DL: Just to add
on to your statement Mike, which showcases, the distinction
between awareness & consciousness is indeed below
mentioned said by you -
"...unaware as
in deep sleep...". Actually one is not unaware in deep
sleep, but unconscious. Awareness is present, though muted.
So sound higher than usual wakes you, touch harder than
usual wakes, very bright light will also wake you. Your
subconscious awareness (that maintains homeostasis) is also
working. But you are unconscious.
[log in to unmask]"> Waldemar:
Now this, in my view, moves us forward in the discussion. The suggestion that an amoeba is aware of its surroundings anchors the discussion. And yes — I agree that Wittgenstein is deeply relevant here.
I’m not sure what it means to say that an amoeba is “aware” of its surroundings. Let’s start with Wittgenstein. We use the term “aware” in many ways. We say, “I’m aware of the fact that hot dogs are bad for you.” This means something like, “I have knowledge that…” or we can say, “I am aware as opposed to being unaware as in deep sleep)”; or we can say, “I am aware of the bottle in front of me”. Each use of the term — as you imply — means something different.
Which, if any of these meanings do we want to extend to the ameba — an organism without an nervous system! When we look at the amoeba, and we see it move in one or another direction in response to the presence of a substance in the environment, it certainly feels like we want to attribute “awareness” to the organism. In what sense can it be said that the amoeba is “aware of” something here?
Now, my good, lovely, sweet, smart friend Gregg would likely use the term “functional awareness” to refer to what is going on here. And there may be something to this idea — which I would define as some form of “awareness” that mediates the functioning of the organism. But, as currently formulated, in my view, the concept of functional awareness begs the question of the nature of awareness! What is the form of awareness that is involved in such and such functioning?
There are two ways, I think, to figure out what — if any — form of “awareness” an amoeba has. Second, we need a theory of the nature and role of awareness in biological functioning. Having such a theory, we can postulate what level of awareness — if any — would be needed to mediate the amoebas behavior in particular contexts.
But first — and there is no way around this, I would argue — we have to engage in some sort of intersubjectivity with he amoeba. And this is because the only way that we can recognize “awareness”, “sentience” or “consciousness” in the other is through our capacity to (imagine) what an amoeba experiences. There can be, I think, no such thing as an “objective” theory of consciousness. Our concept of consciousness, awareness and what have you have their origins in the meaning of terms that we jointly create as we refer to intersubjective aspects of experience in joint action. That’s were we get our notions from. And when we attribute something like that to an amoeba, we cannot help but do so on the basis of concepts that arise from our own language-mediated reflections upon our own intersubjective experience. (See Alisdaire MacIntire on dolphin intelligence)…
And so, I ask: what form of awareness would be present in an amoeba? What function would it serve in the context of an understanding of its biological apparatus and ecology?
M.
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On Oct 4, 2020, at 11:46 AM, Waldemar Schmidt <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Mike:############################
Perhaps your application of the word “consciousness” is heavily influenced by its relationship to the concept of “unconsciousess?” In the case of the latter we are both unaware and unaware and unconscious in the sense of being not-conscious as in “self-aware,” ie, “self-conscious." An amoeba is “aware” of its surroundings but cannot be considered conscious in the sense of “self-consicousness.”
The distinctions involved enable the concepts of “awareness," “consciousness,” and “self-awareness” (or, “self-consciousness”) to be apprehended as a spectrum.
Wittgensteinian language games.
Best regards,
Waldemar
Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044
Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)
On Oct 4, 2020, at 7:20 AM, Michael Mascolo <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Thank you, Nicholas and Gregg:############################
In your view, is it meaningful to say that an organism can be aware but not conscious?
I am aware of research that seeks to differentiate attention and consciousness. I am somewhat suspect of this work (I need to look deeper) mostly because of terminological issues. In my view, we cannot identify or define consciousness, awareness, attention, etc. by looking carefully or by doing experiments. This is because these words already have meaning our everyday culture, and we start with these meanings. We have to start first by understanding these everyday meanings. Then, when we do studies and experiments, we can refine these meanings. When we notice odd things in research, we must then invoke different terms, phrases and definitions as we refine our concepts.
In my view — I am open to modification — I do not understand how an organism can be aware without being conscious. Awareness is, it would seem to me, a basic form of consciousness — not something fundamentally different.
Thoughts?
M.
On Oct 4, 2020, at 10:04 AM, Nicholas Lattanzio <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
I would first argue that most casual references of consciousness do refer to aspects of awareness that we are conscious of, largely being perceptual and cognitive images (versus the actual processes of perception and cognition/thinking). One always has operations of consciousness that are not in one's attentional field, and we can direct our conscious attention to bring things into consciousness and in the same throw lose consciousness of others. We have loose correlational research to suggest that consciousness and attention are different but related, and probably interdependent processes, I have yet to see anything close to compelling about awareness.
In my experience (I.e., in my consciousness), awareness seems to be more fundamental to existence than consciousness. One can be asleep (unconscious) but we still have a bare sense of existence, which I argue is what awareness 'is' and is what we fundamentally 'are.'
My perspective is highly nondual and phenomenological in nature, and I truly don't believe we have the scientific means to say we can define consciousness and awareness, or even mind in a precise or empirically reliable and valid way. I'm sure others on this thread with share more technical theories, but short of solving the hard problem of consciousness (if we even understand the question correctly), theory is all we can say we have.
Regards,
Nicholas G. Lattanzio, Psy.D.
############################Hi All:
Can someone please suggest definitions for “consciousness” and “awareness”. Is anyone here arguing that these are two different processes? I’m not sure what it means to say that an organism can be aware but not conscious (unless consciousness means “self-conscious”).
M.
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