Michael and Gregg, Emergentism is really all about specificity. Its really a claim that you cannot reassemble a thing by analysis because of critical information loss. The thing can only be understood in wholes at "X" level or above, below which the information loss is so great that it is qualitatively incomparable. This is CAUSED by irreducible complexity. So once you agree to the existence of irreducibly complex conditions that unfold in real time, bam, you get qualia and so forth. This part is EASY: this is the heart and soul of all complexity thinking, and it is the dominant view of social science theorists today. the HARD part remains: //// and then what do we do about complexity? do we give up? throw up our hands? Short answer: no, we attempt to at least catalogue which levels are irreducibly complex , as these levels create our core units of analysis in an otherwise continuous universe. For example, a species is a clear "level", and an individual is another. These are easy to recognize. The hard part is to PREDICT future states, to predict future jumps in emergence, and to predict useful events and processes that we didnt already have the ability to predict. in macrosocial science such as my World Systems Theory 3.0, we try to predict radical changes in the world system - new hegemons, paradigm shifts, and most difficult of all, new emergent institutional structure for which there is no historical precedent on the same scale , such sa the emergence of science and the emergence of the modern corporation based economy. My goal is to provide a model that gives us a good shot at predicting all such events as I mentioned. No prior world systems theory had any path toward predicting a new emergent institutional system, but mine does.... thanks Robert On Tue, Sep 7, 2021 at 9:34 AM ryanrc111 <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > Michael, > > if you are arguing against any reality which is inconsistent with material > reality, i think you'll find few scientists who will take the opposite side > of your argument. > > I think pretty much all practicing scientists, like myself, think that > what emerges is consistent with the material (physical) world. > emergent things dont suddenly move backwards in time or violate gravity or > whatnot. > Just like how digital realities of the internet are built on laws of > physics and information. > > I would be really surprised if people on this list were to say: > "no, i believe social phenomena like qualia violate physics". > So, not sure what point we are driving here that is novel- > perhaps I am missing something, but emergent materialism is already the > mainstream norm throughout social science. > Sandra Mitchell defines biological and material concepts as emergent and > yet consistent with materialism, for example. > > Thanks > Robert > > > On Tue, Sep 7, 2021 at 9:16 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx < > [log in to unmask]> wrote: > >> Mike, >> >> >> >> I agree with what you say here. And my strong sense is that you and I >> share a highly similar ontology (i.e., we are both emergent naturalists as >> far as I can tell). >> >> >> Best, >> Gregg >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion < >> [log in to unmask]> *On Behalf Of *Michael Mascolo >> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 7, 2021 9:02 AM >> *To:* [log in to unmask] >> *Subject:* Re: Materialism without Reductionism -- and why "mind" is a >> troublesome concept... >> >> >> >> *CAUTION: *This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click links >> or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is >> safe. >> ------------------------------ >> >> Bruce, Robert, Gregg and All: >> >> >> >> I wonder if we might be talking passed each other. I wonder if we are >> approaching the issue of reductionism with different meanings in mind. My >> comments are mainly directed at the need for a theory of persons in which >> consciousness is not seen as something that is non-material — that is, >> spiritual or non-corporeal. If the emergent product has properties that >> are not in the base elements, then that emergent product is irreducible. >> So, yes, the experience of red is irreducible to the base elements (neural >> firings). Nonetheless, I suggest that the emergent experience of red is >> the equivalent of the novel organizational whole — the integrated >> biological structures and processes that produce the experience of “red”. >> We will not find red in the synapses; it the emergent product of the >> network. >> >> >> >> A bicycle is not to be found in its parts; a bicycle is an emergent whole >> that arises when the parts are put together and function as one unit. The >> musical tone of the violin is not to be found in the violin, but in the >> playing of this song by this master at this time — and then heard by this >> person with this level of sophistication, etc. The tone of is an emergent >> equivalent, I suggest, of the whole. This is an issue of parts and wholes, >> I think. >> >> >> >> Bruce and Robert seem to be speaking of a different sense of reductionism >> — whether the experience of redness can be, in some sense, objectively >> identified (they might be able to clarify my understanding of their >> positions here) in those bodily processes. In my view, it can’t! The >> experience of red is indeed irreducible. And the reason that the experience >> of red cannot be reduced to an objective characterization is that…well… >> objective — that is “third person” characterizations — do not exhaust the >> ways we come to know. We cannot know “objectively” that this or that brain >> state provides the neurobiological substrata of the experiencing of red >> independent of the first and second person frames of reference. First >> person experience is not reducible to third person observation. (In fact, >> I would argue that BOTH first and third person descriptions of the world >> RELY UPON second person, shared intersubjective categories. Without shared >> intersubjective categories, we would have not way to make first and third >> person experiences intelligible). >> >> >> >> Given this, I am wondering if there is really disagreement here. Brian, >> Robert, Gregg and Mike all seem to agree in some sense of emergence in >> order to explain the origins of experience; we seem to agree that no >> “objective” identification of “the experience of red” in the brain is >> possible (or even makes sense). I imagine that we might agree that given >> the intersubjective category “red” — one that we create by coordinating our >> use of the word “red” with our experiences-of-the-world — that is, we agree >> that the word “red” correspond to the range of colors that we point to in >> this object, that one, that one and that one — we might be able to identify >> third person pattens of biological activity that are the equivalent —that >> correspond to or are the biological substrata for — experiencing red. Do >> we? If not, where do we disagree? >> >> >> >> My Best, >> >> >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> >> >> *Michael F. Mascolo, Ph.D.* >> >> Academic Director, Compass Program >> Professor, Department of Psychology >> Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01845 >> 978.837.3503 (office) >> 978.979.8745 (cell) >> >> Bridging Political Divides Website: Creating Common Ground >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.creatingcommonground.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rbPn97OJkIqY8rMJarKmQ_7kDYu1jO-bJCI0RpP3AV8&s=CczBxS8Rr4DHlYzezh04KIvWyVeN2WlV13K70fkyOxI&e=> >> Blog: Values Matter >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_values-2Dmatter&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rbPn97OJkIqY8rMJarKmQ_7kDYu1jO-bJCI0RpP3AV8&s=FNEbpp-8IAlesjHQysJn_Ip21LpYdZgE2yolctKjPvc&e=> >> Journal: Pedagogy and the Human Sciences >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__scholarworks.merrimack.edu_phs_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rbPn97OJkIqY8rMJarKmQ_7kDYu1jO-bJCI0RpP3AV8&s=OXGhiMN7Lv9Q1KoI1OvtKy-vOphl6IFyb7hd2Pxi6P4&e=> >> Author and Coaching Website: www.michaelmascolo.com >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.michaelmascolo.com&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rbPn97OJkIqY8rMJarKmQ_7kDYu1jO-bJCI0RpP3AV8&s=UMoTjRUPKidRVRU48xT7yyH4XlXA6wmlLuLuYCQSd7g&e=> >> Academia Home Page >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__merrimack.academia.edu_MichaelMascolo&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rbPn97OJkIqY8rMJarKmQ_7kDYu1jO-bJCI0RpP3AV8&s=0RwemxFm6ewXMLr6OWLVoYdXB625_5epf3j58u2VkwE&e=> >> Constructivist Meetup Series >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.constructivistmeetup.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rbPn97OJkIqY8rMJarKmQ_7kDYu1jO-bJCI0RpP3AV8&s=LdNqV5mwJu8LeflSGsC9BN5txZEKMI75plcliMYElcw&e=> >> >> Things move, persons act. -- Kenneth Burke >> If it's not worth doing, it's not worth doing well. -- Donald Hebb >> >> >> >> On Sep 7, 2021, at 7:04 AM, ryanrc111 <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >> >> >> But in my understanding, the 'hard problem' is deemed a hard problem, >> not because agent-like behaviors can emerge in complex systems -- that's >> all still third-person, objective description and focus; still a >> behavior-orientation. The hard problem is a hard problem because there >> seems to be no objective explanation of how or why any of that would lead >> to first-person, qualitative feeling or experience. >> >> >> >> ############################ >> >> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the >> following link: >> http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >> ############################ >> >> To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: >> mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the >> following link: >> http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1 >> > ############################ To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:[log in to unmask] or click the following link: http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1