You wrote: “And, that the humanistic language system doesn’t work well in describing the scientific language system operations.”
Brilliant! The incommensurability between the two language systems is key. As you suggest, it is well-known by scientific modernist that the humanistic language system has
been off key in a scientific way. However, one of the things that I am arguing is that part of the reason for the incommensurability is that the science language game is also off key. It is too physical/material/mechanical/reductive. For my professional seminar
class, we are reading a book “The Scientific Method in Brief.” Attached is the first part of the book. It is very good, done by a prominent botanist. However, it sits in a natural science metaphysical set of assumptions that is not clarified. For example,
over and over again, he talks about science being about the “physical world” yet he never specifies what he means. I just shot the following note to him:
I am writing to first say thank you for your wonderfully clear and straightforward book, The Scientific Method
in Brief. I am using it in a class in which we are exploring the concept of science and we are about 1/3 of the way through and already there have been many positive comments. I have not read the whole book, but I have a sense of it, having skimmed
it. I am writing to see if my students have questions whether or not you would have time to respond. For example, we have already encountered the frame that science is about the “physical world”, but we have wondered what that means, exactly.
I should let you know that the doctoral program that I teach in is not botanists, but professional psychologists. Thus we are very much interested in “the mental
and the social” and were wondering about your understanding in relation to the “physical”. We have actually decided to take a professional seminar and try to tackle the question: What does science mean and what
is its relationship to professional practice? Another question that the students have been wondering about is your understanding of the relationship between the natural and social sciences. For example, as you
may be aware, the well-known psychologist Jerome Kagan argued that there were
“three cultures”, the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. We were wondering if you had an opinion about that.
Anyway, I completely understand if you are too busy to field such questions. Regardless, I wanted to say we were enjoying your book and want to thank you for
your stimulating and helpful contribution to our quest to understand the concept of science and what it means to us in our roles as psychological doctors.
The book mentions metaphysics, but it does not get into it. But I now see the metaphysics of science as being the key. Recall the work by Cahoone. He is the philosopher that
points out that we need to be playing off of a map of nature that is clearly ordered. It is not the “physical world” only that science is mapping. It is the ontically
real world, as seen from a general third person observer position (exterior). And that real world is a developmental, relationally bound, emergent natural set of processes and patterns. That it, it is “behavior writ large”, mapped by the ToK. I
just put up this blog, based on an earlier essay.
The beauty of behavior as conceptualized by the ToK is that it avoids the reductive problem. It is a substance monist position, but not a reductive one. Here is another example
to see what I am getting at.
Here is Wilber’s Quadrants:
Notice that the “behavior” quadrant is represented by “brain levels” This is a category error, as Skinner would be quick to point out. The bottom line is that the ToK does
a much better job in mapping the right side of Wilber’s quadrants. It is a map of behavior that sorts both the individual/part level (UR) and the broad systemic level (LR).
Here is my point. Behaviors are NOT only “brains” or “the physical”. Once you realize that mental behaviors (animal activities, inside and out) are mediated by the biophysical
brain, but are not the SAME as the biophysical brain, then we get a science language system that is much more consistent with the humanistic language system. This is why psychology is a standalone science and can never be reduced to neurology.
To close, when I sit across from a client telling me her presenting problem, she has her folk psychological, interior, first person, spiritual language for her idiographic
lifeworld and lifequest. What I see as a psychological doctor are behavior investment patterns and justifications in a cultural context, listened to via a map of well-being and character functioning. These
are the scientific language concepts that actually CAN line up with her humanistic language. Now, my ToK science tells me that her behavioral investment patterns and justifications are mediated by her nervous system. But they are not caused by the
physical brain and we should not mistake that notion. This is Skinner’s key insight, which is that the behavior of the animal as a whole must be scientifically taken as its own level of analysis. Mental behavior is the language of the mind-brain system as
a whole. And human mental behavior is about behavioral investments (inside and out) and linguistic justifications.
With this insight, we can now update the language of science and the language of humanism and really start to build a way to weave together these two epistemological frames
(Wilber’s interior v exterior) in a healthy way. If we do that, we can really spark an Enlightenment 2.0 reboot.
I agree, it is an interesting deeper search into how our “brain/mind” appears to work.
I also agree that what it presented is in the scientific portion of a justification system, that it presents a scientific explanation, and that the scientific language explanation
does not explain the myriad other aspects of “the human condition.”
It is interesting that this singular explanation of one facet of how the brain/mind works is important because it is the brain/mind which is so central in the instantiation
of the other aspects of brain/mind “work” to which refer to as the “humanistic.”
A more complete, and complex, presentation of “the human condition,” as well as the condition of the system within which the human condition resides (ie, the environment) requires
at a minimum the appreciation of both language systems simultaneously. (How’s that for a run-on sentence?)
In other words, to apprehend “the human condition” requires the comprehensive recognition of I, I-thou/other, !-We, and I-It, as a package - a Wilberian integral mentation
and justification production.
I think the scientific justification of brain/mind may allow us more insight into the nature and justification of the humanstic justification and vice-versa!
At least, that’s an operating assumption for me.
Interesting that it all seems to circulate around what, how, why the embodied brain/mind does what it does - where “it” refers to what Stein refers to a metapsychology.
I can’t help it - it’s the anatomist in me; always looking for structure and trying to explain function.
Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044
Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)
Thanks for this paper, Waldemar. It is fascinating.
It is also the case that because I have been spending more time lately in “humanistic language systems”, I want to make a comment about it from a meta-language system view
point. To do so, we need to locate the “language game” of this article. It is squarely in the scientific language system. That is, of course, all well and good, but I am convinced we should be differentiating the science language game from the humanistic.
One of the things I now see as the great error of modernity is that the scientific language game became so powerful that it started to become believed that it was the only “real and true” justification system. Which, of course, is not “true” at all. It is
the best justification systems for determining the “habits of nature” as Alexander Bard would say; but that is not the same thing as Truth across all domains of life.
It is perhaps useful to place it in the scientific language system. From a ToK vantage point, the primary placement of the language game the authors are using is in the PTB
dimension 3, levels 1 & 2. That is, it is operating off of a neuroscience into a cognitive-behavioral-neuroscience perspective. In addition, because it is concerned with psychopathology, it is operating in the context of “applied” human science,
that of psychiatry and clinical psychology. That means that there are meta-value systems operating that frame the discourse in addition to the basic value of the accurate and reliable descriptions and explanations of behavior (the rules of basic science).
Such values determine that which is disordered/pathological from that which is normal/functional/desirable.
For clarity, when I say a science language game, I am saying that it operates off a scientific assumptions, methods and theory of reality, which is what the ToK tries to map
holistically. That is, an objective, realist, truthful, intersubjective/public set of models that offer generalizable statements of patterns and processes (i.e., behaviors broadly defined). The ToK maps the ontic reality on the left and the scientific onto-epistemological
schemas and models on the right (the empirical methods of science are the processes by which the theoretical models are corresponded to the data systematically drawn from reality to determine validity of the proposed model). The ToK also clearly specifies
that science is a particular kind of language game/knowledge-justification system that emerges out of Culture.
I am being specific about this because I am teaching a course on the nature of science writ large and wanting to sharping my discourse on the nature of the scientific language
game in relation to the humanistic ones. As I have suggested in my “Behavior, Spirit and Morality” conception, it seems that there are at least two humanistic language games that are qualitatively different from the scientific language game. One of which is
the idiographic, unique, particular, first person perspective (spirit) and the other is the interpersonal/intersubjective shared notion of moral/ethical/normative/right-wrong notions. We should be very clear in a wholistic scientific humanistic philosophy
(what Zak Stein is referring to as a metapsychology) that these are separate systems of justification.
___________________________________________
Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Graduate Psychology
216 Johnston Hall
MSC 7401
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, VA 22807
(540) 568-7857 (phone)
(540) 568-4747 (fax)
Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.
Check out my Theory of Knowledge blog at Psychology Today at:
In the previous email I suggested that connectomics might be important in providing further understanding of how the embodied emergence of consciousness concept (Mascolo &
Kallio) plays a role in brain/mind function vis-à-vis PCT (perceptual control theory) as a “coordinating” factor.
Attached is a paper proposing how connectomes might play a role in brain/mind operations in psychopathology.
IMportantly, how we use our mind/brain influences the connectomes and these are important to the function of the mind/brain we have available for use.
Plausibly, this would apply to both those instances of a “broken brain” (ie, mental disease of demonstrated etiology) and the more frequently encountered “disorders” of mind/brain
function produced by otherwise “intact” brains (ie, mental disorders or the various neuroses).
Our ability to alter connectomes as a result of brain/mind use and/or injury/disease (ie, plasticity) is important in terms of consequent psychopathologic behavior.
The Mascolo/Kallio concept clearly notes that the emergent consciousness interacts to bring multiple psychological functions in the generation of behavior.
No surprise then that the resultant output is dimensional rather than categorical - for both normative and psychopathologic behaviors - whether or not a “broken brain” is involved.
In roundabout way, one might reasonably conclude that such connections play a role in how the mind/brain functions which produce normative behavior.
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Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044
Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)
I have enjoyed the comments each has shared on the Mascolo & Kallio paper.
The discussions about determinism, free will, etc, has been interesting to follow.
Thank you each for sharing your insights.
I agree that the paper being discussed is significant.
However, it seems my response to the paper has been quite different from that of others.
Likely, that is due, at least in part, to my protracted work in and study of human pathology, where there is typically more stress on processes than philosophy.
My perception is that the concept, and processes proposed for embodied emergence of conscious agency is a further detailing or explication of perceptual control theory.
To me, it appears that perceptual control theory, as presented in Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perceptual_control_theory),
is a macro-scale clarification of the mind’s processes regarding evaluation, decision-making, and action, whilst embodied emergence of consciousness is a meso-scale
elucidation in greater detail of how perceptual control appears to work with and upon other systems.
Presumably, connectomics would provide a micro-scale (or, at least, a micro-meso-scale)
illumination of how the various other systems are entailed as a consequence of embodied consciousness.
As a result we may appropriately apprehend consciousness not as a driving or controlling force on behavior but rather as the means by which various sensory inputs and their
derived perceptions are brought into a focused awareness.
Consciousness then may be seen as the person’s experience of what may be termed intentional attention.
That is, consciousness is an experience of conscious, and subconscious, intentional attention rather than a control mechanism - it is the result of a process some of which
we experience consciously and which serves to focus attention on what processes need to be recruited to attend to that which is at hand.
That is, there is also a subconscious form of intentional attention - which also is not the
controlling element of behavior.
Rather, as a consequence of both forms of attention we decide what is needed to be done to acquire the desired situational perception in terms of affect, cognition, and behavior.
I agree that determinism is a form of soothsaying, perhaps even the quintessential plea of victim mentality.
Given the complexity of human experience, the opaqueness of the subconscious, and the multiplicity of human needs it is not surprising at all that results or outcomes are un-pre-stateable.
The outcome is particularly emergent and in-deterministic when one also factors in the recursive nature of the human mind.
Although the embodied conscious likely is able to “overcome” the unconscious, intentional attention we
might not have or practice as much “conscious free will” as we would like to think that we do.
Within the subconscious, Shealy’s "personal BS content" comes to play, silently and unknown, upon our careful plans to act.
And, perhaps, that’s why I came to write this and why I hope to elicit comment.
Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044
Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)
I have come to consider determinists to be low-grade soothsayers. They claim that the future is written but then won’t tell us what it is. It’s a total rip off.
Another term for this indeterminism beyond the determinism versus indeterminism deadlock is transdeterminism.
Transdeterminism is where we arrive when we have two time dimensions and both operate indeterministically (precisely because one can not dictate the other) and the laws of nature must be understood
merely as habits of nature within specific emergence vectors and not as universal laws (which would require that they be determined prior to what they affect). Think Charles Sanders Peirce taken to his most Whiteheadian extreme.
Indeterminism requires contingency as the meta-law. Transdeterminism is even beyond such a meta-law. Nothing is not determined as much as the whole issue of determination is dissolved.
I believe this is what Kaufman means when he says that what evolves evolves unprestatably. With an even further twist.
Can somebody please provide Kauffman with some Penrosian big bounce theory?
Peter,
The concept was from Stuart Kaufman in his recent work, The World Beyond Physics (2019).
Here is the quote…
But what evolves cannot be said ahead of time: what evolves emerges unprestatably—I know of no better word—and builds
our biosphere of increasing complexity.
It refers to the idea that the future of emergence is not only not determined, it is of such a mystery that is simply cannot be stated what will come about.
Best,
Gregg
Cory,
I am hoping that it reminds you that Schrodinger’s cat was meant to reveal the fallacy of applying quantum physics to the robust physical world in which we make choices.
Un-pre-stateable? Does that mean that we cannot dependably reveal potential?
@ Gregg
The un-pre-stateable concept immediately reminds me of Schrodinger’s cat.
Cory
The emergentist biologist has a nice word for the fact that the universe is not pre-determined. He argues it is not only not pre-determined, it is “un-pre-stateable” because
of the nature of unpredictable emergences…
As per your suggestion, I think it is best to keep free will and determinism as two separate arguments. Free will does not have too be a proof for the invalidity of determinism,
but after everything else is said it can be spoken of how free will does contradict determinism.
As you say, there can be degrees of freedom. I think that we all regularly witness this. The problem with determinism is that there cannot be degrees of determinism. That’s
a conceptual contradiction. We will need to toss out many words if the universe is determined: choice, choosing, chaos, chance, probability, accident, serendipitous, hope, achievement, failure...
Eeva and I had a lot of conversations about recursive systems because it is a major part of my own work. My thinking has been that if an agent can self-reference, then it
determines itself. But… if an agent determines itself, then isn’t that kinda the definition of free will?
My best guess has been that the truth is to be found by treating the positions of free-will and determinism as two halves of a greater whole – which is admittedly hard to
imagine, since everything we learn about it derives from a historically endless series of literary squabbles that we inherit from the literature, which fogs our vision on the matter.
Of course the issue is nuanced, and there are degrees of freedom, as is exemplified in nonlinear systems theories, and well-defined in phase space mathematics.
Thank you for sharing the intriguing article by Mascolo and Kallio.
It was a difficult but inspiring read, though I do not agree with how the “three perennial problems” that need to be addressed are presented: 1.) the dualism of the mental
and physical, 2.) that it’s problematic that people argue for the existence free will, 3.) the role of consciousness. My thoughts are, in short, 1.) we are physical beings, 2.) there is no reason to doubt our conscious agency that we minute by minute witness,
and 3.) consciousness is not the measure of autonomy because many free acts are accomplished without reflection and even Libet disagrees with the determinist interpretation of his experiment.
I am guessing that my primary difficulty here, and with your subsequent blog, is that I do not agree that the concept of determinism is compatible with the laws of physics.
Meanwhile, despite claims by determinists, free will can exist in a material world and is compatible with the laws of physics. Determinism is a claim about the future, so it is unobservable, unrepeatable, and untestable, and there is useful evidence for doubting
it.
The premise of the essay by Mascolo and Kallio is; “While consciousness contributes to the production of novel action, it cannot do so autonomously.”
(p454-455) This is claimed to be true because “…consciousness is itself an emergent product of nonconscious processes.” But what if consciousness can get in front of the nonconscious processes from which it emerges? What if a “non-autonomous” consciousness
chooses to have experiences that alter the biological nonconscious processes from which the consciousness emerges? What if this newly biologically altered “non-autonomous” consciousness then decides to have more experiences that then alter the whole of the
embodied biological emergent processes? At what point can one be considered an autonomous agent making free conscious choices that continuously manipulate one’s biological nonconscious processes that in turn manipulate the embodied emergence of one’s (biological)
consciousness? In other words, if we are free to alter the environments that alter our biological functions, are we not equally as free to consciously alter the interior environment of our(biological)selves? I am not positing here that there needs to be a
specific goal in the alterations, but that even change itself can be a goal.
Again, thank you for all that you share.
FYI, I put up a blog today that combines Mascolo and Kaillo’s paper with Jordan Hall’s concept of sovereignty:
I think the combination provides a nice, useful picture of self-conscious agency and responsibility.
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