Michael,

Let me add that this isn't novel ground. you're saying :" I think mind
stuff is mysterious , it's just bad terminology that makes it mysterious. "

This was the entire history of artificial intelligence: explaining elusive
conscious decision making by simulating it with lots of other stuff.

Herbert Simon, the most prolific social scientist of the 20th century,
began where you are. That's exactly where his work started Then he went on
for 60 more years of work and did 1000 papers ... and before death admitted
he wasn't much closer to solving anything truly philospicslly  difficult.

 Herbert Simon was the expert of explaining complex problems with simpler
rules.
 He was one of the inventors of complexity mathematics ...
 And he also was the 1st person to teach an artificially intelligent
program to play chess with learning algorithms rather than just rig some
sort of dumb program to imitate chess play with reactive algorithms.

 Simon was convinced that most of what humans do can be automated. Whereas
John searle was skeptical of strong a.i., Simon was skeptical of strong
human consciousness.  His simple answer to the consciousness problem was
that consciousness itself was an illusion and that most of what we think we
we can do in our brains we actually can't do. For example he doesn't think
that we actually make that many decisions with our consciousness. He did
studies  show that most of our behavior with subconscious and rather simple.

 On the other hand he was rather impressed with how difficult it was to
simulate human behavior. It was far more fascinated with the human
unconscious than the human consciousness.

I tend to agree the unconscious is far more compelling and mysterious to
us. And it does far more of our thinking than our conscious brain does.
Over 90% of our decisions are driven by unconscious unconscious processes.
Really the conscious part of our brain is the easiest to simulate because
it tries to follow the simple rules of reasoning. It's our intuition that
fascinated Herbert Simon. He found that it took about 10000 hours for the
average expert to become an expert of a specialized human field. He also
found that experts rarely could explain to you how they made decisions.
When they could explain it to you it was always very simple.

In other words, wuse people can't explain wisdom because it's not coming
from their consciousness.

This unconscious thought is non reductive. Chess study has shown that
machines can only beat humans using pure brute force and calculating
hundreds of trillions of times per move, and being truly encyclopedic and
trying literally every outcome possible before picking a best path.
 Humans somehow avoid having to try every possibility.

Mind is the qualitative difference between simulating mental experience
with outside technology humans crested (computers) and actually doing it
with the exact physical hardware of the human mind itself.   Obviously you
don't need to believe in some spooky magic. The definition of mind simply
requires it to be something you can't describe without loss of
information.

 You may want to look at mathematics. Indeed the most important issue here
is loss of information. Mathematically speaking a complex system that is
modeled as a complicated system suffering suffers from loss of information.
So you may be able to simulate a complex system with a complicated system
but you'll never actually be the thing itself and there will always be some
ambiguity or uncertainty due to loss of information and those things create
real qualitative problems.

Similarly speaking humanity has erected a staggeringly  complicated global
unfrastructure to support  Our economy and routines of life.... However
there is some loss of information between how we describe the modern world
is modern world and the actual complexity of the modern world. The size of
that information loss is enough that our society Is a tower of Babel...
Even with very small differences in and our perceptions of of the human
condition we come up with radical different conclusions on an individual
basis about how to live our lives and how to describe reality.  This is
partially because in a complex system 2 different complicated hated
reductions of that same system are going to be wildly different. So my
verbal description of society is going to be very different than yours even
though we live in the same society. Mind is very much an irreducibly
different qualitative filter.... In fact you might say that mental
processes kind of suck because they're not very accurate and reproducible.
But the one thing we can't do is throw away the concept of mind. Any
simulation of the human mind is gonna be too Too rational but yet not into
it of enough to count as mind. Indeed some philosophers would prefer to
replace the human mind with a computer because the computer is more elegant
and consistent.

I have a feeling that you're trying to do the same thing. That your theory
of mind is gonna create a more elegant sort of artificial intelligence
rather than describe the mind as it actually works. Herbert Simon conceited
near the end of his life that his entire career was on the path of creating
simulations thst were more elegant than human minds , partially because he
didn't LIKE the mysteries of the mind and it disturbed him that ubconscous
minds couldn't be tamed controlled and replaced with fully conscious
knowledge and materialistic truths. So he created his own very good  models
of the conscious mind rather than go down the rabbit hole of modeling our
really persistently hard unconscious.

Michael, you've got a lot of reading to do about the history of a.i. and
about the philosophy of science....
 Clearly you've got some sort of significant significant background in
these topics but I'm cautioning you that there's a lot that's been done
that you seem to be unfamiliar with....its a huge topic.

Thanks..

Robert







On Tue, Sep 7, 2021, 5:48 AM ryanrc111 <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> hi,
> Bruce is correct - the hard problem is stubbornly resistant to external
> explanation.
>
> For example, qualia. The color we see that we call red. We can explain it
> very well externally- the frequency of it, the way the eye processes red,
> etc. all very well known.
> But the theory of the qualitative experience of red is persistently
> difficult.
>
> I dont think its "unsolvable" because synesthesia is the primary approach.
> there is famous scene in the movie, Mask, where te main character is trying
> to teach the blind person about colors by qualitative analogies, such as by
> showing how temperatures "Feel" like colors. However, like most things, the
> solution itself will never "Explain" red as qualia as well as just
> experiencing red. The explanation must necessarily be clumsier, more
> complicated, and less petic than the direct experience.
>
> Thus, is seems that qualia are real but irreducible, and only analogously
> explainable with indirect methods.
>
> Robert
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 6, 2021 at 11:22 PM Bruce Alderman <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>> *CAUTION: *This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click links
>> or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is
>> safe.
>> ------------------------------
>> Hi, Michael, I am familiar with the H2O metaphor for the emergence of
>> 'mind' or the psychological, but in my view it still is reductionistic --
>> and / or it doesn't do the work it is supposed to do.  All examples of
>> emergence we have are of the same kind:  new organizations of matter, with
>> new emergent behaviors.  But in my understanding, the 'hard problem' is
>> deemed a hard problem, not because agent-like behaviors can emerge in
>> complex systems -- that's all still third-person, objective description and
>> focus; still a behavior-orientation.  The hard problem is a hard problem
>> because there seems to be no objective explanation of how or why any of
>> that would lead to first-person, qualitative feeling or experience.  There
>> is a leap being made, where we assert that 'subjective feeling / experience
>> is here,' but all we have accounted for is the emergence of new complex
>> forms of the behavior of material forms.  Not the irruption of 1p
>> experience into a world utterly devoid of such until then.
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 6, 2021 at 4:23 PM Michael Mascolo <[log in to unmask]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> *CAUTION: *This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click
>>> links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the
>>> content is safe.
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Hi All:
>>>
>>> In a recent post, I expressed agreement with the an article that
>>> asserted that that “the mind does not exist” – at least to the extent that
>>> “mind” and “mental” are defined in contrast with “physical” and
>>> “material”.  The mental/physical dichotomy is a nasty one, as it suggests
>>> that “mind” is something that is non-corporeal.  Robert Ryan — in a post
>>> that I am deeply grateful for — suggested that the ideas that I had
>>> advanced are reductionistic. Robert inspired me to try to be clearer in my
>>> thoughts about why “mind” and “mental” are unhelpful concepts, and how it
>>> is possible to be both a materialist and to be non-reductionist.  I believe
>>> that it is possible to have a non-reductionist materialist conception of
>>> consciousness and experience.  And I think that this position aligns quite
>>> closely indeed with Gregg’s system.
>>>
>>> I want to assert a concept that I have called *embodied emergence *(Mascolo
>>> & Kallio, 2019) — the idea that psychological processes and states
>>> (consciousness, experience) *are* complexly-organized biological
>>> processes, albeit ones with novel emergent properties. (Please – stay with
>>> me – there is something new here as I hope will become clear below.)  Novel
>>> psychological properties – e.g., awareness meaning, experience, qualia –
>>> are emergent from biological processes in the sense that they are *not
>>> found* in their base biological elements.  However, these novel and
>>> emergent psychological processes do not contain (nor do they have to)
>>> properties that *override* or *conflict with* the properties of their
>>> base elements.
>>>
>>> To make this argument, I want to show that qualitative transformations
>>> routinely occur in everyday physical systems without creating structures
>>> that override or conflict with the properties of their base elements.  This
>>> can be illustrated with the common example of how we get *liquid* –
>>> water – from the combination of two *gasses* – hydrogen and oxygen.
>>> When we combine hydrogen and oxygen – two gasses – we don’t get more gas –
>>> we get a liquid – something with qualitatively different properties.  How
>>> is this possible?
>>>
>>> This is not a mysterious process. This well-understood process is
>>> described in the graphic below.  The short story: A water molecule, of
>>> course, is formed with two molecules of hydrogen combine with one molecule
>>> of oxygen. When this happens, individual water molecules connect to each
>>> other through the formation of a *hydrogen bond* between the slightly
>>> negatively-charged oxygen molecule of one water molecule and the slightly
>>> positively-charged hydrogen molecule of another This bond, however, is very
>>> weak. As a result, movement breaks the bond quickly, allowing molecules to
>>> flow over each other – thus producing liquid.
>>>
>>> The novel way of understanding this process is to be found in the
>>> concept of *EQUIVALENCE *(which, as I understand in mathematics, is
>>> different from *equality*).  Liquidity is an emergent property of H20
>>> molecules aggregated together.   When we combine material gas of H and the
>>> material gas of O, we get the material liquid of H20.  When we say that
>>> liquid emerges from a combination of H2 and O, we do not say that the
>>> combination produces H20 *and then also* the liquid we call water.  H20
>>> is the EQUIVALENT of the liquid we call water. The properties of water are
>>> fully explainable by the novel structure that arises from the relations
>>> between H2 and O.  We don’t need to *add something* in addition to the
>>> novel structure of H20 to explain its properties.  We simply have a
>>> novel structure with emergent properties.  The properties that emerge from
>>> the coordination of base elements are not to be found in those base
>>> elements. In this way, the novel properties cannot be reduced to their base
>>> elements.
>>>
>>> I want to say that the *same basic equivalence relation* occurs between
>>> base biological processes and emergent psychological processes.  We have
>>> biological structures and processes – cells, neurons, synapses, etc.
>>> Psychological states and processes emerge from the complex organization of
>>> biological structures and processes (in ways that we do not understand).
>>> Now, here is the important philosophical point: When this happens, the
>>> higher-order *biological organization* has novel psychological
>>> properties – e.g., awareness, qualia, etc. – that are not found in the base
>>> elements themselves (e.g., individual cells).
>>>
>>> What I want to say is that the relation between (a) base biological
>>> processes and (b) biological processes with emergent psychological
>>> properties is akin to the relation between (a’) the base physical elements
>>> of H and O (b’) and the physical water molecule -- H20 – with the
>>> emergent property of liquidity. That is:
>>>
>>> The liquid we call “water” is the EQUIVALENT of H20.  There is not H20
>>> and THEN ALSO something else – some emergent liquid we call “water”.
>>> Liquidity is the emergent property of H20 – a higher-order structture
>>> We don’t have H20 plus something else called “water” or “liquid”.
>>>
>>> States we call consciousness, awareness or qualia are the EQUIVALENT of
>>> complexly organized biological processes. There are not the
>>> complexly-organized biological structures and THEN ALSO some novel “mental”
>>> or “non-biological” something called “consciousness”.  We don’t have
>>> biological processes PLUS something else called “mind” or the “mental”.
>>> Psychological processes ARE complex biological processes with emergent
>>> properties (awareness).
>>>
>>> But wait, you might say: The psychological person is an agent – the
>>> person has something akin to “free will” – the capacity to control his or
>>> her own behavior.  Physical systems don’t do this.  How do we get something
>>> like conscious agency from a physical system?  To explain psychological
>>> processes in a material system, don’t we have to explain how we are capable
>>> of conscious control?  Don’t our powers of conscious control mean that
>>> somehow “minds” emerge that control “physical” or “biological” bodies?
>>>
>>> The answer is “no” – we do not have to postulate a “mental” entity to
>>> control behavior – because the capacity for hierarchical regulation is
>>> already built into the structure and processes of biological systems.
>>>
>>> I believe that we tend to believe that “mind” is something that is
>>> separate from “body” not not because we can’t imagine how awareness can
>>> emerge from biological processes, but instead because we cannot imagine how
>>> human *agency* –  the capacity to consciously control behavior --
>>>  emerges from a physical or biological system.  We attribute a capacity for
>>> conscious control (sometimes called “free will”) to “mind”.  How else can
>>> “we” be in control?
>>>
>>> But the point is this: We don’t need complex “mental” processes to
>>> explain the capacity for agency.  Agency – or at least *hierarchical
>>> regulation *is a basic property of biological systems. Even single
>>> celled organisms are self-regulating systems.  The complexity of
>>> self-regulation increases as we move up phylogenetic levels of complexity.
>>> At some point, the capacity to represent one’s environs (and indeed, one’s
>>> own processes) comes to function as part of the biological self-regulating
>>> system itself.  If this is true, then we do not need to invoke mysterious
>>> conceptions of “I” or attribute mysterious properties of agency to
>>> consciousness to explain human behavior. Consciousness and other
>>> psychological processes serve functions other than agency in the human
>>> system.  Consciousness and other psychological processes transform the
>>> already existing capacities for agency and hierarchical control that
>>> already exist in biological systems.  Consciousness likely serves the
>>> function of coordinating or integrating information from endogenous and
>>> exogenous sources so that the organism can respond to increasingly complex
>>> systems of adaptive challenges.
>>>
>>> And so, the assertion that psychological processes ARE
>>> complexly-organized biological processes is not a reductionistic statement
>>> (although it can be, in some formulations).  Glucose metabolism is a
>>> biological process but not a psychological process (although it can
>>> arguably be *influenced* by psychological processes). Consciousness is
>>> both a biological *and* a psychological process; it is a biological
>>> process with emergent properties that function in the service of the
>>> already adaptive self-organizing organismic system as a whole.
>>> All My Best,
>>>
>>> *Michael F. Mascolo, Ph.D.*
>>> Academic Director, Compass Program
>>> Professor, Department of Psychology
>>> Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01845
>>> 978.837.3503 (office)
>>> 978.979.8745 (cell)
>>>
>>> Bridging Political Divides Website: Creating Common Ground
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.creatingcommonground.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=BiXTct126rn5ZsNOJ2THyGg7QkeTiFNc3sNcxpioSYs&s=dnaikad71T93VCsHiaWfPRCcRhnRziPJtxl4YvZAMxo&e=>
>>> Blog: Values Matter
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_values-2Dmatter&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=BiXTct126rn5ZsNOJ2THyGg7QkeTiFNc3sNcxpioSYs&s=ig-BUTBtjh39H7resrXu6Tu-qsaO7_rLhP7-Bl3vMZQ&e=>
>>> Journal: Pedagogy and the Human Sciences
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__scholarworks.merrimack.edu_phs_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=BiXTct126rn5ZsNOJ2THyGg7QkeTiFNc3sNcxpioSYs&s=FzppyMwN986Lq13axaveLOYQ2M6IBG96yT0skmPQ_M0&e=>
>>> Author and Coaching Website: www.michaelmascolo.com
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.michaelmascolo.com&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=BiXTct126rn5ZsNOJ2THyGg7QkeTiFNc3sNcxpioSYs&s=gcLC-6dvIK_0kUcEAhcLfpV6J3kqE1aJGeWoOxj74SA&e=>
>>> Academia Home Page
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__merrimack.academia.edu_MichaelMascolo&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=BiXTct126rn5ZsNOJ2THyGg7QkeTiFNc3sNcxpioSYs&s=FJ8UplzkVL7xXFlWe_3bGVMwGcFGNSLXltxzbm1PRRE&e=>
>>> Constructivist Meetup Series
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.constructivistmeetup.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=BiXTct126rn5ZsNOJ2THyGg7QkeTiFNc3sNcxpioSYs&s=3dJgNYXjbaZ5CTnG-CjJJEm3ToN-Cf-23W6W-4IZWXQ&e=>
>>>
>>> Things move, persons act. -- Kenneth Burke
>>> If it's not worth doing, it's not worth doing well. -- Donald Hebb
>>>
>>> ############################
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Aug 31, 2021, at 4:18 PM, ryanrc111 <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>>
>>> *CAUTION: *This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click
>>> links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the
>>> content is safe.
>>> ------------------------------
>>> Dr. Mascolo,
>>>
>>> That is a reductionist reasoning that i cannot agree with.
>>>
>>> When systems are qualitatively different, they deserve qualitative
>>> labels that are different.
>>>  "everything is just ____________" never has worked in the history of
>>> science, and I don't think it will start working now.
>>> Biological systems are not merely just physical. Social systems are not
>>> merely just biological.
>>> They do have different features, different epistemic concerns, and
>>> indeed differing levels of action.
>>> The universe is digital -quantum particles do not continuously effect
>>> large scale systems.
>>>  There are clear breaks at different scales, where hardly any
>>> activity on scale 1 affects systems on scale 2.
>>> the math of differential equations and complexity supports a digital
>>> world of level-based actions and level-based systems.
>>>
>>> You might be interested to read the work of Sandra Mitchell , a top
>>> philosopher of science, whom I took coursework from at U Pittsburgh. "
>>> IN fact, Sandra is the department chair of the #1 rated philosophy of
>>> science dept. in the world, and I learned from her there!
>>> She has presented full theories about the qualitative difference between
>>> the "sciences". and they are close to Henriques.
>>>
>>> Sandra Mitchell - Wikipedia
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Sandra-5FMitchell&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=a4GpWt5qlsEqQs-EqHtfR3r3f3Htlu2QNX7L0XB9WSA&s=S4VqQYAPqYN8zdUcJWtT-iY3bYuy__DjE1-CRUeealQ&e=>
>>>
>>> There is no possibility of reducing social to biological , and so forth.
>>> Just because there are causal linkages through the material world, does
>>> not mean these systems are qualitatively identical in character.
>>> Emergence is very well established, but I do realize there are people
>>> who hate it as a concept.
>>>  However, Its far easier to defend the qualitative thesis because it
>>> doesn't require a magic bullet theory.
>>> I have yet see a magic bullet theory that accurately reduces one
>>> "science" to another. They have all failed.
>>> thus, knowledge still stands as qualitatively different for different
>>> systems.
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> Robert Conan Ryan
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 4:03 PM Michael Mascolo <[log in to unmask]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> *CAUTION: *This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click
>>>> links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the
>>>> content is safe.
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>> Greetings All:
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for pointing us to this article Gregg.
>>>>
>>>> I must admit, I agree deeply with Gough’s thesis in this paper.  I
>>>> think that terms like “mind” and “mental” should be discarded — except
>>>> metaphorical terms to use in everyday discourse.
>>>>
>>>> Like any term, the meanings of “mind” and “mental” gain their meaning
>>>> dialectical through a contrast to what they are *not*.   Different
>>>> meanings of a term can be illuminated by understanding the different ways
>>>> in which they can be contrasted with what they are not.
>>>>
>>>> A central meaning of the terms “mind” and “mental” arise from their
>>>> contrast with terms like “physical”, “bodily” and “corporeal”.  This
>>>> contrast identifies “mind” and “mental” in contradistinction to that which
>>>> is material.  It is this meaning that is problematic.  The moment we
>>>> suggest that “mind” and “mentality” are in some way “not physical”, we
>>>> become deeply entrenched in the intractable mind-body problem: How can
>>>> something non-physical “cause” changes in something “physical”, and so
>>>> forth.  This problem is intractable.
>>>>
>>>> In my view, terms like consciousness, experience, meaning,
>>>> representation, awareness all refer to psychological processes. The
>>>> difference is that these terms do not carry any necessary connotations of
>>>> non-corporality.  This is why, in my view, it is preferable to use these
>>>> terms rather than “mind” or “mental”.
>>>>
>>>> From this point of view, psychological processes ARE physical and
>>>> material processes — biological processes that function at a higher (yes
>>>> higher) level or organization.  There is no mind/body problem because what
>>>> people call mind — consciousness, experience, agency — is not
>>>> non-physical.  Thus, it makes sense to ask, How does consciousness emerge
>>>> in a bio-physical system — where consciousness is NOT assumed to be
>>>> non-physical.  In contrast, the question, How does “the mind” emerge from
>>>> bio-physical systems suggests that there is something called “mind” that is
>>>> “nonphysical”.
>>>>
>>>> My Best,
>>>>
>>>> M.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Michael F. Mascolo, Ph.D.*
>>>> Academic Director, Compass Program
>>>> Professor, Department of Psychology
>>>> Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01845
>>>> 978.837.3503 (office)
>>>> 978.979.8745 (cell)
>>>>
>>>> Bridging Political Divides Website: Creating Common Ground
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.creatingcommonground.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=wbQHy-km9ZamhneRh-j419humCnbwn3N8TNk9Sf1W0s&e=>
>>>> Blog: Values Matter
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_values-2Dmatter&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=Rxk4SxQTODZW19gdIp9UwwsXxrwYmXBnNLVOA_MsFlQ&e=>
>>>> Journal: Pedagogy and the Human Sciences
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__scholarworks.merrimack.edu_phs_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=TZ6zu3gYBpGnc-qth35P0K2ja09V8ek0yZeb7b9RJX4&e=>
>>>> Author and Coaching Website: www.michaelmascolo.com
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.michaelmascolo.com&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=RL_7xz7ooeAUoUwKBhSOce0-I_E53OAudK0rqrgCLxQ&e=>
>>>> Academia Home Page
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__merrimack.academia.edu_MichaelMascolo&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=56YJNHQVrlG5_KhposaD-iRF6ryS8sc2fdU_9plf7lc&e=>
>>>> Constructivist Meetup Series
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.constructivistmeetup.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=DOR19Cpta4Old-RNx6bEYIXm4AV594j23SqBnPOLr4Y&e=>
>>>>
>>>> Things move, persons act. -- Kenneth Burke
>>>> If it's not worth doing, it's not worth doing well. -- Donald Hebb
>>>>
>>>> On Aug 31, 2021, at 1:55 PM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
>>>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi List,
>>>>
>>>> Although we hardly need more evidence for the Enlightenment Gap’s claim
>>>> that there is profound confusion regarding the relationship between matter
>>>> and mind in modern systems of understanding, here is yet another article
>>>> that makes the point, with the assertion that we should discard the
>>>> concepts of mental and the mind all together:
>>>>
>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__aeon.co_essays_why-2Dtheres-2Dno-2Dsuch-2Dthing-2Das-2Dthe-2Dmind-2Dand-2Dnothing-2Dis-2Dmental&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=s0W_Y2V414qXye-4CscO35VI1tqwt8WlOr2CAmEjuL8&s=4fp4xH747kr2-yga7SOaryyiGzkyZcCvRZ8bW0Hbu18&e= 
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__aeon.co_essays_why-2Dtheres-2Dno-2Dsuch-2Dthing-2Das-2Dthe-2Dmind-2Dand-2Dnothing-2Dis-2Dmental&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=Dfn6DlF75Im2bhzy3L3-GEbx5Z5o-fxg-rve0zrNRF0&e=>
>>>>
>>>> Since there are several new people on the UTOK list, I will take this
>>>> opportunity state what many here already know, which is that the central
>>>> feature of UTOK is that it affords us a new, different and much richer
>>>> metaphysical vocabulary for the domain of the mental. Indeed, my current
>>>> book is on how the UTOK solves the problem of psychology by affording us
>>>> clarity about the ontology of the mental. (summarized here
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__medium.com_unified-2Dtheory-2Dof-2Dknowledge_a-2Dnew-2Dapproach-2Dto-2Dthe-2Dscience-2Dof-2Dpsychology-2D66f2042e8c32&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=RHhx_9mTU72UuJ8sUvEHUjOQsb-X_FZj-E_bUj5mNy4&e=>
>>>> ).
>>>>
>>>> Because I want practice streamlining this, here is the basic summary:
>>>> First, via the ToK System’s divisions of complexification, it gives us the
>>>> category capital “M” Mind, which is a tier of complex adaptive behaviors in
>>>> nature. Specifically, it is the adaptive behaviors exhibited by complex
>>>> animals with brains that produce a functional effect on the
>>>> animal-environment relationship. These are the set of mental behaviors.
>>>>
>>>> Second, via the Map of Mind, we divide these mental behaviors first
>>>> into the neurocognitive processes within the nervous system (Mind1a) that
>>>> can be tracked by things like fMRIs, and the overt activities of animals
>>>> that can be observed (Mind1b).
>>>>
>>>> Mind2 is used to denote the interior epistemological space that is
>>>> subjective conscious experience that can only be accessed from the inside
>>>> and cannot be accessed directly from the outside. This divide is called the
>>>> epistemological gap. No camera or any other device we can consider allows
>>>> us to directly experience the Mind2 of another. The most interesting
>>>> possible exception to this I have seen is the Logan Twins who are conjoined
>>>> at the head, and share some brain domains. Even here, however, they
>>>> experience the world via their own epistemological portal and the way they
>>>> describe sharing thoughts is akin to talking.
>>>>
>>>> Speaking of talking, this is the domain of Mind3. Talking flows through
>>>> the interior and exterior without losing its form. It is a shared
>>>> intersubjective space. Mind3a is when it is private speech, Mind3b is when
>>>> it is translated across the barrier of the skin in some other medium.
>>>>
>>>> Finally, regarding UTOK’s solution to this world knot, it should also
>>>> be noted that science is anchored into the language game of behavior and
>>>> the exterior epistemological position. The ToK represents a behavioral
>>>> systemic map of nature. Our subjective idiographic point of view is
>>>> different. It is represented by the iQuad Coin.
>>>>
>>>> Thus, my reply to the article is to agree that it makes an important
>>>> point, but it is laughable that (a) we can just stop using the terms and
>>>> (b) that words like cognitive, psychiatric and psychological are fine even
>>>> though mind and mental are hopeless. What is needed is a proper descriptive
>>>> metaphysical system that is in accordance with natural science ontology
>>>> that affords us clarity about the various domains of the mental and the
>>>> ways they emerged and interface.
>>>>
>>>> This essay is mental in the sense that it is an example of Mind3b
>>>> behavior that operates at the Cultural Person plane of existence, and
>>>> functions to network propositions together to legitimize a version of is
>>>> and ought.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>> Gregg
>>>>
>>>> ___________________________________________
>>>> Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
>>>> Professor
>>>> Department of Graduate Psychology
>>>> 216 Johnston Hall
>>>> MSC 7401
>>>> James Madison University
>>>> Harrisonburg, VA 22807
>>>> (540) 568-7857 (phone)
>>>> (540) 568-4747 (fax)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.*
>>>> Check out the Unified Theory Of Knowledge homepage at:
>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.unifiedtheoryofknowledge.org_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=s0W_Y2V414qXye-4CscO35VI1tqwt8WlOr2CAmEjuL8&s=aJ73UviHe2XKjKOwGjBzXXv49VcVr5DRDljXu5-7ZrA&e= 
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.unifiedtheoryofknowledge.org_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=yR78h67WTt--sRzIZIN2948JxfpkaVqtp2CKS4l3p6g&s=y1OHXcYoLS1rcGRNFEhrIOqM1t09lXA69XKC98X5Ms8&e=>
>>>>
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