Chance, regarding AI, my cynicism directs me to think that it will be used to entrain the largest number of people for the sake of 'economy', just as the current system is doing, but less efficiently. I have lived on this planet long enough to see the big picture, and I fear that dwindling resources and overpopulation trump (pun intended) rational decision making for the sake of expediency. But this is why I think this meeting is so important.....so we can air these thoughts, particularly those that would tell us that there is an alternative to the direction we are going in now.....or at least that is my hope. John

On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 1:56 PM, Chance McDermott <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Thank you for the response, John, and your post does indeed make sense to me.  If we are going to warehouse human beings in artificial environments, then I hope we encourage the creation of terrariums rather than the fluorescent prison cell that is the modern office and class room. 

My hope is that the ai will arrive at this conclusion swiftly, and  this may depend on the ethological sophistication of the programmers, politicians, and businessmen.  

-chance 

-chance 

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 19, 2018, at 5:58 AM, JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Hello Chance, great question. I would like to discuss this with you further at the meeting in April. For me, the epitome of what you are asking is two-fold. First, years ago I was out hiking in the woods with my wife and I turned and asked her why there were never any bad color combinations in Nature? Secondly, according to Alfred Tauber, the scientist-philosopher, HD Thoreau went to Walden to counter Descartes' Mind-Body dichotomy in order to live his life 'deliberately'. Those ideas came back to me as I followed the reverse trajectory for the cell-cell communications that have allowed for the evolution of the organ of gas exchange (equivocating because it isn't just the lung, it's also the skin, and earlier still the cell membrane). That thought experiment got me deeper and deeper into the question of the 'how and why' of the evolutionary process as cellular-molecular biology accommodating the extrernal environment by internalizing it to become physiologic traits, not random mutation and natural selection, which are untestable metaphors. Cut to the chase, the problem with evolution theory is that there is literally no cell biology incorporated into it. I hope that was intelligible.....Gregg keeps telling me that my science is somewhat abstract for psychologists, but I would like to think that it can become relevant to y'all. So when you say that Pop Psychology thinks all humans are the same, I have to take exception to that as a developmental physiologist. We now know that not even identical twins are identical. And for me the learning curve in this regard was 20 years of studying sexual differentiation of the lung.....yes the lung shows sexual dimorphisms that are relevant to its structure and function, explaining volumes about why various lung diseases manifest themselves differently in males and females. Medicine is just now beginning to 'appreciate' that, at least in principle. But beyond that, my epiphany in studying the heritable effects of the environment, referred to as epigenetics, has taught me that the phenotype has agency to collect data from the environment in order to inform the organism of the condition of the environment (hope that wasn't a bridge too far, because it is scientifically based). So what we think of as behavior is actually what I just described as phenotypic agency. So by constraining people as 'one size fits all' society creates neuroses and psychoses in the name of 'civility'......I raised my children to be their own selves knowing what I knew as a reproductive biologist. I think they turned out pretty well. But let's talk more in April, but feel free to ask away since this is not a paragraph, it's volumes of thought for me, and clearly you're thinking about such issues from a psychologist's perspective. I published these essays in Minding Nature....they may be helpful in our dialog (https://www.humansandnature. org/your-inner-thoreau;https:/ /www.humansandnature.org/man- is-integral-with-nature- article-198.php)......they're easier reading than the journal articles and books are. Best, John

P.S. The advent of AI may by-pass all that I just said😂

On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 12:35 AM, Chance McDermott <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

John Torday, I am curious about your perspective and research, and would like to discuss further at the meeting in April.  Pop psychology often takes the stance that "humans are all the same," when in reality we all may need unique environments, regimens, and diets.  

Do you think it's possible to make general claims about the importance of being in "natural" environments, such as open air and wildlife?  I tend to romanticize archaic man, and believe that we are happiest when we are adapted to outdoor living.  From your perspective, would that claim be justified?  

-Chance

On Sun, Feb 18, 2018 at 12:41 PM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

The tone of this last note should be clarified.

 

I simply mean that, for myself, I have found a system that makes cumulative sense out of mind/psychology/animal/person, etc. I am trying to convey how it works. Other folks are, of course, welcome to their own opinions about all of that.

 

G

 

From: Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx
Sent: Sunday, February 18, 2018 1:20 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: RE: Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate (Between Advocate & Skeptic)

 

Well, Jason, we can agree to disagree (or whatever).

 

I don’t feel the dualist split anymore. I am a “property quadist” meaning I experience the universe as an unfolding wave of energy-information that operates at the dimensions of matter, life, mind, and culture (quadist being a made up word for the four dimensions).

 

I know what goes where and essentially all the problems of philosophy of mind (as far as I can see) are more or less resolved.

Best,
Gregg

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@listserv .jmu.edu] On Behalf Of nysa71
Sent: Sunday, February 18, 2018 1:15 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate (Between Advocate & Skeptic)

 

 

Gregg,

It seems to me that none of this really resolves the "problem of dualism". If we go back a ways, the problem used to be "the soul / body" problem. Psychologists come along and are like, "Well, "soul" isn't very "scientific-sounding", so we'll say "mind" instead".

OK. So now we have a "mind / body" problem.

Enter the "computationalists" and their concept of "information".

Now we have an "information / body" problem.

It really all just strikes me as semantics, leaving the "problem of dualism" essentially untouched. And such an approach doesn't escape the same sorts of criticisms, (e.g., Ryle's Regress and the Homunculus Fallacy).

I'm inclined to think that we, as human beings, necessarily (and unavoidably) experience our existence in a dualistic way as a byproduct of language. Language "divides up" the world....perhaps in a manner that could be described ultimately as "subject / object".

~ Jason

On Sunday, February 18, 2018, 9:36:04 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 

 

Jason,

  Thanks for your note. I completely agree that some skepticism should be directed at psychology and the science of mind. As you know, I have long been a critic of the field. As I will explain briefly here, the problem in my opinion, is not so much with the problem of things being “unobservable” or the problem of “information,” but rather the complete lack of a metaphysical system that frames the problems that the field is trying to deal with.

 

The concept of (neuro-) “information processing” is grounded in the science of information. Information is definitely a tricky concept. But then again, so is energy at is foundational level. The famed physicist Richard Feynman commented that we really don’t know what energy “is” exactly. I found the course, The Science of Information, to be helpful in sorting things out. Basically, it is a course on Claude Shannon’s remarkable work in the 1920s and 30s. He can be considered the “Newton” of information theory. It has to do with communication, messaging, the reduction of uncertainty, and the way information can flow through mediums (interface and transmutability). Put it this way, Newton dealt with energy and matter in mechanical form, hence “classical mechanics.” Shannon deals with information, which I argue is a whole different angle on causation. Information behaves very differently than F = ma, for example. The developments in information science and theory and technology all give rise to the “cognitive science” revolution. Here is a quick little blog I did on this point and how it relates to the mind.

 

Best,

Gregg

 

 

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@listserv .jmu.edu] On Behalf Of nysa71
Sent: Sunday, February 18, 2018 8:51 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate (Between Advocate & Skeptic)

 

 

Gregg,

In regards to a science of animal behavior, we're dealing with a functional change in the animal (i.e., object) - environment (i.e., field) relation that is mediated physiologically....and yes, with a particular focus on changes in the nervous system, (though any of the other 10 organ systems can and do play a role in mediating such behavior, the nervous system certainly plays a central "organizing" role in all this).

Furthermore, the scientist can "dig deeper" into the "functional levels of biological organization" and investigate the organs that play a role in the mediation of any given behavior, (e.g., the brain), the tissues, (e.g., nervous tissue), the cells, (e.g., the neuron), the organelles, the biochemicals, etc.

Indeed, the scientist can even investigate the energy involved in all this.

Such things can all be observed and measured, per the scientific method.

No one could reasonably dispute that such things are (in principle) easily amendable to the scientific method, in my opinion.

But I must confess (if you haven't guessed already) that I've long been deeply skeptical of a "science of mind" (e.g., orthodox cognitive psychology) --- "science" in the modern way that term is used, (i.e., observation, measurement, data, testable & falsifiable predictions, etc.). That is, empirical science...

Yes, psychologists can "define" mental "stuff" in such a way as to make them amendable to the scientific method, but that ends up begging the question as to whether or not psychologists end up  actually investigating the very thing that they intended to investigate in the first place.

For example, what exactly is meant by "information" in the context of "neuro-information processing"? What --- scientifically-speaking ---- makes things more parsimonious here than simply using a term like "energy"? I still can't figure that one out!

It appears to me that psychology all too often seems to pick the methodology first (i.e., the scientific method), and then "define" its object of study in such a way as to "fit that method", (therefore making a metaphysics out of method). But that just strikes me as a "cart-before-the-horse" approach.

There can certainly be instances where perfectly legitimate "non-scientific" methodologies are more justifiable. 

Basically, though I'm very much "pro-science", I'm equally, "anti-scientism".

So I'll just leave it there for now, my skepticism out in the open!

~ Jason Bessey

On Saturday, February 17, 2018, 9:59:54 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 

 

Thanks for your considerations, Jason.

 

Given your point about the different vantage points of Skinner and Rogers, you might find Ken Wilber’s epistemological quadrant analysis to be of interest:

https://www.psychologytoday.co m/blog/theory-knowledge/201510 /positioning-our-knowledge-in- four-quadrants.

 

For the record, I am not “insisting” that everything in psychology has to be reconciled right here, right now. I am explaining the language game and metaphysical picture that I developed via the ToK that I argue allows one to untangle past tangles.  Animals (from my vantage point, we should definitely specify animals, not organisms) behave in very different ways from cells and plants. We can start by plainly calling that “animal behavior.” My point is that animal behavior evolves, in a straight forward way, into “mental behavior.” Mental is an adjective that labels the ways in which animals behave so differently from cells and plants.

 

To see this, we can ask, plainly: What is it that causes animals to behave so differently? Descriptively, they behave as units, in real time that have functional effects. And we can ask, What is the organ system that allows for that? The nervous system. Then we can ask: How does the nervous system do that? And the answer, at the broadest level is, “process information.” Once we realize that the broad definition of “cognitive” is neuro-information processing, lots of puzzle pieces fall into place. We can see that animal behavior is a specific kind of behavior that can be described by the adjective mental (i.e., mediated by neuro-information processing…BTW, all “cognitivist” models, including situated cognition, embodied cognition, etc. assume a small “i” neuro-information processing model. By small “i,” I mean “nonsymbolic”). We can contrast this to the conceptual problems that are readily identified in how psychology is currently framed.  

 

One final point about all of this that is relevant from my position is the applied side. That pertains to what are the models of application that stem from the science of human psychology. The outgrowth of the ToK, the UTUA framework, sets the stage for how to train professional psychologists to operate from a fully integrated science of human psychology. This allows them to transcend the various fragmented schools of thought (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, psychodynamic, and humanistic) and operate from a larger perspective that assimilates and integrates key insights into a more coherent whole.

Best,

Gregg

 

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@listserv .jmu.edu] On Behalf Of nysa71
Sent: Saturday, February 17, 2018 8:50 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate (Between Advocate & Skeptic)

 

 

Gregg,

It's a "struggle" if we insist that everything in psychology has to be reconciled right here, right now. Having broad areas in a given field that are currently difficult to reconcile is hardly unique to psychology. I previously mentioned quantum mechanics and relativity theory in physics as an example. If they try to reconcile the two under the "Standard Model", you just get gibberish. There are some promising leads, (e.g., string theory), but the jury is still out.

Indeed, allowing these two areas to develop relatively independently of each other over the course of the 20th century has put them both in a much better position to be reconciled under a grand unified theory.

So if psychologists currently find themselves in the predicament of having different domains of inquiry that are currently difficult (if not currently impossible) to reconcile, then they can hardly be faulted for that. Physicists, for certain, are in no position to be casting stones, that's for sure! The supposed "king of the sciences" has got its own problems!

So perhaps, along the same lines, it's not a bad idea to have a "bottom-up" approach and "top-down" approach develop relatively independent from each other for the time being --- the former dealing with the behavior of organisms in a mechanistic "non-mentalistic" manner, and the latter dealing with the human mind, perhaps grounded in the phenomenological. 

That alone would be challenging enough, but I suspect far more achievable for the foreseeable future. 

In regards to "subject / field" relational change, it would appear that your "Skinner vs. Rogers" reference is a good example of what I'm getting at.

From the "Skinnerian" perspective, the organism-as-a-whole is effectively treated as "an object", thus making its behavior as a change in the object / field relation.

I looked up Rogers on Wikipedia, and there was a list of his "19 propositions". Proposition #1 caught my attention, because it seemed to nicely capture (at least in part) what  I was attempting to express by contrasting  an "object / field relation" with a "subject / field relation":

• "All individuals (organisms) exist in a continually changing world of experience (phenomenal field) of which they are the center."

 

Rogers is effectively treating the person as "a subject", with a change in the relation between the subject (the individual-at-the-center) and the subject's experiential / phenomenal field.

So it's hardly surprising to me that Skinner and Rogers weren't seeing eye-to-eye. But they could've both been equally correct, in principle, simply because they were coming at things from completely opposite vantage points.

It's like someone looking at a building from the outside-in (Skinner) vs someone looking at the same building from the inside-out (Rogers). Of course things are going to look different to both individuals, even though they're both looking at the same building.

~ Jason

 

 

 

On Friday, February 16, 2018, 3:47:54 PM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 

 

Jason,

 

  I under emphasized your framing regarding bottom up and top down. I can see that from those frames, I think you are making good points. Certainly, we can move from physics into physiology and try to explain what we can from that vantage point.   And we can start from human phenomenology and work our way down.

 

  Perhaps one area I am struggling with is that such angles are what is already out there. That is, one can be a Watsonian behaviorist or neurophysiologist that works mechanistically on animal responses as complex reflexive mechanisms (or whatever the specific mechanical terms). Academic psychology did this for several decades.

 

  Then we have folks like Carl Rogers who start with human phenomenology, which presumably would be an example of top down perspectives. And we get Skinner and Rogers engaged in a wide ranging series of debates. Each having very interesting things to say, of course, but ultimately what is clear is that we have different models of mind that are operating from very different language games that appear to be incommensurate. One of the driving themes of the ToK is the capacity to harmonize bottom up and top down conceptions, but conceptually and in terms of professional application.

 

But I should acknowledge that there is value in considering the bottom up and top down perspectives.

 

I am interesting in learning more about how you are thinking of “subject” field relational change…..

 

Best,
Gregg

 

 

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@listserv .jmu.edu] On Behalf Of nysa71
Sent: Friday, February 16, 2018 1:35 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate (Between Advocate & Skeptic)

 

Gregg,

First, note that I wrote, "...such skepticism ought to be embraced when moving from the bottom-up in the ToK." I should also add that I'm approaching the "bottom-up" (indeed, in the spirit of Pepper's analysis), in a strictly mechanistic manner with a particular focus on the organism's behavior and the physiological changes that mediate that behavior. 

"Behavior" being a functional change in the object / field relation.

-----

Gregg: "The best definition of 'the mind' is to have it refer to the information instantiated within and processed by the nervous system."

--- I suspect psychologists who's own views are grounded in perspectives like "situated cognition", "distributed cognition", and "embodied cognition" might take issue with that. 

Gregg: "But, watch a video like this, and tell me you have absolutely no idea what the monkey is feeling."

--- The more pertinent issue, to me, is how we know what "feeling" is in the first place. And we ultimately know what it is phenomenologically. We experience feelings and have language that is associated with that experience.

Or put another way, an example of human verbal behavior that has become associated with human phenomena.

And insofar that "feelings" constitute (in part) what we call "mind", then it is an example of how (in a manner of speaking) the human mind becomes the standard by why which all other (alleged) non-human minds are "measured".

Hence, an example as to what I was referring to in another thread when I suggested that understanding "mind" is best conceived from the top-down in the ToK. 

"Mind" being a functional change in the subject / field relation

 

~ Jason Bessey

 

On Friday, February 16, 2018, 10:50:58 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 

 

Folks,

 

This is a debate, but the vast majority of animal behavioral scientists would argue that animals like dogs are sentient and have emotions like fear. This certainly was Darwin’s position. And modern scholars have largely asserted this point. See, for example, the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. It is, of course, the case that the nature of perceptual subjectivity is that it is purely contained and without language, it is enormously difficult to have direct access. But the idea that dogs and cats are zombies like your computer is seen by most philosophers and animal behavioral scientists as not parsimonious and leads to all sort of ethical concerns as well.

 

But actually the ToK language game deals will all of this ambiguity.

 

It proclaims, first and foremost, that we do NOT confuse human deliberative self-consciousness with the term “mind.” It is not conceptually sound. Deliberative human self-consciousness and experiential perceptual consciousness are both very different than mental activity per se. They are best conceived of as UNIQUE subsets of mental activity. The vast majority of cognitive-covert mental processes are nonconscious.

The best definition of “the mind” is to have it refer to the information instantiated within and processed by the nervous system. Tje ToK simply makes the point that “Mind” is VERY different from consciousness and even more different from deliberative human self-conscious awareness. If we define the mind-brain system as the computational control center and we conceive of it as an information processing system that takes in inputs, performs computational control processes that controls outputs, then we see overt actions as emerging as the informational interface with nervous system.  

 

If we stay with Descartes old conception where mind equals human deliberative self-consciousness, then our language game is plagued by a very problematic dualism. It takes a little practice, but it is worth it because it allows for conceptual clarity. I will say, though, the idea that dogs have emotions EXACTLY like humans is NOT the case, IMO. What I mean by that is our self-conscious language system embedded in a social field is a game changer. Thus, it is an error to simply presume identical/parallel processes. The way we tell stories is crucial in how we experience emotions. So, there is a feedback loop in humans not present in other animals.

 

But, watch a video like this, and tell me you have absolutely no idea what the monkey is feeling. To say that, IMO, is overly committing to a radical skepticism. The most parsimonious explanation via behavioral observation, human introspection, neuroanatomy and behavioral and computational neuroscience is to map the monkey’s reactions via the Influence Matrix. It was activated by an unfavorable social comparison and expressed anger/frustration accordingly. And, all I am saying is that you are observing mental behavior in watching the video. The mental behaviors are well conceived of as a process of perceptual inputs, motivational drives, and affective responses.

 

Exactly what it is like to be the monkey is very hard to say. But, it is hard to say exactly what it is like to be me also.

More later,
G

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@listserv .jmu.edu] On Behalf Of nysa71
Sent: Friday, February 16, 2018 10:10 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate (Between Advocate & Skeptic)

 

ToK Society,

I'm with the skeptic. And, IMO, such skepticism ought to be embraced when moving from the bottom-up in the ToK. The "skeptic's" points are the points I've repeatedly tried to make in another thread. Calling the third dimension "Mind" is shaky, at best. Calling it "Animal Behavior" is on much more solid scientific ground.

Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate

~ Jason Bessey

 

Do Animals Have Emotions? A Debate An advocate and a skeptic dispute whether non-human animals have emotions.

 

 

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