Hi Gregg,

On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 6:09 AM Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> Does anyone have control over the Wiki Tree of Knowledge Entry? We need an
> update on that and I am not sure who put it up.
>

Are you talking wikipedia.org?  Anyone can edit that, even anonymously,
right?


> Second, as we discussed during the 2019 TOK Conference at JMU, the hard
> problem surely remains, at least to some degree. Let me put it this way.
> Which animals are conscious and what kind of qualia do they experience and
> how do you know? If the hard problem was solved, “neurophenomenologists”
> could tell me exactly the kind of Mind2 a praying mantis, a bumble bee, a
> sardine, a squid, a cardinal, a rat, a baboon and a killer whale have. I
> have been reading up on the science of animal consciousness and they can’t.
> And the reason is clear: We don’t really understanding the explanatory
> ontological mechanism that enables perspectival experience to emerge.
>

RQT is not only predicting what is and isn't conscious, but what it is
phenomenally like.  Once we discover what it is that has a redness quality,
and what it is tha has a greenness quality, and the mechanism used to
computationally bind them into one composite consciousness gestalt, we will
be able to observe the same thing (or not) in other animals.  Once we know
what it is that has a redness quality, if we objectively observe that in a
bat, bumble bee, a sardine, rat, a computer, a thermostat...  we will not
only know that it is conscious, we will know that it is like the elemental
redness experienced by a certain percentage of the human population.  For
example, if we observed the same redness and greenness qualitative stuff
being rendered into similar gestalts in a bat using echolocation, we would
know that it is like our visual redness and greenness to be that bat.  We
use particular elemental qualities to represent our visual conscious
knowledge.  Any other animal or machine that uses these colorness qualities
to represent any types of knowledge, we'll be able to create objectiver
detectors/observer, like Jack Galant is doing
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_6FsH7RK1S2E&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=zocMGsB2F2PKbV6zNlyupZnafSU_GuMwulvnrd_Na90&s=pkXUXYvfSx7ZsF_8RqU9TWsKT09Atdzf2ehWcm2inI0&e= > (using
much more advanced detectors than just fMRIs), and project this data on
screens to produce the same visual qualities in our brain - effing the
ineffable.  And this is just the 1. weakest form of effing the ineffable.
There will also be the 2. stronger, and 3. strongest forms of effing the
ineffable for all of this.

 For example, John’s in cognitive science and the metaphysics of Mind2
> makes it quite clear (to me at least) that we should distinguish adjectival
> qualia (redness, greenesss) from adverbial qualia (the witnessing function
> that brings aspects together in a hereness, nowness, and togetherness).
> That folks can meditate and achieve a “pure consciousness event” that is
> essentially devoid of adjectival qualia is good phenomenological evidence
> that there is logic to separating the two functions. Relating this to RQT,
> it suggests there is both representational/modeling and aspectualizing.
>

Yes, the redness we experience when we look at something red should be
distinguished between the best we can 'recall' or remember of redness when
our eyes are closed.  But the same general objective/subjective, perceived
from afar vs directly apprehended principles apply to it all.  There must
be something physically different in our brain, which is both of these
elemental phenomenal constituents of knowledge, and they both must be able
to be computationally bound to make some kind of composite gestalt of these
elemental intrinsic physics we directly apprehend, for which when we
perceive from afar we will only have abstract descriptions of the physical
behavior, still requiring a dictionary.

All conscious experiences, including anything experienced by talented
meditators, are all composed of computationally bound elemental intrinsic
qualities of some kind, like redness and greenness.  The intrinsic
qualities of all that can both be directly apprehended, or the behavior of
such can be objectively observed and abstractly described.  And it is true
for all of it, that the qualitative nature can only be known by directly
apprehending, even though we can objectively observe the behavior of all of
it. right?

Brent

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