On Sun, Oct 4, 2020 at 8:00 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
  Experiential consciousness is not available from the third person exterior epistemological position

I disagree with this.  All 3rd person communication is simply abstract, so requires definitions (otherwise you don’t know what a word like ‘red’ means).  But that does not mean the ineffable cannot be effed.  All you need to do is use non qualia blind language (use more than one abstract word for all things red like red=”anything that reflects or emits red light” and a different word for the different intrinsic quality of your knowledge of red things = “redNESS”) and then define those terms.

 

Here is an example effing statement that makes it available from third person and bridges the explanatory gap, simply by using multiple defined terms:

 

image.png

“My redness is like your greenness, both of which we call red”

 

Also, the emerging consensus camp called RepresentationalQualia Theory defines consciousness to simply be

 

“Computationally bound elemental intrinsic qualities like redness and greenness.”

 

Consciousness or everything you are aware of at any point in time is a composite qualitative experience.  If you are consciously aware of something, that conscious knowledge must be something.  And there must be something that is binding whatever that is in with the rest of your composite awareness.

 

There are lots of things that you “know” but aren’t thinking about, so all that is included in “sub consciousness”.  In computers, the only place computational binding occurs is the computational binding of multiple registers in the CPU, so it helps to think of it that way.  So consciousness is one big computationally bound CPU.  If you know something, but aren’t thinking about it, it is still in subconsciousness (no binding).  When you think about it, this knowledge is loaded into the CPU, where it can be computationally bound to our composite qualitative experience that is everything we are consciously aware of at any point in time.



 
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