As I read this description of Pepper's work I was reminded of the papers by
Nicholas Christakis on his 'social contagion theory'. Christakis shows how
human networks form spontaneously (Jordan JJ, Rand DG, Arbesman S, Fowler
JH, Christakis NA. Contagion of Cooperation in Static and Fluid Social
Networks. PLoS One. 2013 Jun
19;8(6):e66199, for example). This is empiric evidence for what I assume is
being discussed by Steve and Gregg.

On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 3:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It
> will be the next topic for us to journey on.
>
>
>
> Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I
> thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is
> incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh
> in now.
>
>
>
> Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World
> Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, *The
> UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy*, I
> especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often
> they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their
> formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)?
>
>
>
> At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of
> human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about
> adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real
> persons, and* not* bring a worldview to what we do?
>
>
>
> In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing from
> psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical psychology
> tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to factual claims
> about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, and I think he
> is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims are understood
> from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense
> out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of
> concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a
> chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice
> looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing).
>
>
>
> Enjoy the journey!
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gregg
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Sent from Mail <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=4Uh18i8reUZubOylh389zAGEC_3WzaDRcS4m0Nhmlfk&s=ksg3hOrQAHR0WvFqGhC-pD6ZyZ1Q2j6z0sztynQn3RU&e= > for
> Windows 10
>
>
>
> *From: *Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]>
> *Sent: *Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
> *To: *[log in to unmask]
> *Subject: *Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>
>
>
> Hello ToK Community
>
> With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the
> implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of
> the ToK/UTUA framework.  As many participants in this listserv are aware,
> Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his
> “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never
> encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.
>
> I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in
> the 1990’s.  At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among
> the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism.  Yet
> I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close
> study of Pepper’s thought.  So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread
> is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: *World
> Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence* (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of
> California Press).
>
> Why Pepper?  Why Now?
>
>
>    -  As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself
>    puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions.
>    These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and
>    science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated”
>    and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in relation
>    to broader (and perhaps alternative) metaphysical systems.
>    - Given its scope and conceptual rigor, my intuition is that Stephen
>    Pepper’s work will be of considerable value as I continue to work through
>    these issues.  The description on the back cover of *World Hypotheses*
>    offers some justification for this intuition:
>       -   “In setting forth his root-metaphor theory and examining six
>       such hypotheses – animism, mysticism, formism, mechanism, contextualism,
>       and organicism – *Pepper surveys the whole field of metaphysics*…The
>       virtue of the root-metaphor method is that it puts metaphysics on a purely
>       factual basis and pushes philosophical issues back to the interpretation of
>       evidence” (emphasis added).
>
> Procedural matters:
>
>
>    - My intent in this thread is to proceed with a close reading of
>    Pepper’s text, several chapters at a time.   My next post (scheduled for
>    Sunday, January 7) will focus on Chapters 1-4.   Anyone with a copy of *World
>    Hypotheses* is welcome to read along and offer corrections and/or
>    clarifications.   But, in case you can’t do the reading, I will try to make
>    sure my outlines are sufficiently clear that they would make sense to
>    everyone on this listserv.
>    - For the time being, I will limit myself to elaborating and
>    clarifying the thought of Stephen Pepper.  The purpose of this thread is
>    not to articulate my own point of view. That will come later.  Others are
>    certainly free to offer critical comments from whatever vantage point they
>    wish.  My replies will simply reflect my effort to articulate how I think
>    Pepper might respond to the matter at hand. [Of course, I may misinterpret
>    Pepper; in which case, I hope to be corrected.  Indeed, I anticipate that
>    my understanding of Pepper will evolve considerably over the course of this
>    project.]
>    -  Although the positions articulated in this thread are not my own, I
>    will nevertheless frequently generate original examples to illustrate the
>    arguments that I believe Pepper is trying to make.  To render as clear as
>    possible the distinction between Pepper’s writings and my own elaborations,
>    I will provide page references for all ideas and examples that can be found
>    in *World Hypotheses*.
>    -  When we reach the end of Pepper’s (1942) text, I will proceed to
>    Phase 2 of this venture: How does the ToK/UTUA framework stands in relation
>    to Root Metaphor theory?
>
>  As noted above, I will begin this inquiry with a close reading of
> Chapters 1-4.  These chapters include a discussion of the distinction
> (quite important to Pepper) between “multiplicative” and “structural”
> corroboration (and the corresponding difference between “data” and
> “dandum”).
>
> But it seems appropriate to end this post with a (hopefully enticing)
> “sneak preview of coming attractions”.   In the opening paragraphs of *World
> Hypotheses*, Pepper (1942) observes that “among the variety of objects
> which we find in the world are hypotheses about the world itself” (p. 1).
> Examples cited by Pepper include the worldviews implicit in Plato’s*
> Republic*, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, and Descartes’s *Meditations*.  To
> his list, we might add Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams*, Skinner’s *Beyond
> Freedom & Dignity*, and Rogers’ *On Becoming a Person*.
>
> In Chapter 5, Pepper offers four maxims pertaining to world hypotheses:
>
>
>    - *Maxim I:* “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor"
>    (p. 96).
>    -  *Maxim II*: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
>       -   "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of
>       one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both
>       hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
>    - *Maxim III*: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
>       - "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually
>       exclusive.  A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing" (p. 104)
>    - *Maxim IV*: “Concepts which have lost contact with their root
>    metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113)
>
> If you share an interest in the issues reflected in this introductory
> e-mail, then I invite you to accompany me on a journey through the work of
> Stephen Pepper. The next installment of this series (focusing on Chapters
> 1-4) is scheduled for Sunday, January 7.
>
> ~ Steve Quackenbush
>
> P.S.,: My edition of *World Hypotheses* includes two subtitles.  On the
> cover, the subtitle is "Prolegomena to systematic philosophy and a complete
> survey of metaphysics".  On the first page, the subtitle is "A Study in
> Evidence".   Both subtitles are appropriate, but I think the former more
> appropriately reflects the incredible ambition of the text.
>
>
>
>
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