Brent, 'effect' is infact a better word than the one you are meaning, which is 'representation'. As effect allows for a physical connect between an event and it's representation inside. Representation without effect would grant bats the power of imagination of which I am not sure.

I understand your concept, but understanding what Gregg is advocating through his ToK theory, both of you are loggerheads foundationally, though there could be some concurring components.

Ty
DL

On Sat, Apr 3, 2021, 7:11 AM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
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Thanks Deepak.  It helps me to hear other people describe what I often struggle to describe.  Just a few comments about the way you are describing it.  It is problematic to define it as an "effect" that is a reaction to specific wavelengths of light.  It is critical to realize that you could engineer a bat, to represent echolocated bugs with your redness quality.  If that was the case, not only would that redness not be an 'effect' reaction to light (it would be an effect reaction to echolocated sound) but you would then know what it is like, at least partially, to be that bat.  And in that case, saturation would likely not be a factor, as it would just be a particular saturation of red that you can experience.



On Fri, Apr 2, 2021 at 2:58 PM Deepak Loomba <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
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See inside the trail mail text... Helping you understand Brent's view to best of my knowledge.

On Fri, Apr 2, 2021, 4:16 PM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Sounds good. Looking forward to exploring this.

 

I saw those a while back when you shared them. I quickly got the point about the difference between red in the world (i.e., electromagnetic radiation) and redness in qualia (subjective conscious experience). The difference basically parallels the move made by modern empirical natural science to go to a language grounded in third person quantitative away from first person qualitative. What I did not get was the model that was being proposed regarding the mechanism by which neurobiological activity actually produces the experienced quality of redness.

DL: Since redness is an 'effect' that is a reaction produced to a specific wavelength of light. Let's assume that it is caused by a material X in the nervous system that produces the redness. So the more this material the more is the redness with a point of saturation. Therefore, redness could be interpreted quantitatively as the amount of a chemical X or a physical effect Y or a number of nerves Z in a special area of brain cause the redness. And this redness is quantified reaction in our mind to phenomena happening outside and thus being a kind of projection or simulation in one's mind to actions happening elsewhere and can be identified.

This is the “how and why” combination that makes up the ontological explanatory gap. There were some interesting suggestions and possibilities that might frame this, but that is different than having an answer. But maybe I missed something or maybe it was an example of what an answer might look like. I do agree there were some cool frames on it.

 

Via the Map of Mind1,2,3 the UTOK gives a clear descriptive metaphysical system. For example, Chalmers differentiates the hard problem from the easy problems of consciousness. The Map of Mind is a descriptive metaphysical system that frames this ontologically. That is, Mind1 represents a neurocognitive (Mind1a) functionalist account of mental behavior (Mind1b). This corresponds to Chalmers’ talk of the easy problems, but it is now framed ontologically instead of his epistemological point. Mind2 is the domain of the hard problem, which is the subjective conscious experience of being. The account given by the UTOK is functional, phylogenetic, and ontogenetic and integrative (especially now that it syncs up with John Vervaeke’s cognitive account via recursive relevance realization). However, it does not answer the “here-and-now” neurobiological engineering mechanism problem that is the explanatory gap. Put in straight forward terms, I don’t think we have any idea how to build something that has subjective conscious experience. We only know the functional neurobehavioral correlates. This is a lot, but there is still a hard problem to be solved. It is also crucial to note that , via JUST, the UTOK round out the picture by adding Mind3. Mind3a being private narration and Mind3b being public. This boxes in Mind2, and the UTOK also ties all the domains together via informational interface.

 

From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]> On Behalf Of Brent Allsop
Sent: Thursday, April 1, 2021 3:07 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: TOK: Open Discussion on the Nature of Consciousness tomorrow at 1:00 pm EST

 

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Looking forward to it!

 

Just FYI, Rather than have me talk about the significant theoretical consensus we've been able to build and track around Representational Qualia Theory including tracking any competing theories, during this, it would be way better for people to just check out our work in progress animated video on this: "Consciousness, Not a Hard Problem, Just a Color Problem."

We're working on an important additional "Computational Binding" chapter which isn't completed yet, so I may talk a bit about what is in that, and how that fits into a definition of consciousness, to get things started.

 

Looking forward to better understanding how all this fits in with the TOK and such.

 

 

On Thu, Apr 1, 2021 at 6:59 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Hi All,

  This is just a reminder that tomorrow at 1:00 pm EST, Brent Allsop and I will be having an open dialogue about the hard problem of consciousness from our various perspectives. I will send a zoom link to the list serve about 5 minutes prior and anyone who is interested may join us.

 

Best,
Gregg

 

___________________________________________

Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Graduate Psychology
216 Johnston Hall
MSC 7401
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, VA 22807
(540) 568-7857 (phone)
(540) 568-4747 (fax)


Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.

Check out the Unified Theory Of Knowledge homepage at:

https://www.unifiedtheoryofknowledge.org/

 

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