"sentimentalists"  ;)
Must have been a Freudian slip, as I meant to say experimentalists.


On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:22 PM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> Hi Gregg,
>
>
>
> Yes.  All the old grates, like Descartes, Lock, Kant… on whose shoulders
> we stand, came up with terminology, describing models, that captures parts
> of what is going on.  Lock was right when he made a distinction between
> “primary” and “secondary” qualities, but they also missed many things that
> we know, today.  Here is a quote from that article you referenced:
>
>
>
> *Primary qualities* are thought to be properties
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Properties&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=wZWNA_6R16_LyxCKosnp7CZQIfhez48C3HszCEth_Rg&s=GMb83FKq1ya2izEJXc9KPpz6Yxsv0o_WrKtchkBD-lE&e=> of objects that are
> independent of any observer, such as solidity
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Solid&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=wZWNA_6R16_LyxCKosnp7CZQIfhez48C3HszCEth_Rg&s=MNCFNhtNLjFU4pd9sE9MEntD5XHty_lMcHU5_KgP4MU&e=>, extension
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Extension-5F-28metaphysics-29&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=wZWNA_6R16_LyxCKosnp7CZQIfhez48C3HszCEth_Rg&s=EIKNeJSRWWV1X8P9jYciPGnsM4QoU-eVFg8lbe7SOZI&e=>, motion
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Motion-5F-28physics-29&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=wZWNA_6R16_LyxCKosnp7CZQIfhez48C3HszCEth_Rg&s=fmhSxGO4ttfkwJ-TcW_eA2Z094mxAv86ZFFZkAAhSko&e=>, number
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Number&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=wZWNA_6R16_LyxCKosnp7CZQIfhez48C3HszCEth_Rg&s=U6I4-tGsghewM3PpwgnU9ty_NtP9Nr1IxwJisx6puK8&e=> and figure
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Shape&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=wZWNA_6R16_LyxCKosnp7CZQIfhez48C3HszCEth_Rg&s=c8JINSI290ygD6pB9cKh_z6N1gyA41ig8HWTpgv6S7E&e=>. These characteristics convey
> facts. They exist in the thing itself, can be determined with certainty,
> and do not rely on subjective judgments. For example, if an object is
> spherical, no one can reasonably argue that it is triangular.
>
>
>
> Descartes pointed out that we can’t determine these solidity, extension,
> motion, number… things (#1) with certainty, as we could be a brain in a
> vat, where only (#2) exists.  It is #2, or the qualities of our conscious
> knowledge that are the only facts of the matter of anything in itself.
> Since we are aware of these physical qualities, directly, we can’t doubt
> their existence, nor their qualities.
>
>
>
> #2 also has “solidity, extension, motion, number and figure”, as our
> knowledge models and tracks reality, based on the abstract data coming from
> our senses.  Lehar describes this as a diorama, in our brain, that has all
> of these solidity, extension, motion, number and figure…” that represents
> the same in reality.
>
>
>
> The only physical things in the world, which we know the quality of, is
> our physical conscious knowledge.  Everything else we know about the
> outside world is only abstract knowledge, which we don’t yet know how to
> qualitatively interpret.  Check out Steven Lehar’s picture at the top of
> the “Representational Qualia Theory” camp statement:
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=wZWNA_6R16_LyxCKosnp7CZQIfhez48C3HszCEth_Rg&s=Q1ZscrMtJE1LQVLQ358NWQUgro-E3lDYdfvj4o1CJ1M&e=
>
> and notice that only the miss shaped (not at all like it’s referent)
> diorama knowledge, inside the brain has color.  The fact that everything
> outside the brain is in black and white, indicates that all we know of it,
> is abstract knowledge.  Objectively, we are blind to physical qualities, at
> least until sentimentalists stop being qualia blind, so they can discover
> what it is, in our brain, that has a redness quality…
>
>
> Does that answer your question?
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:03 PM JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>> Brent, I am saying that because oxytocin has pleiotropic effects perhaps
>> it connects the image of a strawberry to its taste on the tongue and the
>> color red. And these  elements of red strawberries were acquired across
>> space/time diachronically. That’s what I imagine quaila to be as free
>> associations . I wonder what someone with red-green color blindness sees
>> looking at a strawberry?
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:52 PM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>> Brent,
>>>
>>> Just so I am clear, Is your distinction below parallel or similar to Locke’s
>>> distinction between primary and secondary qualities
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Primary_secondary-5Fquality-5Fdistinction&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=gYtcWhJWfW_jwIkpdOIqstz4l4xPnp3Chp0vIZobamM&s=pK9xRcnEhvTDmerVyZRDnnr2XRkxDtX15ylr08Rsq9I&e=>?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Gregg
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion <
>>> [log in to unmask]> *On Behalf Of *Brent Allsop
>>> *Sent:* Thursday, February 28, 2019 4:47 PM
>>> *To:* [log in to unmask]
>>> *Subject:* Re: How Psychology Helps Reinforce the Justification System
>>> of Neoliberalism
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi John,
>>>
>>> I have missed the point, because we are talking about completely
>>> different things.  Everything you are saying makes complete sense, in a
>>> completely qualia blind way.  For example, when you talk about linking “color
>>> and other physiologic functions of oxytocin” what do you mean by
>>> “color”?  It seems that what you mean by color, you are only talking about
>>> abstract names, such as the word “red”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’m talking about something completely different.  I’m talking about
>>> physical qualities, not their names.  Within my model, when you say color,
>>> I don’t know which of the flooring two physical properties you are talking
>>> about:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. The physical properties that are the target of our observation.
>>> These properties initiate the perception process, such as a strawberry
>>> reflecting red light.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2. The physical properties within the brain that are the final results
>>> of the perception process. These properties comprise our conscious
>>> knowledge of a red strawberry. We experience this *directly*, as
>>> *redness*.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess you’re not talking about either of these, you are only talking
>>> about the physical properties of oxytocin, and how it behaves in the
>>> retina?  Would you agree that it is a very real possibility, that
>>> experimentalists, operating in a non-qualia blind way, could falsify any
>>> belief that oxytocin is necessary for any computationally bound composite
>>> conscious experiences of redness, or any other qualia?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 2:26 PM JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Brent, I think that you have missed the point of the hormone oxytocin
>>> functionally connecting the cell that perceives color (the cone) with the
>>> epithelial cells that line the retina, offering a way of physically seeing
>>> red in conjunction with pain.....it's a hypothesis for linking vision and
>>> color and other physiologic functions of oxytocin, of which there are many,
>>> including regulation of body heat, empathy, the relaxation of the uterus
>>> during birth and production of breast milk, referred to as 'let down',
>>> which I always thought was a funny term, be that as it may. I would
>>> imagine, for example, that a woman in labor might see red due to the pain
>>> of that experience. And just to expand on that idea of interconnections
>>> between physiology and physics, the attached paper shows the homologies
>>> (same origin) between Quantum Mechanics and The First Principles of
>>> Physiology. That nexus would hypothetically open up to seeing a red
>>> strawberry, particularly because I equated pleiotropy (the interconnections
>>> between physiologic traits through the distribution of the same gene in
>>> different tissues and organs) with non-localization, the physics that
>>> Einstein referred to as 'spooky action at a distance'.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 3:48 PM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi John,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’m glad you at least mentioned the name, “red” of a physical quality.
>>> But are the physical properties of oxytocin, or the physical properties of
>>> anything in the retina anything like either of the physical qualities of
>>> these two things?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. The physical properties that are the target of our observation.
>>> These properties initiate the perception process, such as a strawberry
>>> reflecting red light.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2. The physical properties within the brain that are the final results
>>> of the perception process. These properties comprise our conscious
>>> knowledge of a red strawberry. We experience this *directly*, as
>>> *redness*.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Other than the fact that we may be able to abstractly interpret some of
>>> these physical qualities, like we can interpret the word “red” as
>>> representing a redness physical quality?  You can’t know what the word red
>>> (or anything in the eye representing anything) means, unless you provide a
>>> mechanical interpretation mechanism that get’s you back to the real
>>> physical quality they represent.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> All abstract representations (including all computer knowledge) are
>>> abstracted away from physical qualities.  Any set of physical qualities,
>>> like that of a particular physical cone in a retina, can represent a 1 (or
>>> anything else), but only if you have an interpretation mechanism to get the
>>> one, from that particular set of physics.  Consciousness, on the other
>>> hand, represents knowledge directly on physical qualities, like redness and
>>> greenness.  This is more efficient, since it requires less abstracting
>>> hardware.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 1:14 PM JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Brent and TOKers, I am hypothesizing that consciousness is the net
>>> product of our physiology, which is vertically integrated from the
>>> unicellular state to what we think of as complex traits. In that vein, in
>>> the paper attached I proferred as an example the role of oxytocin in
>>> endothermy/homeothermy/warm-bloodedness. The pleiotropic effect of oxytocin
>>> on retinal cones and retinal epithelial cells would hypothetically account
>>> for seeing 'red' when looking at a strawberry, for example. It's the
>>> 'permutations and combinations' that form our physiology that cause such
>>> interrelationships due to our 'history', both short-term developmental and
>>> long-term phylogenetic. Hope that's helpful.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 2:02 PM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Tim Henriques asked:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “What is your operational definition of consciousness?”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> John Torday replied with his definition / model of consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Also, if you google for solutions to the “hard problem” of
>>> consciousness, you will find as many solutions as you care to take time to
>>> look into.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’m sure all these models have some utility, when it comes to
>>> understanding various things about our consciousness, and our place in the
>>> world.  But what I don’t understand is, why not a one of them include
>>> anything about the qualitative nature of consciousness?  None of them give
>>> us anything that might enable us to bridge Joseph Levine’s “Explanatory
>>> Gap”
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Explanatory-5Fgap&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=UIxALV6nC0i0REWXcxwY9XJkwi_k0lNlkxReXKG7Kc4&e=>.
>>> In other words, to me, they are all completely blind to physical qualities
>>> or qualia.  In fact, as far as I know, all of “peer reviewed” scientific
>>> literature, to date, is obliviously qualia blind.  Is not the qualitative
>>> nature of consciousness it’s most important attribute?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One important thing regarding conscious knowledge is the following
>>> necessary truth:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “If you know something, there must be something physical that is that
>>> knowledge.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This implies there are two sets of physical qualities we must consider
>>> when trying to objectively perceive physical qualities:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. The physical properties that are the target of our observation.
>>> These properties initiate the perception process, such as a strawberry
>>> reflecting red light.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2. The physical properties within the brain that are the final results
>>> of the perception process. These properties comprise our conscious
>>> knowledge of a red strawberry. We experience this *directly*, as
>>> *redness*.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If we seek to find what it is in our brain which has a redness quality,
>>> we must associate and identify the necessary and sufficient set of physics
>>> for a redness experience.  For example, it is a hypothetical possibility
>>> that it is glutamate, reacting in synapses, that has the redness quality.
>>> If experimentalists could verify this, we would know that it is glutamate
>>> that has a redness quality.  We would then finally know that it is
>>> glutamate we should interpret “red” as describing.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So, given all that, and given that consciousness is composed of a boat
>>> load of diverse qualia or physical qualities all computationally bound
>>> together, and if experimentalists can verify these predictions about the
>>> qualitative nature of various physical things.  Would that not imply the
>>> following definitions?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “Intentionality, free will, intersubjectivity, self-awareness, desire,
>>> love, spirits… indeed consciousness itself, are all computational bound
>>> composite qualitative knowledge.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As always, for more information, see the emerging expert consensus
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_81-2DMind-2DExperts_1&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=0lbtXYwu6UYUdQeUkWWMfrHjCaUUKuXa5N1zYDhjsf8&e=>
>>> camp over at canonizer.com
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__canonizer.com&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=QF6BXcCLyHuTabm0Y_tR_F1kNvcsGgmM-j5AKZ5FuaE&e=>
>>> being called: “Representational Qualia Theory
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=pEF0jzBSKnzm7WMm97GdK89Xq78vTnh8L2J427I7nac&e=>”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ############################
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>

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