Thank you for alerting me to another of your inspiring blogs. A difficulty I have with it is that, coming from the perspective of philosophy, I look at ontology as the study of the nature of being in a metaphysical sense, though my slant is to keep the metaphysical firmly glued onto the physical. In other words, what does it mean to “be", philosophically speaking, not materially speaking. What does it mean to be conscious? Are we autonomous choosing agents? What is the meaning of self?

I do know, though, that recent writings by some who argue against the existence of free will, or free choice as I prefer to call it, claim that the laws of physics and facts of science defend their claims. In other words, they are appealing wholly to material explanations of ontology. 

In my naiveté I get lost in arguments I see today that don’t just suggest a Cartesian mind-body dualism, but insterad suggest a three-way split of mind-brain-body. I see this in the requirement put forth by some that a free act must be a conscious act, and not a non-conscious act, and that we cannot take credit for what our brain thinks. What this implies is that running while dribbling a basketball, or a playing a musical instrument, are not freely performed or freely chosen acts as we do those things without conscious refection. Also, pain alters choices, sweating influences what we do, and so on and so on. A popular interpretation of Libet’s experiment (though not Libet’s interpretation) is that we do not act freely because there is brain activity associated with an act that precedes awareness of that act, dividing consciousness from non-consciousness and dividing observed-physical brain activities. 

When I read Skinner’s philosophy of behaviorism in the 1970s I recoiled in horror, but in my recent rereading of him I greatly appreciation how he puts the acts of man into their complete context, which is even more than I stated above; mind-brain-body-environment. We never ever make a choice in the vacuum of agent. This seems the initial error in the determinist interpretations of Libet’s experiment; prior to any non-conscious brain activity associated with the monitored act is an awareness of the task at hand; choosing when to push a button. It is the agent’s relationship to this task that provides a leadership of intent, otherwise there would be no button pushing and only a choosing agent making no choices. 

I hope I am not too far afield on this.

Best to all,

Peter