Hello ToK community,

Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread.  The focus of
this post is *World Hypotheses*, Chapters 1-4.  My reflections today are
largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage
for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory.

Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place
where most of us began our intellectual journey: *common sense.*  For
Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we
ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell
and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39).

Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of
“opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude”
described by phenomenologists.  For Pepper, the world of common sense can
be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” –
i.e., *we can always fall back on it*:


   - “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we completely
   give up trying to know anything, then is precisely when we know things in
   the common-sense way.  In that lies the security of common sense” (p. 43).

 But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively
irritable”:


   - “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging,
   contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized,
   rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt,
   playfully enjoyed, and so forth. One may accept common sense and
   thoughtlessly roam in its pasture, but if one looks up and tries to take it
   in, it is like a fantastic dream.  To the serious cognizer it is like a bad
   dream. For the serious cognizer feels responsible to fact and principle,
   and common sense is utterly irresponsible” (p. 43)
   - Common sense is “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, irritable”
   (p. 44).

Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected to
criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes “refined
knowledge” or “critical cognition” (p. 47).  How do we achieve this
transformation?


   - For Pepper, “*all critical evidence becomes critical only as a result
   of the addition of corroborative evidence*.  The work of legitimate
   criticism in cognition, then, is corroboration” (p. 47, emphasis added)

Corroboration can take one of two forms:


   - *1) Multiplicative corroboration (data):*  i.e., The agreement of “man
   with man.” (p. 47).
      - An obvious example of this is the notion of interjudge (or
      interrater) reliability, as understood by psychometricians
      - But, as discussed below, the notion of multiplicative corroboration
      has an important role to play in any scientific enterprise.
   - *2) Structural corroboration (danda):*  i.e., The agreement of “fact
   with fact” (p. 47)
      - An obvious example of this is the “principle of converging
      evidence” in science.
         - Pepper’s example: I might evaluate whether a chair is strong
         enough to bear my weight by considering (a) the kind of wood
with which it
         is made, (b) the reputation of the company that put together
the chair, and
         (c) the fact that the chair shows evidence of wear
(suggesting that “many
         people had successfully sat in it”).  It is by “putting all
this evidence
         together” that I “feel justified in believe that the chair is a strong
         chair” (p. 49)
      - But, insofar as stuctural corroboration is concerned with how a
      multiplicity of facts “hang together” [my phrase], the quest for such
      corroboration will inevitably pull us in the direction of theory. As I
      entertain structural hypotheses, I’m not simply interested in *this*
      or *that *set of data*.*  Rather, I’m interested in how the data I
      observe *coheres* with other things we think we know.  The nature of
      this coherence is a *theoretical* puzzle.

On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (or *data* collection) is
synonymous with the notion of *objectivity* in science.  It reflects the
idea that what we see would be described *in precisely the same way* by
anyone else (given the appropriate level of training):


   - In Pepper’s words, “the search for multiplicative corroboration is the
   effort on the part of a datum to confirm its claim to purity.  It is as
   though a datum turned from one observer to another and asked, Am I not just
   what I said I was?....Are there not some data that never vary, no matter
   who the observer and, if possible, no matter what his point of view?  If
   such there are, these are ideal data” (p. 52).

Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not available”
(p. 52).  Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been developed
in the course of cognitive history” (p. 52). Specifically, Pepper
highlights “two genuses of refined data”:


   -  *Refined empirical data*: “pointer readings and correlations among
   pointer readings” (p. 52)
   - *Refined logical data:* “evidence for the validity of logical and
   mathematical transitions and for those organizations of such transitions
   which are called logical and mathematic systems” (p. 57).

Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the quest
for highly refined empirical and logical data.   But there are several
threats to the program of the dogmatic positivist:


   - The scarcity of refined data
      - “The refined empirical data presently at our disposal cover a very
      small field of nature” (p. 63)
         - “Outside of the fields of physics and chemistry, refined data
         play a secondary role and are rarely capable of expression in
the form of a
         deductive mathematical system” (p. 63)
      - The metaphysical poverty of refined data
   -  “In order to set up refined data as the sole norm of evidence, it is
      necessary to *deny* the claims of danda, derived from various
      structural world theories, as alternative norms of evidence” (pp. 67, 69)
      -  In other words, the dogmatic positivist intends to let the *data
         speak for themselves*, free of the influence of danda (which we
         might consider as a facet of a metaphysical system).
         - But, if we really wish to drive such danda out of our refined
      cognition, “*multiplicative corroboration alone will not do this*,
      for it only establishes the data it establishes, and neither affirms nor
      denies the claims of any facts other than those, like pointer
readings, by
      which man corroborates man” (p. 69, emphasis added)

In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and
structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70).
What, though, does it mean to make *structural* claims (of any sort)?


   - For starters, structural hypotheses necessarily make statements
   concerning “the structure of the world” (p. 74) – i.e., how things “hang
   together”.
   - But – and this is quite a striking claim –  “*structural corroboration
   does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope*” (p. 77, emphasis added)
      -  Why?
         -  Because: “as long as there are outlying facts which might not
         corroborate the facts already organized by the structural
hypothesis, so
         long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable” (p. 77).
      -  An “ideal structural hypothesis”, then, “is one that all facts
   will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 77)
   -  “*Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis*” (p. 77, emphasis added).

Comments regarding “world hypotheses”:


   - They necessarily include *data *[and not just *danda*]
      - It “draws data within its scope as well as everything else” (p. 78)§

         - “It, therefore, does not reject but acquires the cognitive force
         of multiplicative corroboration as well as that of structural
         corroboration” (pp. 78-79)
      -  “Cognition needs both types of refinement [data and danda] as much
      as a bird needs two wings” (p. 79)
   -   Nevertheless, in a world hypothesis, *data are ultimately
   subordinated to danda*.
   -  As a rough approximation of what Pepper is driving at, we might
      consider a world hypothesis as a framework that allows us to *render
      data meaningful*.
      - Or, to employ Gregg's language: "*all factual/empirical claims are
      understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to
      make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of
      framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE
      facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about
      chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees
      nothing)."*
   - In a world hypothesis, evidence and interpretation are “merged” (p.
   79).
      -   “…it is impossible to say where pure fact ends and interpretation
      of fact begins” (p. 79).

 As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field of
psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the
discipline: *Psychology
is* *the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.*


   - Ignoring (for the sake of simplification) the notion of “mental
   processes”, we can certainly agree that “behavior” falls within the
   psychologist’s scope of inquiry.
   - But how – in practice – do we identify a *unit *of behavior?   When
   does a given behavior begin?  When does it end?  And is it really
   meaningful to speak of “behavior” in the abstract, or is the concept always
   qualified in some way?  After all, a personality psychologist never studies
   “behavior” *per se*, but *aggressive* behavior, *conscientious*
   behavior, etc.  In other words, personality psychologists study
   *patterns* of behavior – and the identification of such patterns is
   inevitably theory-driven.

On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs *“A Tree of
Knowledge”* (!):


   - At the bottom of the figure is a box labelled “Roots of knowledge”
   (and it includes “dubitanda”, Pepper’s rather odd term for “common sense
   facts”).
   - The tree (originating out of the box) has *two major trunks* (which
   makes for a rather strange-looking tree!):
      - Trunk #1: Data – Beginning with “rough data” and then branching
      into “scientific data” and “logical data”
      - Trunk #2: Danda – Beginning with “rough danda” and then branching
      into “formistic danda”, “mechanistic danda”, “contextual danda”, and
      “organismic danda”
   - Above the six branches of data and danda sits the phrase: “fruits of
   knowledge”

 In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January 14),
we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know if
you have any questions, comments, or corrections pertaining to this
episode!

~ Steve Quackenbush

On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It
> will be the next topic for us to journey on.
>
>
>
> Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I
> thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is
> incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh
> in now.
>
>
>
> Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World
> Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, *The
> UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy*, I
> especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often
> they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their
> formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)?
>
>
>
> At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of
> human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about
> adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real
> persons, and* not* bring a worldview to what we do?
>
>
>
> In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing from
> psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical psychology
> tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to factual claims
> about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, and I think he
> is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims are understood
> from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense
> out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of
> concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a
> chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice
> looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing).
>
>
>
> Enjoy the journey!
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gregg
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Sent from Mail <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hcgEWNgGBY5zBJvvRP2GG3r87id5mXF-VcFbar1Bg-A&s=d5or990N2srKYiXwxcK2dCHk2PbnGO0IezvlQ8AI-YM&e= > for
> Windows 10
>
>
>
> *From: *Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]>
> *Sent: *Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
> *To: *[log in to unmask]
> *Subject: *Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>
>
>
> Hello ToK Community
>
> With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the
> implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of
> the ToK/UTUA framework.  As many participants in this listserv are aware,
> Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his
> “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never
> encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.
>
> I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in
> the 1990’s.  At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among
> the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism.  Yet
> I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close
> study of Pepper’s thought.  So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread
> is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: *World
> Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence* (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of
> California Press).
>
> Why Pepper?  Why Now?
>
>
>    -  As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself
>    puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions.
>    These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and
>    science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated”
>    and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in relation
>    to broader (and perhaps alternative) metaphysical systems.
>    - Given its scope and conceptual rigor, my intuition is that Stephen
>    Pepper’s work will be of considerable value as I continue to work through
>    these issues.  The description on the back cover of *World Hypotheses*
>    offers some justification for this intuition:
>       -   “In setting forth his root-metaphor theory and examining six
>       such hypotheses – animism, mysticism, formism, mechanism, contextualism,
>       and organicism – *Pepper surveys the whole field of metaphysics*…The
>       virtue of the root-metaphor method is that it puts metaphysics on a purely
>       factual basis and pushes philosophical issues back to the interpretation of
>       evidence” (emphasis added).
>
> Procedural matters:
>
>
>    - My intent in this thread is to proceed with a close reading of
>    Pepper’s text, several chapters at a time.   My next post (scheduled for
>    Sunday, January 7) will focus on Chapters 1-4.   Anyone with a copy of *World
>    Hypotheses* is welcome to read along and offer corrections and/or
>    clarifications.   But, in case you can’t do the reading, I will try to make
>    sure my outlines are sufficiently clear that they would make sense to
>    everyone on this listserv.
>    - For the time being, I will limit myself to elaborating and
>    clarifying the thought of Stephen Pepper.  The purpose of this thread is
>    not to articulate my own point of view. That will come later.  Others are
>    certainly free to offer critical comments from whatever vantage point they
>    wish.  My replies will simply reflect my effort to articulate how I think
>    Pepper might respond to the matter at hand. [Of course, I may misinterpret
>    Pepper; in which case, I hope to be corrected.  Indeed, I anticipate that
>    my understanding of Pepper will evolve considerably over the course of this
>    project.]
>    -  Although the positions articulated in this thread are not my own, I
>    will nevertheless frequently generate original examples to illustrate the
>    arguments that I believe Pepper is trying to make.  To render as clear as
>    possible the distinction between Pepper’s writings and my own elaborations,
>    I will provide page references for all ideas and examples that can be found
>    in *World Hypotheses*.
>    -  When we reach the end of Pepper’s (1942) text, I will proceed to
>    Phase 2 of this venture: How does the ToK/UTUA framework stands in relation
>    to Root Metaphor theory?
>
>  As noted above, I will begin this inquiry with a close reading of
> Chapters 1-4.  These chapters include a discussion of the distinction
> (quite important to Pepper) between “multiplicative” and “structural”
> corroboration (and the corresponding difference between “data” and
> “dandum”).
>
> But it seems appropriate to end this post with a (hopefully enticing)
> “sneak preview of coming attractions”.   In the opening paragraphs of *World
> Hypotheses*, Pepper (1942) observes that “among the variety of objects
> which we find in the world are hypotheses about the world itself” (p. 1).
> Examples cited by Pepper include the worldviews implicit in Plato’s*
> Republic*, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, and Descartes’s *Meditations*.  To
> his list, we might add Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams*, Skinner’s *Beyond
> Freedom & Dignity*, and Rogers’ *On Becoming a Person*.
>
> In Chapter 5, Pepper offers four maxims pertaining to world hypotheses:
>
>
>    - *Maxim I:* “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor"
>    (p. 96).
>    -  *Maxim II*: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
>       -   "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of
>       one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both
>       hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
>    - *Maxim III*: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
>       - "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually
>       exclusive.  A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing" (p. 104)
>    - *Maxim IV*: “Concepts which have lost contact with their root
>    metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113)
>
> If you share an interest in the issues reflected in this introductory
> e-mail, then I invite you to accompany me on a journey through the work of
> Stephen Pepper. The next installment of this series (focusing on Chapters
> 1-4) is scheduled for Sunday, January 7.
>
> ~ Steve Quackenbush
>
> P.S.,: My edition of *World Hypotheses* includes two subtitles.  On the
> cover, the subtitle is "Prolegomena to systematic philosophy and a complete
> survey of metaphysics".  On the first page, the subtitle is "A Study in
> Evidence".   Both subtitles are appropriate, but I think the former more
> appropriately reflects the incredible ambition of the text.
>
>
>
>
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