Hi everyone,

I greatly appreciated the opportunity to share my thoughts about "the
problem of value" on Monday evening.  I've been reflecting on various
issues raised in the discussion, and figured it might be a useful exercise
for me to lay out my position in a series of bullet points.   This is just
a start, and I'll continue to revise for clarity and coherence (if not for
consistency!).   Let me know if you have any thoughts or suggestions.

   - Traits are appropriately defined as *consistent patterns* of thoughts,
   feelings, and behaviors (McCrae & Costa, 1990).
   - By definition, traits are reliable.  Less reliable phenomena (e.g.,
   passing moods) are less "trait like", precisely on that account.
   - All psychological phenomena are semi-reliable.
      - If a phenomenon were not consistent *in some respect*, we would not
      be able to speak of it.
   - Some phenomena are more reliable than others.
   - If we could imagine a perfectly reliable phenomenon, it would be* in
   essence *ahistorical.
      - i.e., an ideal form, a *pure trait*.
   - Trait purity (i.e., perfect reliability) is a fiction insofar as it is
   not rooted in our lived experience.
      - Of course, every time we encounter impure traits (e.g., Mildrid's
      introversion), it is possible to interpret them in light of pure
      (idealized) traits.  But this is a conceptual (pre-empirical) move.
   - Semi-reliable traits are *real*.  They are aspects of our
   lived experience.  Moreover, it may be possible to account for variations
   in traits (across individuals or over specified periods of time) in terms
   of other physiological, psychological, or social phenomena. This is an
   *empirical* issue, and I make no commitment to any particular thesis
   here.  I'm inclined to agree with Gregg that "there are genetic differences
   that track onto behavioral dispositional differences", but we would have to
   clarify what it means to have a "disposition" to do something.  In any
   case, it doesn't matter to me (in this context) whether specific empirical
   claims are supported or refuted.
   - My core argument concerns *Value,* not fact.
   - *Value* might be identified with "what I want", but it is more
   appropriate to say that value is what I *should* want (regardless of
   what I want *as a matter of fact*).
   - I might want money.  I might seek justice.  I might value friendship.
     We can certainly debate the relative merits of these and other goals.
   Such matters fall in the domain of ethics.
   - But some values have epistemological implications.
   - e.g., I want my world to be *predictable*, *consistent, reliable*.
   This has implications for how I see other people.
      - Specifically: If I value reliability, I'm inclined to interpret
      other people's behavior in terms of "pure" traits.  This was well
      understood by Nietzsche (1887/1974):
         - "*Society is pleased to feel that the virtue of this person, the
         ambition of that one, and the thoughtfulness and passion of the third
         provide it with a dependable instrument that is always at
hand; society
         honors this instrumental nature, this way of remaining
faithful to oneself,
         this unchangeability of views, aspirations, and even
faults[,] and lavishes
         its highest honors upon it. Such esteem…breeds "character"
and brings all
         change, all re-learning, all self-transformation into ill repute*."
          (*The Gay Science,* p. 238)
         - Speaking poetically, If I *value* reliability, every phenotypic
   (semi-reliable) psychological phenomena can be interpreted in terms of a
   (material or spiritual) *genotype*.
   - So considered, the "self" is *petrified*.  Change is a surface
   runoff.  The phenotype is less *real *than the genotype (or its official
   representative: *the brain*).
   - If I hope to understand myself properly, I need to place in question
   the values that are guiding my self-interpretations.
   - If I hope to break free of the semi-reliable patterns that have
   heretofore inspired my behavior, I may need to change the way that I look
   at myself.
   - *This is not a matter of changing what I see, but how I see it.*  If
   my self-interpretation is guided by reliability (as an epistemic norm) --
   if I look at myself from a "scientific" point of view -- I slide away from
   my (semi-reliable) lived experience toward my own* lifeless essence*.
   - Substantive change -- and authentic self-understanding -- implies that
   reliability has been *preserved yet surpassed* by alternative epistemic
   values.
   - This is "the problem of value" in its most primitive form.   I *am*
   what I *should* value, but this value is not distinct from fact.




On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 5:52 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]>
wrote:

> Hi Folks,
>
>   Just wanted to say thanks to Steve Q for sharing his story regarding the
> problem of value in psychology. It affirmed for me strongly how fraught the
> problems of simply applying the methodological language game of MENS is to
> human psychology, as it comes with many different “value parameters” that
> can quickly be overlooked and hidden, and extreme assumptions of
> “objectivity” become masked and tangled with the methods.
>
>
>
>   My proposal is for a metapsychology that uses the ToK System instead of
> empirical methodology as the language game of MENS. The reason is
> obviously, metaphysical/conceptual clarity. For example, it was clear that
> the exchange, as all the TOK Community exchanges have been, along with
> virtually all other zoom exchanges, take place on the Culture-Person plane
> of existence and involve justification, investment and influence dynamics.
> In the broad sense, Steve shared his justification narrative for his
> struggles with the justifications that empirical psychology, especially
> trait personality psychology, offer.
>
>
>
>   Mike M largely concurred. I did also, with a caveat. The problem is
> largely resolved, IMO, when we have the right metaphysical map of human
> psychology. The “traits” of the Big Five are, indeed, dispositional
> tendencies that emerge over the course of development. There are genetic
> differences that track onto behavioral dispositional differences, although
> the road is complicated and filled with feedback loops, such that genes
> clearly don’t cause traits.
>
>
>
>   I could go on, but the point is that we need a theory of “traits”, just
> like we need a theory/frame for talking about our entire subject matter.
> And, ala Mike’s arguments, that does need to be intersubjectively
> constructed. (Note, BTW, I am noting an interesting set of tensions is
> emerging between folks in the group who emphasize epistemological positions
> that are grounded in: 1) subjective/phenomenological v 2)
> objective/behavioral v 3) intersubjective/language).
>
>
>
> The question I pose: What is the proper language game for human
> psychology? For me, the metapsychology provided by UTOK provides the best
> way forward. For starters, it shines the light on the Enlightenment Gap
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_us_blog_theory-2Dknowledge_202010_the-2Denlightenment-2Dgap&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=IXQG9tN4hmqFINa3Qx3yVL2stlqaCV4xvYx8-UK_sHM&s=LphDN_3-DYKEgPwEz8XQYDCyXN28sZUR_m1vanbjZOM&e= >
> and offers a way to resolve that. I would argue it was in the shadow of the
> Enlightenment Gap that Steve found his “is-ought” problem. And the proper
> way forward is not via the empirical methods of science, but first, a
> language game that gets the field of inquiry clear. We were headed in that
> direction near the end: What are the* needs* we have as Primates? How do
> we *justify* our selves as Persons?
>
>
>
> Best,
> Gregg
>
>
>
> ___________________________________________
>
> Gregg Henriques, Ph.D.
> Professor
> Department of Graduate Psychology
> 216 Johnston Hall
> MSC 7401
> James Madison University
> Harrisonburg, VA 22807
> (540) 568-7857 (phone)
> (540) 568-4747 (fax)
>
>
> *Be that which enhances dignity and well-being with integrity.*
>
> Check out the Unified Theory Of Knowledge homepage at:
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.unifiedtheoryofknowledge.org_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=IXQG9tN4hmqFINa3Qx3yVL2stlqaCV4xvYx8-UK_sHM&s=3yK6s1fNue8bEiaYiDxFv9Ddno8AqVGEzXksK5wzcx8&e= 
>
>
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