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January 2010

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From:
Gaile Pohlhaus <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Gaile Pohlhaus <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Thu, 14 Jan 2010 10:01:21 -0800
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I completely agree the sentence is a mess, Ann.  Here it is:
 
"Starmans & Friedman (2009) report that, pace professional philosophical intuition, women are far more likely than men to deny the so-called Gettier intuition, and attribute knowledge to a putative knower in the particular Gettier vignettes tested."
 
The "so-called Gettier intuition" is that these cases are *not* really knowledge, even though they are justified, true, and believed, right?  So the sentence above says:
 
"...pace professional intuition, women are far more likely to deny the intuition that these cases are not knowledge, and attribute knowledge to the putative knower...", yes? 
 
This reading is confirmed by what the author says further down:
 
"imagine being a young female philosophy student, presented with the scenario of a famous thought experiment like Gettier, and then asked a question designed to reveal a particular philosophical intuition.  Now imagine that your intuition does not agree with not only the males in the class, but also with the male philosophical majority."
 
Perhaps, the article reveals (with the problem sentence above), that male philosophers are more likely to make convoluted sentences that take some unravelling when they could easily say the same thing in a straightforward  manner and only the most stubborn of women are willing to waste their time unravelling it :) lol!!
 
Still, how to reason that a Gettier case could be seen as actual knowledge remains unsolved...
 
Perhaps some intuit that the "justification" in Gettier cases is not legit justification at all, so that these are *not* cases of justified true belief.  I could probably sign on to that and come up with some reasoning in support.  But not that these are cases of true knowledge (and that is what the messy sentence appears to say after the "and").
 
GP


--- On Thu, 1/14/10, Ann Ferguson <[log in to unmask]> wrote:


From: Ann Ferguson <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: hear ye hear ye! philosophical intuitions gender based!
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Thursday, January 14, 2010, 12:01 PM


Dear Gaile:  I actually read the article differently, to suggest the opposite of what you impute to it, i.e. that women are less like to think it does make sense.  Have a look at it again (the sentence clauses are confusing) and see what you think.

Ann


On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 11:41 AM, Gaile Pohlhaus <[log in to unmask]> wrote:






Hmmmm.... I feel a little silly asking, but can someone explain to me how a person (purportedly more women, but not this one) could make sense of the claim that the subject in the Gettier examples actually knows? 
 
I could see how some would not intuitively see the Gettier examples as revelatory or important, but to actually attribute knowledge?  I'm having trouble making sense of that (and am troubled by the claim that women are more likely to think it does make some sense).

GPjr.

--- On Wed, 1/13/10, Shay Welch <[log in to unmask]> wrote:


From: Shay Welch <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: hear ye hear ye! philosophical intuitions gender based!
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Wednesday, January 13, 2010, 10:53 PM



Read the new paper out on Experimental Philosophy:

http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/2010/01/is-the-armchair-sexist.html

"Is the Armchair Sexist?"




-- 
Ann Ferguson
Professor emerita of Philosophy and Women's Studies UMass Amherst and feminist activist



      

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