Cory, 
I am hoping that it reminds you that Schrodinger’s cat was meant to reveal the fallacy of applying quantum physics to the robust physical world in which we make choices. 

Gregg,
Un-pre-stateable? Does that mean that we cannot dependably reveal potential?
Peter


Peter Lloyd Jones
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Sent by determined causes that no amount of will is able to thwart. 



On Sep 12, 2019, at 8:03 PM, Cory David Barker <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

@ Gregg

The un-pre-stateable concept immediately reminds me of Schrodinger’s cat.

Cory

On Sep 12, 2019, at 4:08 PM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

The emergentist biologist has a nice word for the fact that the universe is not pre-determined. He argues it is not only not pre-determined, it is “un-pre-stateable” because of the nature of unpredictable emergences…
G
 
From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]> On Behalf Of Peter Lloyd Jones
Sent: Thursday, September 12, 2019 4:04 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: On the concept of sovereignty
 
Hi Cory,
As per your suggestion, I think it is best to keep free will and determinism as two separate arguments. Free will does not have too be a proof for the invalidity of determinism, but after everything else is said it can be spoken of how free will does contradict determinism. 
 
As you say, there can be degrees of freedom. I think that we all regularly witness this. The problem with determinism is that there cannot be degrees of determinism. That’s a conceptual contradiction. We will need to toss out many words if the universe is determined: choice, choosing, chaos, chance, probability, accident, serendipitous, hope, achievement, failure...
 
Peter
 
 
 
Peter Lloyd Jones
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562-209-4080

Sent by determined causes that no amount of will is able to thwart. 
 
 


On Sep 12, 2019, at 3:37 PM, Cory David Barker <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
 
@ Peter
 
Eeva and I had a lot of conversations about recursive systems because it is a major part of my own work. My thinking has been that if an agent can self-reference, then it determines itself. But… if an agent determines itself, then isn’t that kinda the definition of free will? 
 
My best guess has been that the truth is to be found by treating the positions of free-will and determinism as two halves of a greater whole – which is admittedly hard to imagine, since everything we learn about it derives from a historically endless series of literary squabbles that we inherit from the literature, which fogs our vision on the matter.
 
Of course the issue is nuanced, and there are degrees of freedom, as is exemplified in nonlinear systems theories, and well-defined in phase space mathematics.
 
Cory


On Sep 12, 2019, at 2:59 PM, Peter Lloyd Jones <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
 
Hi, Greg, and others,
Thank you for sharing the intriguing article by Mascolo and Kallio.
It was a difficult but inspiring read, though I do not agree with how the “three perennial problems” that need to be addressed are presented: 1.) the dualism of the mental and physical, 2.) that it’s problematic that people argue for the existence free will, 3.) the role of consciousness. My thoughts are, in short, 1.) we are physical beings, 2.) there is no reason to doubt our conscious agency that we minute by minute witness, and 3.) consciousness is not the measure of autonomy because many free acts are accomplished without reflection and even Libet disagrees with the determinist interpretation of his experiment.
I am guessing that my primary difficulty here, and with your subsequent blog, is that I do not agree that the concept of determinism is compatible with the laws of physics. Meanwhile, despite claims by determinists, free will can exist in a material world and is compatible with the laws of physics. Determinism is a claim about the future, so it is unobservable, unrepeatable, and untestable, and there is useful evidence for doubting it.  
The premise of the essay by Mascolo and Kallio is; “While consciousness contributes to the production of novel action, it cannot do so autonomously.” (p454-455) This is claimed to be true because “…consciousness is itself an emergent product of nonconscious processes.” But what if consciousness can get in front of the nonconscious processes from which it emerges? What if a “non-autonomous” consciousness chooses to have experiences that alter the biological nonconscious processes from which the consciousness emerges? What if this newly biologically altered “non-autonomous” consciousness then decides to have more experiences that then alter the whole of the embodied biological emergent processes? At what point can one be considered an autonomous agent making free conscious choices that continuously manipulate one’s biological nonconscious processes that in turn manipulate the embodied emergence of one’s (biological) consciousness? In other words, if we are free to alter the environments that alter our biological functions, are we not equally as free to consciously alter the interior environment of our(biological)selves? I am not positing here that there needs to be a specific goal in the alterations, but that even change itself can be a goal.
 
Again, thank you for all that you share.
Peter
Peter Lloyd Jones
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562-209-4080

Sent by determined causes that no amount of will is able to thwart. 
 
 


On Sep 12, 2019, at 1:57 PM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
 
Hi TOK List,
FYI, I put up a blog today that combines Mascolo and Kaillo’s paper with Jordan Hall’s concept of sovereignty:
 
I think the combination provides a nice, useful picture of self-conscious agency and responsibility.
 
Best,
Gregg
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