Something went wrong in that sentence. Why would it be worth messing with the privacy of your mind in order to know if we perceive those things the same way? And is that really all you care about regarding your wife? / L On 31-10-2019 17:20, Lene Rachel Andersen - Nordic Bildung / Fremvirke wrote: > > Why would that be worth messing with the privacy of your mind for? > > / L > > On 31-10-2019 16:56, Brent Allsop wrote: >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 31, 2019 at 9:28 AM Lene Rachel Andersen - Nordic Bildung >> / Fremvirke <[log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote: >> >> Playing along and accepting that this device ends up in your >> head, how would you know that what you experience is in fact what >> the other person or the dog experiences? >> >> >> For the answer, let me start with another question. >> >> When you perceive a strawberry in your right field of vision, your >> physical knowledge of such, which has a redness quality, is in your >> left hemisphere. At the same time, if there is a leaf in your left >> field of vision, knowledge of that, which has a physical greenness >> quality exist in your right hemisphere. How would your left >> hemisphere know that what your other hemisphere is experiencing is in >> fact what the other hemisphere or the dog experiences? >> >> >> Physical things can have both a color (the kind of light they >> reflect, which is only abstract, no qualitative meaning) and a >> coolness we can be directly aware of. Once experimentalists stop >> being qualia blind (using more than one word to represent different >> physical qualities) we’ll finally discover what colorness things in >> the brain have.If we objectively observe that another person is using >> the physical stuff which has your greenness quality to represent red >> things, we will be able to make objectively justified effing of the >> ineffable statements like: “My redness is like your greenness”. >> >> >> Again, it 's not a hard mind body problem. It's just an >> approachable color problem. We just need to improve our sloppy >> epistemology of what color or what physical qualities something has. >> The falsifiable prediction is that the causal properties of redness, >> and the causal properties of glutamate are the same thing. In other >> words, glutamate and redness are abstract labels for the same >> physical thing. Once experimentalists start making this connect >> (that redness is our subjective directawareness of glutamate, as it >> reacts in a synapse) this will connect the subjective with the >> objective, making the introspective, objectively observable and >> shareable. Then we can finally objectively eff the ineffable nature >> of elemental physical qualities like redness and greenness. >> >> >> Color of glutamate: white (it reflects white light) >> >> Colorness of glutamate: redness, which we are directly aware of. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ############################ >> >> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >> mailto:[log in to unmask] >> <mailto:mailto:[log in to unmask]> or >> click the following link: >> http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >> ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1