Steve et al.,
If you google "relational developmental systems" the pdf link should come
up.
Darcia
On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 4:58 PM, Steven Quackenbush <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> Hello ToK Community,
>
> Thanks for the various comments and questions. I promise that I will try
> to address them all eventually. But I want to finish reviewing the four
> "relatively adequate" world hypotheses before I explore the implications
> (or corollaries) of Pepper's approach.
>
> Here, I'd like to offer a few thoughts regarding eclecticism to supplement
> my previous e-mail (a "deleted scene" of sorts).
>
> *On Eclecticism:*
>
> Pepper informs us that "eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104). But, as Pepper
> is offering a complete survey of *metaphysics*, his understanding of (
> *metaphysical)* eclecticism may differ from the way the term is
> ordinarily used in psychology journals.
>
> *Lazarus & Beutler (1993), *for example, begin their discussion of
> eclecticism by acknowledging that "many counselors and clinicians have
> realized that one true path to understanding and correcting human problems
> does not exist -- no single orientation has all the answers" (p. 381).
>
> But these authors are concerned that "the haphazard mishmash of divergent
> bits and pieces, and the syncretistic muddle of idiosyncratic and ineffable
> clinical creations, are the antithesis of what effective and efficient
> counseling represents" (p. 71). This sort of theoretical scrap quilt is
> dubbed *unsystematic eclecticism*.
>
> One alternative to such undignified eclecticism is *theoretical
> integrationism*, where two or more imperfect theories (or approaches to
> counseling) presumably achieve some sort of *synergistic* effect when
> combined.
>
> - e.g., (1) the focus on *insight* associated with psychodynamic
> theory, + (2) the concern with *action* associated with behavioral
> theory, = (3) a much more adequate *behavioral-psychodymic* theory
> (where the whole, it seems, is much greater than the parts).
> - "Does this not argue for merging psychodynamic and behavioral
> formulations?" (p. 382).
> - Lazarus & Beutler reply: "Emphatically not!" (p. 382).
>
> What's wrong with theoretical integrationism?
>
> - According to Lazarus & Beutler (1993), "We lack criteria to
> determine what portions or pieces of each theory to preserve or
> expunge....Such criteria are not available and it is uncertain whether the
> value that might exist in these theories could be retained in a truncated
> and combined form" (p. 382)
> - e.g., "How would one assess whether to introduce systematic
> desensitization before, during, or after the exploration of defense
> mechanisms?" (p. 383)
> - "In general, when looking through these two divergent lenses, how
> would the counselor know whether and when to explore mental conflict rather
> than promote reparative action?" (p. 383)
>
> As an alternative to both unsystematic eclecticism and theoretical
> eclecticism, Lazarus & Beutler (1993) consider *technical eclecticism*,
> an approach whereby practitioners "select procedures from different sources
> without necessarily subscribing to the theories that spawned them" (p.
> 383).
>
> - "They work within a preferred theory...but recognize that few
> techniques are inevitably wedded to any theory" (p. 384).
> - "Hence they borrow techniques from other orientations, based on the
> proven worth of these procedures" (p. 384).
>
> We can think what we will about "technical eclecticism" (as defined here),
> but it should be clear that it has little to do with Pepper's discussion.
> Technical eclectics remain firmly grounded in a single world hypothesis and
> are thus not "eclectic" in his sense.
>
> Regarding "theoretical integrationism", it might be said that the picture
> is not as bleak as Lazarus and Beutler (1993) suggest. Perhaps there *is*
> a way to sew together the various scraps that are worth saving from
> alternative theoretical frameworks (e.g., behaviorism, psychoanalysis), and
> do so in a manner that makes good theoretical sense. But these frameworks
> are not "world hypotheses", as understood by Pepper.
>
> A metaphysical world hypothesis is a synthesis of ontology and
> epistemology. It doesn't merely account for the "way things are", it plays
> a role in determining what there is "to account for" in the first place.
> Thus, working with multiple world hypotheses is not really akin to patching
> together a quilt. Rather, it is like trying to play both checkers and
> chess *on the same board, at the same time*. "Confusing", to say the
> least!
>
> I'd like to suggest that eclecticism, in Pepper's sense, is the exception
> to the rule in the field of psychology. The typical student learns early
> on that psychology is the *science* of behavior and mental processes.
> And then, in a series of required statistics and methods courses,
> assimilates a more-or-less-unified account of the scientific enterprise.
> The point of view eventually be adopted by the well-socialized psychology
> student is wonderfully articulated in Keith Stanovich's classic text, *How
> to Think Straight about Psychology*. Of course, there are
> epistemological variations (family squabbles, of sorts). But most of us
> begin our work with a more-or-less agreed upon framework for asking and
> answering questions. From this point of view, a certain sort of
> *theoretical* (but not *metaphysical*) eclecticism seems quite
> reasonable. Insofar as we remain firmly grounded in our (relatively
> refined) philosophy of science, we have the cognitive tools necessary to
> sew together the pieces from many boxes of scraps.
>
> P.S. #1, Waldemar: I've been looking into the question regarding the
> etymology of the terms "danda" and "dubitanda." I haven't found anything
> to suggest the terms precede Pepper. Perhaps they are neologisms. [Can
> anyone offer assistance here?]
>
> P.S. #2: Jason: I'm especially intrigued by your suggestion that
> metaphysical eclecticism may involve a regression (or sorts) back to
> mysticism or animism. e.g., If I lose touch with my (relatively refined)
> root metaphor, perhaps I'll be tempted by what Pepper describes as an
> "emotion theory of truth" (mysticism).
>
> P.S. #3: Darcia: Thanks for the Developmental Systems Theory link. I will
> read the material and offer comments in a subsequent post. I tried to
> click on the Overton PowerPoint link, but ended up with a "page not found"
> error.
>
> ~ Steve Q.
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 9:10 PM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc-
> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>>
>> A few questions...
>>
>> Since mysticism is inadequate in *scope*, and animism is inadequate in
>> *precision*, could mysticism be considered an unrefined and inadequate
>> *integrative* hypothesis, and animism an unrefined and inadequate
>> *dispersive* hypothesis?
>>
>> If so, could both Mechanism and Organicism be conceived as significant
>> refinements of Mysticism, and could Formism and Contextualism be conceived
>> as significant refinements of Animism?
>>
>> Or conversely, could Mysticism be conceived as an unrefined eclectic of
>> proto-Mechanism and proto-Organicism, and Animism be conceived of as an
>> unrefined eclectic of proto-Formism and proto-Contextualism?
>>
>> Indeed, could Eclecticism be conceived --- not as progress --- but
>> ultimately *as a regression to Mysticism and Animism*?
>>
>> ~ Jason Bessey
>> On Sunday, January 14, 2018, 10:23:39 PM EST, Steven Quackenbush <
>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses**: Season 1, Episode 2*
>>
>>
>>
>> *Narrator: “Previously on World Hypotheses:” *
>>
>>
>> - We began with “common sense” (the *dubitanda*).
>> - Though “secure” (because we can always fall back on it), common
>> sense is nevertheless “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word,
>> irritable” (p. 44).
>> - As such, we are driven to “refine” (or criticize) cognition.
>> - For Pepper, “all critical evidence becomes critical only as a
>> result of the addition of corroborative evidence” (p. 47)
>> - Corroboration can take one of two forms:
>> - Multiplicative corroboration: agreement among persons (consensus)
>> - This generates *data* that can vary from rough to refined,
>> depending on the extent or quality of corroboration. The fact that my four
>> friends and I just saw Casper the Ghost is merely “rough data” (as I have
>> no reason to believe that my skeptical brother will see things the same way
>> whenever he shows up). Scores on the NEO-PI are relatively refined
>> [insofar as everyone can see that Andrew scored one standard deviation
>> below the mean on the agreeableness subscale]
>> - The refinement of data, it would appear, is the path to
>> achieving *objectivity* in science – i.e., interpretations free
>> of idiosyncratic biases
>> - Structural corroboration: agreement among facts
>> - This generates *danda* that can vary from rough to refined,
>> depending on the extent or quality of corroboration.
>> - The notion of structural corroboration is rather mysterious
>> at this point. *What does it mean for a fact to agree with a
>> fact*? A simple example is the principle of converging
>> evidence, where multiples sources of information point me in the same
>> direction (e.g., it is safe to sit on this chair because it is made of
>> solid wood, the manufacturer can be trusted, etc.). But as our theories
>> grow more complex, it is not always clear what evidence would serve to
>> corroborate a specific theoretical claim. E.g., what facts can we
>> highlight in support of Melanie Klein’s “object relations” theory? And how
>> do we determine the *adequacy* of this theory relative to
>> competing accounts of the same phenomena? Do we simply count up the number
>> of corroborations [such that each theory gets a “corroboration score”] or
>> are some corroborations *worth more* than others?
>> - Whereas multiplicative corroboration offers us *consensus,*
>> structural corroboration advances *understanding. *
>> - Our goal is ultimately to make sense of our universe, to grasp
>> how it all “hangs together”.
>>
>>
>>
>> *World Hypotheses, Chapters 5-7. *
>>
>>
>> - A world hypothesis is a hypothesis about “the world itself” (p. 1).
>> - But how do we generate world hypotheses?
>> - Pepper offers his “root metaphor theory” as “a *hypothesis*
>> concerning the origins of world theories” (p. 84; emphasis added)
>> - The fact that this is just a *hypothesis* implies that there
>> may be *other ways *to generate theories about the world. The
>> value of studying world hypotheses (of whatever sort) is not contingent on
>> the truth of root metaphor theory.
>> - Pepper observes that root metaphor theory “is itself a
>> structural hypothesis” that must ultimately be supported by “an adequate
>> world theory”
>> - But Pepper also acknowledges that *we are not yet in
>> possession of a perfect world theory*:
>> - “Ideally, we should pass directly from dubitanda and data
>> to fully adequate danda which would exhibit all things cognitively in their
>> proper order. Unfortunately, danda are not at present nearly adequate” (p.
>> 86).
>> - We are entitled to ask: Why do our world theories fall short
>> of our cognitive ideal?
>> - Pepper’s root metaphor theory is an effort explain *how* we
>> have developed our less-than-perfect world hypotheses.
>> - The root metaphor theory is “in the nature of a *rough dandum*”
>> (p. 86, emphasis added).
>> - It “definitely does not legislate over world theories except
>> so far as these voluntarily accept and refine it” (p. 86).
>> - “On the contrary, an adequate world theory by virtue of
>> its refinement legislates over this theory or any like it. There is no
>> reliable cognitive appeal beyond an adequate world theory. But when world
>> theories show themselves to be inadequate we accept what makeshifts we can
>> find. This root-metaphor theory is such a makeshift. Its purpose is to
>> squeeze out all the cognitive values that can found in the world theories
>> we have and to supply a receptacle in which their juices may be collected,
>> so that they will not dry up from dogmatism, or be wasted over the ground
>> through the indiscriminate pecking of marauding birds” (pp. 86-87).
>>
>> *Root Metaphor Theory*
>>
>>
>> - How do we manage to get from common sense to a world hypothesis?
>> [or from dubitanda to relatively refined danda?]
>> - Pepper suggests that we look out into the world of common sense and *grab
>> onto something*. In effect, I find myself saying: *Perhaps this is
>> the key to the universe!*
>> - Here’s how Pepper puts the matter:
>> - “A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a
>> clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of common sense fact
>> and tries if he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. The
>> original area becomes then *his basic analogy or root metaphor*”
>> (p. 91, emphasis added)
>> - This person then “describes as best he can the
>> characteristics of this area, or, if you will, discriminates its
>> structure. A list of its structural characteristics becomes his basic
>> concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of
>> *categories*” (p. 91, emphasis added)
>> - “In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other
>> areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes
>> to interpret all facts in terms of these categories” (p. 91)
>> - “As a result of the impact of these other facts upon his
>> categories, he may qualify and readjust the categories…” (p. 91).
>> - “a great deal of development and refinement is required
>> if they are to prove adequate for a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 91).
>> - “Some root metaphors prove more fertile than others, have
>> greater powers of expansion and of adjustment. These survive in comparison
>> with the others and generate relatively adequate world theories” (pp.
>> 91-92).
>> - So, let’s try to build a world theory:
>> - In the beginning, I adopted an unrefined natural attitude
>> consonant with the spirit of my age.
>> - One day, I experience (seemingly out of the blue) a *love* more
>> profound than anything I could have ever imagined possible.
>> - Fully cognizant of the fact that words can never do justice to
>> my experience, I nevertheless tell my friends and relatives that I have
>> finally achieved a state of true peace and harmony – a sense of oneness
>> with a caring cosmos.
>> - Perhaps *this* is the key that unlocks the secret of the
>> universe!
>> - According to Pepper, I have just become a *mystic*.
>> - Root metaphor = Love
>> - “This hypothesis states that this emotion is the substance
>> of the universe, and that as far as we differentiate things, these are
>> generated from this substance and are ultimately nothing but this
>> substance” (p. 133).
>> - Well, what’s wrong with this? [It sounds good to me!]
>> - There’s nothing to be said against the mystical *experience*
>> as such.
>> - The mystic “need not be a metaphysician. He might have
>> and enjoy his experience and make no cognitive claims for it beyond his
>> having had it and enjoyed it” (p. 129)
>> - But if mysticism is considered as a metaphysical hypothesis,
>> it will ultimately leave us unsatisfied. Pepper cites mysticism as an
>> example of a world hypothesis with *inadequate scope*. There
>> are simply too many facts that the theory leaves behind (or interprets in a
>> manner that is simply too crude for more refined cognitive tastes)
>> - “The immediate temptation here is to deny outright the
>> reality of all ‘facts’ except the one mystic Fact” (p. 131).
>> - “So pain, misery, sorrow, sadness are unreal, as
>> opposed to beatific qualities” (p. 134).
>> - In addition, "pleasures, comforts, sensuous delights
>> are false from lack of intensity” (p. 134).
>> - Interestingly, Pepper dubs mysticism as an “emotional
>> theory of truth” (p. 135).
>> - “As *the* philosophy of unity and love, it is the most
>> destructive of all world theories in cognition and finally destroys itself
>> by the very intensity of its desire for unity and peace” (p. 127).
>> - Ok, so much for mysticism.
>> - I return to my stroll amongst the dubitanda. I take a trip to
>> Hawaii and receive a text message telling me that there is a “ballistic
>> missile threat inbound” and I should “seek cover immediately.” After
>> thirty minutes of panic, I am relieved to learn it was a false alarm.
>> [Incidentally, this twist in the narrative was inspired by the fact that my
>> brother is presently vacationing in Hawaii and experienced the threat
>> firsthand.]
>> - So, as I recover from the ballistic missile threat, I start
>> thinking about *myself* and how wonderful it is to be alive. I
>> have goals, yet I also have the freedom to change my path in life. I have
>> values, though I fully realize that they may well be crushed if I don’t do
>> something to stand up for them.
>> - Perhaps *I’m* the key to the universe! I don’t mean this in the
>> sense that the universe should cater to my whims. Rather, perhaps my very
>> mode of being-in-the-world illuminates the structure of the cosmos. I look
>> out into the starry heavens and I have a sense that “we are not alone”.
>> [As Tom Cruise once said in an interview, “are you really so arrogant as to
>> believe we are alone in this universe?”] Better, as I reflect on the
>> cosmos, I don’t simply contemplate creation. I also experience myself in
>> relation to some sort of creative spirit – a divine “person” that somehow
>> participates in my essence, or vice versa.
>> - My truth is no longer *love* (which, I now recognize, was
>> simply a positive experience *to be valued*).
>> - Rather, *personhood as such* is the key to the universe.
>> - I have become an *animist*.
>> - Root Metaphor = The Person
>> - According to Pepper, “animism, as a metaphysical
>> hypothesis, is the theory that takes common-sense man, the human being, the
>> person, as its primitive root metaphor” (p. 120).
>> - “This is the most appealing root metaphor that has ever
>> been selected” (p. 120).
>> - “This view of the world is the only one in which many
>> feels completely at home” (p. 120).
>> - I’m reminded here of the wonderful scene at the end
>> of Close Encounters, where a bunch of kindhearted aliens arrive in a
>> magnificent spaceship, befriend humanity, and invite Richard Dreyfus to fly
>> away on what I like to call: “the secure base from outer space”.
>> - In its crudest forms, animism is difficult to sustain
>> past childhood. But the root metaphor can be refined:
>> - “The full maturity of an animistic world theory…occurs when
>> the root metaphor of man’s personality has developed into in the richest
>> conception of spirit, and when a luxuriant mythology has vividly populated
>> the universe with explanatory spirits” (p. 123).
>> - But: “under the pressure of criticism, mythological
>> interpretations begin to be thinned down. At first they are treated as
>> allegories, then as symbols of something higher and finer, and finally the
>> notion of spirit itself is ephemeralized into an emotionally shaded word
>> with vague direction outward or inward” (p. 124)
>> - So, the original animistic categories eventually evolve
>> [or devolve] into acceptable – but ultimately “empty” – abstractions (see
>> pp. 124-126)
>> - Significantly, these abstractions (e.g. the divine “source
>> of all”) retain their appeal precisely by virtue of their “animistic
>> source”.
>> - “They would not be entertained for a moment if the source
>> were cut off” (p. 126)
>> - Unlike mysticism, animism has no problem with scope. It
>> doesn’t demean (or render *less than real*) any particular set
>> of facts.
>> - The problem with animism, according to Pepper, is its *inadequate
>> precision*.
>> - “What is thunder? It is the angry voice of a great
>> spirit….[Or] It is the stamping of the hoofs of the steeds of a great
>> spirit…[Or] It may even be a spirit itself roaring in pursuit of some other
>> spirit to devour.” (p. 122).
>> - “[There] is nothing but the limits of poetic fancy to put
>> a stop to such interpretations” (p. 122).
>> - “These interpretations are all consonant with the
>> categories of spirit....There is no one precise determination of thunder,
>> nor is there any precise method for finding one, nor is there any hope that
>> more factual observations will ever produce one through these categories”
>> (p. 122).
>> - “Since the categories lack determinateness, they are
>> unable to control their interpretations, which multiply about the same fact
>> and mutually contradict one another” (p. 127, from the concluding paragraph
>> of the section)
>> - If we are able to decide upon a specific interpretation,
>> it is by virtue of “the authority of shaman, medicine man, and priest” (p.
>> 123)
>> - Pepper submits that “animism is the natural metaphysical
>> support of authoritarianism” (p. 123)
>> - Note: For a consideration of animism in the context
>> Gregg’s ToK framework, I recommend Leigh Shaffer’s (2008) article entitled: *Religion
>> as a Large-Scale Justification System: Does the Justification Hypothesis
>> Explain Animistic Attribution*? [The abstract is available
>> here: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__journals.sagepub.com_do&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=8r8FwSblHLWwSdudXf57f4TlvU_aP46_KKJPgBYripA&e=
>> i/abs/10.1177/0959354308097257?journalCode=tapa
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__journals.sagepub.com_doi_abs_10.1177_0959354308097257-3FjournalCode-3Dtapa&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=7BwDiHWlIEMNxQKcB89qknayUCpaNVt3W-_rQ_skBIg&s=EB-Oc7qE9Raed2TLKSbwz0B5kBbCRLOS0H4IraXhbdc&e=>
>> ]
>>
>>
>> *Generalizations regarding the role played by root metaphors in the
>> development of World Hypotheses:*
>>
>> - *Maxim I:* “A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor"
>> (p. 96).
>> - Pepper identifies four “relatively adequate” world theories and
>> their corresponding "root metaphors"
>> - World Hypothesis #1 = Formism; root metaphor =
>> "similarity"
>> - World Hypothesis #2 = Mechanism; root metaphor = "machine"
>> - World Hypothesis #3 = Contextualism; root metaphor =
>> "historical event"
>> - World Hypothesis #4 = Organicism; root metaphor =
>> "organism"
>> - Pepper devotes a chapter to each of these world hypotheses
>> (Chapters 8,9,10, & 11, respectively). So we will eventually have a chance
>> to examine each of these hypotheses in considerable detail.
>> - *Maxim II*: “Each world hypothesis is autonomous" (p. 98)
>> - *Corollary #1*: "It is illegitimate to disparage the factual
>> interpretations of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories of
>> another -- if both hypotheses are equally adequate" (p. 98)
>> - "It follows that what are pure facts for one theory are
>> highly interpreted evidence for another" (p. 100)
>> - *Corollary #2*: "A world hypothesis does not have to accept data
>> at their face value, or to exclude the acceptance of any other sort of
>> evidence than data" (p. 101).
>> - *Corollary #3*: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of
>> structural refinement (world hypotheses) to the cognitive standards (or
>> limitations) of multiplicative refinement” (p. 101).
>> - “Data must be accepted as evidence to be accounted for in a
>> world hypothesis, but a world hypothesis does not have to accept data at
>> their face value, or to exclude acceptance of any other sort of evidence
>> than data (p. 101).
>> - *Corollary #4*: “It is illegitimate to subject the results of
>> structural refinement to the assumptions of common sense” (p. 102).
>> - *Corollary #5*: “It is convenient to employ common-sense
>> concepts as bases for comparison for parallel fields of evidence among
>> world theories” (p. 102)
>> - In other words, we can clarify differences among world
>> theories by considering how they might respectively deal with events that
>> occur in the world of ordinary experience.
>> - For example, consider the statement: “Joe has a good sense
>> of humor.” The notion of “humor” is part of our ordinary experience and
>> thus falls within the scope of any comprehensive world theory. So, how
>> would a mechanistic make sense of humor? How would a formist understand
>> this concept? Etc.
>> - Answering such questions helps us appreciate differences
>> in how each world hypothesis interprets “the *same*
>> common-sense fact” (p. 103, emphasis in original)
>> - *Maxim III*: “Eclecticism is confusing" (p. 104)
>> - "If world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually
>> exclusive. A mixture of them, therefore, can only be confusing".
>> - For example, we might be tempted remedy the shortcomings of
>> animism by somehow combining it with mysticism:
>> - “Just fill in the empty spirit concept of an emaciated
>> animism with the vivid indubitable mystic emotion, and each theory seems to
>> revive” (p. 136).
>> - But Pepper doesn’t think that we can achieve a stable
>> synthesis of mysticism and animism.
>> - E.g., “the world of spirits still try to raise their Great
>> Spirit upon the throne which mystic intuition occupies” (p. 136)
>> - Thus, we now have a tension between (a) the
>> infallibility implicit in animism (which was necessary to avoid endless
>> proliferation of personalistic interpretations) and (b) the indubitability
>> that lies at the core of mysticism (i.e., the very real experience of
>> love).
>> - Pepper observes that “historically the ecclesiastics and
>> the mystics have never harmonized very well. Periodically each group has
>> tried to clean the other out – and this may be taken as a typical lesson in
>> eclecticism” (p. 136).
>> - It might be replied that we would have more luck if we tried
>> to achieve a synthesis of relatively adequate world hypotheses. But Pepper
>> doesn’t think that’s possible at the present time:
>> - “While all sorts of things might happen to these diverse
>> theories so far as abstract possibility is concerned, as a fact (in the
>> best sense of fact we know) these four theories are just now
>> irreconcilable. Any credible attempt to reconcile them turns out to be the
>> judgment of one of the theories on the nature of the others” (p. 105-106)
>> - "*Maxim IV*: Concepts which have lost contact with their root
>> metaphors are empty abstractions" (p. 113).
>> - Interestingly, Pepper suggests that such “empty abstractions”
>> are a likely consequence of the push toward eclecticism (which has no root
>> metaphor of its own to help refine cognition).
>>
>> *A Conceptual Scheme for Comparing World Hypotheses:*
>>
>>
>> - *Analytic vs. Synthetic World Hypotheses:*
>> - *Analytic:* Formism, Mechanism – Basic facts include “elements”
>> or “factors". Any apparent synthesis (e.g., my life conceived
>> holistically) is merely derivative.
>> - *Synthetic:* Organicism, Contextualism – Basic facts include
>> “complexes” or “contexts”. I’m reminded here of family systems theory,
>> where certain formal “elements” (e.g., the personality traits of a single
>> family member) might be considered as a function of contextual dynamics
>> (and are thus derivative).
>> - *Dispersive vs. Integrative World Hypotheses*
>> - *Dispersive Hypotheses: *Formism, contextualism – The facts are
>> “loosely scattered about” and “are not necessarily determining one another
>> to any considerable degree” (pp. 142-143).
>> - Example: In a formist “trait psychology”, Andrew’s
>> disagreeableness may be reflected in (a) a tendency to make snide comments
>> about coworkers, and (b) a recent “road rage” incident. These two
>> behaviors (a & b) don’t really have much to do with each other, outside of
>> the fact that they are presumably mediated by the notion of
>> disagreeableness. Contrast this with the notion of a machine where every
>> fact has its place in an integrative whole.
>> - The chief problem associated with dispersive theories is
>> inadequate precision. [What will *disagreeable Andrew* do
>> next? Who knows. But whatever he chooses to do, we will be able to make
>> sense of it via our categories]
>> - *Integrative Hypotheses:* Mechanism, organicism
>> - “For these two theories the world appears literally as a
>> cosmos where facts occur in determinate order, and where, if enough were
>> known, they could be predicted or at least described, as being necessarily
>> just what they are to the minutest detail” (p. 143)
>> - The chief problem associated with integrative theories is
>> inadequate scope
>>
>> *Narrator: “Next week on Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses. **We discuss
>> two relatively adequate metaphysical systems: Formism and Mechanism"
>> (Chapters 8 & 9; Sunday, January 21)*
>>
>>
>> ~ Steve Q.
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 9:27 AM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc-reques
>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hello ToK Community,
>>
>> Is there something fundamentally paradoxical about Pepper's *World
>> Hypotheses*?
>>
>> That is, wouldn't Pepper's "World Hypotheses" itself necessarily be a
>> World Hypothesis by definition?
>>
>> And insofar that his "World Hypotheses" is itself a "World Hypothesis",
>> would it not necessarily have to be grounded in one of his Root Metaphors,
>> therefore meaning that one would have to embrace that particular root
>> metaphor (to the exclusion of the other root metaphors) in the first place
>> for even the possibility to (in turn) embrace his World Hypothesis about
>> World Hypotheses?
>>
>> ~ Jason Bessey
>> On Thursday, January 11, 2018, 7:55:34 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg -
>> henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Thanks for this narrative, John.
>>
>>
>>
>> My expectation is that soon after the tour that Steve offers us of the
>> World Hypotheses, we should shift the floor to you so that you can narrate
>> your “world hypothesis.” I know in talking with you, I have had visions of
>> “Human Psycho-Physiological Laws” that would allow us to harmonize
>> ourselves, all the way from literal legal systems down into our individual
>> experiences into our bio-physiological developmental life cycles and even
>> down into negentropic energy flow, and information-communication transfer
>> that you see connecting the dots in a bottom up fashion, from physics to
>> biology all the way into human consciousness.
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Gregg
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@
>> listserv.jmu.edu <[log in to unmask]>] *On Behalf Of *JOHN
>> TORDAY
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 10, 2018 2:31 PM
>>
>> *To:* [log in to unmask]
>> *Subject:* Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>>
>>
>>
>> Gregg, having lost most of my family in the Holocaust I came to the
>> 'table' as a Blank Slate. My passion as a scientist has been to contribute
>> knowledge that would make life better, specifically for preterm newborns as
>> a way to mitigate against hate, which I consider the nidus of the
>> Holocaust. Over the course of the last decade or so I have come to a bigger
>> picture perspective because I had amassed enough data over the course of 50
>> years of research to understand the development and phylogeny of the lung,
>> going all the way back to its unicellular origins by connecting the
>> physiologic dots between gas exchange and gravity experimentally. That
>> exercise provided insight to the evolution of the lung and many other
>> physiologic traits. And in the aggregate, the biggest picture was the
>> relationship between physiology and the Singularity/Big Bang through the
>> homology between Quantum Mechanics and the evolution of the protocell as
>> The First Principles of Physiology. So my world view has expanded
>> exponentially of late based on a priori scientific knowledge, hubris aside.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 9:47 AM, nysa71 <000000c289d6ba14-dmarc-
>> [log in to unmask]
>> <[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
>>
>> Gregg,
>>
>> Oh, I don't disagree with you Gregg. However, I suspect you'd find that
>> those who have a World Hypothesis grounded in "common sense" (i.e., Level 1
>> Justification Systems), themselves typically have a more *common*
>> personality type, while those who have more refined World Hypotheses, would
>> tend to have more *uncommon* personality types. The research in that
>> paper, I think, was focused on the latter.
>>
>> ~ Jason B.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 10, 2018, 10:45:56 AM EST, Henriques, Gregg -
>> henriqgx <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Am loving this discussion.
>>
>>
>>
>> One point I think we should keep in mind about Pepper’s analysis (which
>> Steve will get to, but I bring it up here because of Jason B’s point about
>> personality and a comment Steve made regarding justification level 1).
>>
>>
>>
>> Most people hold World Hypotheses that are animistic or mystical. That
>> is, most people are religious and view the universe as being created by God
>> and/or has some mystical animating force. To me, Jason B., this is an
>> important point to keep in mind and why I would question the set up of the
>> reseach. Just because Pepper sees these World Hypotheses as “inadequate,”
>> does not mean that most folks don’t see the world this way. To me, by the
>> time you are really diving into the four world hypotheses Pepper sees as
>> adequate, you are likely dealing with people who have, at least at some
>> level, “refined” knowledge, rather than just populist “common sense.”
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Gregg
>>
>>
>>
>> Sent from Mail
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=lpgvCYo-xEMi_dHVRw7Hb_rnYcFYXtHOu-mwYODqBik&s=tTpSky1NBZmXYIiglSFhpFyLiU-Vdf6DeI8TJNMD8fU&e=>
>> for Windows 10
>>
>>
>>
>> *From: *Stout, Jason (DBHDS) <[log in to unmask]>
>> *Sent: *Wednesday, January 10, 2018 10:17 AM
>> *To: *[log in to unmask]
>> *Subject: *Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>>
>>
>>
>> This has been a fascinating discussion. I found myself recalling Donald
>> Hoffman’s TED talk entitled “Do we see reality as it is?” while reading
>> this. He does work in computer simulations using natural selection
>> algorithms to better understand this process and is particularly interested
>> in “a mathematical model of consciousness.” Here is a more in-depth
>> article about his positions: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.theatlantic.com_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=Qw3q3YJDIt_rfQy2WRgzAn2iztUC_8t6gW5Iq-ocT7w&e=
>> science/archive/2016/04/the- illusion-of-reality/479559/
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.theatlantic.com_science_archive_2016_04_the-2Dillusion-2Dof-2Dreality_479559_&d=DwMGaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=rnb8-r0GMZiKVJVPv4DGLSCcO9TK-NnFDdaxc9p-yKY&s=VoxNLmYZr2VsD4zFeCTlupL_FUPdorxuqyAMheYzhPM&e=>
>> I haven’t yet taken the time to make direct correlations between his work
>> and that of Pepper, but my mental algorithms, or world hypothesis, suggest
>> to me that there are correlations here.
>>
>>
>>
>> I love sci-fi and futurism, and an interesting thought experiment to me
>> is pondering how a consciousness that sees reality as it actually is, and
>> not how it is selected to do so through environmental pressures, would vary
>> from our experience of the same. Hoffman has also wondered about this,
>> and has speculated that perhaps logic and reasoning are selected for traits
>> through evolutionary processes.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>>
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* tree of knowledge system discussion [mailto:TOK-SOCIETY-L@
>> listserv.jmu.edu <[log in to unmask]>] *On Behalf Of *Steven
>> Quackenbush
>>
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 09, 2018 6:14 PM
>> *To:* [log in to unmask]
>> *Subject:* Re: Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>>
>>
>>
>> A few quick comments before I begin the process of crafting the next
>> formal outline (scheduled for Sunday).
>>
>> - Waldemar asks whether it is appropriate to consider an individual's
>> worldview as an example of a world hypothesis.
>>
>>
>> - This seems reasonable to me*, *and I've always loosely equated an
>> individual's worldview with a "world hypothesis" (of some sort). Of
>> course, the conventional language user (adopting what Gregg calls Level 1
>> Justifications) might not formally embrace any of the world hypotheses
>> discussed by Pepper. If we ask a random person to describe their
>> worldview, the answer may come across as an incoherent mess (including
>> random elements of formism, mysticism, organicism, etc.). Still, even a
>> pastiche can be understood as a "world hypothesis" of sorts.
>> - That said, I'm intrigued by Jason's suggestion (grounded in
>> Jungian theory) that some of us are satisfied with "local hypotheses".
>> Even if I will never be satisfied until my philosophy is corroborated by *the
>> entire world*, that doesn't mean that the rest of humanity must
>> submit to my need to achieve unlimited scope.
>> - My personal bias is that we all have "world hypotheses" that are
>> (implicitly) unlimited in scope (even if we *say* we are only
>> concerned with local hypotheses). But I'm not sure Pepper would agree with
>> me here. We will return to this issue in due course.
>>
>>
>> - Ken observes that the ghost example I gave in my previous post
>> "sounds a lot like the distinction commonly illustrated between reliability
>> (esp consensus / agreement) and validity." He asks: "Does the language
>> system from research methods and psychometrics / construct validation
>> traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some way?"
>>
>>
>> - I agree that Pepper's understanding of multiplicative and
>> structural corroboration resembles the distinction typically made between
>> reliability (especially consensus) and validity.
>> - Two quick notes (inspired by Ken's comments, though not really
>> answers to his question).
>>
>>
>> - The validation process is itself closely tied to an individual's
>> world hypothesis.
>>
>>
>> - In the ghost example, it is possible to imagine a metaphysical
>> framework [some sort of "supernaturalism"] that would validate the reliable
>> report of the witnesses (even if this framework has problems of its own and
>> does not thereby achieve universal acclaim).
>> - The close link between metaphysical frameworks and the
>> validation process is more obvious when we consider the countless
>> hypothetical constructs that find their way into psychology textbooks.
>> What does it mean, for example, to develop a valid measure of
>> "self-esteem"? The concept itself is grounded in a theoretical framework
>> (that may or may not be formally articulated). Moreover, it is not obvious
>> what "facts" would corroborate: (a) the relevant validity claims and (b)
>> the theoretical framework within which such claims are made.
>>
>>
>> - In Pepper's thought, there *seems* to be blurring a reliability and
>> validity (though I may modify this claim when we reach the end of the
>> book).
>>
>>
>> - In the course of his conversation regarding the tensions between
>> data and danda (where he presented the ghost scenario), Pepper admits that
>> "a highly refined datum would probably never have to give way to a highly
>> refined dandum." In other words, the *objectivity* of the
>> data would be sufficient to withstand the "winds of theory" [my phrase].
>> But this is "only because the datum has been thinned to such a degree that
>> it does not commit itself to very much" [p. 50]
>> - A few pages later, Pepper observes that "*the inherent
>> lack of significance in data alone* is what we meant earlier
>> by the thinness of refined data, a thinness which finally causes a return
>> to common sense for a security and healthiness of fact that threatens to
>> disappear when data try to carry cognition alone" (pp. 63-64, emphasis
>> added)
>> - So, even as we are assessing *what we all see *(consensus) we
>> are also deciding *what we should be looking at* (which is
>> necessarily a reflection of our theoretical framework and thus implicitly a
>> "validity" concern). In other words, we don't want to waste our time
>> developing reliable measures of trivia. Rather, we seek out truths that
>> are "reliably meaningful", or "meaningfully reliable", even if this means
>> that we have to sacrifice some degree of refinement (purity).
>>
>>
>>
>> Again, all this is based on my reading of Chapters 1-4. When we reach
>> the end of the book, I will try to provide more satisfactory answers to
>> everyone's questions. Here's the list of questions that I've compiled so
>> far:
>>
>>
>>
>> - *"Is there a term when multiplicative corroboration (data) and
>> structural corroboration (danda) are in agreement? Would that be considered
>> 'idealdata'? Or is a prerequisite, if you will, of danda that it first be
>> data?" [Ali]*
>> - *"The ghost example you give sounds a lot like the distinction
>> commonly illustrated between reliability (esp consensus / agreement) and
>> validity. Does the language system from research methods and psychometrics
>> / construct validation traditions apply here? or stand in tension in some
>> way?" [Ken]*
>> - *"Is it** appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an
>> example of a world hypothesis?" [Waldemar]*
>>
>> Until next time,
>>
>>
>>
>> ~ Steve Q.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 2:40 PM, [log in to unmask] <
>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>> Steve:
>>
>>
>>
>> A question about world hypotheses and the concept of worldview.
>>
>>
>>
>> Is it appropriate to consider the individual’s worldview as an example of
>> a world hypothesis?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best regards,
>>
>>
>>
>> Waldemar
>>
>>
>>
>> *Waldemar A Schmidt, PhD, MD*
>> (Perseveret et Percipiunt)
>> 503.631.8044
>>
>> *Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value.* (A Einstein)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2018, at 4:57 PM, Steven Quackenbush <
>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Hello ToK community,
>>
>> Welcome to the first episode of the Stephen Pepper thread. The focus of
>> this post is *World Hypotheses*, Chapters 1-4. My reflections today are
>> largely confined to definitional matters, but I also hope to set the stage
>> for an examination (in my next post) of Pepper’s “root metaphor” theory.
>>
>> Perhaps the clearest path into Pepper’s thought is to consider the place
>> where most of us began our intellectual journey: *common sense.* For
>> Pepper, common sense includes “the sorts of things we think of when we
>> ordinarily read the papers…or the sort of things we see and hear and smell
>> and feel as we walk along the street or in the country…” (p. 39).
>>
>> Pepper considers common sense as a loose synonym for Plato’s notion of
>> “opinion” (p. 39). I’m also reminded here of the “natural attitude”
>> described by phenomenologists. For Pepper, the world of common sense can
>> be characterized as “secure” in the sense that it is “never lacking” –
>> i.e., *we can always fall back on it*:
>>
>>
>>
>> - “No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we
>> completely give up trying to know anything, then is precisely when we know
>> things in the common-sense way. In that lies the security of common sense”
>> (p. 43).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But, in spite of its security, common sense is also “cognitively
>> irritable”:
>>
>>
>>
>> - “The materials of common sense are changing, unchanging,
>> contradictory, vague, rigid, muddled, melodramatically clear, unorganized,
>> rationalized, dogmatic, shrewdly dubious, recklessly dubious, piously felt,
>> playfully enjoyed, and so forth. One may accept common sense and
>> thoughtlessly roam in its pasture, but if one looks up and tries to take it
>> in, it is like a fantastic dream. To the serious cognizer it is like a bad
>> dream. For the serious cognizer feels responsible to fact and principle,
>> and common sense is utterly irresponsible” (p. 43)
>> - Common sense is “unreliable, irresponsible, and, in a word,
>> irritable” (p. 44).
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course, the way of life dubbed “common sense” can always be subjected
>> to criticism, in which case ordinary (unrefined) experience becomes
>> “refined knowledge” or “critical cognition” (p. 47). How do we achieve
>> this transformation?
>>
>>
>>
>> - For Pepper, “*all critical evidence becomes critical only as a
>> result of the addition of corroborative evidence*. The work of
>> legitimate criticism in cognition, then, is corroboration” (p. 47, emphasis
>> added)
>>
>>
>>
>> Corroboration can take one of two forms:
>>
>>
>>
>> - *1) Multiplicative corroboration (data):* i.e., The agreement of
>> “man with man.” (p. 47).
>>
>>
>> - An obvious example of this is the notion of interjudge (or
>> interrater) reliability, as understood by psychometricians
>> - But, as discussed below, the notion of multiplicative
>> corroboration has an important role to play in any scientific enterprise.
>>
>>
>> - *2) Structural corroboration (danda):* i.e., The agreement of
>> “fact with fact” (p. 47)
>>
>>
>> - An obvious example of this is the “principle of converging
>> evidence” in science.
>>
>>
>> - Pepper’s example: I might evaluate whether a chair is strong enough
>> to bear my weight by considering (a) the kind of wood with which it is
>> made, (b) the reputation of the company that put together the chair, and
>> (c) the fact that the chair shows evidence of wear (suggesting that “many
>> people had successfully sat in it”). It is by “putting all this evidence
>> together” that I “feel justified in believe that the chair is a strong
>> chair” (p. 49)
>>
>>
>> - But, insofar as stuctural corroboration is concerned with how a
>> multiplicity of facts “hang together” [my phrase], the quest for such
>> corroboration will inevitably pull us in the direction of theory. As I
>> entertain structural hypotheses, I’m not simply interested in
>> *this* or *that *set of data*.* Rather, I’m interested in how the
>> data I observe *coheres* with other things we think we know. The
>> nature of this coherence is a *theoretical* puzzle.
>>
>>
>>
>> On my reading, multiplicative corroboration (or *data* collection) is
>> synonymous with the notion of *objectivity* in science. It reflects the
>> idea that what we see would be described *in precisely the same way* by
>> anyone else (given the appropriate level of training):
>>
>>
>>
>> - In Pepper’s words, “the search for multiplicative corroboration is
>> the effort on the part of a datum to confirm its claim to purity. It is as
>> though a datum turned from one observer to another and asked, Am I not just
>> what I said I was?....Are there not some data that never vary, no matter
>> who the observer and, if possible, no matter what his point of view? If
>> such there are, these are ideal data” (p. 52).
>>
>>
>>
>> Pepper acknowledges that “absolutely ideal data are probably not
>> available” (p. 52). Nevertheless, “close approximations to them have been
>> developed in the course of cognitive history” (p. 52). Specifically, Pepper
>> highlights “two genuses of refined data”:
>>
>>
>>
>> - *Refined empirical data*: “pointer readings and correlations among
>> pointer readings” (p. 52)
>>
>>
>> - *Refined logical data:* “evidence for the validity of logical and
>> mathematical transitions and for those organizations of such transitions
>> which are called logical and mathematic systems” (p. 57).
>>
>>
>>
>> Pepper identifies “positivism” (as a philosophy of science) with the
>> quest for highly refined empirical and logical data. But there are
>> several threats to the program of the dogmatic positivist:
>>
>>
>>
>> - The scarcity of refined data
>>
>>
>> - “The refined empirical data presently at our disposal cover a very
>> small field of nature” (p. 63)
>>
>>
>> - “Outside of the fields of physics and chemistry, refined data play
>> a secondary role and are rarely capable of expression in the form of a
>> deductive mathematical system” (p. 63)
>>
>>
>> - The metaphysical poverty of refined data
>>
>>
>> - “In order to set up refined data as the sole norm of evidence, it
>> is necessary to *deny* the claims of danda, derived from various
>> structural world theories, as alternative norms of evidence” (pp. 67, 69)
>>
>>
>> - In other words, the dogmatic positivist intends to let the *data
>> speak for themselves*, free of the influence of danda (which we
>> might consider as a facet of a metaphysical system).
>>
>>
>> - But, if we really wish to drive such danda out of our refined
>> cognition, “*multiplicative corroboration alone will not do this*,
>> for it only establishes the data it establishes, and neither affirms nor
>> denies the claims of any facts other than those, like pointer readings, by
>> which man corroborates man” (p. 69, emphasis added)
>>
>> In light of these issues, Pepper submits that “the study of danda and
>> structural corroboration seems…to be cognitively justified” (p. 70).
>> What, though, does it mean to make *structural* claims (of any sort)?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - For starters, structural hypotheses necessarily make statements
>> concerning “the structure of the world” (p. 74) – i.e., how things “hang
>> together”.
>> - But – and this is quite a striking claim – “*structural
>> corroboration does not stop until it reaches unlimited scope*” (p.
>> 77, emphasis added)
>>
>>
>> - Why?
>>
>>
>> - Because: “as long as there are outlying facts which might not
>> corroborate the facts already organized by the structural hypothesis, so
>> long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable” (p. 77).
>>
>>
>> - An “ideal structural hypothesis”, then, “is one that all facts
>> will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope” (p. 77)
>> - “*Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis*” (p. 77, emphasis
>> added).
>>
>>
>>
>> Comments regarding “world hypotheses”:
>>
>>
>>
>> - They necessarily include *data *[and not just *danda*]
>>
>>
>> - It “draws data within its scope as well as everything else” (p. 78)§
>>
>>
>>
>> - “It, therefore, does not reject but acquires the cognitive force of
>> multiplicative corroboration as well as that of structural corroboration”
>> (pp. 78-79)
>>
>>
>> - “Cognition needs both types of refinement [data and danda] as much
>> as a bird needs two wings” (p. 79)
>>
>>
>> - Nevertheless, in a world hypothesis, *data are ultimately
>> subordinated to danda*.
>>
>>
>> - As a rough approximation of what Pepper is driving at, we might
>> consider a world hypothesis as a framework that allows us to *render
>> data meaningful*.
>> - Or, to employ Gregg's language: "*all factual/empirical claims
>> are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is
>> to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort
>> of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to
>> SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about
>> chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees
>> nothing)."*
>>
>>
>> - In a world hypothesis, evidence and interpretation are “merged” (p.
>> 79).
>>
>>
>> - “…it is impossible to say where pure fact ends and interpretation
>> of fact begins” (p. 79).
>>
>>
>>
>> As an example of the difficulty of identifying pure facts in the field
>> of psychology, consider the standard textbook definition of the discipline: *Psychology
>> is* *the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.*
>>
>>
>>
>> - Ignoring (for the sake of simplification) the notion of “mental
>> processes”, we can certainly agree that “behavior” falls within the
>> psychologist’s scope of inquiry.
>> - But how – in practice – do we identify a *unit *of behavior? When
>> does a given behavior begin? When does it end? And is it really
>> meaningful to speak of “behavior” in the abstract, or is the concept always
>> qualified in some way? After all, a personality psychologist never studies
>> “behavior” *per se*, but *aggressive* behavior, *conscientious*
>> behavior, etc. In other words, personality psychologists study
>> *patterns* of behavior – and the identification of such patterns is
>> inevitably theory-driven.
>>
>>
>>
>> On page 68, Pepper offers a figure (or diagram) that he dubs *“A Tree of
>> Knowledge”* (!):
>>
>>
>>
>> - At the bottom of the figure is a box labelled “Roots of knowledge”
>> (and it includes “dubitanda”, Pepper’s rather odd term for “common sense
>> facts”).
>> - The tree (originating out of the box) has *two major trunks* (which
>> makes for a rather strange-looking tree!):
>>
>>
>> - Trunk #1: Data – Beginning with “rough data” and then branching
>> into “scientific data” and “logical data”
>> - Trunk #2: Danda – Beginning with “rough danda” and then
>> branching into “formistic danda”, “mechanistic danda”, “contextual danda”,
>> and “organismic danda”
>>
>>
>> - Above the six branches of data and danda sits the phrase: “fruits
>> of knowledge”
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In the next episode of this commentary (scheduled for Sunday January
>> 14), we will focus on Chapters 5-7 of Pepper’s text. But please let me know
>> if you have any questions, comments, or corrections pertaining to this
>> episode!
>>
>> ~ Steve Quackenbush
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:38 AM, Henriques, Gregg - henriqgx <
>> [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>> This is wonderful, Steve. Folks please track this if you have time. It
>> will be the next topic for us to journey on.
>>
>>
>>
>> Pepper’s work is fascinating. I read up on it ten years ago or so. I
>> thought about it often, but the chance for a systematic survey is
>> incredibly valuable. I have my own thoughts about it, but I will not weigh
>> in now.
>>
>>
>>
>> Let me instead just invite folks to sit with the idea of “World
>> Hypotheses”. And, since I am recharged in working on my next book, *The
>> UTUA Framework: A New Vision for Psychology and Psychotherapy*, I
>> especially invite the psychologists on our list to think about how often
>> they encountered concepts like “metaphysics” or “World Hypotheses” in their
>> formal education (especially outside JMU’s program)?
>>
>>
>>
>> At the same time, how could we, as human knowers, engage in the study of
>> human individuals and small groups and venture to make judgments about
>> adaptive and maladaptive processes, work deeply and intimately with real
>> persons, and* not* bring a worldview to what we do?
>>
>>
>>
>> In other words, it simply is a FACT that world hypotheses are missing
>> from psychology. And it also is the case that mainstream empirical
>> psychology tries to reduce human behavior and actions of therapists to
>> factual claims about empirical states of affairs. But if Pepper is right,
>> and I think he is (at least on this point), all factual/empirical claims
>> are understood from the view of a metaphysical/conceptual system. That is
>> to make sense out of facts one must have a scheme of some sort; some sort
>> of framework of concepts and categories. (To give a concrete example, to
>> SEE facts about a chess game, one must have a framework of knowledge about
>> chess. A novice looks at a game between masters and basically sees nothing).
>>
>>
>>
>> Enjoy the journey!
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gregg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Sent from Mail
>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__go.microsoft.com_fwlink_-3FLinkId-3D550986&d=DwMFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hcgEWNgGBY5zBJvvRP2GG3r87id5mXF-VcFbar1Bg-A&s=d5or990N2srKYiXwxcK2dCHk2PbnGO0IezvlQ8AI-YM&e=>
>> for Windows 10
>>
>>
>>
>> *From: *Steven Quackenbush <[log in to unmask]>
>>
>>
>> *Sent: *Thursday, January 4, 2018 5:07 PM
>> *To: *[log in to unmask]
>> *Subject: *Stephen Pepper's "World Hypotheses"
>>
>>
>>
>> Hello ToK Community
>>
>> With this e-mail, I’d like to begin a new thread exploring the
>> implications of the philosophy of Stephen Pepper’s for our understanding of
>> the ToK/UTUA framework. As many participants in this listserv are aware,
>> Stephen Pepper (1891-1972) was a philosopher of science best known for his
>> “root metaphor” theory and the corresponding claim that scientists never
>> encounter "pure data", completely free of interpretation.
>>
>> I first became acquainted with Pepper’s thought as a graduate student in
>> the 1990’s. At the time, I was primarily concerned with differences among
>> the worldviews of mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism. Yet
>> I’ve always had a sense that there is much more I can learn from a close
>> study of Pepper’s thought. So, what I’d like to do in this listserv thread
>> is offer a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Pepper’s most influential text: *World
>> Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence* (Stephen Pepper, 1942, University of
>> California Press).
>>
>> Why Pepper? Why Now?
>>
>>
>>
>> - As I continue to explore the Tok/UTUA framework, I find myself
>> puzzling over some very basic epistemological and metaphysical questions.
>> These questions include (a) the relationship between mathematics and
>> science, (b) what it means for a fact (or a theory) to be “corroborated”
>> and (c) how a scientific account of the world might be situated in
>>
>> ...
>>
>> [Message clipped]
>
>
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--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Darcia Narvaez (DAR-sha narv-EYES)
Professor of Psychology, 118 Haggar Hall, University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame IN 46556 USA
[log in to unmask], 574-631-7835
*My University Website <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.nd.edu_-257Ednarvaez&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=qLttS3Wr9sCmGvvyNw7UcMLkwTeZSnLCEd0EyQM5c_Q&e= > *
Also see DarciaNarvaez.com
Blog at Psychology Today: Moral Landscapes
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.psychologytoday.com_blog_moral-2Dlandscapes&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=LduJ_LU1a97sXvpZjcjmtzEWXxdx6CO5qczUuy0fTnU&e= >
Former Editor, Journal of Moral Education
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.tandfonline.com_toc_cjme20_current&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=dSxeIWq906jxr3v5jHPsh36pus2EbhX5Coi4Q2yzmLk&e= >
Interviews and Podcasts <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www3.nd.edu_-257Ednarvaez_OtherMedia.htm&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=nKVeXaDyS7RSPib9gkkIdgnVIPYEYkM-gpRL6Q4KgP0&e= >
BOOKS: <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.oup.com_us_catalog_general_subject_Psychology_Developmental_-3Fview-3Dusa-26sf-3Dtoc-26ci-3D9780199755059&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=2RiVbKuUexNPjwyC6UDLFtenOzZQwHDUbsDx9uWfd7s&e= >
Embodied Morality: Protectionism, Engagement and Imagination
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.palgrave.com_us_book_9781137553980&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=pGbzNjrII7FCstNQ7ESpFI6opSJ2dlJoLBY1_9pKjw4&e= > (Palgrave-Macmillan)
Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution, Culture
and Wisdom <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__books.wwnorton.com_books_Author.aspx-3Fid-3D4294978774&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=guVA2mC_2VmSz-fOpny3xz3mcxEXnJc6Ts4kar4ljEA&e= >
(Norton; discount: NARVAEZ)
Evolution, Early Experience and Human Development
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.oup.com_us_catalog_general_subject_Psychology_Developmental_-3Fview-3Dusa-26sf-3Dtoc-26ci-3D9780199755059&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=2RiVbKuUexNPjwyC6UDLFtenOzZQwHDUbsDx9uWfd7s&e= >
(OUP)
Ancestral Landscapes in Human Evolution
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__global.oup.com_academic_product_ancestral-2Dlandscapes-2Din-2Dhuman-2Devolution-2D9780199964253-3Fq-3DAncestral-2520Landscapes-2520in-2520Human-2520Evolution-3A-2520Culture-2C-2520Childrearing-2520and-2520Social-2520Wellbeing-26lang-3Den-26cc-3Dus&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=yMqJJp--ljsoGXaRdlAamougrKNqvk6EpiVvdVL9whs&e= >
(OUP)
Young Child Flourishing: Evolution, Family & Society
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__global.oup.com_academic_product_contexts-2Dfor-2Dyoung-2Dchild-2Dflourishing-2D9780190237790-3Fcc-3Dus-26lang-3Den-26&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=ljMYJHOL_9oZiNqa6ZvqUwW81_3PHQ8c5pQvsdaAXg8&e= >
(OUP)
amazon.com/author/darcianarvaez
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www3.nd.edu_-7Ednarvaez_OtherMedia.htm&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=_GIoECnrxYwlOSNEMQuZuzJWRHuXCKZot9IlE_QgaVI&e= >
Self, Motivation and Virtue Project <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__smvproject.com_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=Dk_rAlH_s5GQU5PbSbfvNfki84sVGE8eNxrSReY2cXM&e= >
CONFERENCE VIDEOS: Sustainable Wisdom: Integrating Indigenous Knowhow
for Global Flourishing <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__sustainablewisdomatnd.com&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=Rvpl2ui-RHEEcS2Oh3cthKfErGvCHXhYMjykEGbYmJU&e= >
Families for Conscious Living <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.familiesforconsciousliving.com_&d=DwIFaQ&c=eLbWYnpnzycBCgmb7vCI4uqNEB9RSjOdn_5nBEmmeq0&r=HPo1IXYDhKClogP-UOpybo6Cfxxz-jIYBgjO2gOz4-A&m=hn4Qm65QiKRy2_stv-b7TkJ2XI4seNIgIiBhOUui__M&s=vcFj1O1MQOtt3UD3c-MOPJrFDU49tAZ4vtm0k8eIU_0&e= >
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