*Call for Abstracts: Two-Day Workshop on*
VIRTUE AND MORAL REASONING UNDER
OPPRESSIVE SOCIAL CONDITIONS
Concordia University in Montreal, February 10-11, 2018
KEYNOTES BY: Charlotte Witt (U New Hampshire), Erik Wiland (U Missouri,
St. Louis), Elijah Milgram (U Utah), and Macalester Bell (Bryn Mawr
College).
TOPIC
How should we think about virtue and practical rationality under
oppressive conditions? Practical rationality and virtues are often
understood in terms of ideals, such as: fully flourishing agents, ideal
observers, or reasoners who are not subject to influences of
sensibility. It is unclear, however, whether such ideals are helpful for
us, non-ideal agents when facing real-life decisions in a non-ideal world.
One well-known problem for virtue theories here is that a less than
fully virtuous agent shouldn't always do what a fully virtuous agent
would do in her situation. Must we perhaps turn to conceptions such as
care, social practices, spheres of virtues, bounded rationality, moral
advice or the like to determine the role of virtues and rationality
under non-ideal social and political conditions?
Traditionally, virtues are seen as closely related to practical
rationality (see Aristotle, Kant, Foot). Some have claimed, however,
that certain character traits—for instance an unwillingness to
compromise—count as virtues in the context of systemic injustice but not
in other contexts. If what counts as a virtue depends on the political
circumstances, then what counts as practically rational will probably
depend on the same factors. But shouldn't rationality be the same for
everyone? Can rationality require us to do what is less than fully
rational if what would be fully rational is beyond reach?
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS include, but are not limited to: How can ideals of
complete virtue or rationality be relevant for non-ideal agents in
non-ideal social circumstances? What does it mean for oppressed people
to be virtuous and rational? How do social structures make it difficult
to become virtuous or rational? Are virtues or rationality relative to
social and political contexts? What resources does virtue ethics offer
to theorize non-ideal political conditions? Are some virtues essentially
geared towards non-ideal social relations? What role should moral
advice, testimony and consciousness-raising play in situations of
oppression? How should we reason together about policies when our
practical rationality is impaired?
SUBMISSION RULES
We welcome submissions from a wide range of philosophical perspectives.
Women and members of underrepresented groups are particularly encouraged
to apply.
Please submit an anonymized abstract (500-1000 words; pdf, doc, or docx)
through EasyChair at: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__easychair.org_conferences_-3Fconf-3Dvprm2017&d=DwIDaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HUp8-bkYMlNgd3ZJBxWBKsBsFAFGHrEZg21p9gxugJA&m=0Er7qCC6mJyuQHWFWhZo-Owt6D6Fpk3Q3vNgaUtsk40&s=x8eGdA3jl2x2LOCMucDTHxEaTLCy3NTr8pvZVbTssoc&e= .
Selection will be via blind review.
DEADLINE: *September 30, 2017*.
NOTIFICATION BY: October 30, 2017.
QUESTIONS?
A website for the workshop will be available soon at:
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__sites.google.com_site_vprm2017_&d=DwIDaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HUp8-bkYMlNgd3ZJBxWBKsBsFAFGHrEZg21p9gxugJA&m=0Er7qCC6mJyuQHWFWhZo-Owt6D6Fpk3Q3vNgaUtsk40&s=HUfhhdwivRn6HBRkVB2DlhgmKzQ_Wwj5vyPJnU7dQwk&e= . For other questions, please
email one of the organizers: Ulf Hlobil ([log in to unmask]) or
Katharina Nieswandt ([log in to unmask]).
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