Michael Mascolo:
Interesting insight. Have you heard of Paul Ricoeur.  He overcomes Cartesian dualism by "reintroducing mind into body."  I have an analogy.  Islands can be seen above water as isolated. Below water, they are emerging from the unifying land mass.  I distinguish as follows:
materialism     totally reducible       nothing irreduciblematerial          generally reducible      somewhat irreduciblemind vs body     and the anti material     totally irreducible
I have found a flaw in Gilbert Ryle's myth of Descartes, and the Oxford University example of the university totally reducible to the sum of buildings on campus.
Best,
Michael M. K.    On Monday, September 6, 2021, 06:24:25 PM CDT, Michael Mascolo <[log in to unmask]> wrote:  
 
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Hi All:

In a recent post, I expressed agreement with the an article that asserted that that “the mind does not exist” – at least to the extent that “mind” and “mental” are defined in contrast with “physical” and “material”.  The mental/physical dichotomy is a nasty one, as it suggests that “mind” is something that is non-corporeal.  Robert Ryan — in a post that I am deeply grateful for — suggested that the ideas that I had advanced are reductionistic. Robert inspired me to try to be clearer in my thoughts about why “mind” and “mental” are unhelpful concepts, and how it is possible to be both a materialist and to be non-reductionist.  I believe that it is possible to have a non-reductionist materialist conception of consciousness and experience.  And I think that this position aligns quite closely indeed with Gregg’s system.

I want to assert a concept that I have called embodied emergence (Mascolo & Kallio, 2019) — the idea that psychological processes and states (consciousness, experience)are complexly-organized biological processes, albeit ones with novel emergent properties. (Please – stay with me – there is something new here as I hope will become clear below.)  Novel psychological properties – e.g., awareness meaning, experience, qualia – are emergent from biological processes in the sense that they arenot found in their base biological elements.  However, these novel and emergent psychological processes do not contain (nor do they have to) properties thatoverride or conflict with the properties of their base elements.

To make this argument, I want to show that qualitative transformations routinely occur in everyday physical systems without creating structures that override or conflict with the properties of their base elements.  This can be illustrated with the common example of how we get liquid – water – from the combination of twogasses – hydrogen and oxygen.  When we combine hydrogen and oxygen – two gasses – we don’t get more gas – we get a liquid – something with qualitatively different properties.  How is this possible? 

This is not a mysterious process. This well-understood process is described in the graphic below.  The short story: A water molecule, of course, is formed with two molecules of hydrogen combine with one molecule of oxygen. When this happens, individual water molecules connect to each other through the formation of a hydrogen bond between the slightly negatively-charged oxygen molecule of one water molecule and the slightly positively-charged hydrogen molecule of another This bond, however, is very weak. As a result, movement breaks the bond quickly, allowing molecules to flow over each other – thus producing liquid.

The novel way of understanding this process is to be found in the concept ofEQUIVALENCE (which, as I understand in mathematics, is different fromequality).  Liquidity is an emergent property of H20 molecules aggregated together.   When we combine material gas of H and the material gas of O, we get the material liquid of H20.  When we say that liquid emerges from a combination of H2 and O, we do not say that the combination produces H20and then also the liquid we call water.  H20 is the EQUIVALENT of the liquid we call water. The properties of water are fully explainable by the novel structure that arises from the relations between H2 and O.  We don’t need to add something in addition to the novel structure of H20 to explain its properties.  We simply have a novel structure with emergent properties.  The properties that emerge from the coordination of base elements are not to be found in those base elements. In this way, the novel properties cannot be reduced to their base elements.

I want to say that the same basic equivalence relation occurs between base biological processes and emergent psychological processes.  We have biological structures and processes – cells, neurons, synapses, etc.  Psychological states and processes emerge from the complex organization of biological structures and processes (in ways that we do not understand).  Now, here is the important philosophical point: When this happens, the higher-orderbiological organization has novel psychological properties – e.g., awareness, qualia, etc. – that are not found in the base elements themselves (e.g., individual cells). 

What I want to say is that the relation between (a) base biological processes and (b) biological processes with emergent psychological properties is akin to the relation between (a’) the base physical elements of H and O (b’) and the physical water molecule -- H20 – with the emergent property of liquidity. That is:

The liquid we call “water” is the EQUIVALENT of H20.  There is not H20 and THEN ALSO something else – some emergent liquid we call “water”. Liquidity is the emergent property of H20 – a higher-order structture  We don’t have H20 plus something else called “water” or “liquid”.

States we call consciousness, awareness or qualia are the EQUIVALENT of complexly organized biological processes. There are not the complexly-organized biological structures and THEN ALSO some novel “mental” or “non-biological” something called “consciousness”.  We don’t have biological processes PLUS something else called “mind” or the “mental”. Psychological processes ARE complex biological processes with emergent properties (awareness).

But wait, you might say: The psychological person is an agent – the person has something akin to “free will” – the capacity to control his or her own behavior.  Physical systems don’t do this.  How do we get something like conscious agency from a physical system?  To explain psychological processes in a material system, don’t we have to explain how we are capable of conscious control?  Don’t our powers of conscious control mean that somehow “minds” emerge that control “physical” or “biological” bodies?

The answer is “no” – we do not have to postulate a “mental” entity to control behavior – because the capacity for hierarchical regulation is already built into the structure and processes of biological systems. 

I believe that we tend to believe that “mind” is something that is separate from “body” not not because we can’t imagine how awareness can emerge from biological processes, but instead because we cannot imagine how humanagency –  the capacity to consciously control behavior --  emerges from a physical or biological system.  We attribute a capacity for conscious control (sometimes called “free will”) to “mind”.  How else can “we” be in control? 

But the point is this: We don’t need complex “mental” processes to explain the capacity for agency.  Agency – or at leasthierarchical regulation is a basic property of biological systems. Even single celled organisms are self-regulating systems.  The complexity of self-regulation increases as we move up phylogenetic levels of complexity.  At some point, the capacity to represent one’s environs (and indeed, one’s own processes) comes to function as part of the biological self-regulating system itself.  If this is true, then we do not need to invoke mysterious conceptions of “I” or attribute mysterious properties of agency to consciousness to explain human behavior. Consciousness and other psychological processes serve functions other than agency in the human system.  Consciousness and other psychological processes transform the already existing capacities for agency and hierarchical control that already exist in biological systems.  Consciousness likely serves the function of coordinating or integrating information from endogenous and exogenous sources so that the organism can respond to increasingly complex systems of adaptive challenges.

And so, the assertion that psychological processes ARE complexly-organized biological processes is not a reductionistic statement (although it can be, in some formulations).  Glucose metabolism is a biological process but not a psychological process (although it can arguably be influenced by psychological processes). Consciousness is both a biologicaland a psychological process; it is a biological process with emergent properties that function in the service of the already adaptive self-organizing organismic system as a whole.  
All My Best,
Michael F. Mascolo, Ph.D.Academic Director, Compass Program
Professor, Department of Psychology
Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01845
978.837.3503 (office)
978.979.8745 (cell)

Bridging Political Divides Website: Creating Common Ground
Blog: Values Matter
Journal: Pedagogy and the Human Sciences
Author and Coaching Website: www.michaelmascolo.com
Academia Home Page 
Constructivist Meetup Series

Things move, persons act. -- Kenneth Burke
If it's not worth doing, it's not worth doing well. -- Donald Hebb
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On Aug 31, 2021, at 4:18 PM, ryanrc111 <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

CAUTION:This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.Dr. Mascolo,

That is a reductionist reasoning that i cannot agree with.

When systems are qualitatively different, they deserve qualitative labels that are different. 
 "everything is just ____________" never has worked in the history of science, and I don't think it will start working now. 
Biological systems are not merely just physical. Social systems are not merely just biological.
They do have different features, different epistemic concerns, and indeed differing levels of action.
The universe is digital -quantum particles do not continuously effect large scale systems.  There are clear breaks at different scales, where hardly any activity on scale 1 affects systems on scale 2. 
the math of differential equations and complexity supports a digital world of level-based actions and level-based systems. 

You might be interested to read the work of Sandra Mitchell , a top philosopher of science, whom I took coursework from at U Pittsburgh. "
IN fact, Sandra is the department chair of the #1 rated philosophy of science dept. in the world, and I learned from her there!
She has presented full theories about the qualitative difference between the "sciences". and they are close to Henriques. 

Sandra Mitchell - Wikipedia

There is no possibility of reducing social to biological , and so forth. 
Just because there are causal linkages through the material world, does not mean these systems are qualitatively identical in character. 
Emergence is very well established, but I do realize there are people who hate it as a concept.
 However, Its far easier to defend the qualitative thesis because it doesn't require a magic bullet theory. 
I have yet see a magic bullet theory that accurately reduces one "science" to another. They have all failed. 
thus, knowledge still stands as qualitatively different for different systems.

Thanks

Robert Conan Ryan
  


On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 4:03 PM Michael Mascolo <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

CAUTION:This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.Greetings All:
Thanks for pointing us to this article Gregg.
I must admit, I agree deeply with Gough’s thesis in this paper.  I think that terms like “mind” and “mental” should be discarded — except metaphorical terms to use in everyday discourse.  
Like any term, the meanings of “mind” and “mental” gain their meaning dialectical through a contrast to what they arenot.   Different meanings of a term can be illuminated by understanding the different ways in which they can be contrasted with what they are not. 
A central meaning of the terms “mind” and “mental” arise from their contrast with terms like “physical”, “bodily” and “corporeal”.  This contrast identifies “mind” and “mental” in contradistinction to that which is material.  It is this meaning that is problematic.  The moment we suggest that “mind” and “mentality” are in some way “not physical”, we become deeply entrenched in the intractable mind-body problem: How can something non-physical “cause” changes in something “physical”, and so forth.  This problem is intractable.
In my view, terms like consciousness, experience, meaning, representation, awareness all refer to psychological processes. The difference is that these terms do not carry any necessary connotations of non-corporality.  This is why, in my view, it is preferable to use these terms rather than “mind” or “mental”.
From this point of view, psychological processes ARE physical and material processes — biological processes that function at a higher (yes higher) level or organization.  There is no mind/body problem because what people call mind — consciousness, experience, agency — is not non-physical.  Thus, it makes sense to ask, How does consciousness emerge in a bio-physical system — where consciousness is NOT assumed to be non-physical.  In contrast, the question, How does “the mind” emerge from bio-physical systems suggests that there is something called “mind” that is “nonphysical”. 
My Best,
M.




 
Michael F. Mascolo, Ph.D.Academic Director, Compass Program
Professor, Department of Psychology
Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01845
978.837.3503 (office)
978.979.8745 (cell)

Bridging Political Divides Website: Creating Common Ground
Blog: Values Matter
Journal: Pedagogy and the Human Sciences
Author and Coaching Website: www.michaelmascolo.com
Academia Home Page 
Constructivist Meetup Series

Things move, persons act. -- Kenneth Burke
If it's not worth doing, it's not worth doing well. -- Donald Hebb

On Aug 31, 2021, at 1:55 PM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Hi List, Although we hardly need more evidence for the Enlightenment Gap’s claim that there is profound confusion regarding the relationship between matter and mind in modern systems of understanding, here is yet another article that makes the point, with the assertion that we should discard the concepts of mental and the mind all together:https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__aeon.co_essays_why-2Dtheres-2Dno-2Dsuch-2Dthing-2Das-2Dthe-2Dmind-2Dand-2Dnothing-2Dis-2Dmental&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=Uh2HVhsURiERs5gWE4ntDwPEP69wXVG8LIPGsaWQbXQ&s=g9tm0XITFo3gaMtQwzl_CgSmOWYxnq7PIYxeW9nlEao&e=  Since there are several new people on the UTOK list, I will take this opportunity state what many here already know, which is that the central feature of UTOK is that it affords us a new, different and much richer metaphysical vocabulary for the domain of the mental. Indeed, my current book is on how the UTOK solves the problem of psychology by affording us clarity about the ontology of the mental. (summarized here).  Because I want practice streamlining this, here is the basic summary: First, via the ToK System’s divisions of complexification, it gives us the category capital “M” Mind, which is a tier of complex adaptive behaviors in nature. Specifically, it is the adaptive behaviors exhibited by complex animals with brains that produce a functional effect on the animal-environment relationship. These are the set of mental behaviors. Second, via the Map of Mind, we divide these mental behaviors first into the neurocognitive processes within the nervous system (Mind1a) that can be tracked by things like fMRIs, and the overt activities of animals that can be observed (Mind1b).  Mind2 is used to denote the interior epistemological space that is subjective conscious experience that can only be accessed from the inside and cannot be accessed directly from the outside. This divide is called the epistemological gap. No camera or any other device we can consider allows us to directly experience the Mind2 of another. The most interesting possible exception to this I have seen is the Logan Twins who are conjoined at the head, and share some brain domains. Even here, however, they experience the world via their own epistemological portal and the way they describe sharing thoughts is akin to talking. Speaking of talking, this is the domain of Mind3. Talking flows through the interior and exterior without losing its form. It is a shared intersubjective space. Mind3a is when it is private speech, Mind3b is when it is translated across the barrier of the skin in some other medium.  Finally, regarding UTOK’s solution to this world knot, it should also be noted that science is anchored into the language game of behavior and the exterior epistemological position. The ToK represents a behavioral systemic map of nature. Our subjective idiographic point of view is different. It is represented by the iQuad Coin. Thus, my reply to the article is to agree that it makes an important point, but it is laughable that (a) we can just stop using the terms and (b) that words like cognitive, psychiatric and psychological are fine even though mind and mental are hopeless. What is needed is a proper descriptive metaphysical system that is in accordance with natural science ontology that affords us clarity about the various domains of the mental and the ways they emerged and interface. This essay is mental in the sense that it is an example of Mind3b behavior that operates at the Cultural Person plane of existence, and functions to network propositions together to legitimize a version of is and ought.   Best,Gregg   ___________________________________________Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Graduate Psychology
216 Johnston Hall
MSC 7401
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, VA 22807
(540) 568-7857 (phone)
(540) 568-4747 (fax)

Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.
Check out the Unified Theory Of Knowledge homepage at:https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.unifiedtheoryofknowledge.org_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=Uh2HVhsURiERs5gWE4ntDwPEP69wXVG8LIPGsaWQbXQ&s=81h-oTGaFRO001Q-Ncw1WmMX5MAQXHtVY2pMbG3XYms&e=  ############################
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