Hi Greg,
It bothers me the way you ignore any future possibilities, which are surely
necessary at some point in our future.  Just as we could know that man
would surely eventually be able to fly, because birds could fly.
Just as these twins are wired together, surely at some point in the future
we'll be binding brains together the same way our two hemispheres are wired
together, in such a way that we can directly apprehend all of the
experiences, not just half.  And once we can demonstrate which of all our
descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness (i.e. we
finally know the coolness properties of things)  we will be able to observe
things both subjectively (via direct apprehension of redness in our brain
or a computationally bound brain) and objectively, by knowing which of all
our descriptions of stuff in the brain is a description of redness.

Once we know which of all our descriptions of stuff in the brain, is a
description of redness, i.e, we know the intrinsic colorness properties of
stuff, will there be any remaining problems, of any kind, left?
EVERYTHING else is easy problems, right?  If not, then what and why?




On Tue, Apr 13, 2021 at 6:32 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> Hi TOK List,
>
>
>
>   Given the dialogue about consciousness recently, I thought some might
> find this discussion between Phillip Goff and Sean Carroll of interest.
>
>
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.youtube.com_watch-3Fv-3DlfAhup-2DfDYs&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=fHkdhAsQj0KWnjve_htI0ZBaV8HR-xJ04SZdBPrZ5MY&s=yJnVk41BXt64gHGhbSWV0xlCa9qbabslWErkPIFTMQM&e= 
>
>
>
> Goff recounts Galileo’s work in developing modern science. He frames it as
> a shift from qualities to quantities. This is what I call the shift from
> first person empiricism to third person empiricism. It relates to the
> epistemological hard problem of consciousness, which, as this blog makes
> clear, is different from the ontological hard problem. The epistemological
> problem refers to the brute fact that subjective conscious experience
> (i.e., the domain of Mind 2 on the Map of Mind) cannot be observed from the
> outside. Brent Allsop pointed out that there might be one known
> quasi-exception to this rule, which is the case of conjoined Hogan twins
> who share aspects of their brains
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.cbc.ca_cbcdocspov_features_the-2Dhogan-2Dtwins-2Dshare-2Da-2Dbrain-2Dand-2Dsee-2Dout-2Dof-2Deach-2Dothers-2Deyes&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=fHkdhAsQj0KWnjve_htI0ZBaV8HR-xJ04SZdBPrZ5MY&s=-XuHMWNr_fLNMER0zzShGukHtvPQRT9H0dypfPSpz8w&e= >.
> However, even here, they have distinct and separable “epistemological
> portals” and only “see each others’ thoughts” through their own Mind2.
>
>
>
> Anyway, the discussion is interesting for those who want to grapple with
> the way modern (physical) science sets up a particular epistemology and how
> that relates to what we know about the world.
>
>
>
> The UTOK argument is that the descriptive metaphysical system afforded by
> the ToK sorts out the conceptual issues, and then the rest of the UTOK key
> ideas affords a metatheoretical and pragmatic synthesis.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gregg
>
>
>
>
>
> ___________________________________________
>
> Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
> Professor
> Department of Graduate Psychology
> 216 Johnston Hall
> MSC 7401
> James Madison University
> Harrisonburg, VA 22807
> (540) 568-7857 (phone)
> (540) 568-4747 (fax)
>
>
> *Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.*
>
> Check out the Unified Theory Of Knowledge homepage at:
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.unifiedtheoryofknowledge.org_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=fHkdhAsQj0KWnjve_htI0ZBaV8HR-xJ04SZdBPrZ5MY&s=U9CamqO2zlvVypB28QcdMINSeUkLbZTyrXUobJIAaiI&e= 
>
>
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