Hi Tyler,
  Good question. Anything that I send out like this can be shared anywhere. Indeed, I consider my comments on this list to be public (after all they are going out to about 130 people and are stored in the archives for anyone to search). So that can be a general rule FOR MY posts.

That said, any exchanges that involve our community and its culture and discussion within our members should not be shared without everyone who posted permission.

Thanks for raising this issue.

Best,
Gregg

From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]> On Behalf Of James Tyler Carpenter
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2020 8:03 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and consciousness

Can this e-mail/links be shared on other lists, Gregg.

It will come as no surprise to most of us here that many programs and modes of treatment, particularly those involving systems and complex and disabling disorders, routinely mix these ways of thinking.

Although I have yet to completely read  this (I have to rush to work from home😉, what I have read leads me to surmise that there are places that I routinely hang out in the virtual world, and citizens thereof, that may want to read parts of this post.

Is it OK to share ?

Thanks much as always,
Tyler

James Tyler Carpenter, PhD, FAACP
www.metispsych.com<http://www.metispsych.com>
http://www.experts.com/Expert-Witnesses/search?keyword=Clinical%20psychology&keywordsearchtype=All%20Words&category=Clinical%20forensic%20&categorysearchtype=Any%20Word&name=James%20tyler%20carpenter&namesearchtype=All%20Words&company=Metis&companysearchtype=All%20Words&address=%20&addresssearchtype=All%20Words&state=MA&statesearchtype=Any%20Word&country=ALL%20(or%20Choose%20a%20Country)&countrysearchtype=All%20Words&page=1&freshsearch=1
________________________________
From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> on behalf of Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2020 7:54:04 AM
To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Subject: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and consciousness


Hi TOK Folks,



For any of you who remain interested in the cognitivism versus behaviorism debate in psychology, the attached 2011 chapter offers a good review, defending the behavioral perspective, but also showing how the move to 4e cognition results in bridging concepts.  There should be no mistaking the fact that the UTOK readily solves this problem with its Map of Mind1,2,3<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__drive.google.com_file_d_1iKq-2DJEN2KGuTF9MZdkvaWeZm4Sh1wmcV_view-3Fusp-3Dsharing&d=DwMGaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=1w4kFjUvcfSnYyzhmlqAqM2FR-RmPFoNurfTzMPrte0&s=1UIzW-pHtLqYbylmzPRElinlqH_DRYZO_vp8rYosqRw&e=>.



  First, we can note that this dispute is all about Mind1, which is about generating a neurocognitive functionalist account of mental behavior. The sides go round and round because they lack the right grammar and map of the right relations in the conceptual field.



  To advance the ball, it helps to step outside this arena and note that neither traditional behavioral nor neurocognitive approaches really address Mind2 (i.e., phenomenological consciousness). Here is David Chalmers recently explaining to Sam Harris on Making Sense this issue:



It is useful to start by distinguishing the easy problems-which are basically about performance functions—from the hard problem which is about experience. [Some] easy problems are: How do we discriminate information in our environment and respond appropriately? How does the brain integrate information from different sources and bring it together to make a judgment and control our behavior? How do we voluntarily control our behavior to respond in a controlled way to the environment?...

The easier problems fall within the standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science What makes the hard problem of experience hard? Because it doesn’t seem to be about behavior or about functions. You can in principle imagine explaining all my behavioral responses to a given stimulus and how my brain discriminates and integrates and monitors itself and controls my behavior. You can explain all that with, say a neural mechanism, but you won’t have touched the central question, which is, “Why does it feel like something from the first-person point of view?



Note that the difference Chalmers is talking about is the difference between Mind1 and Mind2 (and, of course, no one is even touching Mind3, where all of this exchange is taking place!).



Bottom line, to first we need to weave the behavioral and neurocognitive accounts together in a functional/mental behaviorism. This makes sense because live cats behave differently than dead cats. Both can fall out of trees, but only one lands on its feet and takes off. Falling is a physical behavior. Landing on your feet and taking off is a mental behavior and YES the adjective makes all the difference. Doing so allows one to realize that neurocognitive functionalism can provide a general scientific ontological and epistemological frame for Mind1. However, as Chalmers notes, Mind2 is a different ballgame.



Indeed, as I pointed out in this popular blog<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_theory-2Dknowledge_201910_there-2Dare-2Dtwo-2Dhard-2Dproblems-2Dconsciousness-2Dnot-2Done&d=DwMGaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=1w4kFjUvcfSnYyzhmlqAqM2FR-RmPFoNurfTzMPrte0&s=eE0YGPAeYp9nfEHOSKC4ez7oUU6unZoPibbjdvK8320&e=>, Chalmers does not appropriately specify the nature of the problem, because he calls it the hard problem. There are in fact two hard problems associated with Mind2. One is epistemological in nature and the other is ontological. The epistemological problem stems from the language game of MENS<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_theory-2Dknowledge_202007_theory-2Dmens-2Dknowledge&d=DwMGaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=1w4kFjUvcfSnYyzhmlqAqM2FR-RmPFoNurfTzMPrte0&s=nXJhYR6L4SdtZdyefIMxaeEEh_K1oFlAewIEO0cAqAM&e=>. It only sees things and processes (i.e., behaviors) from an exterior epistemology, so it is, by its very grammar of justification, blind to interior subjects and their perspectives. The ontological problem is that we don’t know the mechanism of how neurobiological activity generates the experiential point of view.



The point here is that we can readily untangle the worldknot with the right system of understanding.



Best,
Gregg





___________________________________________

Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Graduate Psychology
216 Johnston Hall
MSC 7401
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, VA 22807
(540) 568-7857 (phone)
(540) 568-4747 (fax)

Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.

Check out the Theory Of Knowledge homepage at:

https://www.toksociety.org/home<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.toksociety.org_home&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=wjF8cZoiFchamTuxBdDEmw&m=57e2I6uWglJ4JwStWjClCslCp37381OxvNIxockoINI&s=aRdOGoP0Bdt7IhOV8uIntjmwOR6o8wiDviSHJrpgpaM&e=>


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