Hi Gregg,



Yes.  All the old grates, like Descartes, Lock, Kant… on whose shoulders we
stand, came up with terminology, describing models, that captures parts of
what is going on.  Lock was right when he made a distinction between
“primary” and “secondary” qualities, but they also missed many things that
we know, today.  Here is a quote from that article you referenced:



*Primary qualities* are thought to be properties
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Properties&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=ypYheJMSiP8n8SqJZvQAeZT99eCwi1P5S-1OjltGptQ&s=YjR_MSi_6ozYtJe0zSPD4GTECpaKf0Srzg3EWbHo-Zk&e=> of objects that are independent
of any observer, such as solidity <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Solid&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=ypYheJMSiP8n8SqJZvQAeZT99eCwi1P5S-1OjltGptQ&s=HOfyDwR6Qt2bk2d20Apg8EBrcwaxbY4qmWqaV4QLAZM&e=>,
extension <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Extension-5F-28metaphysics-29&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=ypYheJMSiP8n8SqJZvQAeZT99eCwi1P5S-1OjltGptQ&s=mIr5G0NxfB6bU0VqturzhOJiti31sIvUIUz2hiCgdfA&e=>, motion
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Motion-5F-28physics-29&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=ypYheJMSiP8n8SqJZvQAeZT99eCwi1P5S-1OjltGptQ&s=IQSoXLneWUr3auOvUu41Ai9rE-aBhKX1Znqu_L1kvro&e=>, number
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Number&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=ypYheJMSiP8n8SqJZvQAeZT99eCwi1P5S-1OjltGptQ&s=dqFrc1NgwYp_oa2Ov3lZi7D9RlBcUPWzWXe4mSv3XmU&e=> and figure
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Shape&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=ypYheJMSiP8n8SqJZvQAeZT99eCwi1P5S-1OjltGptQ&s=-FBvJCxrArzcd6Gw75L8F4X7KeOENJzdrgULZhBBdgU&e=>. These characteristics convey facts.
They exist in the thing itself, can be determined with certainty, and do
not rely on subjective judgments. For example, if an object is spherical,
no one can reasonably argue that it is triangular.



Descartes pointed out that we can’t determine these solidity, extension,
motion, number… things (#1) with certainty, as we could be a brain in a
vat, where only (#2) exists.  It is #2, or the qualities of our conscious
knowledge that are the only facts of the matter of anything in itself.
Since we are aware of these physical qualities, directly, we can’t doubt
their existence, nor their qualities.



#2 also has “solidity, extension, motion, number and figure”, as our
knowledge models and tracks reality, based on the abstract data coming from
our senses.  Lehar describes this as a diorama, in our brain, that has all
of these solidity, extension, motion, number and figure…” that represents
the same in reality.



The only physical things in the world, which we know the quality of, is our
physical conscious knowledge.  Everything else we know about the outside
world is only abstract knowledge, which we don’t yet know how to
qualitatively interpret.  Check out Steven Lehar’s picture at the top of
the “Representational Qualia Theory” camp statement:

https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=ypYheJMSiP8n8SqJZvQAeZT99eCwi1P5S-1OjltGptQ&s=m_trX15tUH_rmanAM3ZXp0Tjlxaxzx2_AxLXanRvtlE&e=

and notice that only the miss shaped (not at all like it’s referent)
diorama knowledge, inside the brain has color.  The fact that everything
outside the brain is in black and white, indicates that all we know of it,
is abstract knowledge.  Objectively, we are blind to physical qualities, at
least until sentimentalists stop being qualia blind, so they can discover
what it is, in our brain, that has a redness quality…


Does that answer your question?




On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:03 PM JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> Brent, I am saying that because oxytocin has pleiotropic effects perhaps
> it connects the image of a strawberry to its taste on the tongue and the
> color red. And these  elements of red strawberries were acquired across
> space/time diachronically. That’s what I imagine quaila to be as free
> associations . I wonder what someone with red-green color blindness sees
> looking at a strawberry?
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:52 PM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>> Brent,
>>
>> Just so I am clear, Is your distinction below parallel or similar to Locke’s
>> distinction between primary and secondary qualities
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Primary_secondary-5Fquality-5Fdistinction&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=gYtcWhJWfW_jwIkpdOIqstz4l4xPnp3Chp0vIZobamM&s=pK9xRcnEhvTDmerVyZRDnnr2XRkxDtX15ylr08Rsq9I&e=>?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Gregg
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion <
>> [log in to unmask]> *On Behalf Of *Brent Allsop
>> *Sent:* Thursday, February 28, 2019 4:47 PM
>> *To:* [log in to unmask]
>> *Subject:* Re: How Psychology Helps Reinforce the Justification System
>> of Neoliberalism
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi John,
>>
>> I have missed the point, because we are talking about completely
>> different things.  Everything you are saying makes complete sense, in a
>> completely qualia blind way.  For example, when you talk about linking “color
>> and other physiologic functions of oxytocin” what do you mean by
>> “color”?  It seems that what you mean by color, you are only talking about
>> abstract names, such as the word “red”.
>>
>>
>>
>> I’m talking about something completely different.  I’m talking about
>> physical qualities, not their names.  Within my model, when you say color,
>> I don’t know which of the flooring two physical properties you are talking
>> about:
>>
>>
>>
>> 1. The physical properties that are the target of our observation. These
>> properties initiate the perception process, such as a strawberry reflecting
>> red light.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2. The physical properties within the brain that are the final results of
>> the perception process. These properties comprise our conscious knowledge
>> of a red strawberry. We experience this *directly*, as *redness*.
>>
>>
>>
>> I guess you’re not talking about either of these, you are only talking
>> about the physical properties of oxytocin, and how it behaves in the
>> retina?  Would you agree that it is a very real possibility, that
>> experimentalists, operating in a non-qualia blind way, could falsify any
>> belief that oxytocin is necessary for any computationally bound composite
>> conscious experiences of redness, or any other qualia?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 2:26 PM JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>> Brent, I think that you have missed the point of the hormone oxytocin
>> functionally connecting the cell that perceives color (the cone) with the
>> epithelial cells that line the retina, offering a way of physically seeing
>> red in conjunction with pain.....it's a hypothesis for linking vision and
>> color and other physiologic functions of oxytocin, of which there are many,
>> including regulation of body heat, empathy, the relaxation of the uterus
>> during birth and production of breast milk, referred to as 'let down',
>> which I always thought was a funny term, be that as it may. I would
>> imagine, for example, that a woman in labor might see red due to the pain
>> of that experience. And just to expand on that idea of interconnections
>> between physiology and physics, the attached paper shows the homologies
>> (same origin) between Quantum Mechanics and The First Principles of
>> Physiology. That nexus would hypothetically open up to seeing a red
>> strawberry, particularly because I equated pleiotropy (the interconnections
>> between physiologic traits through the distribution of the same gene in
>> different tissues and organs) with non-localization, the physics that
>> Einstein referred to as 'spooky action at a distance'.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 3:48 PM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi John,
>>
>>
>>
>> I’m glad you at least mentioned the name, “red” of a physical quality.
>> But are the physical properties of oxytocin, or the physical properties of
>> anything in the retina anything like either of the physical qualities of
>> these two things?
>>
>>
>>
>> 1. The physical properties that are the target of our observation. These
>> properties initiate the perception process, such as a strawberry reflecting
>> red light.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2. The physical properties within the brain that are the final results of
>> the perception process. These properties comprise our conscious knowledge
>> of a red strawberry. We experience this *directly*, as *redness*.
>>
>>
>>
>> Other than the fact that we may be able to abstractly interpret some of
>> these physical qualities, like we can interpret the word “red” as
>> representing a redness physical quality?  You can’t know what the word red
>> (or anything in the eye representing anything) means, unless you provide a
>> mechanical interpretation mechanism that get’s you back to the real
>> physical quality they represent.
>>
>>
>>
>> All abstract representations (including all computer knowledge) are
>> abstracted away from physical qualities.  Any set of physical qualities,
>> like that of a particular physical cone in a retina, can represent a 1 (or
>> anything else), but only if you have an interpretation mechanism to get the
>> one, from that particular set of physics.  Consciousness, on the other
>> hand, represents knowledge directly on physical qualities, like redness and
>> greenness.  This is more efficient, since it requires less abstracting
>> hardware.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 1:14 PM JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>> Brent and TOKers, I am hypothesizing that consciousness is the net
>> product of our physiology, which is vertically integrated from the
>> unicellular state to what we think of as complex traits. In that vein, in
>> the paper attached I proferred as an example the role of oxytocin in
>> endothermy/homeothermy/warm-bloodedness. The pleiotropic effect of oxytocin
>> on retinal cones and retinal epithelial cells would hypothetically account
>> for seeing 'red' when looking at a strawberry, for example. It's the
>> 'permutations and combinations' that form our physiology that cause such
>> interrelationships due to our 'history', both short-term developmental and
>> long-term phylogenetic. Hope that's helpful.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 2:02 PM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Tim Henriques asked:
>>
>>
>>
>> “What is your operational definition of consciousness?”
>>
>>
>>
>> John Torday replied with his definition / model of consciousness.
>>
>>
>>
>> Also, if you google for solutions to the “hard problem” of consciousness,
>> you will find as many solutions as you care to take time to look into.
>>
>>
>>
>> I’m sure all these models have some utility, when it comes to
>> understanding various things about our consciousness, and our place in the
>> world.  But what I don’t understand is, why not a one of them include
>> anything about the qualitative nature of consciousness?  None of them give
>> us anything that might enable us to bridge Joseph Levine’s “Explanatory
>> Gap”
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Explanatory-5Fgap&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=UIxALV6nC0i0REWXcxwY9XJkwi_k0lNlkxReXKG7Kc4&e=>.
>> In other words, to me, they are all completely blind to physical qualities
>> or qualia.  In fact, as far as I know, all of “peer reviewed” scientific
>> literature, to date, is obliviously qualia blind.  Is not the qualitative
>> nature of consciousness it’s most important attribute?
>>
>>
>>
>> One important thing regarding conscious knowledge is the following
>> necessary truth:
>>
>>
>>
>> “If you know something, there must be something physical that is that
>> knowledge.”
>>
>>
>>
>> This implies there are two sets of physical qualities we must consider
>> when trying to objectively perceive physical qualities:
>>
>>
>>
>> 1. The physical properties that are the target of our observation. These
>> properties initiate the perception process, such as a strawberry reflecting
>> red light.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2. The physical properties within the brain that are the final results of
>> the perception process. These properties comprise our conscious knowledge
>> of a red strawberry. We experience this *directly*, as *redness*.
>>
>>
>>
>> If we seek to find what it is in our brain which has a redness quality,
>> we must associate and identify the necessary and sufficient set of physics
>> for a redness experience.  For example, it is a hypothetical possibility
>> that it is glutamate, reacting in synapses, that has the redness quality.
>> If experimentalists could verify this, we would know that it is glutamate
>> that has a redness quality.  We would then finally know that it is
>> glutamate we should interpret “red” as describing.
>>
>>
>>
>> So, given all that, and given that consciousness is composed of a boat
>> load of diverse qualia or physical qualities all computationally bound
>> together, and if experimentalists can verify these predictions about the
>> qualitative nature of various physical things.  Would that not imply the
>> following definitions?
>>
>>
>>
>> “Intentionality, free will, intersubjectivity, self-awareness, desire,
>> love, spirits… indeed consciousness itself, are all computational bound
>> composite qualitative knowledge.”
>>
>>
>>
>> As always, for more information, see the emerging expert consensus
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_81-2DMind-2DExperts_1&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=0lbtXYwu6UYUdQeUkWWMfrHjCaUUKuXa5N1zYDhjsf8&e=>
>> camp over at canonizer.com
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__canonizer.com&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=QF6BXcCLyHuTabm0Y_tR_F1kNvcsGgmM-j5AKZ5FuaE&e=>
>> being called: “Representational Qualia Theory
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__canonizer.com_topic_88-2DRepresentational-2DQualia_6&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=is49AUyt7veBXQyowhTXwLkYTEOXiaEfeR_6txOxafU&s=pEF0jzBSKnzm7WMm97GdK89Xq78vTnh8L2J427I7nac&e=>”.
>>
>>
>>
>>
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