Brent, I honestly don't understand how you can say that the denotative
dictionary definition is 'wrong'. It may connote something different. And
as for my lack of understanding of the way you see Qualia, I think you make
the same systematic error that Etienne Roux talks about in the attached
paper on physiology as function. John

On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 9:40 AM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

>
> Sorry, this e-mail should have been addressed to John, not Greg.
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 10:37 AM Brent Allsop <[log in to unmask]>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi Greg,
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:13 AM JOHN TORDAY <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>> HI Brent, I essentially agree with your description of what Qualia are,
>>>
>>
>> If you do agree, then your thinking, or at least what you say about many
>> things, must have now changed.  For example, do you now understand how the
>> dictionary definition of red is wrong and qualia blind?  Do you now
>> understand how redness grenness qualia inverts (either natural or
>> engineered) are functionally and mechanistically identical, but physically
>> (and consciously) very qualitatively different.  If not, then you still do
>> not understand, let alone agree with, my description of what qualia are.
>>
>>
>>> but as I have said repeatedly, the only way to understand the
>>> mechanistic basis for Qualia, like that of physiology, is to delve into the
>>> 'history' of the strawberry over the course of the evolution of the
>>> organism.
>>>
>>
>> Again, this indicates that you do not yet understand.  Redness and
>> grenness are mechanistically identical, but qualitatively very different.
>> Either one can represent knowledge of red things in mechanistically
>> identical ways.  So, again, using your models, you can learn everything
>> about the mechanistic bases for qualia, while still completely missing
>> whether you are talking about the mechanistically identical redness or
>> grenness.
>>
>> Without doing that you will only show associations and correlations, not
>>> the origins and causation, which empowers prediction as the hallmark of a
>>> true scientific concept. John
>>>
>>
>> This statement also reveals how you don't yet understand what qualitative
>> physical qualities are.  Associations and correlations between a redness
>> experience, and the particular physics in the brain that has a redness
>> experience are the only thing important to modeling qualia, and making
>> predictions like are two people red green inverts or not.  The origins and
>> causations, have nothing to do with these kinds of predictions about or
>> objective observations discovering whether someone uses redness or grenness
>> to represent red things with.
>>
>> Sure your models handle, deal with, and predict a great many things about
>> the mechanisms of consciousness.  But they can tell us nothing about
>> whether someone is a red green invert, or not.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
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