Great question. By "representation of" I mean "neurological encoding of", i.e., a physical representation of an abstract concept for a real-world thing. Thanks I will have to unpack the rest. Cheers On Thu, Sep 17, 2020, 3:02 PM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > Hi James, > > > > “1. What is a thought (redness), i.e., how is it physically represented > in the brain, and” > > > > This seems confused to me. What do you mean by “represent” here? What is > the definition of “redness” for you? Representational Qualia Theory models > different intrinsic properties with different terms. Red is a label for > anything that reflects or emits red light. Redness is a different label > for the different intrinsic quality of our knowledge of red things. The > intrinsic quality, redness, is the definition for the term ‘redness’. > Things with intrinsic qualities (redness) can be thought of or interpreted > as (using a dictionary) “representing something else”. But redness just is > an intrinsic quality, you don’t represent it, it is the definition of the > word 'redness'. > > > > > > “(2) Are you aware that you no longer have a term for "redness"? > > It's the awareness of having a construct - metacognition - thinking about > thinking - that is consciousness.” > > > > That is a different definition of “consciousness” than what Representational > Qualia Theory > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=gbsTDJOpkYUwHq6qarJ61W7JJXPP1KK09UJ73_mq970&s=p6V7B14poz3wVnqGA9qSYt5q6DRguSipTxWPPOUyxcw&e=> > Uses. Let me see if I can describe the problem we would have with using > your definition, starting with your statement: > > > “And when you do this, intentionally, you are, in my subjective > experience, *more aware*.” > > > Something trivial like a thermostat, could be implemented both abstractly > or phenomenally. An abstract system would be based on 1s and 0s. When the > internal wire changed from 0 to 5 volts (required dictionary: 0 volts = 0 , > 5 volts = 1) the thermostat would turn on the heat. A phenomenal system > could represent the off state with greenness and the on state with > redness. When greenness changed to redness, the heat would be turned on. > You don’t need a dictionary for redness, it just is. 1’s and 0s are > abstracted away from the intrinsic properties, via additional dictionary or > transducing hardware. Phenomenal systems run directly on intrinsic > qualities like redness and greenness. > > > You could make both of these systems “*more aware*”, both having > additional "metacognition" By computationally binding additional, > self-referential knowledge such as: “There is an additional me, and this me > no longer has a term for ‘redness’”. The abstract one would represent this > additional lack of knowledge, abstractly, or independent of any specific > intrinsic qualities, while a phenomenal system would represent the same > additional “self-aware’ knowledge directly on additional computationally > bound into the gestalt of elemental qualities like redness and greenness. > > > This is how your definition would classify these 4 things differently than > RQT: > > > > > * RQT > definition Jame’s definition* > > Abstract thermostat… Not Conscious > Not Conscious > > Phenomenal thermostat > Conscious Not Conscious > > *More aware* abstract thermostat Not > Conscious Conscious > > *More aware* phenomenal thermostat Conscious > Conscious > > > > Not only do we know both phenomenal thermostats are conscious, we know > what each is like. > > > It's not about how complex it is, it's about whether it is like redness or > greenness or not. (running directly on intrinsic qualities or abstracted > away from them with a dictionary) > > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 8:40 AM James Lyons-Weiler < > [log in to unmask]> wrote: > >> Interesting discussion; I've read the general form of the qualia-based >> concept of consciousness. >> >> Perhaps an improbable thought experiment will teach us something: >> >> You are born. You have no concept of a term for "red" or "redness". That >> concept does not exist in your brain until >> the perception of redness occurs. The capacity to experience redness >> exists, however, presuming you, the child, is not color-blind. >> >> You are shown a red object for the first time on your 5th birthday. You >> have experienced discussions about this other color, >> called "red", you have read about it. In your mind, there is a color, >> something more like purple than like pink, the opposite of green. >> >> You see this new color. Most people might wonder "is this red?". >> The association between the actual color and term of course is >> culture, and unless you are lied to, you are told "yes" and the brain >> construct associating the color til that date of "more like purple than >> like pink, the opposite of green" is expanded to include, and indeed be >> replaced by "red". >> >> You're not a young adult, and you experience a head injury. You lose >> your capacity to speak; you can learn again how to speak, but you must >> re-learn all of your words. >> >> Including 'red'. >> >> Two important questions, that distinguish mental constructs from >> consciousness: >> >> (1) Before you relearn your words, >> -Do you recognize "red"? >> >> (2) Are you aware that you no longer have a term for "redness"? >> >> It's the awareness of having a construct - metacognition - thinking about >> thinking - that is consciousness. >> >> And when you do this, intentionally, you are, in my subjective >> experience, more aware. >> >> The physical layering of the neocortex during the last 500,000 years is >> likely made possible by a shift >> in the potency of neural stem cells lying at the base of the outer >> subventricular zone. Both intermediate progenitor (IP) cells, which divide >> to produce pairs of neurons. and radial glial fibers play a role in >> neurogenesis. Compared to humans, the number of outer subventricular zone >> radial glia-like (oRG) cells exist in, say, the mouse, is very small. >> >> Fig 4 of this reference is a good illustration >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3610574_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=pzqre5LtBwOgWAlrjNWUGaFa7spSGzbuvNRyCqh2b0U&s=yO_jHUyFV6LTNM87ltjEDKPf9czmgVIVVk95VmKLPGo&e= >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3610574_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=rkVmvs7HnCdBl5voaYXl1dAk0IgqyWdvwls39O9JUX4&e=> >> >> The evolutionary shift in the potency of the stem cells that give rise to >> more complex outer subventricular zone involves >> gene duplication events of genes that control the stem cells' activities. >> >> The neocortex, and the cortex, being layered upon the cortex, layered >> upon the more primitive brain stem, "experiences" >> signals from "beneath" and sorts them out. The cerebral cortex, being a >> location involved in much of awareness of things >> (as experiments with rhesus monkeys have shown), is a good candidate for >> general consciousness. Higher thinking, like >> mathematics, fires up the prefrontal cortex as it monitors and controls >> the flow of information among the posterior parietal cortex, ventrotemporal >> occipital cortex, and itself... many of the experiences and duties our >> brains undertake are managed by, primarily, >> the prefrontal cortex such as focus (aware of thought), planning >> (organizing and thus awareness of thought), impulse control (awareness of >> limbic signals), emotional control (ditto), empathy (awareness of others' >> perceptions), judgment (ditto) and insight (de novo synthesis, generative >> knowledge). So the frontal cortex is a good candidate for much of what we >> experience as consciousness. >> >> That outlay provides us with an rather standard overall schematic, but >> it's reductionist to a fault in that it never answers the question >> >> 1. What is a thought (redness), i.e., how is it physically represented in >> the brain, and >> >> 2. How are we aware of our holding a construct of redness? >> >> If a thought is a neural pattern, it should, if physically relocated from >> one brain to the next, in principle be transferrable. >> >> We do not have the technology to do that, but imagine if we could arrange >> neurons via nanobots, let's say, a collection of neurons >> into the same pattern that was recognized as firing reproducibly when a >> mouse is shown food... >> >> if a thought is a neural pattern, it might be disrupted in two ways; >> disrupted via impairment of the mapping information >> of where the information is stored, or impairment of the actual stored >> information. When we "forget" something, it's likely >> that we lost the keys to the card catalog - and the neocortex is an >> excellent hierarchical system within which general categories >> and specific instance bits of information might be stored. With 100,000 >> billion neurons in the neocortex, we >> would likely have a physical limit to the card catalog on the order 0.06 >> mb (six layers x 100,000), if they were truly and strictly hierarchical. >> But we know in spite of broad appearances that the physical architecture of >> the neocortex and the secret to its complexity is in the lateral >> connections, typified not by static representation but instead by dynamic, >> living, moving arbors - not a fixed microstructure, but a tendency of a >> neural pattern, with free-flowing microglia pruning away during learning, >> creating physical >> representations of where knowledge lies and the information itself. >> >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3767963_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=pzqre5LtBwOgWAlrjNWUGaFa7spSGzbuvNRyCqh2b0U&s=JaHLyDSIcX_Mh4uNq-vLrBMmZv6t_2xARwyEMJ9oHZ8&e= >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3767963_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=wVXNjjVoDigyIt-JlksKZ96JgJxrQBlesD8fngXNNCg&e=> >> >> The brain sculpts itself throughout life with processes we are aware of, >> but that we only have some control over, and processes >> that we have no hope of driving. Beware: the human brain expresses the >> largest number of genes' RNA than any other organ, and also the greatest >> diversity of splice variants (more alternative splicing) than any other >> organ, as well. >> >> While general consciousness is disruptible via signalling conduits, but >> then same for loss of 02. >> >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC4280551_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=pzqre5LtBwOgWAlrjNWUGaFa7spSGzbuvNRyCqh2b0U&s=JEj6s9yJnzPmkJi2NiC7OVFQEk1XFtcTfEeNncNsPBE&e= >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC4280551_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=SKMdcFtEn3l7NvdjQdLL2eJ3JvJoFnzazZTtLyfqetc&e=> >> >> I think we know only this: Somewhere between proteins, cells, tissues and >> subregions/organ awash in electrochemical baths lie 100% of human >> consciousness; it seems to reside in the interrelationships among numerous >> working parts of "representation" with the whole being greater than the sum >> of the living parts. If in this description there lies a "qualia", I'd be >> gratified to know. My point is that no description of human consciousness >> can be complete w/out including consideration of both developmental and >> evolutionary processes and trends. I don't rule out an emergent field >> w/long-distance effects by any means, and understanding those relationships >> require the evolutionary and developmental perspectives. >> >> In 2014, I was set to embark on a book on the evolution of consciousness >> but became distracted into trying to understand >> what autism is and wrote that book, instead. >> >> Now I find I must write out a general theory of science as Science has >> lost its way completely, at least the loudest and most >> powerful influences of Science on society are becoming threats to reality >> and to safety. >> >> If there is a book afoot I would not mind contributing a chapter (subject >> to review/revision) on the implications of evolution >> and development on consciousness. I have a publisher whom I think would >> welcome a multi-authored piece written for the masses. >> >> James Lyons-Weiler >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:50 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx < >> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Brent. >>> >>> The challenge here is that it seems to me you assume “redness” has a >>> neurophysiological anchor that is consistent and independent of the rest of >>> the context. But there are lots of reasons to suppose that redness does not >>> have a direct one-to-one linkage with neurophysiological properties per se. >>> That is, there may be lots of different kinds of neurological arrangements >>> and histories that produce redness. Consider how the checkerboard illusion >>> demonstrates the same external wavelength results in massively different >>> interior experiences depending on context… >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Consider also that my brain’s pathway to generate greyness might not be >>> your brain’s pathway. To see what I mean, consider how some individuals >>> have remarkable brain pathology (i.e., huge parts of the brain are missing) >>> but develop in relatively normal ways (e.g., see here >>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.bbc.com_future_article_20141216-2Dcan-2Dyou-2Dlive-2Dwith-2Dhalf-2Da-2Dbrain&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=Uz_mmdidTLRKWVfN0GMyz5YL9uvyFHq_-79ZxFWm_g8&e=> >>> .) >>> >>> >>> >>> My point here is that “greyness” is not necessarily tied to one thing >>> the brain in all species is doing. Or at least, there is very good reason >>> to believe that is not the case. And given where things are, if I >>> interpreted you correctly, I disagree with your conclusion that the hard >>> problem is either not hard or solved. (And this is just one of the >>> reasons…there are many). >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> Gregg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion < >>> [log in to unmask]> *On Behalf Of *Brent Allsop >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 16, 2020 1:14 PM >>> *To:* [log in to unmask] >>> *Subject:* Re: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and >>> consciousness >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Hi Gregg, >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 6:09 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx < >>> [log in to unmask]> wrote: >>> >>> Does anyone have control over the Wiki Tree of Knowledge Entry? We need >>> an update on that and I am not sure who put it up. >>> >>> >>> >>> Are you talking wikipedia.org >>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wikipedia.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zocMGsB2F2PKbV6zNlyupZnafSU_GuMwulvnrd_Na90&s=yT0CfPPss3DuYy2sjTHqQK9kqIOBSlMwLVpbqAap7YA&e=>? >>> Anyone can edit that, even anonymously, right? >>> >>> >>> >>> Second, as we discussed during the 2019 TOK Conference at JMU, the hard >>> problem surely remains, at least to some degree. Let me put it this way. >>> Which animals are conscious and what kind of qualia do they experience and >>> how do you know? If the hard problem was solved, “neurophenomenologists” >>> could tell me exactly the kind of Mind2 a praying mantis, a bumble bee, a >>> sardine, a squid, a cardinal, a rat, a baboon and a killer whale have. I >>> have been reading up on the science of animal consciousness and they can’t. >>> And the reason is clear: We don’t really understanding the explanatory >>> ontological mechanism that enables perspectival experience to emerge. >>> >>> >>> >>> RQT is not only predicting what is and isn't conscious, but what it is >>> phenomenally like. Once we discover what it is that has a redness quality, >>> and what it is tha has a greenness quality, and the mechanism used to >>> computationally bind them into one composite consciousness gestalt, we will >>> be able to observe the same thing (or not) in other animals. Once we know >>> what it is that has a redness quality, if we objectively observe that in a >>> bat, bumble bee, a sardine, rat, a computer, a thermostat... we will not >>> only know that it is conscious, we will know that it is like the elemental >>> redness experienced by a certain percentage of the human population. For >>> example, if we observed the same redness and greenness qualitative stuff >>> being rendered into similar gestalts in a bat using echolocation, we would >>> know that it is like our visual redness and greenness to be that bat. We >>> use particular elemental qualities to represent our visual conscious >>> knowledge. Any other animal or machine that uses these colorness qualities >>> to represent any types of knowledge, we'll be able to create objectiver >>> detectors/observer, like Jack Galant is doing >>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_6FsH7RK1S2E&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zocMGsB2F2PKbV6zNlyupZnafSU_GuMwulvnrd_Na90&s=pkXUXYvfSx7ZsF_8RqU9TWsKT09Atdzf2ehWcm2inI0&e=> (using >>> much more advanced detectors than just fMRIs), and project this data on >>> screens to produce the same visual qualities in our brain - effing the >>> ineffable. And this is just the 1. weakest form of effing the ineffable. >>> There will also be the 2. stronger, and 3. strongest forms of effing the >>> ineffable for all of this. >>> >>> >>> >>> For example, John’s in cognitive science and the metaphysics of Mind2 >>> makes it quite clear (to me at least) that we should distinguish adjectival >>> qualia (redness, greenesss) from adverbial qualia (the witnessing function >>> that brings aspects together in a hereness, nowness, and togetherness). >>> That folks can meditate and achieve a “pure consciousness event” that is >>> essentially devoid of adjectival qualia is good phenomenological evidence >>> that there is logic to separating the two functions. Relating this to RQT, >>> it suggests there is both representational/modeling and aspectualizing. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, the redness we experience when we look at something red should be >>> distinguished between the best we can 'recall' or remember of redness when >>> our eyes are closed. But the same general objective/subjective, perceived >>> from afar vs directly apprehended principles apply to it all. There must >>> be something physically different in our brain, which is both of these >>> elemental phenomenal constituents of knowledge, and they both must be able >>> to be computationally bound to make some kind of composite gestalt of these >>> elemental intrinsic physics we directly apprehend, for which when we >>> perceive from afar we will only have abstract descriptions of the physical >>> behavior, still requiring a dictionary. >>> >>> >>> >>> All conscious experiences, including anything experienced by talented >>> meditators, are all composed of computationally bound elemental intrinsic >>> qualities of some kind, like redness and greenness. The intrinsic >>> qualities of all that can both be directly apprehended, or the behavior of >>> such can be objectively observed and abstractly described. And it is true >>> for all of it, that the qualitative nature can only be known by directly >>> apprehending, even though we can objectively observe the behavior of all of >>> it. right? >>> >>> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ############################ >>> >>> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >>> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the >>> following link: >>> http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >>> ############################ >>> >>> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >>> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the >>> following link: >>> http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >>> >> >> >> -- >> --- >> james lyons-weiler, phd >> Author, CEO, President, Scientist >> Editor-in-Chief, Science, Public Health Policy, and the Law >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.publichealthpolicyjournal.com_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=5ne8z9dx2rLN-3TbZqHcsRNMoRb5-bcnKpNXgxpZ47I&e=> >> Guest Contributor, Children's Health Defense >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__childrenshealthdefense.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=al2A96rhjfNni0_sXR7LNiNh8RfROj4FNZzk9YFWqLg&e=> >> >> The Environmental and Genetic Causes of Autism >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__amzn.to_1KNSxPp&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=NdyHGKdDB79kAwMUC_3_e_1f3YpmpCb8ABwO8J5rg5k&e=> >> (Skyhorse Publishing) >> Cures vs. Profits: Successes in Translational Research >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.amazon.com_gp_product_9814730149_ref-3Das-5Fli-5Fqf-5Fsp-5Fasin-5Fil-5Ftl-3Fie-3DUTF8-26camp-3D1789-26creative-3D9325-26creativeASIN-3D9814730149-26linkCode-3Das2-26tag-3Dlivgrelivwel-2D20&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=DpG-1YGp_yLMlfhOYjjQWysY1luS2N6HTxGIgi89LPY&e=> (World >> Scientific, 2016) >> Ebola: An Evolving Story >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__amzn.to_1TGYY9r&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=a5OGD6i1PzXj0imjz0FwSOBgmOyZeWkcQR1GBKtVhho&e=> >> (World Scientific, 2015) >> cell 412-728-8743 >> email [log in to unmask] >> www.*linkedin*.com/in/*jameslyonsweiler* >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.linkedin.com_in_jameslyonsweiler&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=xaJn6y5HnnxmXn6kXROvdh1P7nRDTON9Pu3gI76rE_Q&e=> >> ############################ >> >> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the >> following link: >> http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >> > ############################ > > To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: > mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the > following link: > http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 > ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1