Dear Colleagues:

I would like to add to this discussion, within which each participant appreciates some aspect of the issue/s at hand.
It seems we are stuck at a brick wall when it comes to the idea of the "consciousness hard problem.”

From my position (a natural “philosopher", allopathic physician, and pathologist) we seem to be stuck trying to explicate consciousness by considering “brain” function in terms of primary neurophysiology alone - though we allude to a role being performed by “other” elements, such as connectomes.
That is, trying to understand a complex physiologic function/product in terms of neurons, glia, synapses, neurotransmitters, etc, alone, falls short of our intents.
We can’t, for instance, understand and explain a bicycle in terms only of it’s chain drive, can we?

Minsky’s comment that "mind is what brain does," affords some insight.
Mind is a product of the brain, the body within which it lies (think 4E), and the mind/body's interaction within the environment within which it exists.

From the internet: The brain is an organ but the mind isn't. The brain is the physical place where the mind resides (sic). ... The mind is the manifestations of thought, perception, emotion, determination, memory and imagination that takes place within the brain. Mind is often used to refer especially to the thought processes of reason. A simplistic but conceptually useful definition - see also: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wiktionary.org_wiki_mind&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=RnaflREbMiuyptQ0XCN0dMqhiOZ7eki7jpTgOkmT4-I&s=y7hPlJr15LbVt7MmGk_nPmUx7WjS8iIR1nRM0-2g5ps&e=  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wiktionary.org_wiki_mind&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=RnaflREbMiuyptQ0XCN0dMqhiOZ7eki7jpTgOkmT4-I&s=y7hPlJr15LbVt7MmGk_nPmUx7WjS8iIR1nRM0-2g5ps&e= >. 

But surely, far more than primary neurophysiology is involved in generating consciousness, or “the mind,” for that matter.
A more expansive view of neurophysiology suggests that at least 9 or more levels of neurophysiology are recognizable.
If we were to be able to understand and describe the interactions of all levels of neurophysiology, perhaps the problem would not be so “hard.”
In seems the mind (and one of its components, consciousness) is a non-physical construct arising from complex neurophysiological interactions.

Please find attached an incomplete draft of an expanded iteration of the recognizable levels of neurophysiology.
I include it in hopes that there may be some constructive criticism of this concept.
It may also serve as an aid for those with sleep problems.

Simply put, we have not reached a level of brain neurophysiology which enables one to understand how the brain/body produces that product we consider a “mind.”
The “mind” is, at least, an emergent non-physical physiologic product arising in the brain as a result of the physical and non-physical brain/mind/body/environment interactions - other compounding factors being “equal."

Best regards,

Waldemar





> On Sep 7, 2021, at 6:14 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> 
> Mike,
>  
>   I agree with what you say here. And my strong sense is that you and I share a highly similar ontology (i.e., we are both emergent naturalists as far as I can tell).
> 
> Best,
> Gregg
>  
>  
> From: tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]> On Behalf Of Michael Mascolo
> Sent: Tuesday, September 7, 2021 9:02 AM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Materialism without Reductionism -- and why "mind" is a troublesome concept...
>  
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of JMU. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
> Bruce, Robert, Gregg and All: 
>  
> I wonder if we might be talking passed each other.  I wonder if we are approaching the issue of reductionism with different meanings in mind.  My comments are mainly directed at the need for a theory of persons in which consciousness is not seen as something that is non-material — that is, spiritual or non-corporeal.  If the emergent product has properties that are not in the base elements, then that emergent product is irreducible.  So, yes, the experience of red is irreducible to the base elements (neural firings).  Nonetheless, I suggest that the emergent experience of red is the equivalent of the novel organizational whole — the integrated biological structures and processes that produce the experience of “red”.  We will not find red in the synapses; it the emergent product of the network.
>  
> A bicycle is not to be found in its parts; a bicycle is an emergent whole that arises when the parts are put together and function as one unit.  The musical tone of the violin is not to be found in the violin, but in the playing of this song by this master at this time — and then heard by this person with this level of sophistication, etc.  The tone of is an emergent equivalent, I suggest, of the whole.  This is an issue of parts and wholes, I think.
>  
> Bruce and Robert seem to be speaking of a different sense of reductionism — whether the experience of redness can be, in some sense, objectively identified (they might be able to clarify my understanding of their positions here) in those bodily processes. In my view, it can’t!  The experience of red is indeed irreducible. And the reason that the experience of red cannot be reduced to an objective characterization is that…well… objective — that is “third person” characterizations — do not exhaust the ways we come to know.  We cannot know “objectively” that this or that brain state provides the neurobiological substrata of the experiencing of red independent of the first and second person frames of reference.  First person experience is not reducible to third person observation.  (In fact, I would argue that BOTH first and third person descriptions of the world RELY UPON second person, shared intersubjective categories.  Without shared intersubjective categories, we would have not way to make first and third person experiences intelligible).
>  
> Given this, I am wondering if there is really disagreement here.  Brian, Robert, Gregg and Mike all seem to agree in some sense of emergence in order to explain the origins of experience; we seem to agree that no “objective” identification of “the experience of red” in the brain is possible (or even makes sense).  I imagine that we might agree that given the intersubjective category “red” — one that we create by coordinating our use of the word “red” with our experiences-of-the-world — that is, we agree that the word “red” correspond to the range of colors that we point to in this object, that one, that one and that one — we might be able to identify third person pattens of biological activity that are the equivalent —that correspond to or are the biological substrata for — experiencing red.  Do we?  If not, where do we disagree?
>  
> My Best,
>  
> Mike
>  
>  
> Michael F. Mascolo, Ph.D.
> Academic Director, Compass Program
> Professor, Department of Psychology
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> 
> 
> On Sep 7, 2021, at 7:04 AM, ryanrc111 <[log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
>  
>   But in my understanding, the 'hard problem' is deemed a hard problem, not because agent-like behaviors can emerge in complex systems -- that's all still third-person, objective description and focus; still a behavior-orientation.  The hard problem is a hard problem because there seems to be no objective explanation of how or why any of that would lead to first-person, qualitative feeling or experience.  
>  
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