Sounds good - kind of a if a tree falls in the forest or Variation on Heffalump or Snark hunt???? James Tyler Carpenter, PhD, FAACP www.metispsych.com https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.experts.com_Expert-2DWitnesses_search-3Fkeyword-3DClinical-2520psychology-26keywordsearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26category-3DClinical-2520forensic-2520-26categorysearchtype-3DAny-2520Word-26name-3DJames-2520tyler-2520carpenter-26namesearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26company-3DMetis-26companysearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26address-3D-2520-26addresssearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26state-3DMA-26statesearchtype-3DAny-2520Word-26country-3DALL-2520-28or-2520Choose-2520a-2520Country-29-26countrysearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26page-3D1-26freshsearch-3D1&d=DwIF-g&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=PFWmImi9KjOYlYMlZNJPzQpis652ckHvLgPqnzcl5oM&s=zfQfeNwDb5RGHiuBTNtZdBz6SA0F8jGLDdNMARFykvQ&e= ________________________________ From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]> on behalf of Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 8:36:46 AM To: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]> Subject: Re: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and consciousness Tyler and others on this thread, Since more and more connections with physics, time, etc. are emerging in this conversation, let me share that folks might be interested in this slide deck<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__drive.google.com_file_d_1qcVYNlshp5M3X-5FXR59zikEs38LCbQ9fJ_view-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=DwIF-g&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=PFWmImi9KjOYlYMlZNJPzQpis652ckHvLgPqnzcl5oM&s=WCAVHBQW-38HwJitDfgqVxMT9SKt6-cmzoBP45BmwAc&e= > on the “iQuad path” into the Garden. It is hard to summarize succinctly, but I will share two slides, since you mentioned Bohr: [cid:image002.jpg@01D68C04.8180AD60] [cid:image003.jpg@01D68C04.8180AD60] Consciousness, mind, etc might be a great TOK Community discussion topic. We could have a Yo Tribe gathering and people could bring ideas and proposals and then we could move around and chat and discuss. Best, G From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]> On Behalf Of James Tyler Carpenter Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 8:13 AM To: [log in to unmask] Subject: Re: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and consciousness Do any of these models have a quantum and time dimension. As Heraclitus observed, the only constant is change. Bohr was a fan of paradox as I understand it (limited physics expertise) Tyler James Tyler Carpenter, PhD, FAACP www.metispsych.com<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.metispsych.com&d=DwIF-g&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=PFWmImi9KjOYlYMlZNJPzQpis652ckHvLgPqnzcl5oM&s=ci_iUeKPClULLhWPvz2iSl_brwe67AlVXYY7mnxOBUk&e= > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.experts.com_Expert-2DWitnesses_search-3Fkeyword-3DClinical-2520psychology-26keywordsearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26category-3DClinical-2520forensic-2520-26categorysearchtype-3DAny-2520Word-26name-3DJames-2520tyler-2520carpenter-26namesearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26company-3DMetis-26companysearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26address-3D-2520-26addresssearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26state-3DMA-26statesearchtype-3DAny-2520Word-26country-3DALL-2520-28or-2520Choose-2520a-2520Country-29-26countrysearchtype-3DAll-2520Words-26page-3D1-26freshsearch-3D1&d=DwIF-g&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=PFWmImi9KjOYlYMlZNJPzQpis652ckHvLgPqnzcl5oM&s=zfQfeNwDb5RGHiuBTNtZdBz6SA0F8jGLDdNMARFykvQ&e= ________________________________ From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> on behalf of Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 8:07:45 AM To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> Subject: Re: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and consciousness Hi Brent, I will be brief here, as there are many issues and I don’t want to get bogged down. First, the ToK System into UTOK does advance the “language game ball” regarding consciousness. [Please note, as this ed video tries to makes clear, there is an important distinction between the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System and what it evolved into as the Unified Theory Of Knowledge (represented by the UTOK Tree, its 8 branches and the Garden of UTUA)]. So, there are additions to be made to the ToK System entry. Indeed, this brings up a question. Does anyone have control over the Wiki Tree of Knowledge Entry? We need an update on that and I am not sure who put it up. Second, as we discussed during the 2019 TOK Conference at JMU, the hard problem surely remains, at least to some degree. Let me put it this way. Which animals are conscious and what kind of qualia do they experience and how do you know? If the hard problem was solved, “neurophenomenologists” could tell me exactly the kind of Mind2 a praying mantis, a bumble bee, a sardine, a squid, a cardinal, a rat, a baboon and a killer whale have. I have been reading up on the science of animal consciousness and they can’t. And the reason is clear: We don’t really understanding the explanatory ontological mechanism that enables perspectival experience to emerge. Third, I do agree that the ToK System and larger UTOK line up with Representational Qualia Theory. However, as John Vervaeke and I are going through in the Untangling the Worldknot of Consciousness series, there is lots that needs to be analyzed and unpacked and then put back together. For example, John’s in cognitive science and the metaphysics of Mind2 makes it quite clear (to me at least) that we should distinguish adjectival qualia (redness, greenesss) from adverbial qualia (the witnessing function that brings aspects together in a hereness, nowness, and togetherness). That folks can meditate and achieve a “pure consciousness event” that is essentially devoid of adjectival qualia is good phenomenological evidence that there is logic to separating the two functions. Relating this to RQT, it suggests there is both representational/modeling and aspectualizing. Anyway, my primary focus is getting the vocabulary for science, mind, and behavior clear and shared. Best, Gregg From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> On Behalf Of Brent Allsop Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2020 11:10 PM To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> Subject: Re: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and consciousness Interesting. Thinking I’m still missing something in all this, I was reviewing some of the TOK stuff in Wikipedia<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Tree-5Fof-5Fknowledge-5Fsystem&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=nwlc1iY3ex1Yzb3ZzP0kvexhicdJTtlzcoW4fOdKHDc&e=> and I think I noticed what I was missing. There is talk of an “ambiguous definition” of consciousness and: “The ingredient of neurological behavior that allows for the emergence of mental experience is considered the "hard" problem of consciousness and the ToK System does not address this question explicitly.” It seems to me, the TOK system addresses it perfectly, and isn’t really ambiguous, as pointed out in “Representational Qualia Theory<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=of1Fvba4LRygZPSvdDa27rnpsWHkp4u9LTntXy503uo&e=>.” All you need to do is to experimentally connect so you can define the perceived from afar objective in terms of the directly apprehended subjective. A big part of the dual or ambiguous definitions is everyone tends to separate the subjective and the objective right up front with their assumptions. Everyone always uses separating terms like “neural corelate” of consciousness, and consciousness “emerging” or “arising” from something else. Even if the subjective at best “corelates with” or “emerges from” something, whatever it emerges from is secondary, and not what we really want to objectively observe. We want to objectively observe the subjective. What is it that has the elemental redness quality we directly apprehend, not what it correlates with, or emerges from? A critical point has to do with intrinsic physical properties or qualities. Objective “perception” of intrinsic properties is always done from afar, through cause and effect-based chains of different intrinsic properties. Objective observation is necessarily ‘substrate independent’ or abstract. You need a dictionary to know what any different intrinsic property in the chain is meant to represent. In other words you can invert the dictionary for red and green at any point in the chain. Notice how the following statement can bridge the explanatory gap for two such inverted people by simply using multiple non ambiguous terms for red and redness, and defining those terms: “My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red.” [cid:image001.png@01D68C04.1215E170] Qualia are not ‘perceived from afar’ they are the actual intrinsic qualities of the conscious knowledge that is rendered into gestalts of awareness by our perception systems. You don’t need a dictionary for an intrinsic redness quality, redness is the intrinsic definition of ‘red’. Now ask the question, what would we get if we detected or ‘perceived’ subjective redness with our instruments and senses? We would only have an abstract description of redness behavior, which would not be intrinsically red. To know the actual quality of that behavior, you still need a dictionary, as in THAT is how redness behaves. Similarly, all we objectively know about anything in the brain like the neurotransmitter glutamate, is how it behaves. It is an objectively verifiable possibility glutamate behavior in a synapse is what we directly apprehend as redness. The subjective term redness, and the objective term glutamate, could be labels for the same thing. In other words, the intrinsic qualitative subjective definition of glutamate behavior could be redness. Isn’t all this ambiguity and talk of ‘hard mind body’ problems just slopping intrinsic color epistemology? Isn’t it just an intrinsic color problem? We are simply still like Frank Jackson’s Mary. We can abstractly describe the behaviors of all of nature; we just don’t know the subjective intrinsic qualities those abstract descriptions are describing. In other words, we just need to ask: “Which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness”? Won’t answering that question finally resolve the apparent ambiguity in the TOK’s definitions of consciousness? RQT<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=of1Fvba4LRygZPSvdDa27rnpsWHkp4u9LTntXy503uo&e=> non ambiguously defines consciousness to be any “composite qualitative experience” (i.e. a gestalt) composed of computationally bound elemental intrinsic qualities like redness and greenness which can both be objectively perceived from afar, and directly apprehended. It seems to me: It’s not a ‘hard mind body problem’ it’s just an easy intrinsic color problem. On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 3:55 PM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote: Hi TOK Folks, FYI, continuing with mind/brain/behavior issue, I spent some of the day reading through Bruce Goldstein’s (2020) The Mind: Consciousness, Prediction and the Brain<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mitpress.mit.edu_books_mind-2D1&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=BnlP7FgcCyKLQwXiQM6A4w_pgpMhi9NElvR-e3Qy97M&e=>. It is a short book, “less than fifty thousand words” as Goldstein puts it. I can recommend it for offering a nice summary of the neurocognitive functionalist account from a cognitive science/psychology vantage point. The book lines up directly with Mind1a in our Map of Mind1,2,3 . That is, it is the neurocognitive functionalist/information processing and communication aspects of the Animal-Mind plane of existence. Also, it basically corresponds to how I define the mind as the information instantiated within and processed by the nervous system. I can also recommend it because of how it offers good insights on the mind as a predictive system. Interestingly, it offers a chapter on consciousness and defines it exactly as Mind2, in that it is the first person, subjective experience of being. However, despite identifying consciousness as such, he has no clue how to frame it in relation to “the mind”. This is evident in his final summary statement ending chapter 2 on pg 63…”Now, as we move on to chapter 3, we leave unscientific speculation and the hard problem of consciousness behind to devote all our energy to describing what physiological and behavioral research has revealed about how the mind works. To begin this discussion, we consider how creation of the mind involves mechanisms that are largely hidden from view.” His final sentence of the book is also worth quoting… ”Our photographable brain contains within it everything we need to create the mysteries of everything our invisible mind creates.” Folks, as cool as this stuff is from within the cognitive science perspective, it is clapping with one hand when it comes to genuine understanding. MENS knowledge is committed to the exterior vantage point, but that does not mean that the only language we can speak is science. Indeed, I strongly recommend you speak other languages. Consider that my personal existence is framed by an interior epistemology. That is, the only observations I can see are in the field of Mind2. The idea that the whole of the mind is “invisible” and that musings about conscious experience is “unscientific”—and thus should be ignored by implication--is absurd. It is because Goldstein, like basically everyone grounded in a MENS knowledge frame, is trying to explain everything from an exterior epistemological vantage point, which is just plain silly. This is what Wilber rightly criticizes when he goes after the unhealthy dominance of much modern scientistic thinking. [Another angle of criticism is opened by considering this email. What are these propositions by extensions of my mind? (i.e., Mind3b). I did not see much in the book on Mind3 and culture.] Bottom line, MENS is a valuable way of thinking, but it is outdated we need to move from it to a Wisdom Oriented MENS knowledge system. According to UTOK, it should be framed by the “quadrant quadratic<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__drive.google.com_file_d_1xdUa1btq588F6aXGKexUBVoVH7FKhns0_view&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=vbmzXB-lbHqpX9doseFF-Yy9m1L9uH7flUE5FUrSuNQ&e=>” of each individual relative to the Garden, which can be thought of as a holistic onto-epistemology that maps the ontic reality and orients us, via the metavalues of dignity, well-being and integrity, to what might and ought to be in the 21st Century. Best, Gregg From: Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2020 7:54 AM To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>' <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> Subject: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and consciousness Hi TOK Folks, For any of you who remain interested in the cognitivism versus behaviorism debate in psychology, the attached 2011 chapter offers a good review, defending the behavioral perspective, but also showing how the move to 4e cognition results in bridging concepts. There should be no mistaking the fact that the UTOK readily solves this problem with its Map of Mind1,2,3<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__drive.google.com_file_d_1iKq-2DJEN2KGuTF9MZdkvaWeZm4Sh1wmcV_view-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=uMawEgBpTJbEgmVg1zVM6MUEHQ1iYHto8XwLITbT5DU&e=>. First, we can note that this dispute is all about Mind1, which is about generating a neurocognitive functionalist account of mental behavior. The sides go round and round because they lack the right grammar and map of the right relations in the conceptual field. To advance the ball, it helps to step outside this arena and note that neither traditional behavioral nor neurocognitive approaches really address Mind2 (i.e., phenomenological consciousness). Here is David Chalmers recently explaining to Sam Harris on Making Sense this issue: It is useful to start by distinguishing the easy problems-which are basically about performance functions—from the hard problem which is about experience. [Some] easy problems are: How do we discriminate information in our environment and respond appropriately? How does the brain integrate information from different sources and bring it together to make a judgment and control our behavior? How do we voluntarily control our behavior to respond in a controlled way to the environment?... The easier problems fall within the standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science What makes the hard problem of experience hard? Because it doesn’t seem to be about behavior or about functions. You can in principle imagine explaining all my behavioral responses to a given stimulus and how my brain discriminates and integrates and monitors itself and controls my behavior. You can explain all that with, say a neural mechanism, but you won’t have touched the central question, which is, “Why does it feel like something from the first-person point of view? Note that the difference Chalmers is talking about is the difference between Mind1 and Mind2 (and, of course, no one is even touching Mind3, where all of this exchange is taking place!). Bottom line, to first we need to weave the behavioral and neurocognitive accounts together in a functional/mental behaviorism. This makes sense because live cats behave differently than dead cats. Both can fall out of trees, but only one lands on its feet and takes off. Falling is a physical behavior. Landing on your feet and taking off is a mental behavior and YES the adjective makes all the difference. Doing so allows one to realize that neurocognitive functionalism can provide a general scientific ontological and epistemological frame for Mind1. However, as Chalmers notes, Mind2 is a different ballgame. Indeed, as I pointed out in this popular blog<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_theory-2Dknowledge_201910_there-2Dare-2Dtwo-2Dhard-2Dproblems-2Dconsciousness-2Dnot-2Done&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=FeuZGtSxg2noQFxyLYiO3kl7scpMlKrHUXMT2DyozzQ&e=>, Chalmers does not appropriately specify the nature of the problem, because he calls it the hard problem. There are in fact two hard problems associated with Mind2. One is epistemological in nature and the other is ontological. The epistemological problem stems from the language game of MENS<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_theory-2Dknowledge_202007_theory-2Dmens-2Dknowledge&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=_s3PDBwPD81TiU9Siv5Enbx6vRAaCYSnJPdoqM0rhvQ&s=CQ1vi__7Wvg1-jyd7xi05i1Gpv9bmTcvHs7ydbVsX7g&e=>. It only sees things and processes (i.e., behaviors) from an exterior epistemology, so it is, by its very grammar of justification, blind to interior subjects and their perspectives. The ontological problem is that we don’t know the mechanism of how neurobiological activity generates the experiential point of view. The point here is that we can readily untangle the worldknot with the right system of understanding. Best, Gregg ___________________________________________ Gregg Henriques, Ph.D. Professor Department of Graduate Psychology 216 Johnston Hall MSC 7401 James Madison University Harrisonburg, VA 22807 (540) 568-7857 (phone) (540) 568-4747 (fax) Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity. Check out the Theory Of Knowledge homepage at: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.toksociety.org_home&d=DwIF-g&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=PFWmImi9KjOYlYMlZNJPzQpis652ckHvLgPqnzcl5oM&s=QlmsPNU3J60QHfaBvPoMe1tXBf1YTCWsTxf3KAZJMA8&e= <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.toksociety.org_home&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=wjF8cZoiFchamTuxBdDEmw&m=57e2I6uWglJ4JwStWjClCslCp37381OxvNIxockoINI&s=aRdOGoP0Bdt7IhOV8uIntjmwOR6o8wiDviSHJrpgpaM&e=> ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]<mailto:mailto:[log in to unmask]> or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]<mailto:mailto:[log in to unmask]> or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]<mailto:mailto:[log in to unmask]> or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]<mailto:mailto:[log in to unmask]> or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]<mailto:mailto:[log in to unmask]> or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1