A chart I found online that sums up what Steve wrote above, (which is great stuff, by the way!).
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.jeffbloom.net_docs_StephenPepper-2DWorldHypoth.pdf&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=Ng4yoQ27hVbm0eMSBTzXp7h1GWAQ0orIHSJbpBGhEKI&s=uwyQSgcsf4AAZ4nAy3UZdn8GOCrhX9uFSNBqt7hceVE&e=
On Sunday, January 14, 2018, 10:23:39 PM EST, Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Stephen Pepper’s WorldHypotheses: Season 1, Episode 2
Narrator: “Previously on World Hypotheses:”
- We began with “commonsense” (the dubitanda).
- Though “secure” (because we can always fall back on it), commonsense is nevertheless “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word,irritable” (p. 44).
- Assuch, we are driven to “refine” (or criticize) cognition.
- ForPepper, “all critical evidence becomes critical only as a result of theaddition of corroborative evidence” (p. 47)
- Corroborationcan take one of two forms:
- Multiplicativecorroboration: agreement among persons (consensus)
- Thisgenerates data that can vary fromrough to refined, depending on the extent or quality of corroboration. The fact that my four friends and I just sawCasper the Ghost is merely “rough data” (as I have no reason to believe that myskeptical brother will see things the same way whenever he shows up). Scores on the NEO-PI are relatively refined [insofaras everyone can see that Andrew scored one standard deviation below the mean onthe agreeableness subscale]
- Therefinement of data, it would appear, is the path to achieving objectivity in science – i.e.,interpretations free of idiosyncratic biases
- Structuralcorroboration: agreement among facts
- Thisgenerates danda that can vary fromrough to refined, depending on the extent or quality of corroboration.
- Thenotion of structural corroboration is rather mysterious at this point. Whatdoes it mean for a fact to agree with a fact? Asimple example is the principle of converging evidence, where multiples sourcesof information point me in the same direction (e.g., it is safe to sit on this chairbecause it is made of solid wood, the manufacturer can be trusted, etc.). But as our theories grow more complex, it isnot always clear what evidence would serve to corroborate a specifictheoretical claim. E.g., what facts can we highlight in supportof Melanie Klein’s “object relations” theory? And how do we determine the adequacyof this theory relative to competing accounts of the same phenomena? Do we simply count up the number ofcorroborations [such that each theory gets a “corroboration score”] or are somecorroborations worth more thanothers?
- Whereasmultiplicative corroboration offers us consensus,structural corroboration advances understanding.
- Ourgoal is ultimately to make sense of our universe, to grasp how it all “hangstogether”.
World Hypotheses, Chapters 5-7.
- Aworld hypothesis is a hypothesis about “the world itself” (p. 1).
- Buthow do we generate world hypotheses?
- Pepperoffers his “root metaphor theory” as “a hypothesisconcerning the origins of world theories” (p. 84; emphasis added)
- Thefact that this is just a hypothesisimplies that there may be other ways to generate theories about the world. The value of studying world hypotheses (ofwhatever sort) is not contingent on the truth of root metaphor theory.
- Pepperobserves that root metaphor theory “is itself a structural hypothesis” thatmust ultimately be supported by “an adequate world theory”
- ButPepper also acknowledges that we are not yet in possession of a perfect worldtheory:
- “Ideally,we should pass directly from dubitanda and data to fully adequate danda whichwould exhibit all things cognitively in their proper order. Unfortunately, danda are not at presentnearly adequate” (p. 86).
- Weare entitled to ask: Why do our world theories fall short of our cognitiveideal?
- Pepper’sroot metaphor theory is an effort explain howwe have developed our less-than-perfect world hypotheses.
- The root metaphor theory is “in the nature of a roughdandum” (p. 86, emphasis added).
- It“definitely does not legislate over world theories except so far as thesevoluntarily accept and refine it” (p. 86).
- “Onthe contrary, an adequate world theory by virtue of its refinement legislates overthis theory or any like it. There is no reliable cognitive appeal beyond anadequate world theory. But when worldtheories show themselves to be inadequate we accept what makeshifts we canfind. This root-metaphor theory is sucha makeshift. Its purpose is to squeezeout all the cognitive values that can found in the world theories we have andto supply a receptacle in which their juices may be collected, so that theywill not dry up from dogmatism, or be wasted over the ground through theindiscriminate pecking of marauding birds” (pp. 86-87).
Root Metaphor Theory
- Howdo we manage to get from common sense to a world hypothesis? [or from dubitandato relatively refined danda?]
- Peppersuggests that we look out into the world of common sense and grab onto something. In effect, I find myself saying: Perhaps this is the key to theuniverse!
- Here’show Pepper puts the matter:
- “Aman desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to itscomprehension. He pitches upon some area of common sense fact and tries if hecannot understand other areas in terms of this one. The original area becomesthen his basic analogy or root metaphor”(p. 91, emphasis added)
- Thisperson then “describes as best he can the characteristics of this area, or, ifyou will, discriminates its structure. Alist of its structural characteristics becomes his basic concepts ofexplanation and description. We callthem a set of categories” (p. 91,emphasis added)
- “Interms of these categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whetheruncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to interpret all facts in terms of these categories” (p.91)
- “Asa result of the impact of these other facts upon his categories, he may qualifyand readjust the categories…” (p. 91).
- “agreat deal of development and refinement is required if they are to proveadequate for a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 91).
- “Someroot metaphors prove more fertile than others, have greater powers of expansionand of adjustment. These survive incomparison with the others and generate relatively adequate world theories” (pp.91-92).
- So,let’s try to build a world theory:
- Inthe beginning, I adopted an unrefined natural attitude consonant with thespirit of my age.
- Oneday, I experience (seemingly out of the blue) a love more profound than anything I could have everimagined possible.
- Fully cognizant of the fact that words can never do justice to my experience, I nevertheless tell my friends and relatives that I have finally achieved a state of true peace and harmony – a sense of oneness with acaring cosmos.
- Perhaps this isthe key that unlocks the secret of the universe!
- Accordingto Pepper, I have just become a mystic.
- Rootmetaphor = Love
- “Thishypothesis states that this emotion is the substance of the universe, and thatas far as we differentiate things, these are generated from this substance andare ultimately nothing but this substance” (p. 133).
- Well,what’s wrong with this? [It sounds goodto me!]
- There’snothing to be said against the mystical experienceas such.
- Themystic “need not be a metaphysician. Hemight have and enjoy his experience and make no cognitive claims for it beyondhis having had it and enjoyed it” (p. 129)
- Butif mysticism is considered as a metaphysical hypothesis, it will ultimatelyleave us unsatisfied. Pepper citesmysticism as an example of a world hypothesis with inadequate scope. There are simply too many facts that thetheory leaves behind (or interprets in a manner that is simply too crude formore refined cognitive tastes)
- “Theimmediate temptation here is to deny outright the reality of all ‘facts’ exceptthe one mystic Fact” (p. 131).
- “Sopain, misery, sorrow, sadness are unreal, as opposed to beatific qualities” (p.134).
- In addition, "pleasures,comforts, sensuous delights are false from lack of intensity” (p. 134).
- Interestingly,Pepper dubs mysticism as an “emotional theory of truth” (p. 135).
- “Asthe philosophy of unity and love, itis the most destructive of all world theories in cognition and finally destroysitself by the very intensity of its desire for unity and peace” (p. 127).
- Ok,so much for mysticism.
- Ireturn to my stroll amongst the dubitanda. Itake a trip to Hawaii and receive a text message telling me that there is a “ballistic missile threat inbound” and Ishould “seek cover immediately.” Afterthirty minutes of panic, I am relieved to learn it was a false alarm. [Incidentally, this twist in the narrative was inspired by the fact that my brother is presently vacationing inHawaii and experienced the threat firsthand.]
- So, as I recover from the ballistic missile threat, I start thinking about myselfand how wonderful it is to be alive. Ihave goals, yet I also have the freedom to change my path in life. I have values, though I fully realize thatthey may well be crushed if I don’t do something to stand up for them.
- PerhapsI’m the key to the universe! Idon’t mean this in the sense that the universe should cater to my whims. Rather, perhaps my very mode ofbeing-in-the-world illuminates the structure of the cosmos. I look out into the starry heavens and I havea sense that “we are not alone”. [As TomCruise once said in an interview, “are you really so arrogant as to believe weare alone in this universe?”] Better,as I reflect on the cosmos, I don’t simply contemplate creation. I alsoexperience myself in relation to some sort of creative spirit – a divine“person” that somehow participates in my essence, or vice versa.
- Mytruth is no longer love (which, I nowrecognize, was simply a positive experience to bevalued).
- Rather, personhood as such is the key to theuniverse.
- Ihave become an animist.
- Root Metaphor = The Person
- Accordingto Pepper, “animism, as a metaphysical hypothesis, is the theory that takescommon-sense man, the human being, the person, as its primitive root metaphor”(p. 120).
- “Thisis the most appealing root metaphor that has ever been selected” (p. 120).
- “Thisview of the world is the only one in which many feels completely at home” (p.120).
- I’mreminded here of the wonderful scene at the end of Close Encounters, where abunch of kindhearted aliens arrive in a magnificent spaceship, befriendhumanity, and invite Richard Dreyfus to fly away on what I like to call: “thesecure base from outer space”.
- Inits crudest forms, animism is difficult to sustain past childhood. But the root metaphor can be refined:
- “The full maturity of an animistic worldtheory…occurs when the root metaphor of man’s personality has developed into inthe richest conception of spirit, and when a luxuriant mythology has vividlypopulated the universe with explanatory spirits” (p. 123).
- But:“under the pressure of criticism, mythological interpretations begin to bethinned down. At first they are treatedas allegories, then as symbols of something higher and finer, and finally thenotion of spirit itself is ephemeralized into an emotionally shaded word withvague direction outward or inward” (p. 124)
- So,the original animistic categories eventually evolve [or devolve] intoacceptable – but ultimately “empty” – abstractions (see pp. 124-126)
- Significantly,these abstractions (e.g. the divine “source of all”) retain their appealprecisely by virtue of their “animistic source”.
- “Theywould not be entertained for a moment if the source were cut off” (p. 126)
- Unlikemysticism, animism has no problem with scope. It doesn’t demean (or render lessthan real) any particular set of facts.
- Theproblem with animism, according to Pepper, is its inadequate precision.
- “Whatis thunder? It is the angry voice of agreat spirit….[Or] It is the stamping of the hoofs of the steeds of a greatspirit…[Or] It may even be a spirit itself roaring in pursuit of some other spiritto devour.” (p. 122).
- “[There]is nothing but the limits of poetic fancy to put a stop to suchinterpretations” (p. 122).
- “Theseinterpretations are all consonant with the categories of spirit....There is no one precise determination ofthunder, nor is there any precise method for finding one, nor is there any hopethat more factual observations will ever produce one through these categories”(p. 122).
- “Sincethe categories lack determinateness, they are unable to control theirinterpretations, which multiply about the same fact and mutually contradict oneanother” (p. 127, from the concluding paragraph of the section)
- Ifwe are able to decide upon a specific interpretation, it is by virtue of “theauthority of shaman, medicine man, and priest” (p. 123)
- Peppersubmits that “animism is the natural metaphysical support of authoritarianism”(p. 123)
- Note:For a consideration of animism in the context Gregg’s ToK framework, Irecommend Leigh Shaffer’s (2008) article entitled: Religion as a Large-ScaleJustification System: Does the Justification Hypothesis Explain AnimisticAttribution? [The abstract is available here: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__journals.sagepub.com_doi_abs_10.1177_0959354308097257-3FjournalCode-3Dtapa&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=Ng4yoQ27hVbm0eMSBTzXp7h1GWAQ0orIHSJbpBGhEKI&s=WGZJv0BUmlcpRcR45pLagLU3OV4Ao8spQ46FlWT_6R4&e= ]
Generalizationsregarding the role played by root metaphors in the development of WorldHypotheses:
- Maxim I: “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor" (p. 96).
- Pepper identifies four “relatively adequate” world theories and their corresponding "root metaphors"
- World Hypothesis #1 = Formism; root metaphor = "similarity"
- World Hypothesis #2 = Mechanism; root metaphor = "machine"
- World Hypothesis #3 = Contextualism; root metaphor = "historical event"
- World Hypothesis #4 = Organicism; root metaphor = "organism"
- Pepper devotes a chapter to each of these world hypotheses (Chapters 8,9,10, & 11, respectively). So we will eventually have a chance to examine each of these hypotheses in considerable detail.
- Maxim II: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
- Corollary #1: "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
- "It follows that what are pure facts for one theory are highly interpreted evidence for another" (p. 100)
- Corollary #2: "A world hypothesis does not have to accept data at their face value, or to exclude the acceptance of any other sort of evidence than data" (p. 101).
- Corollary #3: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of structural refinement (world hypotheses) to the cognitive standards (or limitations) of multiplicative refinement” (p. 101).
- “Data must be accepted as evidence to be accounted for in a world hypothesis, but a world hypothesis does not have to accept data at their face value, or to exclude acceptance of any other sort of evidence than data (p. 101).
- Corollary #4: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of structural refinement to the assumptions of common sense” (p. 102).
- Corollary #5: “It is convenient to employ common-sense concepts as bases for comparison for parallel fields of evidence among world theories” (p. 102)
- In other words, we can clarify differences among world theories by considering how they might respectively deal with events that occur in the world of ordinary experience.
- For example, consider the statement: “Joe has a good sense of humor.” The notion of “humor” is part of our ordinary experience and thus falls within the scope of any comprehensive world theory. So, how would a mechanistic make sense of humor? How would a formist understand this concept? Etc.
- Answering such questions helps us appreciate differences in how each world hypothesis interprets “the same common-sense fact” (p. 103, emphasis in original)
- Maxim III: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
- "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually exclusive. A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing".
- For example, we might be tempted remedy the shortcomings of animism by somehow combining it with mysticism:
- “Just fill in the empty spirit concept of an emaciated animism with the vivid indubitable mystic emotion, and each theory seems to revive” (p. 136).
- But Pepper doesn’t think that we can achieve a stable synthesis of mysticism and animism.
- E.g., “the world of spirits still try to raise their Great Spirit upon the throne which mystic intuition occupies” (p. 136)
- Thus, we now have a tension between (a) the infallibility implicit in animism (which was necessary to avoid endless proliferation of personalistic interpretations) and (b) the indubitability that lies at the core of mysticism (i.e., the very real experience of love).
- Pepper observes that “historically the ecclesiastics and the mystics have never harmonized very well. Periodically each group has tried to clean the other out – and this may be taken as a typical lesson in eclecticism” (p. 136).
- It might be replied that we would have more luck if we tried to achieve a synthesis of relatively adequate world hypotheses. But Pepper doesn’t think that’s possible at the present time:
- “While all sorts of things might happen to these diverse theories so far as abstract possibility is concerned, as a fact (in the best sense of fact we know) these four theories are just now irreconcilable. Any credible attempt to reconcile them turns out to be the judgment of one of the theories on the nature of the others” (p. 105-106)
- "Maxim IV: Concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113).
- Interestingly, Pepper suggests that such “empty abstractions” are a likely consequence of the push toward eclecticism (which has no root metaphor of its own to help refine cognition).
AConceptual Scheme for Comparing World Hypotheses:
- Analytic vs. Synthetic World Hypotheses:
- Analytic: Formism, Mechanism – Basic facts include“elements” or “factors". Any apparent synthesis (e.g., my life conceivedholistically) is merely derivative.
- Synthetic: Organicism, Contextualism – Basic factsinclude “complexes” or “contexts”. I’mreminded here of family systems theory, where certain formal “elements” (e.g., thepersonality traits of a single family member) might be considered as a function of contextual dynamics(and are thus derivative).
- Dispersive vs. Integrative World Hypotheses
- DispersiveHypotheses: Formism, contextualism– The facts are “loosely scattered about” and “are not necessarily determiningone another to any considerable degree” (pp. 142-143).
- Example: In a formist “trait psychology”,Andrew’s disagreeableness may be reflected in (a) a tendency to make snidecomments about coworkers, and (b) a recent “road rage” incident. These two behaviors (a & b) don’t reallyhave much to do with each other, outside of the fact that they are presumably mediatedby the notion of disagreeableness. Contrast this with the notion of a machine where every fact has itsplace in an integrative whole.
- The chief problem associated with dispersivetheories is inadequate precision. [Whatwill disagreeable Andrew do next? Who knows. But whatever he chooses to do, we will beable to make sense of it via our categories]
- IntegrativeHypotheses: Mechanism,organicism
- “For these two theories the world appearsliterally as a cosmos where facts occur in determinate order, and where, ifenough were known, they could be predicted or at least described, as beingnecessarily just what they are to the minutest detail” (p. 143)
- The chief problem associated with integrative theories is inadequate scope
Narrator: “Next weekon Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses. We discuss two relatively adequate metaphysical systems: Formism and Mechanism" (Chapters 8 & 9; Sunday, January 21)
~ Steve Q.
On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 9:27 AM, nysa71 <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Hello ToK Community,
Is there something fundamentally paradoxical about Pepper's World Hypotheses?
That is, wouldn't Pepper's "World Hypotheses" itself necessarily be a World Hypothesis by definition?
And insofar that his "World Hypotheses" is itself a "World Hypothesis", would it not necessarily have to be grounded in one of his Root Metaphors, therefore meaning that one would have to embrace that particular root metaphor (to the exclusion of the other root metaphors) in the first place for even the possibility to (in turn) embrace his World Hypothesis about World Hypotheses?
~ Jason Bessey On Thursday, January 11, 2018, 7:55:34 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Thanks for this narrative, John.
My expectation is that soon after the tour that Steve offers us of the World Hypotheses, we should shift the floor to you so that you can narrate your “world hypothesis.” I know in talking with you, I have had visions of “Human Psycho-Physiological Laws” that would allow us to harmonize ourselves, all the way from literal legal systems down into our individual experiences into our bio-physiological developmental life cycles and even down into negentropic energy flow, and information-communication transfer that you see connecting the dots in a bottom up fashion, from physics to biology all the way into human consciousness.
Best,
Gregg
From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@ listserv.jmu.edu]On Behalf Of JOHN TORDAY
Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2018 2:31 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
Gregg, having lost most of my family in the Holocaust I came to the 'table' as a Blank Slate. My passion as a scientist has been to contribute knowledge that would make life better, specifically for preterm newborns as a way to mitigate against hate, which I consider the nidus of the Holocaust. Over the course of the last decade or so I have come to a bigger picture perspective because I had amassed enough data over the course of 50 years of research to understand the development and phylogeny of the lung, going all the way back to its unicellular origins by connecting the physiologic dots between gas exchange and gravity experimentally. That exercise provided insight to the evolution of the lung and many other physiologic traits. And in the aggregate, the biggest picture was the relationship between physiology and the Singularity/Big Bang through the homology between Quantum Mechanics and the evolution of the protocell as The First Principles of Physiology. So my world view has expanded exponentially of late based on a priori scientific knowledge, hubris aside.
On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 9:47 AM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc- [log in to unmask]> wrote:
Gregg,
Oh, I don't disagree with you Gregg. However, I suspect you'd find that those who have a World Hypothesis grounded in "common sense" (i.e., Level 1 Justification Systems), themselves typically have a morecommon personality type, while those who have more refined World Hypotheses, would tend to have moreuncommon personality types. The research in that paper, I think, was focused on the latter.
~ Jason B.
On Wednesday, January 10, 2018, 10:45:56 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Am loving this discussion.
One point I think we should keep in mind about Pepper’s analysis (which Steve will get to, but I bring it up here because of Jason B’s point about personality and a comment Steve made regarding justification level 1).
Most people hold World Hypotheses that are animistic or mystical. That is, most people are religious and view the universe as being created by God and/or has some mystical animating force. To me, Jason B., this is an important point to keep in mind and why I would question the set up of the reseach. Just because Pepper sees these World Hypotheses as “inadequate,” does not mean that most folks don’t see the world this way. To me, by the time you are really diving into the four world hypotheses Pepper sees as adequate, you are likely dealing with people who have, at least at some level, “refined” knowledge, rather than just populist “common sense.”
Best,
Gregg
Sent fromMail for Windows 10
From:Stout, Jason (DBHDS)
Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2018 10:17 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
This has been a fascinating discussion. I found myself recalling Donald Hoffman’s TED talk entitled “Do we see reality as it is?” while reading this. He does work in computer simulations using natural selection algorithms to better understand this process and is particularly interested in “a mathematical model of consciousness.” Here is a more in-depth article about his positions: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.theatlantic.com_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=Ng4yoQ27hVbm0eMSBTzXp7h1GWAQ0orIHSJbpBGhEKI&s=8Rh8JYuHN8sLqIIOdp_4JfQTFVzA1F8GrlqxSuRXUIs&e= science/archive/2016/04/the- illusion-of-reality/479559/ I haven’t yet taken the time to make direct correlations between his work and that of Pepper, but my mental algorithms, or world hypothesis, suggest to me that there are correlations here.
I love sci-fi and futurism, and an interesting thought experiment to me is pondering how a consciousness that sees reality as it actually is, and not how it is selected to do so through environmental pressures, would vary from our experience of the same. Hoffman has also wondered about this, and has speculated that perhaps logic and reasoning are selected for traits through evolutionary processes.
Thanks,
Jason
From: tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@ listserv.jmu.edu]On Behalf Of Steven Quackenbush
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 6:14 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
A few quick comments before I begin the process of crafting the next formal outline (scheduled for Sunday).
- Waldemar asks whether it is appropriate to consider an individual's worldview as an example of a world hypothesis.
- This seems reasonable to me,and I've always loosely equated an individual's worldview with a "world hypothesis" (of some sort). Of course, the conventional language user (adopting what Gregg calls Level 1 Justifications) might not formally embrace any of the world hypotheses discussed by Pepper. If we ask a random person to describe their worldview, the answer may come across as an incoherent mess (including random elements of formism, mysticism, organicism, etc.). Still, even a pastiche can be understood as a "world hypothesis" of sorts.
- That said, I'm intrigued by Jason's suggestion (grounded in Jungian theory) that some of us are satisfied with "local hypotheses". Even if I will never be satisfied until my philosophy is corroborated by the entire world, that doesn't mean that the rest of humanity must submit to my need to achieve unlimited scope.
- My personal bias is that we all have "world hypotheses" that are (implicitly) unlimited in scope (even if wesay we are only concerned with local hypotheses). But I'm not sure Pepper would agree with me here. We will return to this issue in due course.
- Ken observes that the ghost example I gave in my previous post "sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and validity." He asks: "Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?"
- I agree that Pepper's understanding of multiplicative and structural corroboration resembles the distinction typically made between reliability (especially consensus) and validity.
- Two quick notes (inspired by Ken's comments, though not really answers to his question).
- The validation process is itself closely tied to an individual's world hypothesis.
- In the ghost example, it is possible to imagine a metaphysical framework [some sort of "supernaturalism"] that would validate the reliable report of the witnesses (even if this framework has problems of its own and does not thereby achieve universal acclaim).
- The close link between metaphysical frameworks and the validation process is more obvious when we consider the countless hypothetical constructs that find their way into psychology textbooks. What does it mean, for example, to develop a valid measure of "self-esteem"? The concept itself is grounded in a theoretical framework (that may or may not be formally articulated). Moreover, it is not obvious what "facts" would corroborate: (a) the relevant validity claims and (b) the theoretical framework within which such claims are made.
- In Pepper's thought, thereseems to be blurring a reliability and validity (though I may modify this claim when we reach the end of the book).
- In the course of his conversation regarding the tensions between data and danda (where he presented the ghost scenario), Pepper admits that "a highly refined datum would probably never have to give way to a highly refined dandum." In other words, the objectivity of the data would be sufficient to withstand the "winds of theory" [my phrase]. But this is "only because the datum has been thinned to such a degree that it does not commit itself to very much" [p. 50]
- A few pages later, Pepper observes that "the inherent lack of significance in data alone is what we meant earlier by the thinness of refined data, a thinness which finally causes a return to common sense for a security and healthiness of fact that threatens to disappear when data try to carry cognition alone" (pp. 63-64, emphasis added)
- So, even as we are assessing what we all see(consensus) we are also deciding what we should be looking at (which is necessarily a reflection of our theoretical framework and thus implicitly a "validity" concern). In other words, we don't want to waste our time developing reliable measures of trivia. Rather, we seek out truths that are "reliably meaningful", or "meaningfully reliable", even if this means that we have to sacrifice some degree of refinement (purity).
Again, all this is based on my reading of Chapters 1-4. When we reach the end of the book, I will try to provide more satisfactory answers to everyone's questions. Here's the list of questions that I've compiled so far:
- "Is there a term when multiplicative corroboration (data) and structural corroboration (danda) are in agreement? Would that be considered 'idealdata'? Or is a prerequisite, if you will, of danda that it first be data?" [Ali]
- "The ghost example you give sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and validity. Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?" [Ken]
- "Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of a world hypothesis?" [Waldemar]
Until next time,
~ Steve Q.
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 2:40 PM,[log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Steve:
A question about world hypotheses and the concept of worldview.
Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of a world hypothesis?
Best regards,
Waldemar
Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD
(Perseveret et Percipiunt)
503.631.8044
Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value. (A Einstein)
On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:57 PM, Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Hello ToK community,
Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread. The focus of this post isWorld Hypotheses, Chapters 1-4. My reflections today are largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory.
Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place where most of us began our intellectual journey:common sense. For Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39).
Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude” described by phenomenologists. For Pepper, the world of common sense can be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” – i.e.,we can always fall back on it:
- “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we completely give up trying to know anything, then is precisely when we know things in the common-sense way. In that lies the security of common sense” (p. 43).
But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively irritable”:
- “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging, contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized, rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt, playfully enjoyed, and so forth. One may accept common sense and thoughtlessly roam in its pasture, but if one looks up and tries to take it in, it is like a fantastic dream. To the serious cognizer it is like a bad dream. For the serious cognizer feels responsible to fact and principle, and common sense is utterly irresponsible” (p. 43)
- Common sense is “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word, irritable” (p. 44).
Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected to criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes “refined knowledge” or “critical cognition” (p. 47). How do we achieve this transformation?
- For Pepper, “all critical evidence becomes critical only as a result of the addition of corroborative evidence. The work of legitimate criticism in cognition, then, is corroboration” (p. 47, emphasis added)
Corroboration can take one of two forms:
- 1) Multiplicative corroboration (data): i.e., The agreement of “man with man.” (p. 47).
- An obvious example of this is the notion of interjudge (or interrater) reliability, as understood by psychometricians
- But, as discussed below, the notion of multiplicative corroboration has an important role to play in any scientific enterprise.
- 2) Structural corroboration (danda): i.e., The agreement of “fact with fact” (p. 47)
- An obvious example of this is the “principle of converging evidence” in science.
- Pepper’s example: I might evaluate whether a chair is strong enough to bear my weight by considering (a) the kind of wood with which it is made, (b) the reputation of the company that put together the chair, and (c) the fact that the chair shows evidence of wear (suggesting that “many people had successfully sat in it”). It is by “putting all this evidence together” that I “feel justified in believe that the chair is a strong chair” (p. 49)
- But, insofar as stuctural corroboration is concerned with how a multiplicity of facts “hang together” [my phrase], the quest for such corroboration will inevitably pull us in the direction of theory. As I entertain structural hypotheses, I’m not simply interested in this orthat set of data. Rather, I’m interested in how the data I observecoheres with other things we think we know. The nature of this coherence is atheoretical puzzle.
On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (ordata collection) is synonymous with the notion of objectivity in science. It reflects the idea that what we see would be describedin precisely the same way by anyone else (given the appropriate level of training):
- In Pepper’s words, “the search for multiplicative corroboration is the effort on the part of a datum to confirm its claim to purity. It is as though a datum turned from one observer to another and asked, Am I not just what I said I was?....Are there not some data that never vary, no matter who the observer and, if possible, no matter what his point of view? If such there are, these are ideal data” (p. 52).
Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not available” (p. 52). Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been developed in the course of cognitive history” (p. 52). Specifically, Pepper highlights “two genuses of refined data”:
- Refined empirical data: “pointer readings and correlations among pointer readings” (p. 52)
- Refined logical data: “evidence for the validity of logical and mathematical transitions and for those organizations of such transitions which are called logical and mathematic systems” (p. 57).
Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the quest for highly refined empirical and logical data. But there are several threats to the program of the dogmatic positivist:
- The scarcity of refined data
- “The refined empirical data presently at our disposal cover a very small field of nature” (p. 63)
- “Outside of the fields of physics and chemistry, refined data play a secondary role and are rarely capable of expression in the form of a deductive mathematical system” (p. 63)
- The metaphysical poverty of refined data
- “In order to set up refined data as the sole norm of evidence, it is necessary todeny the claims of danda, derived from various structural world theories, as alternative norms of evidence” (pp. 67, 69)
- In other words, the dogmatic positivist intends to let thedata speak for themselves, free of the influence of danda (which we might consider as a facet of a metaphysical system).
- But, if we really wish to drive such danda out of our refined cognition, “multiplicative corroboration alone will not do this, for it only establishes the data it establishes, and neither affirms nor denies the claims of any facts other than those, like pointer readings, by which man corroborates man” (p. 69, emphasis added)
In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70). What, though, does it mean to make structural claims (of any sort)?
- For starters, structural hypotheses necessarily make statements concerning “the structure of the world” (p. 74) – i.e., how things “hang together”.
- But – and this is quite a striking claim – “structural corroboration does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope” (p. 77, emphasis added)
- Why?
- Because: “as long as there are outlying facts which might not corroborate the facts already organized by the structural hypothesis, so long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable” (p. 77).
- An “ideal structural hypothesis”, then, “is one that all facts will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 77)
- “Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis” (p. 77, emphasis added).
Comments regarding “world hypotheses”:
- They necessarily includedata [and not just danda]
- It “draws data within its scope as well as everything else” (p. 78)§
- “It, therefore, does not reject but acquires the cognitive force of multiplicative corroboration as well as that of structural corroboration” (pp. 78-79)
- “Cognition needs both types of refinement [data and danda] as much as a bird needs two wings” (p. 79)
- Nevertheless, in a world hypothesis,data are ultimately subordinated to danda.
- As a rough approximation of what Pepper is driving at, we might consider a world hypothesis as a framework that allows us to render data meaningful.
- Or, to employ Gregg's language: "all factual/empirical claims are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing)."
- In a world hypothesis, evidence and interpretation are “merged” (p. 79).
- “…it is impossible to say where pure fact ends and interpretation of fact begins” (p. 79).
As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field of psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the discipline:Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.
- Ignoring (for the sake of simplification) the notion of “mental processes”, we can certainly agree that “behavior” falls within the psychologist’s scope of inquiry.
- But how – in practice – do we identify aunit of behavior? When does a given behavior begin? When does it end? And is it really meaningful to speak of “behavior” in the abstract, or is the concept always qualified in some way? After all, a personality psychologist never studies “behavior”per se, but aggressive behavior, conscientious behavior, etc. In other words, personality psychologists studypatterns of behavior – and the identification of such patterns is inevitably theory-driven.
On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs“A Tree of Knowledge” (!):
- At the bottom of the figure is a box labelled “Roots of knowledge” (and it includes “dubitanda”, Pepper’s rather odd term for “common sense facts”).
- The tree (originating out of the box) hastwo major trunks (which makes for a rather strange-looking tree!):
- Trunk #1: Data – Beginning with “rough data” and then branching into “scientific data” and “logical data”
- Trunk #2: Danda – Beginning with “rough danda” and then branching into “formistic danda”, “mechanistic danda”, “contextual danda”, and “organismic danda”
- Above the six branches of data and danda sits the phrase: “fruits of knowledge”
In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January 14), we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know if you have any questions, comments, or corrections pertaining to this episode!
~ Steve Quackenbush
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It will be the next topic for us to journey on.
Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh in now.
Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, The UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy, I especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)?
At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real persons, and not bring a worldview to what we do?
In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing from psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical psychology tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to factual claims about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right, and I think he is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing).
Enjoy the journey!
Best,
Gregg
Sent fromMail for Windows 10
From:Steven Quackenbush
Sent: Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
Hello ToK Community
With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of the ToK/UTUA framework. As many participants in this listserv are aware, Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.
I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in the 1990’s. At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism. Yet I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close study of Pepper’s thought. So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of California Press).
Why Pepper? Why Now?
- As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions. These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated” and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in relation to broader (and perhaps alternative) metaphysical systems.
- Given its scope and conceptual rigor, my intuition is that Stephen Pepper’s work will be of considerable value as I continue to work through these issues. The description on the back cover ofWorld Hypotheses offers some justification for this intuition:
- “In setting forth his root-metaphor theory and examining six such hypotheses – animism, mysticism, formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism – Pepper surveys the whole field of metaphysics…The virtue of the root-metaphor method is that it puts metaphysics on a purely factual basis and pushes philosophical issues back to the interpretation of evidence” (emphasis added).
Procedural matters:
- My intent in this thread is to proceed with a close reading of Pepper’s text, several chapters at a time. My next post (scheduled for Sunday, January 7) will focus on Chapters 1-4. Anyone with a copy of World Hypotheses is welcome to read along and offer corrections and/or clarifications. But, in case you can’t do the reading, I will try to make sure my outlines are sufficiently clear that they would make sense to everyone on this listserv.
- For the time being, I will limit myself to elaborating and clarifying the thought of Stephen Pepper. The purpose of this thread is not to articulate my own point of view. That will come later. Others are certainly free to offer critical comments from whatever vantage point they wish. My replies will simply reflect my effort to articulate how I think Pepper might respond to the matter at hand. [Of course, I may misinterpret Pepper; in which case, I hope to be corrected. Indeed, I anticipate that my understanding of Pepper will evolve considerably over the course of this project.]
- Although the positions articulated in this thread are not my own, I will nevertheless frequently generate original examples to illustrate the arguments that I believe Pepper is trying to make. To render as clear as possible the distinction between Pepper’s writings and my own elaborations, I will provide page references for all ideas and examples that can be found inWorld Hypotheses.
- When we reach the end of Pepper’s (1942) text, I will proceed to Phase 2 of this venture: How does the ToK/UTUA framework stands in relation to Root Metaphor theory?
As noted above, I will begin this inquiry with a close reading of Chapters 1-4. These chapters include a discussion of the distinction (quite important to Pepper) between “multiplicative” and “structural” corroboration (and the corresponding difference between “data” and “dandum”).
But it seems appropriate to end this post with a (hopefully enticing) “sneak preview of coming attractions”. In the opening paragraphs ofWorld Hypotheses, Pepper (1942) observes that “among the variety of objects which we find in the world are hypotheses about the world itself” (p. 1). Examples cited by Pepper include the worldviews implicit in Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’sMetaphysics, and Descartes’s Meditations. To his list, we might add Freud’sInterpretation of Dreams, Skinner’s Beyond Freedom & Dignity, and Rogers’On Becoming a Person.
In Chapter 5, Pepper offers four maxims pertaining to world hypotheses:
- Maxim I: “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor" (p. 96).
- Maxim II: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
- "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
- Maxim III: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
- "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually exclusive. A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing" (p. 104)
- Maxim IV: “Concepts which have lost contact with their root metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113)
If you share an interest in the issues reflected in this introductory e-mail, then I invite you to accompany me on a journey through the work of Stephen Pepper. The next installment of this series (focusing on Chapters 1-4) is scheduled for Sunday, January 7.
~ Steve Quackenbush
P.S.,: My edition ofWorld Hypotheses includes two subtitles. On the cover, the subtitle is "Prolegomena to systematic philosophy and a complete survey of metaphysics". On the first page, the subtitle is "A Study in Evidence". Both subtitles are appropriate, but I think the former more appropriately reflects the incredible ambition of the text.
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to:mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list: write to: mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] or click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list:write to: mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list:write to: mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L-SIGNOFF- [log in to unmask] click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi- bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A= 1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list:write to: mailto:[log in to unmask] click the following link:http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1
############################
To unsubscribe from the TOK-SOCIETY-L list:
write to: mailto:[log in to unmask]
or click the following link:
http://listserv.jmu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=TOK-SOCIETY-L&A=1
|
