Hi James,
“1. What is a thought (redness), i.e., how is it physically represented in
the brain, and”
This seems confused to me. What do you mean by “represent” here? What is
the definition of “redness” for you? Representational Qualia Theory models
different intrinsic properties with different terms. Red is a label for
anything that reflects or emits red light. Redness is a different label
for the different intrinsic quality of our knowledge of red things. The
intrinsic quality, redness, is the definition for the term ‘redness’.
Things with intrinsic qualities (redness) can be thought of or interpreted
as (using a dictionary) “representing something else”. But redness just is
an intrinsic quality, you don’t represent it, it is the definition of the
word 'redness'.
“(2) Are you aware that you no longer have a term for "redness"?
It's the awareness of having a construct - metacognition - thinking about
thinking - that is consciousness.”
That is a different definition of “consciousness” than what Representational
Qualia Theory <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=gbsTDJOpkYUwHq6qarJ61W7JJXPP1KK09UJ73_mq970&s=p6V7B14poz3wVnqGA9qSYt5q6DRguSipTxWPPOUyxcw&e= >
Uses. Let me see if I can describe the problem we would have with using
your definition, starting with your statement:
“And when you do this, intentionally, you are, in my subjective
experience, *more
aware*.”
Something trivial like a thermostat, could be implemented both abstractly
or phenomenally. An abstract system would be based on 1s and 0s. When the
internal wire changed from 0 to 5 volts (required dictionary: 0 volts = 0 ,
5 volts = 1) the thermostat would turn on the heat. A phenomenal system
could represent the off state with greenness and the on state with
redness. When greenness changed to redness, the heat would be turned on.
You don’t need a dictionary for redness, it just is. 1’s and 0s are
abstracted away from the intrinsic properties, via additional dictionary or
transducing hardware. Phenomenal systems run directly on intrinsic
qualities like redness and greenness.
You could make both of these systems “*more aware*”, both having additional
"metacognition" By computationally binding additional, self-referential
knowledge such as: “There is an additional me, and this me no longer has a
term for ‘redness’”. The abstract one would represent this additional lack
of knowledge, abstractly, or independent of any specific intrinsic
qualities, while a phenomenal system would represent the same additional
“self-aware’ knowledge directly on additional computationally bound into
the gestalt of elemental qualities like redness and greenness.
This is how your definition would classify these 4 things differently than
RQT:
* RQT
definition Jame’s definition*
Abstract thermostat… Not Conscious
Not Conscious
Phenomenal thermostat
Conscious Not Conscious
*More aware* abstract thermostat Not Conscious
Conscious
*More aware* phenomenal thermostat Conscious
Conscious
Not only do we know both phenomenal thermostats are conscious, we know what
each is like.
It's not about how complex it is, it's about whether it is like redness or
greenness or not. (running directly on intrinsic qualities or abstracted
away from them with a dictionary)
On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 8:40 AM James Lyons-Weiler <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> Interesting discussion; I've read the general form of the qualia-based
> concept of consciousness.
>
> Perhaps an improbable thought experiment will teach us something:
>
> You are born. You have no concept of a term for "red" or "redness". That
> concept does not exist in your brain until
> the perception of redness occurs. The capacity to experience redness
> exists, however, presuming you, the child, is not color-blind.
>
> You are shown a red object for the first time on your 5th birthday. You
> have experienced discussions about this other color,
> called "red", you have read about it. In your mind, there is a color,
> something more like purple than like pink, the opposite of green.
>
> You see this new color. Most people might wonder "is this red?".
> The association between the actual color and term of course is
> culture, and unless you are lied to, you are told "yes" and the brain
> construct associating the color til that date of "more like purple than
> like pink, the opposite of green" is expanded to include, and indeed be
> replaced by "red".
>
> You're not a young adult, and you experience a head injury. You lose your
> capacity to speak; you can learn again how to speak, but you must re-learn
> all of your words.
>
> Including 'red'.
>
> Two important questions, that distinguish mental constructs from
> consciousness:
>
> (1) Before you relearn your words,
> -Do you recognize "red"?
>
> (2) Are you aware that you no longer have a term for "redness"?
>
> It's the awareness of having a construct - metacognition - thinking about
> thinking - that is consciousness.
>
> And when you do this, intentionally, you are, in my subjective experience,
> more aware.
>
> The physical layering of the neocortex during the last 500,000 years is
> likely made possible by a shift
> in the potency of neural stem cells lying at the base of the outer
> subventricular zone. Both intermediate progenitor (IP) cells, which divide
> to produce pairs of neurons. and radial glial fibers play a role in
> neurogenesis. Compared to humans, the number of outer subventricular zone
> radial glia-like (oRG) cells exist in, say, the mouse, is very small.
>
> Fig 4 of this reference is a good illustration
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3610574_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=gbsTDJOpkYUwHq6qarJ61W7JJXPP1KK09UJ73_mq970&s=j1JVi8qzyJG-0pvHNAsQHGjpHZdrcNE4XElnMGh_GeQ&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3610574_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=rkVmvs7HnCdBl5voaYXl1dAk0IgqyWdvwls39O9JUX4&e=>
>
> The evolutionary shift in the potency of the stem cells that give rise to
> more complex outer subventricular zone involves
> gene duplication events of genes that control the stem cells' activities.
>
> The neocortex, and the cortex, being layered upon the cortex, layered upon
> the more primitive brain stem, "experiences"
> signals from "beneath" and sorts them out. The cerebral cortex, being a
> location involved in much of awareness of things
> (as experiments with rhesus monkeys have shown), is a good candidate for
> general consciousness. Higher thinking, like
> mathematics, fires up the prefrontal cortex as it monitors and controls
> the flow of information among the posterior parietal cortex, ventrotemporal
> occipital cortex, and itself... many of the experiences and duties our
> brains undertake are managed by, primarily,
> the prefrontal cortex such as focus (aware of thought), planning
> (organizing and thus awareness of thought), impulse control (awareness of
> limbic signals), emotional control (ditto), empathy (awareness of others'
> perceptions), judgment (ditto) and insight (de novo synthesis, generative
> knowledge). So the frontal cortex is a good candidate for much of what we
> experience as consciousness.
>
> That outlay provides us with an rather standard overall schematic, but
> it's reductionist to a fault in that it never answers the question
>
> 1. What is a thought (redness), i.e., how is it physically represented in
> the brain, and
>
> 2. How are we aware of our holding a construct of redness?
>
> If a thought is a neural pattern, it should, if physically relocated from
> one brain to the next, in principle be transferrable.
>
> We do not have the technology to do that, but imagine if we could arrange
> neurons via nanobots, let's say, a collection of neurons
> into the same pattern that was recognized as firing reproducibly when a
> mouse is shown food...
>
> if a thought is a neural pattern, it might be disrupted in two ways;
> disrupted via impairment of the mapping information
> of where the information is stored, or impairment of the actual stored
> information. When we "forget" something, it's likely
> that we lost the keys to the card catalog - and the neocortex is an
> excellent hierarchical system within which general categories
> and specific instance bits of information might be stored. With 100,000
> billion neurons in the neocortex, we
> would likely have a physical limit to the card catalog on the order 0.06
> mb (six layers x 100,000), if they were truly and strictly hierarchical.
> But we know in spite of broad appearances that the physical architecture of
> the neocortex and the secret to its complexity is in the lateral
> connections, typified not by static representation but instead by dynamic,
> living, moving arbors - not a fixed microstructure, but a tendency of a
> neural pattern, with free-flowing microglia pruning away during learning,
> creating physical
> representations of where knowledge lies and the information itself.
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3767963_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=gbsTDJOpkYUwHq6qarJ61W7JJXPP1KK09UJ73_mq970&s=etINGEZGYM6uJSJk9u4F2NSiciXa9y0g4NwGcl8dCvM&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC3767963_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=wVXNjjVoDigyIt-JlksKZ96JgJxrQBlesD8fngXNNCg&e=>
>
> The brain sculpts itself throughout life with processes we are aware of,
> but that we only have some control over, and processes
> that we have no hope of driving. Beware: the human brain expresses the
> largest number of genes' RNA than any other organ, and also the greatest
> diversity of splice variants (more alternative splicing) than any other
> organ, as well.
>
> While general consciousness is disruptible via signalling conduits, but
> then same for loss of 02.
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC4280551_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=gbsTDJOpkYUwHq6qarJ61W7JJXPP1KK09UJ73_mq970&s=9mc-zIzvDUbVSnigsgIjN60UAVgR4IHW-tNMLz4r6_k&e=
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov_pmc_articles_PMC4280551_&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=SKMdcFtEn3l7NvdjQdLL2eJ3JvJoFnzazZTtLyfqetc&e=>
>
> I think we know only this: Somewhere between proteins, cells, tissues and
> subregions/organ awash in electrochemical baths lie 100% of human
> consciousness; it seems to reside in the interrelationships among numerous
> working parts of "representation" with the whole being greater than the sum
> of the living parts. If in this description there lies a "qualia", I'd be
> gratified to know. My point is that no description of human consciousness
> can be complete w/out including consideration of both developmental and
> evolutionary processes and trends. I don't rule out an emergent field
> w/long-distance effects by any means, and understanding those relationships
> require the evolutionary and developmental perspectives.
>
> In 2014, I was set to embark on a book on the evolution of consciousness
> but became distracted into trying to understand
> what autism is and wrote that book, instead.
>
> Now I find I must write out a general theory of science as Science has
> lost its way completely, at least the loudest and most
> powerful influences of Science on society are becoming threats to reality
> and to safety.
>
> If there is a book afoot I would not mind contributing a chapter (subject
> to review/revision) on the implications of evolution
> and development on consciousness. I have a publisher whom I think would
> welcome a multi-authored piece written for the masses.
>
> James Lyons-Weiler
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:50 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>> Thanks, Brent.
>>
>> The challenge here is that it seems to me you assume “redness” has a
>> neurophysiological anchor that is consistent and independent of the rest of
>> the context. But there are lots of reasons to suppose that redness does not
>> have a direct one-to-one linkage with neurophysiological properties per se.
>> That is, there may be lots of different kinds of neurological arrangements
>> and histories that produce redness. Consider how the checkerboard illusion
>> demonstrates the same external wavelength results in massively different
>> interior experiences depending on context…
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Consider also that my brain’s pathway to generate greyness might not be
>> your brain’s pathway. To see what I mean, consider how some individuals
>> have remarkable brain pathology (i.e., huge parts of the brain are missing)
>> but develop in relatively normal ways (e.g., see here
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.bbc.com_future_article_20141216-2Dcan-2Dyou-2Dlive-2Dwith-2Dhalf-2Da-2Dbrain&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=Uz_mmdidTLRKWVfN0GMyz5YL9uvyFHq_-79ZxFWm_g8&e=>
>> .)
>>
>>
>>
>> My point here is that “greyness” is not necessarily tied to one thing the
>> brain in all species is doing. Or at least, there is very good reason to
>> believe that is not the case. And given where things are, if I interpreted
>> you correctly, I disagree with your conclusion that the hard problem is
>> either not hard or solved. (And this is just one of the reasons…there are
>> many).
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Gregg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion <
>> [log in to unmask]> *On Behalf Of *Brent Allsop
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 16, 2020 1:14 PM
>> *To:* [log in to unmask]
>> *Subject:* Re: sorting out the way to talk about behavior, mind and
>> consciousness
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Gregg,
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 6:09 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>> Does anyone have control over the Wiki Tree of Knowledge Entry? We need
>> an update on that and I am not sure who put it up.
>>
>>
>>
>> Are you talking wikipedia.org
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__wikipedia.org&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zocMGsB2F2PKbV6zNlyupZnafSU_GuMwulvnrd_Na90&s=yT0CfPPss3DuYy2sjTHqQK9kqIOBSlMwLVpbqAap7YA&e=>?
>> Anyone can edit that, even anonymously, right?
>>
>>
>>
>> Second, as we discussed during the 2019 TOK Conference at JMU, the hard
>> problem surely remains, at least to some degree. Let me put it this way.
>> Which animals are conscious and what kind of qualia do they experience and
>> how do you know? If the hard problem was solved, “neurophenomenologists”
>> could tell me exactly the kind of Mind2 a praying mantis, a bumble bee, a
>> sardine, a squid, a cardinal, a rat, a baboon and a killer whale have. I
>> have been reading up on the science of animal consciousness and they can’t.
>> And the reason is clear: We don’t really understanding the explanatory
>> ontological mechanism that enables perspectival experience to emerge.
>>
>>
>>
>> RQT is not only predicting what is and isn't conscious, but what it is
>> phenomenally like. Once we discover what it is that has a redness quality,
>> and what it is tha has a greenness quality, and the mechanism used to
>> computationally bind them into one composite consciousness gestalt, we will
>> be able to observe the same thing (or not) in other animals. Once we know
>> what it is that has a redness quality, if we objectively observe that in a
>> bat, bumble bee, a sardine, rat, a computer, a thermostat... we will not
>> only know that it is conscious, we will know that it is like the elemental
>> redness experienced by a certain percentage of the human population. For
>> example, if we observed the same redness and greenness qualitative stuff
>> being rendered into similar gestalts in a bat using echolocation, we would
>> know that it is like our visual redness and greenness to be that bat. We
>> use particular elemental qualities to represent our visual conscious
>> knowledge. Any other animal or machine that uses these colorness qualities
>> to represent any types of knowledge, we'll be able to create objectiver
>> detectors/observer, like Jack Galant is doing
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_6FsH7RK1S2E&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zocMGsB2F2PKbV6zNlyupZnafSU_GuMwulvnrd_Na90&s=pkXUXYvfSx7ZsF_8RqU9TWsKT09Atdzf2ehWcm2inI0&e=> (using
>> much more advanced detectors than just fMRIs), and project this data on
>> screens to produce the same visual qualities in our brain - effing the
>> ineffable. And this is just the 1. weakest form of effing the ineffable.
>> There will also be the 2. stronger, and 3. strongest forms of effing the
>> ineffable for all of this.
>>
>>
>>
>> For example, John’s in cognitive science and the metaphysics of Mind2
>> makes it quite clear (to me at least) that we should distinguish adjectival
>> qualia (redness, greenesss) from adverbial qualia (the witnessing function
>> that brings aspects together in a hereness, nowness, and togetherness).
>> That folks can meditate and achieve a “pure consciousness event” that is
>> essentially devoid of adjectival qualia is good phenomenological evidence
>> that there is logic to separating the two functions. Relating this to RQT,
>> it suggests there is both representational/modeling and aspectualizing.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, the redness we experience when we look at something red should be
>> distinguished between the best we can 'recall' or remember of redness when
>> our eyes are closed. But the same general objective/subjective, perceived
>> from afar vs directly apprehended principles apply to it all. There must
>> be something physically different in our brain, which is both of these
>> elemental phenomenal constituents of knowledge, and they both must be able
>> to be computationally bound to make some kind of composite gestalt of these
>> elemental intrinsic physics we directly apprehend, for which when we
>> perceive from afar we will only have abstract descriptions of the physical
>> behavior, still requiring a dictionary.
>>
>>
>>
>> All conscious experiences, including anything experienced by talented
>> meditators, are all composed of computationally bound elemental intrinsic
>> qualities of some kind, like redness and greenness. The intrinsic
>> qualities of all that can both be directly apprehended, or the behavior of
>> such can be objectively observed and abstractly described. And it is true
>> for all of it, that the qualitative nature can only be known by directly
>> apprehending, even though we can objectively observe the behavior of all of
>> it. right?
>>
>>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
> --
> ---
> james lyons-weiler, phd
> Author, CEO, President, Scientist
> Editor-in-Chief, Science, Public Health Policy, and the Law
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> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__amzn.to_1TGYY9r&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zc7ydABO6PtO46hQFAwOxfzbY0mlYggOk0HGzTWAJiU&s=a5OGD6i1PzXj0imjz0FwSOBgmOyZeWkcQR1GBKtVhho&e=>
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