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February 2021

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Subject:
From:
Peter Lloyd Jones <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
tree of knowledge system discussion <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 1 Feb 2021 13:08:27 -0500
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Hi Gregg,
While I fully agree with you that "consciousness is not an autonomous center of control," I do not see that as an argument against free will. I am unsure if you do.

As per my last note, I think that it is unreasonable that the requirement for behavior to be classified as intentional and autonomous, it must be conscious. As per that note, we can consciously load ourselves with influences for the purpose of creating subconscious behaviors of which we anticipate becoming conscious. I do not see any issue therefore in claiming my subconscious behavior as being mine and of being intentional and purposeful, leading to conscious behavior leading to more subconscious behavior... 

Peter

Peter Lloyd Jones
562-209-4080

Sent by determined causes that no amount of will is able to thwart. 




> On Feb 1, 2021, at 10:52 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> 
> Wonderful, Mike. I was hoping you would chime in 😊. 
>  
> Here is the abstract of one of the best articles written on the topic:
>  
> Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency
> Michael F. Mascolo & Eeva Kallio
> ABSTRACT
> Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied emergence – the idea that psychological processes are higher-order biological processes, albeit ones that exhibit emergent properties. Although consciousness, experience, and representation are emergent properties of higher-order biological organisms, the capacity for hierarchical regulation is a property of all living systems. Thus, while the capacity for consciousness transforms the process of hierarchical regulation, consciousness is not an autonomous center of control. Instead, consciousness functions as a system for coordinating novel representations of the most pressing demands placed on the organism at any given time. While it does not regulate action directly, consciousness orients and activates preconscious control systems that mediate the construction of genuinely novel action. Far from being an epiphenomenon, consciousness plays a central albeit non-autonomous role in psychological functioning.
> 
> Best,
> G
> 
>  

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