p 206). >> - They “just *happen* to have the locations they have” >> (p. 206). >> - *Category #3: “Laws holding among the primary qualities in >> the field”* (p. 207) >> - Laws [such as Newton’s laws of motion] “constitute the *dynamic* element >> in the mechanistic universe” (p. 210). >> - “The field itself is static and undifferentiated” (p. 210) >> - “Even when the field is dotted with masses, it still lacks >> efficacy” (p. 210) >> - “The dynamic structure of nature comes from the laws which >> connect the masses together and guide them from one configuration to >> another” (p. 210). >> - Puzzle: What is the ontological status of these laws? >> - There is a real danger of slipping back into transcendent >> formism (where the laws of nature served as transcendent norms). >> - Formism “is the constant threat in the rear of mechanism” >> (p. 210). >> - “The only way of avoiding this mechanistic catastrophe [of >> slipping back into formism] is to imbed the primary qualities *and >> the law* firmly in the spatiotemporal field. Things are real >> only if they have a time and a place. Only particulars exist. This >> principle must never be abandoned, for the penalty is the dissolution of >> mechanism” [p. 211] >> - “The mechanist is scornful of abstractions and forms. He >> wants his feet on the ground, and the ground in the field of time and >> space, and he does not want to believe in anything that is not also on the >> ground (p. 212) >> - “To achieve this end, however, he must *consolidate his >> categories*” (p. 212) >> - *“The primary qualities and the laws must become structural >> features of the spatiotemporal field…*” (p. 212) >> - This brings us to *consolidated mechanism*. >> >> *Consolidated mechanism* >> >> - “In place of the discrete particle is the spatiotemporal path” (p. >> 212) >> - “In place of the discrete laws of mechanics is a geometry, or, >> better, a geography” (p. 212) >> - “The purpose of this cosmic geometry is simply to describe to us >> the unique structure of the spatiotemporal whole” (p. 212) >> - Example: Relativity theory >> - “The chief modern impetus for consolidation comes, of course, >> from relativity theory, for this has to do with the details of the >> spatiotemporal field. The special theory of relatively breaks down the >> clean-cut traditional separation between space and time” (p. 213) >> - “But the most important evidence is *the general theory of >> relativity*, which *amalgamates the gravitational field with the >> spatiotemporal field*” (p. 213) >> - Gravitation is linked to mass – one of the primary qualities considered >> above >> - But “gravitational mass is interpreted in terms of a >> gravitational field, which has the effect of amalgamating the law of >> gravitation into the first category [location], so that the field is no >> longer just the spatiotemporal field but the spatiotemporal-gravitational >> field” (p. 213). >> - “Strictly speaking, there are no laws in consolidated >> mechanism; there are just structural modifications of the spatiotemporal >> field” (p. 214) >> - There are “no primary qualities, either, for these are resolved >> into field laws, which are themselves resolved into the structure of the >> field” (p. 214) . >> - “So now, at last, *only particulars exist*, or, more truly still, *only >> a particular exists*, namely, the consolidated >> spatiotemporal-gravitational- electromagnetic field” (p. 314) >> - “Laws and masses *are* the structure of the field itself” (p. 215) >> - But consolidated mechanism lacks “scope”. e.g., what does the >> general theory of relativity have to do with the fact that Bill and Sam >> have decided to stop talking to each other? >> - The scope of mechanism might be expanded if we introduce the notion >> of *secondary qualities.* >> - Secondary qualities include “all the irreducible characters of the >> world which are not identifiable with the primary qualities…[Among] them >> are probably all the characters of human perception” (p. 215). >> - How do we connect primary with secondary qualities? Implicit here >> is the issue regarding how we understand the relationship between >> *brain* (which is presumably consolidated with the primary qualities >> -- or the spatiotemporal field) and *mind* (a constellation of >> secondary qualities). >> - Three possibilities (for the mechanist to consider): >> - *Identity:* Primary and secondary qualities are really the >> same thing >> - Pepper doesn’t think this works: “Color and sound, for >> instance, are not literally electromagnetic or air vibrations, nor even >> neural activities. They are irreducible qualities” (p. 216). >> - *Causation: *Primary qualities somehow “cause” secondary >> qualities >> - Pepper doesn’t think this works any better. The laws >> considered by the mechanist (e.g., electromagnetic-field laws) “have no >> application to such qualities as colors and sounds” (p. 216) >> - *Correlation:* The observation that “upon the occurrence of >> certain configurations of matter certain qualities appear which are not >> reducible to the characters of matter or the characters of the >> configurations” (p. 216-217) >> - “The term *emergence *signalizes such correlated >> appearances” (p. 217). >> - If we go with *correlation [emergence],* we have the problem >> of somehow getting from “matter” to “mind” (and eventually “culture”). >> - “The gap between such secondary qualities as our sensations >> of color or sound and the configurations of matter among primary qualities >> seems to be so great as to *suggest many intervening levels of >> successively emerging secondary qualities” *(p. 217). >> - *“Thus we pass from the elementary and primary electrons, >> positrons, neutrons, and so forth, to atoms, molecules, crystals, amino >> acids, cells, tissues, organisms.” (p. 217)* >> - *“At each level new properties seem to emerge which are not >> reducible to, or predictable from, the properties of configurations at the >> lower levels” (p. 217).* >> - As an aside, I wonder if Pepper (were he to have ten >> minutes to peruse a brief sketch) might classify Gregg’s *ToK >> System* as *consolidated mechanism with successively >> emerging secondary qualities.* >> - I don’t think this is the appropriate way to consider >> the ToK system (which is why I specified that Pepper only spent ten >> minutes looking at a brief sketch). Further comments on >> the matter will have to await a subsequent episode of this series. >> >> *The mechnanistic theory of truth* >> >> - Does "correspondence theory" work? >> - Pepper observes that many mechanists do indeed embrace a simple >> correspondence theory of truth whereby an idea (or image) in my mind >> corresponds with the object about which I am making truth claims. But this >> doesn’t really work because “both the object and the idea which are being >> directly compared for their correspondences are private awarenesses of the >> individual organism making the comparison. We get no assurance from such >> correspondence about the truth of our ideas concerning the >> external world” (p. 222). >> - Correspondence theory leads us to the conclusion that “the >> truth can never be known, since it can never be reached for a direct >> comparison with an idea that is within the organism” (p. 222). >> - Simple correspondence theory may eventually give way to a more >> sophisticated *symbolic correspondence theory*, where the “idea” >> is replaced by a “a group of symbols in a sentence or a scientific formula" >> (p. 222). >> - “[If] these symbols correspond with features of the object, >> and the symbolized relations among the symbols with the relations among the >> objects, [then] the sentence or formula is true” (p. 222) >> - Symbolic correspondence theory doesn’t solve the problem noted >> above (i.e., acquiring knowledge of primary qualities). >> - But another path may be open to the mechanist. >> - *The causal-adjustment theory* >> - We can begin a consideration of this theory by observing the >> mechanist's commitment to *nominalism*: >> - Words such as “blue jay” are not references to immanent forms >> or transcendental norms. >> - Rather they are simply labels for a number of objects. >> - “Blue jays are grouped into a class simply by virtue of >> the fact that they are all called by that name” (p. 226). >> - In its simplest form, nominalism has no real way to account >> for the fact that a particular set of objects were grouped together in the >> first place (only to be named later). >> - But the mechanist can develop a more sophisticated nominalism >> - “What, now, is a name? It is a specific response made by >> an organism on the stimulus of specific environmental confifurations. In >> principle it is exactly the sort of thing that happens when an organism >> reacts positively to food stimuli and negatively to prick stimuli. It is >> simply specificity of response in an organism carried to a higher degree of >> refinement” (p. 226) >> - So, “a sentence or scientific formula physiologically >> interpreted is nothing but a combination of such reactions or conditioned >> reflexes. The whole thing can be causally interpreted” (p. 226). >> - If I say “that is a sharp nail!”, I can test this >> truth claim by recreating the original experience that led me to make this >> statement: >> - “I would tentatively step on the nail, and if I >> reacted negatively, I would say that the sentence was true; if not, I would >> say that it was false and look about the causes which produced the >> illusion” (p. 226) >> - Contra formism, “nothing is implied about an >> identity of form between the sentence and the nail” (p. 226) >> - “What makes error possible is itself causally >> explained. An organism develops a set of attitudes, or physiological sets, >> on the basis of certain physical stimuli. These attitudes often lack >> specificity, so that they may be set off by stimuli which usually support >> the attitude but on [some occasions] do not” (p. 228) >> - “The nail turns out to be a twig that looked like a >> nail” (p. 228) >> - “The mistake can be easily explained, and is the bases >> for making the attitude still more specific, so that these mistakes will be >> rarer” (p. 228). >> - “Truth thus becomes a name for physiological attitudes >> which are in adjustment with the environment of the organism” (p. 228) >> . >> - Pepper suggest that we might dub this the *causal-adjustment >> theory of truth*. >> - According to this theory, we “learn about the structure of >> the great machine by a sort of detective work” (p. 229) >> - We document “changes among our private secondary >> qualities” >> - And then we “infer their correlations with physiological >> configurations which are in our organism" >> - And “thence infer the structural characters of the >> surrounding field from its effects upon the configuration of our organism” >> (p. 229). >> - Example: “Are there any red-winged blackbirds?” >> - We first establish a pattern of secondary qualities: >> e.g., “we construct the image in our minds or write out our description in >> words” (p., 229). >> - We then "infer that these [secondary qualities] are >> correlated with effective and specific physiological configurations within >> our organism” (p. 229) >> - Our organism (*in tune with our mind*) thus becomes an >> instrument that allows us to address the matter at hand. >> - “We then propel our organism about the environment to >> find out whether there are any configurations in the world that will >> directly stimulate this physiological attitude, and so bring up the >> correlated words in our sentence, or the correlated shapes and colors in >> our perception” (p. 229) >> - “If this happens, we call our sentence or idea true” (p. >> 229). >> >> *On the limits of mechanism* >> >> - Secondary qualities are merely *correlated* with primary qualities. >> This reintroduces *discreteness* into an otherwise consolidated >> metaphysics. >> - *The “gap between the primary and secondary categories still >> remains the center of inadequacy for mechanism”* (p. 231). >> - If we abandon secondary qualities entirely (as does the strict >> *materialist*), mechanism has a serious problem with scope. >> >> >> So, we now have sketches of two world hypotheses: Formism & Mechanism. Each >> world hypothesis employs a unique set of "fundamental categories" to make >> sense of the world. This set of categories functions as a (more-or-less) >> consistent system, with unique approaches to the problem of refined truth. >> >> Coming next week: *Contextualism*. >> >> Here's my episode guide for Season 1 of* Steven Pepper's World >> Hypotheses. * >> >> - Episode 1: Evidence & Corroboration [Chapters 1-4] -- January 7, >> 2018 >> - Episode 2: Root Metaphors [Chapters 5-7] -- January 14, 2018 >> - Episode 3: Formism & Mechanism [Chapters 8-9] -- January 21, 2018 >> - Episode 4: Contextualism [Chapter 10] -- January 28, 2018 >> - Episode 5: Organicism; Conclusions [Chapters 11-12] -- February 4, >> 2018] >> >> Eventually, I'll release the complete Season #1 on PDF, with hours of >> special features, deleted notes, etc. >> >> Until next week, >> >> ~ Steve Q >> >> Note: Bold-faced text = emphasis added >> >> >> ############################ >> >> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the >> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bi >> n/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >> ############################ >> >> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the >> following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bi >> n/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >> > > ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1