I was thinking recently, from your latest graphic showing the levels of complexity within a person, that perhaps subjectivity might have to do with the very fact there is a jump in levels.

I’m reading Christoph Koch’s latest book called The Feeling of Life Itself, on Integrated Information Theory, which says that experience results from, or is, the “whole”, that emerges from integrated parts, or information, measured by phi.

It seems worth exploring connections to these ideas. 

Jamie

On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 8:37 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Hi TOK List,

 

  Here is an interesting article on how bumble bees can engage in cross modal sensory recognition.

 https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2020-02-21/bumblebee-objects-across-senses/11981304

 

I am particularly interested in it because in my current book, one of the key emphases is on the various ways in which we define/conceptualize “mind”. My argument is that we need Mind (capital red) as the third dimension of behavioral complexity to refer to the set of “mental behaviors”.

 

We also need a scientific conception of the mind, which refers to the information instantiated within and processed by the nervous system. The mind (as defined here) is studied via what I call “neurocognitive functionalism” which basically means you observe the functional awareness and response of animals and build and test neuropsychological models that attempt to describe and explain the patterns of mental behavior. Thus, we can readily consider the above study as a study in bee cognition.

 

A key conceptual problem is the jump from this neurocognitive behavioral-functional scientific view of mind to the subjective experiential view of mind. This is the reference of what it is like to be an animal? In this case, what is the experience like to be a bumble bee? This is very hard to know because this involves the two hard problems of phenomenological consciousness. The first problem is the epistemological problem. We can never see what the first person experience is like from anyone or any animal directly. So we can’t observe it firsthand. Second, the ontological problem is that we still don’t know exactly why, in a neurobiological engineering sense, the activity of the brain actually produces the miracle of first person experience.

 

Just some food for thought on a Monday J

 

Peace,
G

 

___________________________________________

Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Graduate Psychology
216 Johnston Hall
MSC 7401
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, VA 22807
(540) 568-7857 (phone)
(540) 568-4747 (fax)


Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.

Check out my Theory of Knowledge blog at Psychology Today at:

https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/theory-knowledge

 

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