On Aug 31, 2021, at 4:18 PM, ryanrc111 <[log in to unmask]> wrote:CAUTION: This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
Dr. Mascolo,
That is a reductionist reasoning that i cannot agree with.
When systems are qualitatively different, they deserve qualitative labels that are different.
"everything is just ____________" never has worked in the history of science, and I don't think it will start working now.
Biological systems are not merely just physical. Social systems are not merely just biological.
They do have different features, different epistemic concerns, and indeed differing levels of action.
The universe is digital -quantum particles do not continuously effect large scale systems.There are clear breaks at different scales, where hardly any activity on scale 1 affects systems on scale 2.
the math of differential equations and complexity supports a digital world of level-based actions and level-based systems.
You might be interested to read the work of Sandra Mitchell , a top philosopher of science, whom I took coursework from at U Pittsburgh. "
IN fact, Sandra is the department chair of the #1 rated philosophy of science dept. in the world, and I learned from her there!
She has presented full theories about the qualitative difference between the "sciences". and they are close to Henriques.
Sandra Mitchell - Wikipedia
There is no possibility of reducing social to biological , and so forth.
Just because there are causal linkages through the material world, does not mean these systems are qualitatively identical in character.
Emergence is very well established, but I do realize there are people who hate it as a concept.
However, Its far easier to defend the qualitative thesis because it doesn't require a magic bullet theory.
I have yet see a magic bullet theory that accurately reduces one "science" to another. They have all failed.
thus, knowledge still stands as qualitatively different for different systems.
Thanks
Robert Conan Ryan
############################CAUTION: This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
Greetings All:
Thanks for pointing us to this article Gregg.
I must admit, I agree deeply with Gough’s thesis in this paper. I think that terms like “mind” and “mental” should be discarded — except metaphorical terms to use in everyday discourse.
Like any term, the meanings of “mind” and “mental” gain their meaning dialectical through a contrast to what they are not. Different meanings of a term can be illuminated by understanding the different ways in which they can be contrasted with what they are not.
A central meaning of the terms “mind” and “mental” arise from their contrast with terms like “physical”, “bodily” and “corporeal”. This contrast identifies “mind” and “mental” in contradistinction to that which is material. It is this meaning that is problematic. The moment we suggest that “mind” and “mentality” are in some way “not physical”, we become deeply entrenched in the intractable mind-body problem: How can something non-physical “cause” changes in something “physical”, and so forth. This problem is intractable.
In my view, terms like consciousness, experience, meaning, representation, awareness all refer to psychological processes. The difference is that these terms do not carry any necessary connotations of non-corporality. This is why, in my view, it is preferable to use these terms rather than “mind” or “mental”.
From this point of view, psychological processes ARE physical and material processes — biological processes that function at a higher (yes higher) level or organization. There is no mind/body problem because what people call mind — consciousness, experience, agency — is not non-physical. Thus, it makes sense to ask, How does consciousness emerge in a bio-physical system — where consciousness is NOT assumed to be non-physical. In contrast, the question, How does “the mind” emerge from bio-physical systems suggests that there is something called “mind” that is “nonphysical”.
My Best,
M.
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Michael F. Mascolo, Ph.D.Academic Director, Compass Program
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On Aug 31, 2021, at 1:55 PM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
############################Hi List,Although we hardly need more evidence for the Enlightenment Gap’s claim that there is profound confusion regarding the relationship between matter and mind in modern systems of understanding, here is yet another article that makes the point, with the assertion that we should discard the concepts of mental and the mind all together:Since there are several new people on the UTOK list, I will take this opportunity state what many here already know, which is that the central feature of UTOK is that it affords us a new, different and much richer metaphysical vocabulary for the domain of the mental. Indeed, my current book is on how the UTOK solves the problem of psychology by affording us clarity about the ontology of the mental. (summarized here).Because I want practice streamlining this, here is the basic summary: First, via the ToK System’s divisions of complexification, it gives us the category capital “M” Mind, which is a tier of complex adaptive behaviors in nature. Specifically, it is the adaptive behaviors exhibited by complex animals with brains that produce a functional effect on the animal-environment relationship. These are the set of mental behaviors.Second, via the Map of Mind, we divide these mental behaviors first into the neurocognitive processes within the nervous system (Mind1a) that can be tracked by things like fMRIs, and the overt activities of animals that can be observed (Mind1b).Mind2 is used to denote the interior epistemological space that is subjective conscious experience that can only be accessed from the inside and cannot be accessed directly from the outside. This divide is called the epistemological gap. No camera or any other device we can consider allows us to directly experience the Mind2 of another. The most interesting possible exception to this I have seen is the Logan Twins who are conjoined at the head, and share some brain domains. Even here, however, they experience the world via their own epistemological portal and the way they describe sharing thoughts is akin to talking.Speaking of talking, this is the domain of Mind3. Talking flows through the interior and exterior without losing its form. It is a shared intersubjective space. Mind3a is when it is private speech, Mind3b is when it is translated across the barrier of the skin in some other medium.Finally, regarding UTOK’s solution to this world knot, it should also be noted that science is anchored into the language game of behavior and the exterior epistemological position. The ToK represents a behavioral systemic map of nature. Our subjective idiographic point of view is different. It is represented by the iQuad Coin.Thus, my reply to the article is to agree that it makes an important point, but it is laughable that (a) we can just stop using the terms and (b) that words like cognitive, psychiatric and psychological are fine even though mind and mental are hopeless. What is needed is a proper descriptive metaphysical system that is in accordance with natural science ontology that affords us clarity about the various domains of the mental and the ways they emerged and interface.This essay is mental in the sense that it is an example of Mind3b behavior that operates at the Cultural Person plane of existence, and functions to network propositions together to legitimize a version of is and ought.Best,Gregg___________________________________________Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
Professor
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