Yes, what Naomi and Gaile say: The paper authors claim that women are more likely than men to say that the subject in the (withheld) example "knows". I don't take this to be a universalizing claim; as with most empirical studies, it is merely a generalization derived from a sample.
I suppose I find it less odd, because it seems right to me to compare it with the Western European vs. East Asian results of the earlier study. That earlier comparative study appealed specifically to use of the classic car question: Imagine Bob is asked if his friend Jill drives an American car and, knowing he's always seen her in a Buick, responds "Yes;" unbeknownst to him, Jill's Buick had been stolen and she now drives a Pontiac, so does Bob really know she drives an American car? (Or "just believe"?)
Western Europeans in the study (again, not to be taken as universal) said he does not know, merely believes, and the implication is that what he doesn't know is the particular outcome. East Asian respondents more often attributed knowledge, and the implication is that Bob knows _Jill_ (vs. knowing the particular outcome). Attention to character and context is taken to be reason for attributing, to Bob, correct knowledge of Jill, of her habits and choices. The facticity of the particular outcome is not that to which the respondents are attributing correctness.
So the suggestion that women may tend to affirm, shall we say, some sort of true knowledge even if it's not perfectly well-grounded knowledge of the particular outcome, may stem from similiar attention to context and character relevant to the knowledge-claim. This is my long-winded way of saying that unless one focuses only on the disembedded outcome, one may feel pulled to saying that the characters in a thought-experiment have knowledge.
Note, too, that the difference in responses to Gettiers is also pronounced between groups from different socioeconomic statuses. I see this as one of the most intriguing implications of the past decade's research on troubling the bland acceptance of Gettier intuitions: The seeming obviousness that the hypothetical knower doesn't know is reduced among people who take themselves to be in less authoritative positions. Interesting stuff!
Kate
Kathryn J. Norlock
Associate Professor of Philosophy
St. Mary's College of Maryland
18952 E. Fisher Rd.
St. Mary's City, MD 20686
240-895-4471 (ph)
240-895-2188 (fax)
[log in to unmask]
________________________________
From: Feminist ethics and social theory [[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Naomi Scheman [[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2010 2:07 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: hear ye hear ye! philosophical intuitions gender based!
I've read the paper, and Gaile is right--the finding claimed is that women are more likely than men to say that the subject in the example does know. The author speculates that the reason for this is that women place more weight than men do on moral or quasi-moral evaluations even in making epistemic attributions--and the subjects of Gettier cases have been doxastically responsible.
I find the paper interesting and suggestive--it is right, I think, to be suspicious of the intutitons that underlie so much of analytic philosophy. (I think especially of Twin Earth examples, with the molecule-for-molecule identical replicas.) And we're not good test cases--we (most of us on this list, I assume) are well-trained philosophers, meaning both that we weren't terminally alienated by the philosophy we were taught and that we succeeded in thinking like those who share the relevant intuitions. (Not that all of us do--things are probably different in continental philosophy, and some of us are probably stubborn enough to stick it out even when we learn that we don't think the way we're supposed to--and to some extent, of course, we're all in that category--or we wouldn't be feminists...)
I'm dubious, however, of universalizing claims about "women" and "men" (though the differences are statistical and not very great), and I'm unsure what to think about experimental philosophy in general--it relies, I think, on continuing to employ what I think of as the fundamental flaw in intuition-testing--namely, putting weight on judgments made on the basis of what the test anecdotes have singled out as relevant We answer the questions because we're set up to think that there is an answer--it's a case of Wittgenstein's conjuring trick: the decisive move is made before we think we've done anything--just set the question. From what I've seen, experimental philosophers are as likely to do this as are the philosophers whose intuitions they're calling into question.
All that said, there's still Gaile's question: is it credible that significant numbers of people say that in Gettier cases, the subject actually does know? I don't find that all that strange. It means, I think, that the two things taken to be important in the pre-Gettier definition--that the subject be justified and that the belief actually be true--carry enough weight to override the usually strangely tricked up circumstances that are meant to undercut them. The element of luck that seems problematically to do the undercutting is dismissed: You did everything you were supposed to and you got it right--good for you! ("I knew it all along" one might say...)
Think of all the work done on moral luck--it's clear that in everyday life the element of luck--which in theory shouldn't affect our moral judgments--actually does: think of the difference between driving after drinking but making it home OK and driving under the same conditions (and driving just as well) but hitting and killing someone. If one were asked by a philosopher testing philosophical intuitions, one might say that the same moral judgment applies (or should apply) to the two people. But that's not what most of us actually do say.
Thgs is too long already--my apologies....But I do think there's something serious (for various reasons) going on here...
naomi
Gaile Pohlhaus wrote:
I completely agree the sentence is a mess, Ann. Here it is:
"Starmans & Friedman (2009) report that, pace professional philosophical intuition, women are far more likely than men to deny the so-called Gettier intuition, and attribute knowledge to a putative knower in the particular Gettier vignettes tested."
The "so-called Gettier intuition" is that these cases are *not* really knowledge, even though they are justified, true, and believed, right? So the sentence above says:
"...pace professional intuition, women are far more likely to deny the intuition that these cases are not knowledge, and attribute knowledge to the putative knower...", yes?
This reading is confirmed by what the author says further down:
"imagine being a young female philosophy student, presented with the scenario of a famous thought experiment like Gettier, and then asked a question designed to reveal a particular philosophical intuition. Now imagine that your intuition does not agree with not only the males in the class, but also with the male philosophical majority."
Perhaps, the article reveals (with the problem sentence above), that male philosophers are more likely to make convoluted sentences that take some unravelling when they could easily say the same thing in a straightforward manner and only the most stubborn of women are willing to waste their time unravelling it :) lol!!
Still, how to reason that a Gettier case could be seen as actual knowledge remains unsolved...
Perhaps some intuit that the "justification" in Gettier cases is not legit justification at all, so that these are *not* cases of justified true belief. I could probably sign on to that and come up with some reasoning in support. But not that these are cases of true knowledge (and that is what the messy sentence appears to say after the "and").
GP
--- On Thu, 1/14/10, Ann Ferguson <[log in to unmask]><mailto:[log in to unmask]> wrote:
From: Ann Ferguson <[log in to unmask]><mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: hear ye hear ye! philosophical intuitions gender based!
To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Date: Thursday, January 14, 2010, 12:01 PM
Dear Gaile: I actually read the article differently, to suggest the opposite of what you impute to it, i.e. that women are less like to think it does make sense. Have a look at it again (the sentence clauses are confusing) and see what you think.
Ann
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 11:41 AM, Gaile Pohlhaus <[log in to unmask]<[log in to unmask]" target="_blank">http:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
Hmmmm.... I feel a little silly asking, but can someone explain to me how a person (purportedly more women, but not this one) could make sense of the claim that the subject in the Gettier examples actually knows?
I could see how some would not intuitively see the Gettier examples as revelatory or important, but to actually attribute knowledge? I'm having trouble making sense of that (and am troubled by the claim that women are more likely to think it does make some sense).
GPjr.
--- On Wed, 1/13/10, Shay Welch <[log in to unmask]<[log in to unmask]" target="_blank">http:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
From: Shay Welch <[log in to unmask]<[log in to unmask]" target="_blank">http:[log in to unmask]>>
Subject: hear ye hear ye! philosophical intuitions gender based!
To: [log in to unmask]<[log in to unmask]" target="_blank">http:[log in to unmask]>
Date: Wednesday, January 13, 2010, 10:53 PM
Read the new paper out on Experimental Philosophy:
http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/2010/01/is-the-armchair-sexist.html
"Is the Armchair Sexist?"
--
Ann Ferguson
Professor emerita of Philosophy and Women's Studies UMass Amherst and feminist activist
--
Naomi Scheman
Professor of Philosophy & Gender, Women's, & Sexuality Studies
University of Minnesota
Philosophy Dept. - 831 Heller Hall,
271 19th Ave. S., Minneapolis MN 55455
612/625-3430; fax: 612/626-8380; [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~nschema/index.html
Guest researcher, Umeå Centre for Gender Studies
Umeå University, Sweden, 2009-2011
|
